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	 Introduction		
		
This	 thesis	 is	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 samethinking	and	 samesaying.	 These	 notions	are	 broad	 and	 capture	 various	 distinct	 but	 related	 phenomena.	 I	will	 focus	 on	two	 particular	 understandings	 of	 ‘samethinking’,	 and	 on	 one	 particular	understanding	 of	 ‘samesaying’.	 Let	me	 address	 samethinking	 first.	 On	 the	 first	understanding	 of	 ‘samethinking’,	 samethinking	 occurs	whenever	 two	 thoughts	concern	the	same	referent.1	We	may	distinguish	between	two	different	ways	 in	which	this	can	occur.	First,	there	are	cases	in	which	the	sameness	of	reference	is	manifest	 to	 the	 subject.	 Take	 for	 instance	 the	 two	 beliefs	 BOB	 DYLAN	 IS	 A	MUSICIAN	 and	BOB	DYLAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE.2	In	 such	 cases,	 the	 sameness	 of	reference	is	transparent	to	the	thinker	in	such	a	way	that	she	may	combine	the	two	 beliefs	 in	 an	 inference	 and	 conclude	 directly	 from	 these	 two	 beliefs	 alone	that	a	musician	won	a	Nobel	Prize.	
Second,	 there	 are	 cases	 in	which	 two	 thoughts	 concern	 the	 same	 referent,	 but	where	the	sameness	of	reference	is	not	manifest	to	the	subject.	Take	for	instance	the	 two	 thoughts	 BOB	 DYLAN	 IS	 A	 MUSICIAN	 and	 ROBERT	 ZIMMERMAN	 WON	 A	NOBEL	 PRIZE.	 ‘Robert	 Zimmerman’	 is	 Bob	 Dylan’s	 birth	 name,	 so	 the	 two	thoughts	concern	the	same	individual.	However,	unless	the	thinker	has	a	further	belief	to	the	effect	that	Bob	Dylan	is	Robert	Zimmerman,	she	may	not	rationally	infer	from	these	beliefs	that	a	musician	won	a	Nobel	Prize.	We	see,	then,	that	two	pairs	of	thoughts	that	are	referentially	equivalent	may	nonetheless	play	different	roles	in	cognition.	In	this	thesis,	I	offer	a	novel	account	of	how	to	understand	the	difference	between	cases	of	samethinking	such	as	those	above.	
																																																								1	By	‘thoughts’,	I	mean	psychologically	instantiated	mental	representations.		2	Throughout	the	thesis,	I	use	capital	letters	to	indicate	concepts	and	thoughts.		
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The	second	understanding	of	‘samethinking’	that	I	will	discuss	in	this	thesis	is	a	broader	 phenomenon.	 Two	 thoughts,	 typically	 entertained	 by	 distinct	individuals	or	the	same	individual	at	different	times,	can	be	said	to	concern	the	same	 subject	 matter	 despite	 differing	 in	 their	 overall	 semantic	 properties.	Likewise,	 it	 seems	 that	 two	 utterances	 may	 concern	 the	 same	 topic	 despite	differing	 in	 their	 overall	 semantic	 properties.	 Consider	 for	 instance	 someone	uttering	 the	 sentence	 “Whales	 are	 fish”	 in	 the	 18th	 century,	 where	 such	 an	utterance	would	generally	be	regarded	as	 true.	 If	 someone	today	were	 to	utter	the	 same	 sentence,	 however,	 we	 would	 regard	 it	 as	 false.	 We	 have	 reason	 to	think	 that	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 term	 ‘fish’	 has	 changed	 between	 then	 and	 now.	Even	 if	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 it	 seems	 as	 though	 the	 18th-century	 person	 and	 the	current	 day	 individual	 are,	 in	 an	 interesting	way,	 talking	 about	 the	 same	 topic	when	uttering	the	sentence.3	This	is	the	notion	of	 ‘samesaying’	I	will	address	in	this	thesis.	I	shed	light	on	what	it	is	for	two	thoughts	or	two	utterances	to	be	the	same	in	this	way.		
The	 thesis	 consists	 of	 four	 chapters	 that	 are	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 individual	 papers.	 I	have,	 however,	 included	 cross-references	 between	 the	 chapters	 where	 this	 is	appropriate. 4 	The	 first	 three	 chapters	 focus	 on	 the	 first	 interpretation	 of	‘samethinking’:	they	are	concerned	with	the	distinction	between	cases	in	which	co-reference	 is	 manifest	 to	 thinkers	 and	 cases	 where	 it	 is	 not.	 The	 general	question	 I	 engage	with	 is	 how	we	 should	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 thought	 in	order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 sort	 of	 rational	 reasoning	 that	 hinges	 on	 such	samethinking.	 I	 develop	 a	 new	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	thoughts.	 This	 framework	 accounts	 for	 the	 difference	 between	 cases	 of	samethinking	in	which	sameness	of	referent	is	manifest	and	cases	where	it	is	not	in	terms	of	primitive	representational	relations.	I	use	this	framework	to	account	for	 some	 of	 the	 long-standing	 puzzles	 within	 the	 philosophy	 of	 mind,	 such	 as	Frege’s	 Puzzle,	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 suggested	 framework	 is	 superior	 to	 central	alternative	views	on	the	nature	of	thought.																																																										3	Whether	or	not	cases	such	as	‘fish’	actually	involve	a	change	in	meaning	is	controversial.	I	say	more	 about	 this	 in	 chapter	 4.	 For	 now,	 I	 use	 the	 case	 as	 an	 example	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 an	intuitive	grip	on	the	relevant	notion.	4	Since	 the	 chapters	 are	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 individual	 papers,	 there	 is	 some	 overlap	 of	 content	 in	certain	places.		
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The	 final	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 concerns	 the	 broader	 understanding	 of	‘samethinking’	as	well	as	the	corresponding	notion	of	‘samesaying’.	I	discuss	how	there	can	be	stability	of	 topic	 in	cases	where	 there	 is	a	change	 in	 the	semantic	properties	of	the	relevant	representational	devices.	I	argue	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	non-transitive	and	that	this	puts	restrictions	on	an	account	of	stability	of	topics.		
In	 this	 introductory	 chapter,	 I	will	 give	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 thesis	 and	 present	some	background	for	the	general	discussion.	In	section	1,	I	present	the	notion	of	
coordination,	which	is	central	to	the	discussion	of	samethinking	in	the	first	three	chapters.	 In	 section	 2,	 I	 briefly	 present	 the	 historical	 background	 for	 this	discussion.	 In	 section	 3,	 I	 introduce	 the	 central	 competing	 views	with	which	 I	engage	 in	 this	 thesis.	 In	 section	 4,	 I	 present	 the	 key	 claims	 of	 my	 positive	proposal,	which	I	call	Vehicle	Relationism.	In	section	5,	I	 lay	out	the	background	for	the	discussion	of	stability	of	topics,	which	is	the	central	theme	of	chapter	4.	In	section	6,	I	give	an	overview	and	summary	of	each	of	the	thesis	chapters.	Finally,	in	 section	 7,	 I	 point	 to	 some	 of	 the	 main	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 as	 well	 as	suggestions	as	to	future	work	based	on	these	findings.	
	
1.	Coordination	in	Thought	
Our	dispositions	to	act	depend	on	our	minds	combining	 information	 in	specific	ways.	In	particular,	the	mind	treating	certain	pieces	of	information	as	concerning	the	same	referent	is	essential	for	such	behavioural	dispositions.	If,	for	instance,	I	have	 a	 desire	 concerning	 a	 particular	 individual	 and	 also	 certain	 beliefs	concerning	 this	 specific	 individual	 I	may	 combine	 such	 propositional	 attitudes	and	act	rationally	on	them	only	if	my	cognitive	system	treats	these	propositional	attitudes	as	concerning	the	same	individual.	Further,	rational	reasoning	depends	on	the	possibility	of	the	beliefs	figuring	as	premises	in	an	inference	being	treated	as	 concerning	 the	 same	 referent.	 An	 important	 question	 is	 this:	 What	 is	 the	nature	of	thought	such	that	our	minds	may	combine	information	in	this	way?	
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Whenever	two	mental	representation	tokens	are	so	related	that	the	subject	may	combine	the	relevant	information	in	inferences,	or	so	as	to	act	on	them,	directly,	without	making	an	explicit	 identity	 judgement,	we	say	that	 the	representations	are	positively	coordinated.5	In	contrast,	if	the	thinker	is	not	rationally	disposed	to	exploit	the	relevant	information	in	this	way	the	representations	in	question	are	
negatively	 coordinated.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 elaborate	 on	 the	 phenomenon	 of	coordination	 and	 show	 why	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 relation	 is	 an	important	philosophical	undertaking.	
	
1.1.	Coordination	and	Behavioural	Dispositions	
Suppose	you	have	a	desire	to	learn	more	about	Bob	Dylan.	Suppose	also	that	you	have	the	belief	that	there	are	several	books	about	Bob	Dylan	in	your	local	library.	You	also	form	the	belief	that	the	best	way	for	you	to	learn	more	about	Bob	Dylan	is	to	go	to	this	 library	and	read	about	him.	You	then	have	a	reason	to	go	to	the	library	and	read	certain	books	there.6	
In	order	 for	you	 to	be	able	 to	 act	on	 such	 reasons	your	 cognitive	 system	must	treat	 the	 relevant	 beliefs	 as	 concerning	 the	 same	 individual	 as	 the	 person	 you	wish	 to	 learn	 more	 about.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 propositional	attitudes	 are	 treated	 as	 concerning	 the	 same	 individual	 is	 essential	 to	 your	behavioural	dispositions.		
To	see	this,	contrast	this	scenario	with	one	in	which	you	have	a	desire	to	 learn	more	about	Robert	Zimmerman.	Since	‘Robert	Zimmerman’	is	Bob	Dylan’s	birth	name,	 this	 desire	 concerns	 the	 same	 individual	 as	 in	 the	 previous	 scenario.	However,	 let’s	 imagine	 that	 you	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 this	 fact.	 You	 have																																																									5	The	term	is	originally	due	to	Fine	(2007).	Fine	sometimes	uses	the	term	in	a	theory-neutral	way	and	 sometimes	 as	 a	 term	 integrated	 in	 his	 specific	 framework.	 I	 follow	 Gray	 (2017,	 2018)	 in	using	 ’coordination’	 in	 a	 theory-neutral	 way.	 ’Coordination’,	 in	 this	 sense,	 ”just	 picks	 out	 a	rationally	relevant	relation	between	representations”	(Gray,	2018,	2	n.3).	As	we’ll	see	later	in	this	section,	the	rationally	relevant	relation	in	question	is	the	one	that	figures	into	the	explanation	of	the	cognitive	system	treating	pieces	of	information	as	concerning	the	same	referent	in	such	a	way	as	to	warrant	trading	on	identity	and	to	yield	certain	behavioural	dispositions.	6	I	assume	here	a	simple	belief/desire	account	of	agency	(cf.	Davidson	1963).	Nothing	hangs	on	this.	
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independently	come	to	know	about	Robert	Zimmerman	through	a	mutual	friend	who	has	told	you	many	stories	about	what	 it	was	 like	growing	up	next	door	to	Robert	Zimmerman.	Let’s	keep	the	beliefs	in	the	initial	scenario	fixed	so	that	you	still	believe	that	the	best	way	for	you	to	learn	more	about	Bob	Dylan	is	to	read	books	about	him	at	the	 library.	 In	this	case,	since	you	are	not	aware	of	the	fact	that	 your	 desire	 to	 learn	 more	 about	 Robert	 Zimmerman	 concerns	 the	 same	individual	as	your	beliefs	regarding	how	best	to	learn	more	about	Dylan,	you	do	not	 have	 the	 behavioural	 disposition	 to	 go	 to	 the	 library	 based	 on	 this	 set	 of	propositional	attitudes	alone.	In	this	case,	the	cognitive	system	does	not	combine	the	 relevant	 propositional	 attitudes	 in	 the	 way	 it	 did	 in	 the	 first	 scenario.	Although	the	different	attitudes	in	fact	concern	the	same	individual,	the	cognitive	system	treats	the	information	as	concerning	distinct	referents.	 In	this	case,	you	need	to	form	a	further	belief	concerning	the	identity	of	Zimmerman	and	Dylan	in	order	to	have	a	(rational)	behavioural	disposition	to	go	to	the	 library	based	on	this	set	of	attitudes.	
What	 aspects	 of	 thoughts	 explain	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 sets	 of	propositional	 attitudes	 in	 the	 two	 cases?	 It	 cannot	 be	 the	 referential	 content,	since	the	referent	is	the	same	in	both	cases.	In	the	first	scenario,	the	sameness	of	reference	 of	 your	 beliefs	 and	 desire	 is	manifest	 to	 you,	whereas	 in	 the	 second	case	 the	 sameness	 in	 reference	 is	 not	 manifest	 to	 you.	 This	 marks	 the	 main	difference	 between	 the	 two	 cases.	 The	 way	 in	 which	 you	 think	 about	 the	individual	 seems	 to	 make	 a	 difference	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 sameness	 in	reference	 is	 manifest	 to	 you.	 Whether	 or	 not	 the	 sameness	 of	 reference	 is	manifest,	in	turn,	explains	the	difference	in	your	behavioural	dispositions	in	the	two	cases.	The	 first	 scenario	 illustrates	a	case	 in	which	your	beliefs	and	desire	are	positively	coordinated.	The	second	scenario	illustrates	a	case	in	which	your	beliefs	and	desire	are	negatively	coordinated.	In	order	to	rationally	act	on	your	belief/desire	 pair	 in	 the	 first	 scenario,	 you	 do	 not	 need	 to	 make	 any	 explicit	identity	 judgement	 to	 the	effect	 that	 the	attitudes	concern	 the	same	 individual.	You	 simply	 combine	 these	 attitudes	 directly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 sameness	 of	reference	being	manifest	 to	 you.	This	phenomenon	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 that	of	
trading	on	identity,	to	which	I	now	turn.	
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1.2.	Trading	on	Identity	
The	ability	to	combine	pieces	of	information	taken	to	concern	the	same	referent	is	essential	to	the	explanation	of	rational	reasoning.	If	you	believe	that	Bob	Dylan	is	a	musician	and	also	that	Bob	Dylan	won	a	Nobel	Prize	you	may	combine	this	information	 and	 rationally	 infer	 that	 a	 musician	 won	 a	 Nobel	 Prize.	 This	 is	because	your	 two	beliefs	are	positively	 coordinated.	 If,	 in	 contrast,	 you	believe	that	Robert	Zimmerman	was	a	musician	and	that	Bob	Dylan	won	a	Nobel	Prize,	your	beliefs	would	be	negatively	coordinated	and	as	a	result,	you	would	not	be	rational	 in	 inferring	 from	 these	 two	beliefs	 alone	 that	 a	musician	won	a	Nobel	Prize.	In	order	to	be	rational	in	making	this	latter	inference,	you	would	also	need	to	have	a	further	belief	to	the	effect	that	Zimmerman	is	Dylan.	What	is	the	nature	of	 the	state	you’re	 in	when	you	are	warranted	 in	making	the	 inference	without	making	an	explicit	identity	judgement?	
As	I	said,	in	cases	where	your	beliefs	are	negatively	coordinated,	the	inference	in	question	would	not	be	warranted,	 since	you	do	not	believe	 that	Zimmerman	 is	Dylan.	 At	 first	 glance,	 then,	 it	might	 seem	 intuitively	 plausible	 that	 the	 reason	why	you	are	rationally	warranted	in	making	the	inference	in	the	first	scenario	–	when	 your	 beliefs	 are	 positively	 coordinated	 –	 is	 that	 in	 this	 situation	 you	do	make	such	an	 identity	 judgement.	This	 judgement,	 then,	would	 result	 in	a	new	belief	to	the	effect	that	Bob	Dylan	is	Bob	Dylan.	On	this	picture,	this	is	what	the	two	inferences	would	look	like:			 BOB	DYLAN	IS	A	MUSICIAN	BOB	DYLAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE		[BOB	DYLAN	IS	BOB	DYLAN]	A	MUSICIAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE	
	 ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN	IS	A	MUSICIAN	BOB	DYLAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE	[ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN	IS	BOB	DYLAN]	A	MUSICIAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE	
	The	suggestion	under	consideration,	then,	is	that	the	difference	between	the	two	cases	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	 the	 first	 case	 you	do	 have	 the	 bracketed	 belief	whereas	 in	 the	 second	 case	 you	 do	 not	 have	 the	 bracketed	 belief.	 If	 this	were	
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true,	 the	 difference	 between	 positive	 and	 negative	 coordination	 could	 be	explained	 in	 terms	 of	 such	 implicit	 identity	 judgements	 obtaining	 or	 failing	 to	obtain.	
There	 are,	 however,	 serious	 problems	 with	 understanding	 the	 difference	between	 the	 two	 cases	 in	 this	 way.	 Notice	 that	 the	 bracketed	 beliefs	 contain	concept	tokens	that	must	be	recognized	as	concerning	the	same	individual	as	the	concept	 tokens	 in	 the	 prior	 premises.	 That	 is,	 the	 singular	 concepts	 in	 the	bracketed	beliefs	(i.e.	[BOB	DYLAN	and	BOB	DYLAN]	in	the	first	inference	and	[BOB	DYLAN	 and	 ROBERT	 ZIMMERMAN]	 in	 the	 second	 inference)	 must	 be	 positively	coordinated	 with	 the	 corresponding	 singular	 concepts	 in	 the	 preceding	premises.	How	do	we	account	for	the	recognition	of	sameness	in	reference	in	this	case?	 If,	 as	 we	 have	 been	 assuming,	 we	 need	 identity	 judgements	 in	 order	 to	recognize	 the	 sameness	 of	 reference,	 we	 would	 have	 to	 introduce	 further	identity	premises	in	order	to	account	for	the	singular	concepts	in	the	bracketed	beliefs	being	treated	as	concerning	the	same	individual	as	the	singular	concepts	in	 the	preceding	premises.	But	we	would	then	run	 into	 further	problems	when	trying	to	explain	how	one	can	recognize	that	 these	 further	 identity	 judgements	concern	 the	same	 individual	as	 the	other	beliefs.	And	the	same	problem	would	arise	again:	an	infinite	regress	ensues.	
We	see,	 then,	 that	the	recognition	of	sameness	 in	the	 first	 inference,	and	hence	someone	being	 rational	 in	making	 such	 an	 inference,	 cannot	 be	 due	 to	 further	identity	 judgements	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 singular	 concepts	 refer	 to	 the	 same	individual.	Instead,	the	correct	way	to	understand	the	inference	is	thus:		
	 BOB	DYLAN	IS	A	MUSICIAN		BOB	DYLAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE	A	MUSICIAN	WON	A	NOBEL	PRIZE	
	There	is	no	need	to	include	the	identity	 judgement	in	order	to	account	for	why	someone	may	be	rational	in	drawing	this	inference.	The	sameness	of	reference	of	
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the	singular	concepts	in	the	premises	is	directly	manifest	to	the	thinker.	This	is	what	 sets	 the	 two	 inferences	 apart:	 In	 the	 case	 of	 someone	 having	 thoughts	about	 Robert	 Zimmerman	 and	 Bob	 Dylan	 without	 realizing	 that	 they	 are	 the	same	person,	they	must	make	the	further	discovery	that	Dylan	is	Zimmerman	in	order	to	rationally	draw	the	inference,	whereas	in	the	other	case	the	sameness	of	reference	is	simply	manifest	in	such	a	way	that	no	further	identity	judgement	is	needed	 for	 the	 inference	 to	be	rational.	This	marks	 the	key	difference	between	those	 beliefs	 that	 are	 positively	 coordinated	 and	 those	 that	 are	 negatively	coordinated.		
When	sameness	of	reference	is	manifest	to	thinkers	and	the	thinker	exploits	this	manifestness	 in	drawing	 inferences	 in	 this	way,	we	may	say	 that	 the	 thinker	 is	
trading	on	identity	of	co-reference.	The	notion	of	‘trading	on	identity’	is	originally	due	 to	 Campbell	 (e.g.	 1987,	 1994,	 2002,	 2012).	 He	 considers	 a	 deductive	argument	of	the	same	form	as	the	inference	concerning	Bob	Dylan	above,	where	the	 singular	 terms	 in	 each	 premise	 is	 manifestly	 co-referential	 to	 the	 thinker	without	the	need	for	an	implicit	identity	judgement:	
This	 argument	 is	 valid	 as	 it	 stands.	 There	 is	 no	 need	 for	 an	 extra	premise	 asserting	 the	 identity	 of	 [Dylan]	 (as	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 first	premise)	with	 [Dylan]	 (as	referred	 to	 in	 the	second	premise).	 If	you	did	suppose	that	such	a	premise	is	needed,	and	provided	it,	you	would	have	only	begun.	For	you	would	now	need	further	premises	asserting	the	identity	of	all	the	various	[Dylans]	referred	to	in	the	course	of	the	inference;	 and	 no	 finite,	 or	 for	 that	 matter,	 infinite	 provision	 of	further	premises	would	be	enough.	We	have	to	acknowledge	that	the	argument	 is	valid	as	 it	 stands.	Rather	 than	depending	on	an	 implicit	identity	 premise	 connecting	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 first	 two	 premises,	 it	simply	‘trades	on’	the	identity	of	reference	of	those	terms.	(Campbell	2012,	97)	
I	take	this	to	be	a	convincing	reason	to	deny	that	trading	on	identity	depends	on	implicit	 identity	 premises.	 That	 is,	 it	 cannot	 be	 the	 case	 that	 positive	
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coordination	obtains	in	virtue	of	such	identity	 judgements.	How	then	are	we	to	understand	what	warrants	trading	on	identity?	
We	need	a	better	understanding	of	 the	nature	of	coordination	relations.	This	 is	the	central	task	with	which	I	will	be	concerned	in	the	first	three	chapters	of	the	thesis.	 I	 will	 consider	 some	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	 contemporary	 accounts	 of	coordination	 relations	 and	 offer	 criticisms	 of	 such	 views.	 I	will	 propose	 a	 new	understanding	 of	 coordination	 relations	 that	 accounts	 for	 the	 phenomenon	 of	trading	on	 identity.	This	 framework	draws	on	some	key	 insights	 from	previous	suggestions	 found	 in	 the	 literature,	 but	 combines	 these	 insights	 in	 a	 new	way.	The	result	is	a	novel	account	of	coordination.		
I	 will	 say	 more	 about	 this	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 but	 first	 I	 will	 present	 some	historical	background	for	the	debate.	Although	most	of	the	views	I	engage	with	in	the	 thesis	 are	 contemporary,	 the	 interest	 in	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 trading	 on	identity	 and	 related	 phenomena	 goes	 back	 to	 at	 least	 Frege	 (e.g.	 1892)	 and	Russell	(e.g.	1910,	1912).	The	various	accounts	of	coordination	proposed	in	the	current	debate	are	in	many	ways	informed	by	the	various	views	on	the	nature	of	thoughts	 stemming	 from	 Frege	 and	 Russell.	 There	 is	 in	 particular	 one	observation	 made	 by	 Frege	 that	 marks	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 debate,	 namely	 his	(1892)	insight	that	sameness	of	reference	is	not	always	manifest	to	thinkers.			
	2.	Historical	Background	
Contemporary	accounts	of	the	nature	of	thoughts	fall	into	two	broad	categories:	On	the	one	hand	there	are	those	who	have	a	broadly	Fregean	view	on	the	nature	of	 thoughts,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 there	 are	 those	 who	 have	 a	 broadly	 Russellian	view	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 thoughts.	 Both	 camps	 maintain	 that	 thinking	 involves	standing	in	a	relation	to	propositions,	but	they	differ	in	what	they	take	the	nature	of	such	propositions	to	be.7	In	what	follows,	I	will	point	to	the	key	distinguishing																																																									7	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	set	aside	views	that	take	propositions	to	be	sets	of	possible	worlds	and	views	that	take	propositions	to	have	no	structure.	My	positive	account	does	not	say	anything	about	 the	 nature	 of	 propositions.	 I	 do,	 however,	 accept	 a	 structured	 view	 on	 propositions.	 I	return	to	this	later	on.	
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aspects	of	such	theories.	I	will	also	point	to	central	puzzles	found	in	the	literature	that	form	the	basis	for	the	current	debate.8	
	
2.1.	Fregeanism	
The	first	broad	group	of	views	accepts	Frege’s	(1892)	distinction	between	sense	and	reference.9	According	 to	 such	views,	 thoughts	about	objects	 in	 the	external	world	 are	 not	 directly	 about	 these	 objects,	 but	 instead	 they	 are	 mediated	 by	senses	associated	with	such	objects.	This	view	is	closely	connected	to	the	thesis	that	thinkers	are	only	related	to	objects	in	the	external	world	via	the	properties	of	 such	 objects.	 When	 we	 think	 about	 objects,	 we	 do	 not	 think	 about	 them	directly,	 but	 indirectly,	 via	 their	 properties.	 Senses	 can	 thus	 be	 understood	 as	descriptive	 satisfaction	 conditions	 that	 determine	 the	 referent	 of	 concepts	 and	thoughts.10	So,	 for	 instance,	 the	 reference	 of	 a	 singular	 concept	 such	 as	 BOB	DYLAN	is	Dylan	himself,	while	the	sense	of	this	concept	is	a	way	of	thinking	about	Bob	Dylan,	a	mode	of	presentation	of	Dylan.		
According	 to	 Frege,	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 thought	 is	 a	 proposition.11	Each	 constituent	concept	of	a	thought	has	a	sense	and	together	they	combine	into	a	complex	sense	of	 the	 thought	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 reference	 of	 a	 thought	 is	 its	 truth-value.	 A	thought’s	truth-value	depends	on	the	reference	of	the	constituent	concepts	and	such	reference	is	determined	by	the	senses	of	the	concepts.	On	this	view,	there																																																									8	Frege	 and	 Russell	 exegesis	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis.	 In	 what	 follows	 I	 present	 the	relevant	 views	 in	 accordance	 with	 standard	 contemporary	 presentations	 of	 such	 views	 (e.g.	Recanati	2012,	Chapter	1;	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	Chapter	2).	I	will	also	present	the	views	in	such	a	way	that	their	relevance	to	the	contemporary	debate	about	coordination	becomes	clear,	rather	than	 going	 into	 details	 about	 Frege	 and	 Russell’s	 views	 that	 are	 not	 directly	 relevant	 to	 the	discussion	in	this	thesis.		9	More	specifically,	 this	broad	category	of	views	takes	senses	to	be	constituents	of	propositions	(e.g.	Evans	1982,	McDowell	1994,	Stanley	2011;	c.f.	Merricks	2015,	129).	10	Some	philosophers	(e.g.	Burge	1979,	Evans	1982,	McDowell	1984)	have	argued	that	Fregean	senses	need	not	be	construed	exclusively	as	descriptive	senses.	 Instead,	we	may	allow	for	non-descriptive	 or	 de	 re	 senses.	 I	 put	 this	 possible	 complication	 aside	 in	 this	 presentation	 since	nothing	of	what	I	say	depends	on	it.	I	will,	 for	simplicity,	follow	Kripke	(1980)	and	assume	that	Frege	was	a	descriptivist.		11	Frege	 uses	 the	 word	 ’thought’	 to	 denote	 what	 is	 commonly	 called	 ’propositions’.	 When	presenting	 Frege’s	 view	 I	 stick	 to	 standard	 terminology	 rather	 than	 Frege’s	 own	 terminology.	Hence,	I	use	‘thought’	in	the	ordinary	sense	rather	than	in	Frege’s	technical	sense.	I	will	use	the	term	‘proposition’	when	talking	about	what	Frege	called	‘thoughts’.	
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are	 two	components	 to	 the	content	of	 concepts	and	 thoughts;	 their	 senses	and	their	reference.	Thinkers	are	only	directly	related	to	the	former.12		
Frege’s	central	argument	in	favour	of	positing	senses	is	tightly	bound	up	with	the	phenomenon	 of	 samethinking,	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 Frege	 argues	for	 the	 distinction	 between	 sense	 and	 reference	 in	 the	 following	 way.	 Let’s	assume	that	there	is	nothing	more	to	the	content	of	atomic	concepts	than	their	referents.	 If	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 the	 content	 of	 BOB	DYLAN	 is	 just	 Dylan	 himself.13	Similarly,	the	content	of	ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN	is	also	Dylan	himself.	On	this	view,	then,	 DYLAN	 and	 ZIMMERMAN	 have	 the	 same	 content.	 Further,	 given	 plausible	assumptions	 about	 compositionality,	 the	 proposition	 that	 Dylan	 won	 a	 Nobel	Prize	and	the	proposition	that	Zimmerman	won	a	Nobel	Prize	is	the	same.	But	as	we	saw	in	the	previous	section,	this	seems	counterintuitive.	One	would	have	to	explain	how	 someone	who	 fails	 to	 realize	 that	DYLAN	and	 ZIMMERMAN	are	 co-referential	 could	 rationally	 believe	 and	 reject	 the	 very	 same	 proposition.	 If	thinking	 is	 a	 direct	 relation	 between	 thinkers	 and	 propositions,	 how	 can	 it	 be	that	someone	may	rationally	accept	and	deny	the	very	same	proposition?	
Further,	anyone	who	has	the	concept	DYLAN	knows	a	priori	that	Dylan	is	Dylan.	However,	if	all	there	is	to	the	contents	of	atomic	concepts	are	their	referents,	the	proposition	that	Dylan	is	Dylan	must	be	the	same	as	the	proposition	that	Dylan	is	Zimmerman.	But	it	seems	intuitively	plausible	that	not	everyone	who	knows	that	Dylan	 is	 Dylan	 knows	 that	 Dylan	 is	 Zimmerman.	 In	 fact,	 the	 latter	 carries	potentially	valuable	 information	 that	allows	someone	who	comes	 to	know	it	 to	gain	new	knowledge	about	 the	world.	The	 thought	 that	Dylan	 is	Dylan	and	 the	thought	that	Dylan	is	Zimmerman	thus	seem	to	play	different	roles	in	cognition:	The	 former	 is	 trivial	while	 the	 latter	 is	potentially	 informative.	 It	 seems	 that	 if	
																																																								12	C.f.	Carruthers’	(1989)	presentation	of	Frege’s	view.	13	Frege,	 of	 course,	 does	 not	 use	 Dylan	 as	 an	 example.	 Instead	 Frege	 talks	 about	 the	 Ancient	Babylonians.	 In	 Ancient	 Babylonia	 people	 called	 the	 brightest	 star	 visible	 in	 the	 morning	‘Phosphorus’.	 They	 gave	 the	 brightest	 star	 visible	 in	 the	 evening	 the	 name	 ‘Hesperus’.	Unbeknownst	to	them	‘Hesperus’	and	‘Phosphorus’	refer	to	the	same	heavenly	body,	namely	the	planet	we	now	call	‘Venus’.	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	I	will	present	Frege’s	puzzle	in	terms	of	BOB	DYLAN	and	ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN.	However,	the	puzzle	as	portrayed	here	is	analogous	to	Frege’s	initial	puzzle.	
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the	 two	 thoughts	 express	 the	 same	 proposition	we	 have	 no	way	 of	 explaining	how	they	may	nonetheless	differ	in	cognitive	significance.	
This	 case	 shows	 that	 if	 thinking	 is	 a	 direct	 relation	 between	 individuals	 and	propositions,	 the	 contribution	 of	 a	 singular	 concept	 to	 a	 proposition	 cannot	simply	 be	 its	 referent.	 This	 is	 because	 two	 thoughts	 that	 are	 referentially	isomorphic	may	potentially	play	different	roles	in	cognition.	One	way	to	cash	out	the	 implication	 of	 Frege’s	 observation	 is	 in	 terms	 of	 coordination	 (c.f.	 Gray	2017).	Coordination,	remember,	is	tied	in	with	the	phenomenon	of	manifest	co-reference.	 Since	 rational	 individuals	 may	 fail	 to	 know	 that	 DYLAN	 and	ZIMMERMAN	are	co-referential	 such	concept	 tokens	are	negatively	coordinated.	Since	the	two	concepts	are	in	fact	co-referential,	coordination	cannot	merely	be	a	matter	 of	 having	 the	 same	 reference.	 We	 need	 something	 more	 in	 order	 to	explain	 the	 possibility	 of	 someone	 recognizing	 or	 failing	 to	 recognize	 the	sameness	of	reference.		
According	to	Frege,	senses	are	what	accounts	for	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	and	 thoughts.	 Even	 though	 two	 concept	 tokens	 have	 the	 same	 reference	 they	may	 have	 different	 senses.	 This	means	 that,	 on	 Frege’s	 view,	 two	 thoughts	 or	concepts	that	play	different	roles	in	cognition	have	different	senses.	As	a	result,	two	 thoughts	 that	 differ	 in	 their	 cognitive	 role	 differ	 in	 their	 propositional	content.	If	two	thoughts	differ	in	truth-value,	or	if	it	is	rationally	permissible	for	a	subject	to	take	conflicting	attitudes	toward	their	contents,	the	two	thoughts	have	different	senses.	This	means	that	they	have	distinct	propositional	contents.		
Campbell	(1987)	explicitly	uses	senses	to	account	for	coordination:	
Any	 account	 of	 logical	 form	which	 deals	with	 inferences	 depending	upon	two	occurrences	of	singular	terms	having	the	same	referent	will	need	to	say	when	one	can,	as	I	shall	put	it,	simply	trade	upon	the	fact	that	 they	have	 the	same	referent.	 […]	 it	 is	 in	dealing	with	 [this]	 that	we	 see	 why	 we	 need	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 singular	 term.	(Campbell	1987,	275)	
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For	Fregeans,	positive	coordination	 is	explained	 in	 terms	of	 sameness	of	 sense	whereas	 negative	 coordination	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 difference	 in	 sense.	That	is,	whether	or	not	trading	on	identity	is	warranted	depends	on	whether	or	not	there	is	sameness	of	sense.	
Understood	this	way,	Frege’s	puzzle	is	ultimately	a	puzzle	about	coordination.	I	thus	accept	what	Gray	(2017)	calls	Cognitive	Significance	as	Coordination,	which	is	 the	 claim	 that	 “differences	 in	 cognitive	 significance	between	 representations	with	the	same	referential	content	are	explained	by	coordination”	(2017,	3).	The	key	aspect	of	Fregeanism	about	coordination	is	this:	Whether	or	not	two	concept	tokens	 are	 positively	 coordinated	 is	 to	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	difference	in	senses.	I	now	turn	to	Russellianism.		
	
2.2.	Russellianism	
The	other	broad	category	of	accounts	of	the	nature	of	thoughts	and	propositions	that	I	will	consider	is	the	Russellian	view.	Russellians	follow	Russell	in	rejecting	Frege’s	distinction	between	sense	and	reference.	
According	to	Russell	(e.g.	1903)	propositions	are	structured	complexes	of	objects	and	relations.	He	says	that	
Whatever	may	be	an	object	of	 thought,	 or	may	occur	 in	 any	 true	or	false	proposition	[…]	I	call	a	term.	[…]	A	man,	a	moment,	a	number,	a	class,	a	relation,	a	chimaera,	or	anything	else	that	can	be	mentioned,	is	sure	 to	be	a	 term;	and	 to	deny	 that	 such	and	such	a	 thing	 is	 a	 term	must	always	be	false.	(Russell	1903,	43)	
Propositions	that	have	singular	individuals	or	objects	as	constituents	are	called	
singular	propositions.		
Russell	 held	 that	 a	 subject	 must	 stand	 in	 a	 direct	 relation	 (what	 he	 calls	 an	
acquaintance	relation)	to	all	the	constituents	of	a	thought	in	order	for	the	subject	to	be	able	to	entertain	it	(1910,	1912).	In	his	early	days,	Russell	thought	that	it	is	
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possible	 for	 individuals	 to	 have	 thoughts	 concerning	 mind-external	 entities	directly,	as	 illustrated	by	the	quote.14	However,	 in	his	 later	works	he	holds	that	the	 only	 sorts	 of	 things	 that	 thinkers	 can	 be	 acquainted	 with	 are	 their	 own	occurrent	sense	data,	universals	and,	perhaps,	also	the	self:	
We	have	acquaintance	in	sensation	with	the	data	of	the	outer	senses,	and	 in	 introspection	with	 the	 data	 of	what	may	 be	 called	 the	 inner	sense—thoughts,	 feelings,	 desires,	 etc.;	 we	 have	 acquaintance	 in	memory	with	things	which	have	been	data	either	of	the	outer	senses	or	of	the	inner	sense.	Further,	it	is	probable,	though	not	certain,	that	we	have	 acquaintance	with	 Self,	 as	 that	which	 is	 aware	of	 things	or	has	desires	towards	things.	(Russell	1912,	51)	
As	a	 result,	 the	only	 singular	propositions	human	beings	are	capable	of	having	propositional	attitudes	towards	are	those	that	have	such	entities	as	constituents.		
Russell’s	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	we	 cannot	 stand	 in	 direct	 relations	 to	mind-external	entities	is	similar	to	Frege’s	reason	for	introducing	the	notion	of	a	sense.	Russell	 thought	 that	 one	 could	 only	 be	 acquainted	 with	 that	 for	 which	misidentification	 is	not	possible.	 If	 someone	could	be	presented	with	 the	 same	object	twice	and	rationally	fail	to	realize	that	it	is	the	same	object,	then	they	do	not	 stand	 in	 an	 acquaintance	 relation	 to	 that	 object.	 If	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 two	thoughts	to	concern	the	same	object	but	where	the	co-reference	is	not	manifest	to	the	thinker,	the	thinker	is	not	acquainted	with	the	relevant	object.	In	the	case	of	BOB	DYLAN	and	ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN,	we	see	that	a	thinker	may	fail	to	realize	that	 two	 thoughts,	 that	 contain	 each	 concept	 respectively,	 concern	 the	 same	individual.	 Thus,	 the	 thinker	 is	 not	 acquainted	with	 Bob	 Dylan.	 Russell	 agrees	with	 Frege	 that	 the	 content	 of	 propositions	 is	 transparent	 to	 thinkers	 in	 that	thinkers	cannot	fail	to	recognize	sameness.	Hence,	there	must	be	a	difference	in	the	 content	 of	 BOB	 DYLAN	 and	 ROBERT	 ZIMMERMAN	 that	 accounts	 for	 the	possibility	of	misidentification.																																																												14	To	give	another	illustration:	In	a	letter	to	Frege,	he	famously	said	that	”I	believe	that	in	spite	of	all	 its	 snowfields	 Mont	 Blanc	 itself	 is	 a	 component	 part	 of	 what	 is	 actually	 asserted	 in	 the	proposition	‘Mont	Blanc	is	more	than	4,000	metres	high”	(Letter	to	Frege,	12	December	1904,	in	Frege	1980,	169).	
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The	resulting	view	is	one	according	to	which	our	thoughts	about	mind-external	objects	are	never	direct,	but	always	mediated	by	our	sense	data,	to	which	we	do	stand	in	direct	relations.	If	you	have	a	thought	about	Bob	Dylan,	it	is	not	directly	Dylan	himself	you	have	a	thought	about.	Rather,	your	thought	about	Dylan	is	of	the	 form	 the	thing	that	caused	THIS	[referring	to	your	occurrent	sense	datum]	is	
so-and-so	(c.f.	 Russell	 1910).	Our	 knowledge	 about	 the	 external	world,	 then,	 is	grounded	 in	 acquaintance	 relations	 between	 ourselves	 and	 sense	 data.	Whenever	 someone	 has	 a	 thought	 about	 determinate	 singular	 objects	 in	 the	external	world	they	deploy	a	singular	thought.	But	according	to	Russell,	it	is	not	the	 mind-external	 object	 that	 is	 a	 constituent	 of	 the	 singular	 proposition,	 but	rather	it	is	a	sense	datum.		
This	 contrasts	 with	 the	 Fregean	 doctrine	 that	 all	 thoughts	 are	 mediated	 by	(Fregean)	 senses	 and	 that	 one	 can	never	 think	 about	 anything,	 not	 even	 sense	data,	 in	 an	 unmediated	way.	 For	 Frege,	 there	 are	 no	 singular	 propositions.	 In	short,	 we	 may	 say	 that	 the	 main	 difference	 between	 Fregean	 and	 Russellian	propositions	 is	that	the	former	are	composed	wholly	of	senses,	while	the	 latter	have	particulars	(such	as	particular	sense	data)	as	constituents.	
In	current	debates,	many	who	are	sympathetic	 to	Russell’s	general	 framework,	which	takes	propositions	to	be	structured	complexes	of	objects	and	relations	and	denies	 the	 need	 for	 a	 further	 level	 of	 semantic	 content	 such	 as	 senses,	 resist	Russell’s	restrictivism	about	acquaintance	relations	and	singular	thoughts.	They	deny	 the	 sort	of	descriptivism	advocated	by	Russell	 (1912).	 Such	philosophers	maintain	 that	 one	may	 have	 singular	 thoughts	 about	mind-external	 objects	 as	well.	Hence,	according	to	such	views,	your	thought	that	Bob	Dylan	won	a	Nobel	Prize	contains	Dylan	himself	as	a	constituent,	rather	than	sense	data	caused	by	that	 individual.	 I	 will	 call	 this	 view	 of	 propositions	Millian/Russellianism.	 The	Millian	aspect	of	the	view	comes	from	Mill’s	(1843)	claim	that	the	referent	of	a	proper	 name	 is	 just	 its	 referent.	 Transposed	 to	 the	 realm	of	 thought,	 the	 view	holds	 that	 the	 semantic	 content	 of	 singular	 concepts	 is	 their	 referent.	 Singular	concepts	 are	 those	 concepts	 that	 refer	 to	 individual	 objects	 in	 an	 unmediated	way	(i.e.	not	by	way	of	descriptions	etc.).	The	Millian	claim,	then,	is	that	singular	concepts	may	refer	directly	to	mind-external	particulars.	
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A	 common	 feature	 of	 Frege’s	 framework	 and	 Russell’s	 framework	 is	 that	 they	take	thinking	to	be	a	direct	relation	between	subjects	and	propositions.	We	may	call	this	the	Dyadic	View	of	Thoughts.	Many	of	those	who	take	propositions	to	be	Millian/Russellian	nowadays	typically	deny	this;	instead	they	take	thinking	to	be	a	 triadic	 relation	 between	 subjects,	mental	 representations	 and	propositions.	 I	will	say	more	about	this	approach	in	section	3.	Before	that,	let	me	briefly	set	out	how	 the	 discussion	 in	 this	 thesis	 will	 relate	 to	 the	 general	 debate	 between	Fregeanism	and	Russellianism.	
In	this	thesis	I	set	aside	the	general	question	of	which	of	the	broad	views	of	the	nature	of	thoughts	is	correct.	However,	the	general	aim	of	the	proposed	account	of	coordination	can	be	seen	as	a	contribution	to	the	debate	in	that,	if	successful,	it	provides	an	argument	in	favour	of	Millian/Russellianism.	Although,	as	I	point	out	throughout	 the	 thesis,	 the	 proposed	 framework	 of	 coordination	 is,	 in	 theory,	compatible	with	 any	 account	 of	 the	nature	 of	 propositions,	 I	will	 in	 discussion	assume	a	Millian/Russellian	account.	My	overarching	aim	is	to	see	whether	it	is	possible	to	do	justice	to	the	Fregean	data	that	co-referential	concepts	may	differ	in	 their	 cognitive	 significance,	 within	 a	 broadly	 Millian/Russellian	 framework.	Hence,	 I	will	not	discuss	Fregean	views	at	 length.	The	views	 I	engage	with	and	that	 I	 take	 to	 be	my	main	 opponents	 are	 views	 that	 share	many	 fundamental	assumptions	with	the	proposed	framework.	I	will	set	out	these	views	in	section	3	below.	All	of	these	views	are	developed	at	least	partly	with	the	aim	of	accounting	for	the	Fregean	data	within	a	broadly	Millian/Russellian	framework.		
As	noted,	if	my	account	of	coordination	is	successful	this	provides	an	argument	in	favour	of	the	Millian/Russellian	picture.	The	Millian/Russellian	framework	is	more	metaphysically	parsimonious	than	the	Fregean	 framework,	 in	 that	 it	only	requires	a	one-levelled	semantics.	Also,	various	serious	objections	to	the	Fregean	view	have	been	raised	in	the	literature.	Among	these,	Kripke’s	(1979)	puzzle	of	Paderewski	 is	most	 relevant	 to	 the	discussion	about	 coordination	 in	 thought.	 I	present	 the	 puzzle	 several	 places	 in	 the	 thesis,	 but	 the	main	 observation	 that	poses	problems	for	the	Fregean	view	is	this:	There	are	cases	where	sameness	or	difference	 in	 sense	 is	 not	manifest	 to	 thinkers.	 If	 this	 is	 correct,	 senses	 cannot	account	for	coordination	since	it	would	be	possible	for	the	thinker	to	misidentify	
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senses.	 I	 aim	 to	 explain	 both	 the	 Fregean	 data	 and	 the	 observation	 made	 by	Kripke	within	a	Millian/Russellian	framework.	In	this	way,	the	arguments	in	this	thesis	lend	support	to	the	Millian/Russellian	picture	of	the	nature	of	the	content	of	thoughts.	
Since	I	presuppose	a	Millian/Russellian	framework	I	will	not	say	much	about	the	nature	 of	 the	 content	 of	 mental	 representation	 throughout	 the	 thesis.	 In	 fact,	strictly	speaking,	 I	don’t	think	anything	about	the	semantic	content	of	thoughts	follows	directly	from	my	view	of	coordination.	However,	as	I	said,	I	do	think	that	if	my	 positive	 framework	 can	 account	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	without	 having	 to	abandon	 Millian/Russellianism,	 this	 gives	 us	 reason	 to	 prefer	Millian/Russellianism	since	overall	the	view	is	the	most	parsimonious.	
Note	 that	 Frege’s	 observation	 that	 co-referential	 terms	 may	 differ	 in	 their	cognitive	 significance	 gives	 rise	 to	 several	 related	 but	 nonetheless	 distinct	puzzles.	One	question	that	arises	from	the	Fregean	data	concerns	the	semantics	of	belief	ascriptions.	Consider	the	following	two	ascriptions:	
1) Lois	Lane	believes	that	Clark	Kent	is	Clark	Kent	2) Lois	Lane	believes	that	Clark	Kent	is	Superman	
Many	 hold	 that	 such	 belief	 ascriptions	 may	 differ	 in	 truth-value	 despite	 both	attributing	a	belief	to	Lois	Lane	that	involves	an	identity	statement	between	the	same	individual.15		
Further,	it	seems	that	two	natural	language	sentences	such	as	
3) Clark	Kent	is	Clark	Kent	4) Clark	Kent	is	Superman	
differ	 in	 informativeness:	 The	 former	 seems	 trivial,	 whereas	 the	 latter	 is	potentially	 informative.	 How	 can	 this	 be,	 if	 the	 two	 sentences	 have	 the	 same	semantic	content?	
																																																								15	E.g.	Crimmins	&	Perry	(1989),	Richard	(1990).	
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I	will	not	address	questions	pertaining	 to	 the	 semantic	 content	of	 sentences	 in	natural	language.	Rather,	my	focus	when	it	comes	to	coordination	is	on	thoughts	and	the	explanation	of	rational	reasoning	and	behavioural	dispositions.	Hence,	I	will	not	explicitly	engage	with	the	linguistic	versions	of	the	puzzle	in	this	thesis.	Some	of	what	I	say	may	be	relevant	to	understanding	coordination	in	language,	but	 the	 nature	 of	 thoughts	 and	 natural	 language	 differ	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	giving	an	account	of	coordination	in	both	domains	would	be	too	ambitious	for	a	single	thesis.16		
As	 a	 result,	 I	 do	 not	 engage	 with	 Millian/Russellian	 frameworks	 that	 focus	primarily	 on	 accounting	 for	 coordination	 in	 language.	 The	 theories	 I	 have	 in	mind	 are	 those	 that	 go	 under	 the	 label	Descriptive	Millianism.	 This	 is	 the	 view	that,	 “although	 sentences	 that	 contain	 names	 express	 singular	 propositions,	when	they	use	those	sentences	speakers	communicate	descriptive	propositions”	(Caplan	2007,	181).17	Such	theories	account	for	the	Fregean	data	in	language	in	terms	of	pragmatic	considerations.	Such	pragmatic	considerations	are,	however,	not	 easily	 transferable	 to	 thoughts.	 For	 similar	 reasons,	 I	 do	 not	 in	 this	 thesis	consider	Millian/Russellian	 views	 that	 focus	 on	 explaining	 the	 Fregean	 puzzle	pertaining	 to	 belief	 ascriptions	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 semantic	 difference.	 According	 to	such	 views,	 propositional	 attitude	 reports	 involve	 unarticulated	 constituents	that	concern	the	way	in	which	the	thinker	believes	what	she	believes.18	Although	I	do	not	engage	with	the	debate	about	coordination	 in	 language,	 I	do	address	a	related	 issue	 pertaining	 to	 language	 in	 the	 final	 chapter	 (Chapter	 4).	 There	 I	discuss	how	utterances	may	concern	the	same	subject	matter	despite	a	change	in	meaning.	 I	 say	 more	 about	 the	 background	 for	 this	 particular	 discussion	 in	
																																																								16	I	do,	however,	say	more	about	 the	relation	between	coordination	 in	 thought	and	 language	 in	section	7.4.	below.	17	Soames	(2002)	provides	the	fullest	defence	of	Descriptive	Millianism.	See	Barber	(2000)	for	a	similar	 view.	 For	 a	 criticism	 of	 Descriptive	 Millianism,	 see	 Caplan	 (2007).	 For	 a	 response	 to	Caplan’s	argument	against	Descriptive	Millianism,	see	Speaks	(2010).		18	See,	for	instance,	Crimmins	&	Perry	(1989)	and	Crimmins	(1992)	for	a	defence	of	this	version	of	Millian/Russellianism.	Such	views	presuppose	a	representational	theory	of	mind	in	that	their	explanation	 of	 the	 semantics	 of	 belief	 ascriptions	 essentially	 involves	 reference	 to	 such	representations.	Although	I	do	not	engage	with	this	specific	account	of	coordination	in	the	case	of	the	 semantics	 of	 belief	 ascriptions,	 I	 do	 consider	 Perry’s	 (1980)	 general	 view	 of	 mental	representations	as	mental	files	(see	section	3.2.	below).	
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section	 4	 below,	 but	 first	 I	will	 set	 out	 the	 theories	 I	 discuss	 in	 the	 first	 three	chapters	of	the	thesis.		
	
3.	Competing	Views	
The	 views	 I	 engage	 with	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 current	 prominent	 accounts	 of	coordination	 in	 thought	 that	 share	 certain	 fundamental	 assumptions	 with	 my	positive	 account.	 These	 views	 include	 Fodor’s	 (e.g.	 1975,	 2008)	 Language	 of	Thought	 Hypothesis	 (LOTH),	 the	 Mental	 File	 Framework	 (c.f.	 Recanati	 2012,	2016),	 Originalism	 (Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	 2011,	 2012)	 and	 Semantic	 Relationism	(Fine	2007).	The	first	three	views	take	thinking	to	be	a	triadic	relation	between	subjects,	 mental	 representations,	 and	 propositional	 content.	 On	 such	 views,	thinkers	are	not	directly	 related	 to	 the	propositional	 content	of	 their	 thoughts.	Rather,	 they	 stand	 in	direct	 relations	 to	mental	 representations	 that	have	 such	propositional	 contents.	As	we’ll	 see,	 this	allows	us	 to	account	 for	 the	problems	raised	 by	 Frege	 and	 Russell	 in	 terms	 of	 something	 other	 than	 sameness	 or	difference	 in	 the	 propositional	 content	 of	 thoughts.	 The	 last	 view,	 Semantic	Relationism,	 does	 not	 appeal	 to	 a	 distinction	 between	mental	 representations	and	 content.	 This	 framework,	 however,	 bears	 certain	 other	 similarities	 to	 the	view	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis;	 both	 views	 take	 coordination	 in	 thought	 to	 be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	relational	features	of	such	entities.	In	this	section,	I	will	give	a	brief	overview	of	each	framework	 in	turn.	 I	do	not,	of	course,	 intend	the	following	presentations	to	cover	the	full	extent	of	these	complex	views.	Rather,	I	will	 focus	 on	 those	 aspects	 of	 the	 theories	 that	 will	 be	 important	 for	 the	discussion	of	coordination	in	this	thesis.		
The	views	I	will	consider	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	categories	based	on	how	they	account	 for	 coordination	 relations.	On	 the	one	hand,	 there	are	what	 I	 call	
intrinsicalist	views,	and	on	the	other,	there	are	relational	views	of	coordination.	Before	 going	 into	 the	 details	 of	 specific	 frameworks,	 let	 me	 say	 a	 few	 words	about	these	general	categories.	
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3.1.	Intrinsicalism	and	Relationism		
We	 may	 distinguish	 between	 two	 classes	 of	 views	 about	 how	 to	 account	 for	coordination	 in	 thought.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 are	 those	 who	 hold	 that	coordination	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	
properties	 of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts.	 I	 borrow	 this	 notion	 from	 Gray	 (2017,	2018).	 It	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 technical	 notion.	 The	properties	 in	 question	need	 be	 neither	 intrinsic	 nor	 representational	 in	 the	 ordinary	 sense	 of	 such	terms.	Let	me	elaborate.	
First,	 an	 intrinsic	 property	 of	 a	 concept	 or	 thought	 is	 here	 understood	 as	 any	property	 that	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 relations	 to	 other	 concepts	 or	 thoughts:	“intrinsic	 representational	 features	 are	 those	 which	 can	 be	 stated	 without	reference	to	another	representation”	(Gray	2017,	4).	A	concept	token	or	thought	token	being	of	a	certain	 type	 is	 thus	 to	be	understood	as	an	 intrinsic	 feature.19	This	 is	 the	 case	 even	 if	 the	 type	 is	 determined	 by	 historical	 facts	 or	 other	relations	that	are	not	strictly	speaking	intrinsic	to	the	concept	or	thought	on	an	ordinary	 understanding	 of	 ‘intrinsic’.	 The	 relevant	 notion	 of	 ‘intrinsic	 feature’	includes	all	features	a	concept	or	thought	has	when	seen	in	isolation	from	other	concepts	and	thoughts.	
Second,	the	properties	in	questions	need	not	be	representational	in	the	ordinary	sense.	 If,	 for	 instance,	 one	 holds	 that	 mental	 representations	 are	 type	individuated	in	terms	of	their	historical	origins20	this	would	count	as	a	feature	of	the	relevant	kind	even	though	having	a	certain	historical	origin	would	not	count	as	a	representational	feature	on	an	ordinary	understanding	of	‘representational’.	Likewise,	 if	mental	 representations	are	 individuated	 in	 terms	of	 their	 syntactic	
shape21	this	would	also	be	an	intrinsic	representational	feature	in	this	context.	In	general,	 the	relevant	features	need	not	have	anything	to	do	with	the	fact	that	a	thought	represents	an	object.		To	repeat:	The	intrinsic	representational	features	in	 question	 are	 those	 that	 can	 be	 characterized	 without	 reference	 to	 other	mental	representations.																																																										19	Unless	the	type	is	determined	holistically.	20	This	is	what	Originalists	claim.	I	say	more	about	this	view	in	section	3.4.	below.	21	I	say	more	about	this	in	the	next	sub-section,	where	I	present	Fodor’s	LOTH.	
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We	may	thus	define	Intrinsicalism	about	coordination	thus:	
Intrinsicalism:	 Coordination	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	representational	properties	of	concepts	and	thoughts,		
where	 the	 relevant	 properties	 are	 those	 that	 a	 concept	 or	 a	 thought	 has	independently	of	other	concepts	or	thoughts.	This	has	been	the	dominant	view	of	coordination	until	recently.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 are	 those	 who	 hold	 that	 coordination	 cannot	 be	accounted	for	purely	in	terms	of	intrinsic	representational	features.	According	to	such	 views,	 coordination	 is	 essentially	 a	 matter	 of	 relational	 representational	features.	Whether	 or	 not	 two	 thoughts	 are	 positively	 coordinated	 depends	 on	how	the	thoughts	are	related,	and	such	relations	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	or	difference	of	intrinsic	representational	features.		
We	may	thus	define	Relationism	about	coordination	thus:	
Relationism:	 Coordination	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 primitive	relational	representational	features.		
My	 positive	 account	 is	 a	 version	 of	 relationism.	 Even	 so,	 it	 bears	 some	 key	similarities	 to	 certain	 well-known	 intrinsicalist	 accounts.	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 an	overview	of	the	competing	frameworks	that	I	will	address	in	this	thesis.	
	
3.2.	Fodor’s	Language	of	Thought	Hypothesis	
The	key	claim	of	Fodor’s	LOTH	is	that	thinking	takes	place	in	a	mental	language.	This	 language	 is	 distinct	 from	 natural	 languages,	 but	 bears	 some	 important	similarities	to	such	languages.	The	main	similarity	is	that	the	language	of	thought	also	has	a	combinatorial	syntax	and	semantics.	A	 thought	 is	made	up	of	simple	expressions	 that	 combine	 into	 complex	 sentence-like	 structures.	 The	 semantic	content	 of	 a	 thought	 depends	 on	 the	 semantic	 content	 of	 the	 syntactic	constituents	of	that	thought:	
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Mental	 representations	 […]	 have	 a	 combinatorial	 syntax	 and	
semantics,	 in	 which	 (a)	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 structurally	atomic	 and	 structurally	 molecular	 representations;	 (b)	 structurally	molecular	 representations	 have	 syntactic	 constituents	 that	 are	themselves	 either	 structurally	molecular	 or	 structurally	 atomic;	 and	(c)	the	semantic	content	of	a	(molecular)	representation	is	a	function	of	 the	 semantic	 contents	 of	 its	 syntactic	 parts	 together	 with	 its	constituent	structure.	(Fodor	&	Pylyshyn	1988,	12)	
The	syntactic	features	of	a	thought	are	physically	implemented	in	the	brain.	The	cognitive	system	is	only	directly	sensitive	to	such	syntactic	features	of	thoughts	rather	 than	 their	 semantic	 properties.	 On	 this	 picture,	 the	 cognitive	 system	resembles	 a	 computer	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 cognitive	 system	 computes	 on	syntactically	specified	entities.	Fodor	says	that	
Computations	 are	 operations	 defined	 over	 syntax	 of	 mental	representations;	 it	 is	 the	 syntax,	 rather	 than	 the	 content,	 of	mental	states	that	determines	its	causal	powers.	(Fodor	2008,	70)	
The	 LOTH	 thus	 implies	 a	 certain	 view	 of	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 thoughts.	Propositional	attitudes	do	not	involve	thinkers	standing	in	direct	relations	to	the	relevant	 propositions.	 Instead,	 thinkers	 only	 stand	 in	 direct	 relation	 to	mental	representations	having	or	expressing	such	propositional	content.	The	LOTH	can	be	understood	as	a	conjunction	of	the	following	three	theses:22	
A) The	 Representational	 Theory	 of	 mind	 (RTM):	 Thinking	 consists	 of	causal	sequences	of	tokenings	of	mental	representations.		B) The	Sentence-Like	Structure	of	Thoughts:	Mental	representations	have	a	 combinatorial	 syntax	 and	 semantics.	 Thoughts	 are	 built	 up	 of	 atomic	constituents	 and	 the	 semantic	 content	 of	 a	 thought	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	semantic	 content	 of	 the	 constituent	 atomic	 representations	 and	 the	syntactic	structure	of	the	thought.		
																																																								22	C.f.	Lycan	&	Prinz	(2008,	146).	
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C) The	Computational	Theory	of	Mind:	The	cognitive	system	is	similar	to	a	computer	 in	 that	 it	 computes	 over	 syntactically	 specified	 mental	representations.	
Thesis	(A)	suggests	a	different	picture	of	the	nature	of	thoughts	than	the	one	we	found	 in	 the	previous	 section	when	discussing	Frege	and	Russell.	According	 to	this	 general	 view,	which	 I	 called	 the	Dyadic	 View,	 thinking	 is	 a	 direct	 relation	between	a	subject	and	a	proposition.	In	contrast,	according	to	RTM	thinking	is	a	triadic	 relation	 between	 a	 subject,	 a	 mental	 representation	 and	 propositional	content.	This	has	important	consequences	for	how	we	account	for	Frege’s	puzzle.	If	 we	 can	 account	 for	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 thoughts	 and	 concepts	 in	 terms	 of	mental	representations,	we	need	not	postulate	a	further	level	of	semantics	akin	to	 Fregean	 senses.	Nor	do	we	have	 to	 follow	Russell	 in	 his	 restrictivism	about	singular	thoughts.	
Remember	that	the	doctrine	of	misidentification	is	what	led	Frege	and	Russell	to	develop	their	specific	views	on	the	nature	of	thoughts.	According	to	this	doctrine,	it	is	the	case	that,	if	it	is	rationally	possible	for	a	thinker	to	take	two	thoughts	to	concern	distinct	 individuals	when	 they	do	 in	 fact	 concern	 the	 same	 individual,	there	 must	 be	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 two	 thoughts.	 On	 the	 RTM	 framework,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 do	 justice	 to	 this	 doctrine	without	 necessitating	 a	 difference	 in	 the	propositional	 content	 of	 the	 relevant	 thoughts.	 Since	 subjects	 are	 only	directly	related	to	mental	representations	it	is	rationally	permissible	to	be	wrong	about	co-reference	 as	 long	 as	 the	 representational	 constituents	 of	 the	 two	 thoughts	differ.	 If	 someone	 has	 the	 beliefs	 BOB	 DYLAN	 IS	 A	 MUSICIAN	 and	 ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN	IS	A	MUSICIAN	she	may,	as	we	have	seen,	rationally	fail	to	know	that	the	 two	beliefs	 concern	 the	 same	 individual.	However,	 all	 that	 follows	 directly	from	 this	 on	 the	 current	 account	 is	 that	 the	 mental	 representations,	 i.e.	 the	syntactic	 features	of	 the	 thoughts,	must	be	different.	 It	does	not	 follow	directly	that	the	two	thought	must	differ	in	their	propositional	content.	
This	means	that	according	to	Fodor’s	LOTH,	coordination	is	ultimately	explained	in	 terms	 of	 a	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 the	 syntactic	 features	 of	 thoughts.	Whether	 or	 not	 two	 thoughts	 are	 positively	 coordinated	 depends	 on	 the	
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sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 the	 constituent	 syntactic	 entities	 of	 such	 thoughts.	Such	 sameness	 or	 difference	 is,	 according	 to	 Fodor,	 a	 matter	 of	 two	 atomic	representation	tokens	being	of	the	same	syntactic	type.		
The	 question,	 then,	 is	 how	 to	 individuate	 such	 atomic	mental	 representations.	Fodor	is	not	explicit	about	exactly	how	to	do	this,	but	in	some	places	he	suggests	that	they	are	to	be	individuated	by	their	syntactic	forms	(cf.	Fodor	2008).	Talk	of	such	 forms	 is	 of	 course	 purely	 metaphorical.	 Type	 identity	 of	 atomic	representations	is	not	determined	by	their	physical	’shape’	or	‘form’	in	the	brain,	since	the	same	concept	may	be	physically	realized	in	many	different	ways	in	the	heads	 of	 different	 thinkers,	 or	 even	 the	 same	 thinker	 at	 different	 times.	 Fodor	(2008)	 illustrates	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 atomic	 representation	 types	 by	appeal	to	how	we	determine	sameness	of	types	of	letters:		
We	distinguish	’dog’	tokens	from	’cat’	tokens	by	their	spelling,	but	we	don’t	distinguish	 ’a’	 tokens	from	’b’	 tokens	that	way,	since	 ’a’	and	 ’b’	don’t,	 of	 course,	have	 spellings.	What	 they	 have	 is	 shapes;	 and	 their	shapes	are	different	in	ways	to	which	our	visual	system	is	responsive;	if	 they	 weren’t,	 we	 wouldn’t	 be	 able	 to	 read.	 Likewise	 mutatis	
mutandis	 for	 the	 way	 the	 minds	 draw	 type	 distinctions	 between	tokens	of	basic	mental	representations.	(Fodor	2008,	80)23	
Exactly	what	is	meant	by	the	talk	of	shapes	of	syntactic	entities	is	not	important	for	the	discussion	in	this	thesis.	Rather,	what	is	important	is	that	Fodor’s	account	of	coordination	explains	the	phenomenon	in	terms	of	 intrinsic	representational	features	 of	 mental	 representations,	 as	 defined	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 Such	intrinsic	 representational	 features,	 recall,	 are	 those	 features	 that	 are	independent	of	 the	properties	of	other	mental	 representations	of	a	 thinker.	On	this	view,	a	mental	 representation	being	of	a	 certain	 type	 is	 independent	of	 its	relation	 to	 other	 thoughts	 or	 concepts	 the	 thinker	may	 have.	 Fodor’s	 LOTH	 is	thus	an	intrinsicalist	account	of	coordination	in	thought.																																																									23	Fodor	also	uses	this	way	of	talking	about	mental	representations	in	earlier	work,	such	as	in	the	following	passage:	 ”Because	Classical	mental	representations	have	combinatorial	 structure,	 it	 is	possible	 for	Classical	mental	operations	to	 apply	 to	 them	by	 reference	 to	 their	 form”	 (Fodor	&	Pylyshyn	1988,	13).	
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The	 next	 two	 frameworks	 I	 will	 present,	 namely	 the	 mental	 file	 account	 and	Originalism,	 also	 accept	 RTM.	 They	 hold	 that	 thinking	 is	 not	 a	 direct	 relation	between	 subjects	 and	 propositions.	 The	 frameworks	 differ,	 however,	 with	respect	to	their	views	as	to	the	exact	nature	of	coordination.	They	take	different	views	on	the	nature	of	mental	representations.	I	turn	presently	to	the	mental	file	account.	
	
3.3.	Mental	Files	
The	mental	file	account	of	the	nature	of	thoughts	has	been	developed	in	various	ways	 by	 different	 authors.	 One	 of	 the	 central	 proponents	 of	 this	 framework	 is	Perry	 (1980).	 Fodor	 also	 mentions	 the	 possibility	 of	 modelling	 mental	representations	 as	 files	 (2008,	 92—100).	 The	 details	 of	 the	 framework	 are,	however,	 most	 thoroughly	 developed	 by	 Recanati	 (2012,	 2016). 24 	In	 what	follows,	I	will	thus	focus	on	Recanati’s	particular	formulation	of	the	framework.	
According	to	this	framework,	singular	concepts	are	to	be	understood	as	clusters	of	information	construed	as	mental	files.	Each	file	contains	pieces	of	information	that	 are	 taken	 by	 the	 subject	 to	 concern	 the	 reference	 of	 the	 file.	 On	 this	framework,	 coordination	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 such	 information	 clustering	within	mental	 files:	All	 pieces	 of	 information	 contained	within	 a	 single	 file	 are	positively	 coordinated.25	What	 file	 a	 given	 piece	 of	 information	 is	 stored	 in	wholly	 depends	 on	 the	 acquaintance	 relation	 through	 which	 it	 was	 gained	(Recanati	 (2012)	 uses	 the	 term	 epistemically	 rewarding	 (ER)	 relation	 for	 such	relations).	 All	 pieces	 of	 information	 gained	 through	 the	 same	 acquaintance	relation	go	into	the	same	file	and	thereby	become	positively	coordinated.		
																																																								24	Talk	of	files	and	equivalent	notions	is	also	used	in	discourse	representation	theory	(e.g.	Kamp	2015)	and	file	change	semantics	(c.f.	Heim	1982).		25	Note	that	Recanati	does	not	use	the	term	’positive	coordination’.	Instead	he	uses	what	I	take	to	be	 a	 synonymous	 term,	 namely	 ’de	 jure	 co-reference’.	 I	 say	 more	 about	 this	 terminology	 in	section	6.1	below.	
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The	mental	file	theorist	maintains	that	such	acquaintance	(i.e.	ER)	relations	may	obtain	between	a	thinker	and	objects	in	the	external	world.26	Hence,	the	mental	file	 framework	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 Russell	 in	 that	 one	 may	 have	 singular	thoughts	about	mind-external	objects.	 In	 fact,	Recanati	develops	his	account	of	mental	 files	 specifically	 as	 a	 way	 of	 accounting	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	 within	 a	Millian/Russellian	 framework.27	He	argues	 that	we	may	have	singular	 thoughts	about	mind-external	 objects	 and	 that	 this	 involves	 deploying	 a	 singular	 file	 in	thought.	
A	mental	file	contains	information	in	the	form	of	predicates	taken	by	the	subject	to	be	satisfied	by	the	referent	of	a	file.	So,	for	instance,	your	mental	file	about	Bob	Dylan	contains	information	such	as	‘is	a	musician,	‘won	a	Nobel	Prize’,	and	so	on.	On	this	picture,	two	pieces	of	information,	i	and	j,	are	positively	coordinated	if	“i	and	j	occur	in	the	same	file	without	the	benefit	of	a	prior	judgement	of	identity”	(Recanati	2012,	95).	Every	piece	of	information	that	is	taken	to	concern	the	same	referent	 is	 stored	 within	 the	 same	 file.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 two	pieces	of	information	‘is	a	musician’	and	‘won	a	Nobel	Prize’	is	stored	within	one	and	the	same	file	is	what	warrants	an	inference	directly	from	the	two	pieces	of	information	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 a	 musician	 won	 a	 Nobel	 Prize.	 That	 is,	 co-location	of	information	in	files	warrants	trading	on	identity.		
In	 contrast,	 two	 pieces	 of	 information	 being	 stored	 in	 distinct	 files	 is	 an	indication	that	the	information	is	taken	to	concern	two	different	referents.	Let’s	say	that	instead	of	having	both	‘is	a	musician’	and	‘won	a	Nobel	Prize’	stored	in	the	same	file,	you	have	the	first	predicate	stored	in	your	BOB	DYLAN	file	and	the																																																									26	Such	 ER	 relations	 may	 be	 perceptually	 based,	 but	 can	 also	 obtain	 in	 cases	 in	 which	 one	 is	indirectly	related	to	an	object	through	testimony.	27	Note	 that	 Recanati	 takes	 his	 mental	 file	 framework	 to	 be	 ’neo-Fregean’.	 He	 says	 that	 he	assumes	 ”a	 two-level	 semantics	 with	 a	 sense-reference	 distinction”	 (2012,	 13).	 However,	 in	 a	footnote	on	the	same	page	he	says	that	”since,	in	my	framework,	mental	files	are	what	plays	the	role	of	sense,	and	mental	files	are	representational	’vehicles’,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	theory	put	forth	 in	 this	 book	 is	not	a	 two-level	 semantic	 à	 la	 Frege”	 (2012,	 13	n.6).	 Later	 on	he	 says	 that	”some	theorists,	most	prominently	Jerry	Fodor,	reject	the	Fregean	distinction	between	sense	and	reference	on	the	grounds	that	what	plays	the	mode	of	presentation	role	is	not	anything	semantic	[…]	So	what	 is	 the	difference	between	 the	view	 I	have	expounded	and	 the	view,	 argued	 for	by	Fodor	[…]	that	modes	of	presentation	are	syntactic?	Not	much,	since	I	accept	that	mental	files	are	representational	vehicles.	The	difference	is	primarily	terminological”	(2012,	244—245).	For	the	purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 thus	 take	 Recanati’s	 framework	 to	 be	 what	 I’ve	 called	’Millian/Russellian’	in	nature.	Nothing	hangs	on	this	terminological	difference.	
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second	 predicate	 stored	 in	 another	 file,	 namely	 your	 ROBERT	 ZIMMERMAN	 file.	Let’s	also	assume	that	you	are	not	aware	that	Dylan	is	Zimmerman.	Now,	since	the	two	pieces	of	information	are	stored	in	distinct	files,	you	are	not	warranted	in	 inferring	 from	 these	 two	pieces	 of	 information	 alone	 that	 a	musician	won	 a	Nobel	 Prize.	 The	 information	 being	 stored	 in	 distinct	 files	 entails	 that	 the	 two	pieces	of	information	are	not	accessible	from	one	and	the	same	file:	“to	say	that	there	 are	 two	 distinct	mental	 files	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 information	 in	 one	 file	 is	insulated	 from	 information	 in	 the	 other”	 (Recanati	 2012,	 42).	 This	 is	why	 one	cannot,	 without	 violating	 rational	 norms,	 trade	 upon	 identity	 of	 two	 pieces	 of	information	that	are	stored	in	distinct	files.		
This	 is	 also	 what	 accounts	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 rational	 individuals	 ascribing	contradictory	predicates	to	the	same	individual:	Since	a	difference	in	files	makes	it	 the	case	 that	 the	 information	 is	 insulated,	 there	 is	nothing	 that	prevents	you	from	 storing	 the	 predicate	 ‘is	 a	 musician’	 in	 the	 BOB	 DYLAN	 file	 and	 ‘is	 not	 a	musician’	in	the	ZIMMERMAN	file,	since	the	contradiction	is	not	manifest	to	you.	On	 this	 picture,	 “information	 integration	 and	 inferential	 exploitation	 of	information	 only	 takes	 place	 within	 files”	 (Recanati	 2012,	 43).	 Negative	coordination,	then,	 is	explained	in	terms	of	 information	being	stored	in	distinct	files.	
Note	that	information	being	gained	through	a	given	acquaintance	relation	counts	as	an	intrinsic	representational	feature.	This	is	because	being	gained	on	the	basis	of	 a	 given	 acquaintance	 relation	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 relations	 to	 other	representations.	 Likewise,	 being	 stored	 in	 a	 given	 file	 does	 not	 depend	 on	relations	 to	 the	other	pieces	of	 information	 that	may	be	 in	 that	 file.	Hence,	 the	mental	 file	 framework	 also	 offers	 an	 intrinsicalist	 account	 of	 coordination	 in	thought.	This	feature	of	the	mental	file	framework	will	play	an	important	role	in	the	discussion	of	this	framework	in	this	thesis.		
I	now	turn	to	a	discussion	of	Originalism,	a	view	that,	like	the	mental	file	account	and	Fodor’s	LOTH,	holds	that	thinking	does	not	involve	a	direct	relation	between	subjects	and	propositions,	and	that	coordination	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	
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of	 intrinsic	 representational	 properties	 of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts.	 However,	 it	disagrees	with	these	other	accounts	about	the	nature	of	mental	representations.		
	
3.4.	Originalism	
Originalism	 is	 developed	 and	 defended	 by	 Sainsbury	&	 Tye	 (2011,	 2012).	 The	framework	 is	 specifically	 developed	 to	 account	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	 within	 a	Millian	 framework.	 Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	 explicitly	 appeal	 to	 possible	 worlds	semantics	when	 illustrating	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 content	 of	 thoughts	 (2012,	 47—46).	However,	the	general	 framework	would	be	equally	compatible	with	classic	Millian/Russellianism	about	propositions.	What’s	relevant	in	the	current	context	is	 that	 they	 claim	 that	 mental	 representations	 can	 do	 the	 work	 traditionally	assigned	to	Fregean	senses,	and	so	there	is	no	need	to	introduce	further	levels	of	semantics	in	order	to	account	for	coordination.		
Originalists	accept	certain	key	claims	of	Fodor’s	LOTH.	First,	concepts	are	taken	to	 be	 mental	 representations.	 Second,	 Originalists	 agree	 with	 Fodor	 that	thoughts	 have	 a	 combinatorial	 structure	 that	 consists	 of	 atomic	 concepts	 and	relations	between	such	concepts:	
[Concepts	are]	mental	representations	of	a	sort	deployed	in	thought;	they	 are	 representational	 constituents	 of	 thoughts.	 Thoughts	 are	made	 up	 of	 concepts,	 and	what	 thoughts	 as	 a	 whole	 represent	 is	 a	function	of	 their	component	concepts:	what	they	represent	and	how	they	are	combined.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	1)	
Originalists	also	agree	with	Fodor	that	the	cognitive	system	computes	over	token	mental	 representations:	 “Cognitive	 processing	depends	not	 directly	 on	 content	but	 on	 the	 vehicles	 of	 content:	 concepts	 and	 thoughts”	 (Ibid.,	 57).	 Hence,	Originalists	 take	 thinking	 to	 be	 a	 triadic	 relation	 between	 a	 thinker,	 mental	representations	 and	 propositional	 content.	 Thinkers	 are	 directly	 related	 to	mental	representations	and	only	 indirectly	to	the	propositional	content	of	such	representations.	
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The	view	differs,	however,	from	that	of	Fodor	in	what	it	takes	the	individuation	conditions	 for	concepts	 to	be.	The	key	claim	of	Originalism	 is	 that	 two	concept	tokens	are	of	the	same	type	if	and	only	if	they	have	the	same	historical	origin:		
Originalism:	Concept	C1	=	concept	C2	if	and	only	if	the	originating	use	of	C1	=	the	originating	use	of	C2	(c.f.	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2011,	105).		
On	this	view,	it	is	the	case	that	for	every	concept	there	is	just	one	originating	use	and	that	every	originating	use	of	a	concept	is	the	origin	of	one	concept	only	(c.f.	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2011,	104).	So	for	instance,	in	the	case	of	someone	tokening	the	concept	ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN,	the	type	of	the	concept	is	determined	by	the	time	in	history	at	which	it	was	first	introduced.	In	this	case,	this	would	most	likely	be	at	Bob	Dylan’s	baptism.	Similarly,	 the	 type	of	a	given	tokening	of	BOB	DYLAN	is	determined	by	the	first	use	of	that	term,	which	took	place	in	a	different	historical	context	 than	 the	 first	 use	of	 ROBERT	ZIMMERMAN.	As	 a	 result,	 the	 two	 concept	tokens	in	question	are	of	different	types,	due	to	having	distinct	historical	origins.		
On	 this	 view,	 coordination	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	concept	 types.	 Concept	 tokens	 that	 are	 of	 the	 same	 type	play	 the	 same	 role	 in	cognition,	while	concept	tokens	of	different	types	play	distinct	roles	in	cognition.	Whether	 or	 not	 two	 concept	 tokens	 are	 of	 the	 same	 type	 fully	 depends	 on	whether	 or	 not	 they	 belong	 to	 chains	 of	 deference	 with	 the	 same	 historical	origin.	Importantly,	Originalists	thus	reject	Frege’s	(1982)	claim	that	the	possible	cognitive	 difference	 of	 co-referential	 concepts	 requires	 the	 introduction	 of	senses.	They	hold	that,	
distinct	 concepts	 can,	 and	 typically	 will,	 play	 different	 roles	 in	 our	cognitive	activities,	even	if	they	have	the	same	content.	[…]	The	work	supposedly	 done	 by	 difference	 of	 sense	 can	 be	 done	 better	 by	difference	of	concepts.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	53—54)	
This	is	the	same	general	idea	that	we	found	in	Fodor’s	LOTH	and	the	mental	file	framework:	We	may	adopt	a	simple	one-levelled	semantics	and	still	account	for	the	 Fregean	 data	 by	 appeal	 to	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 types	 of	 mental	representations.		
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Since	 Originalists	 explain	 coordination	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	types	 of	 concepts	 (and	 such	 types	 are	 not	 determined	 holistically)	 they	ultimately	 account	 for	 coordination	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	features	 of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts,	 as	 defined	 in	 section	 3.1.	 To	 determine	 the	type	of	a	concept	one	need	not	 look	 to	other	concepts	 the	 thinker	deploys.	We	may	determine	the	type	of	a	concept	purely	by	looking	at	historical	 facts	about	when	the	concept	was	first	used.	 In	the	next	section	I	will	say	more	about	why	this	point	is	important	to	the	discussion	in	this	thesis.		
	
3.5.	Semantic	Relationism	
As	mentioned	throughout	the	presentation	of	the	three	previous	views,	they	all	have	 in	 common	 that	 they	 explain	 coordination	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	representational	 features	 of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts.	 Such	 intrinsic	representational	features,	recall,	are	those	that	can	be	established	by	looking	at	a	particular	mental	representation	in	isolation	from	other	mental	representations.	According	 to	 this	 terminology,	 then,	 a	 mental	 representation	 having	 a	 certain	content	 (i.e.	 referent)	 or	 being	 of	 a	 certain	 type	 (as	 long	 as	 types	 are	 not	determined	 holistically)	 counts	 as	 an	 intrinsic	 representational	 feature	 of	 that	representation	 (and,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 this	 is	 the	 case	 even	 when	 type	individuation	involves	an	appeal	to	historical	fact).	
In	 recent	 years,	 some	 philosophers	 have	 argued	 that	 this	 approach	 to	coordination	 is	 misguided.	 Such	 philosophers	 (c.f.	 Fine	 2007,	 Pinillos	 2011)	argue	 that	 coordination	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 sameness	 of	 intrinsic	representational	 features.	 This	 is	 because	 they	 take	 coordination	 to	 be	 an	essentially	 relational	 property.	 I	 call	 this	 general	 account	 of	 coordination	 in	terms	 of	 irreducible	 primitive	 relations	 Relationism.	 The	 most	 prominent	relationist	account	 is	 found	 in	Fine	(2007),	where	he	develops	and	defends	his	
Semantic	 Relationism.	 Fine	 develops	 relationist	 accounts	 for	 coordination	 in	
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logic,	natural	language	and	in	thought.	In	this	thesis	I	focus	on	the	latter,	namely	coordination	in	thought.28		
Like	the	views	discussed	in	the	previous	subsection,	Fine’s	account	is	advanced	as	 a	 way	 of	 accounting	 for	 coordination	 within	 a	 broadly	 Millian/Russellian	framework.	 It	 differs,	 however,	 in	how	 the	 framework	 achieves	 this.	 Fine	does	not	ascribe	any	 interesting	explanatory	 role	 to	mental	 representations	when	 it	comes	to	coordination	in	thought.	This	is	partly	because	he	thinks	that	“thoughts	do	not	 appear	 to	have	 the	 same	kind	of	 clear	 syntax	 as	 sentences”	 (2007,	 73).	This	marks	a	clear	discontinuity	with	the	previous	views	which	all	take	thoughts	to	 consist	 of	 structured	 representations	 and	 explain	 coordination	 in	 terms	 of	features	 of	 such	 mental	 representations.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 Fine’s	 account	 of	coordination	we	may	thus	regard	his	view	as	closer	to	the	Dyadic	View	in	that,	at	least	 for	 our	 explanatory	 purposes,	 thinking	 is	 a	 dyadic	 relation	 between	 a	subject	and	a	proposition.		
Consequently,	Fine	follows	Frege	and	Russell	 in	taking	a	difference	in	cognitive	role	 to	 imply	 a	 difference	 in	 propositional	 content.	 Importantly,	 however,	 Fine	takes	 the	 relevant	 difference	 needed	 to	 account	 for	 coordination	 to	 be	 a	primitive	 relational	 feature	 of	 propositions.	 Two	 thoughts	 that	 differ	 in	 their	cognitive	role	may	share	all	intrinsic	representational	features	and	differ	only	in	their	relational	properties.	On	this	view,	
The	content	of	a	belief	will	be	given	by	a	coordinated	rather	than	by	an	uncoordinated	proposition.	Thus	we	may	distinguish	between	the	content	of	the	belief	that	Cicero	is	Tully	(where	this	is	the	negatively	coordinated	proposition)	from	the	content	of	the	belief	that	Cicero	is	Cicero	(where	this	 is	 the	positively	coordinated	proposition).	This	 is	already	 a	 great	 advantage	 on	 the	 usual	 referentialist	 view,	which	 is																																																									28	As	I	read	Fine,	he	thinks	that	it	is	possible	to	consider	coordination	in	the	different	domains	in	isolation.	Even	though	Fine’s	explanation	of	coordination	is	highly	similar	across	these	domains,	what’s	important	for	the	present	purposes	is	that	his	explanation	of	coordination	in	thought	does	not	 depend	 on	 what	 he	 says	 about	 the	 other	 domains.	 That	 is,	 although	 his	 explanations	 of	coordination	in	language	and	thought	are	similar,	his	account	of	coordination	in	thought	does	not	essentially	depend	on	his	account	of	coordination	 in	 language	and	vice	versa.	 I	say	more	about	the	relation	between	coordination	in	thought	and	language	in	section	7.4.	below.	
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unable	 to	 make	 any	 such	 distinction	 without	 either	 distorting	 the	logical	 form	or	 appealing	 to	 some	notion	 of	 sense	 or	 “guises”.	 (Fine	2007,	77)	
Even	 though	 two	 thoughts	 such	 as	 DYLAN	 IS	DYLAN	 and	 DYLAN	 IS	 ZIMMERMAN	express	 the	same	classic	Millian/Russellian	propositions,	 they	express	different	
coordinated	 propositions:	 The	 former	 proposition	 contains	 a	 coordinative	 link	between	 the	 two	objectual	constituents	making	 it	positively	coordinated,	while	the	 latter	 proposition	 does	 not	 contain	 such	 a	 link,	 making	 it	 negatively	coordinated.	This	 is	why	 in	 the	 former	 thought	 the	 co-reference	 is	manifest	 to	the	thinker	while	in	the	second	thought	this	is	not	the	case.		
An	 important	 consequence	 of	 Semantic	 Relationism,	 then,	 is	 that	 even	 though	classic	 Millian/Russellian	 propositions	 are	 not	 transparent	 to	 thinkers,	coordinated	propositions	must	be.	I	return	to	this	in	section	6.2	below.	
The	account	of	coordination	developed	in	this	thesis	bears	many	similarities	to	the	views	discussed	in	this	general	section.	In	the	next	section	I	will	give	a	brief	overview	 of	 key-claims	 of	 the	 proposed	 account	 and	 point	 to	 similarities	 and	differences	 between	 this	 framework	 and	 the	 related	 frameworks	 considered	above.		
	
4.	Vehicle	Relationism	
I	develop	the	framework	of	Vehicle	Relationism	throughout	chapters	1,	2	and	3.	In	what	follows	I	will	point	to	some	of	the	central	features	of	the	framework.	
The	key	claim	of	Vehicle	Relationism	is	this:	
Vehicle	relationism:	Coordination	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	primitive	relations	between	representational	vehicles.	
I	 use	 the	 notion	 of	pointer	relations	 to	 denote	 the	 relevant	 primitive	 relations.	Whenever	 the	 pointer	 relation	 obtains	 the	 relata	 are	 positively	 coordinated.	
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Importantly,	 the	 pointer	 relations	 do	 not	 reduce	 to	 sameness	 of	 intrinsic	representational	features	of	the	relata.		
I	 call	 the	 representational	 vehicles	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 entering	 into	 pointer	relations	 mental	 tags.	 Together	 with	 pointer	 relations,	 mental	 tags	 are	 the	building	 blocks	 of	 thoughts,	 and	 as	 such	 they	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 individual	concepts.	
We	then	get	the	following	characterization	of	coordination	relations:	
Positive	Coordination:	Two	mental	tags	are	positively	coordinated	if	and	only	if	they	are	connected	by	pointers.	
Negative	Coordination:	Two	mental	tags	are	negatively	coordinated	if	and	only	if	they	are	not	connected	by	pointers.		
Vehicle	Relationism	thus	assumes	a	representational	theory	of	mind.	According	to	 this	 view,	 thinking	 is	 a	 triadic	 relation	 between	 a	 subject,	 mental	representations,	and	propositional	content.	Thinkers	are	only	directly	related	to	mental	 representations	 and	 indirectly	 to	 propositions	 via	 such	 mental	representations.	The	cognitive	computational	system	is	only	directly	sensitive	to	features	of	mental	representations.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 framework	bears	similarity	to	that	of	Fodor’s	LOTH,	the	Mental	File	Framework,	and	Originalism.		
It	differs	 from	such	 frameworks	 in	 that	 it	 is	 essentially	a	 relationist	 account	of	coordination.	 According	 to	 Vehicle	 Relationism,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 determine	whether	or	not	two	representational	vehicles	are	positively	coordinated	merely	by	 looking	 at	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 two	 vehicles	 in	 isolation.	 Two	representational	 vehicles	 may	 share	 the	 exact	 same	 intrinsic	 properties	 –	including	 the	 semantic	 content	 they	 express	 –	 and	 still	 fail	 to	 be	 positively	coordinated.	In	the	case	of	someone	rationally	having	both	the	belief	DYLAN	WON	A	 NOBEL	 PRIZE	 and	 the	 belief	 ZIMMERMAN	 DID	 NOT	 WIN	 A	 NOBEL	 PRIZE,	 the	mental	tags	DYLAN	and	ZIMMERMAN	have	the	same	intrinsic	properties,	including	referential	 content,	 but	 they	 are	 not	 connected	by	pointers.	 Since	 they	 are	 not	connected	by	pointers,	the	co-reference	is	not	manifest	to	the	thinker.	
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Vehicle	Relationism	thus	agrees	with	Semantic	Relationism	in	that	coordination	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	primitive	relations.	The	framework	differs	from	that	of	Fine’s	in	that	it	takes	the	relata	of	these	relations	to	be	representational	vehicles,	 whereas	 Fine	 takes	 the	 relata	 to	 be	 objectual	 constituents	 of	propositions.	
Since	the	framework	strictly	speaking	is	an	account	of	mental	representations	it	is	in	theory	compatible	with	any	account	of	the	nature	of	propositions.	However,	as	already	mentioned,	I	accept	a	Millian/Russellian	account	of	propositions,	and	accounting	for	the	Fregean	data	within	a	Millian/Russellian	framework	is	one	of	the	 central	 motivations	 behind	 the	 development	 of	 Vehicle	 Relationism.	 The	viability	of	Vehicle	Relationism	does	not,	however,	depend	on	the	viability	of	this	particular	view	on	the	nature	of	propositions.			
Thus	 far,	 I’ve	 focused	 on	 a	 notion	 of	 samethinking	 essentially	 tied	 to	 the	explanation	 of	 rational	 reasoning	 and	 behavioural	 dispositions.	 In	 particular,	 I	have	 focused	 on	 coordination,	 which	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 sort	 of	samethinking	that	essentially	has	to	do	with	our	capacity	to	trade	on	identity.	In	the	final	chapter	in	this	thesis	I	explore	a	different	way	in	which	thoughts	can	be	said	to	be	about	the	same	phenomenon.	This	notion	of	 ‘samethinking’	 is	tied	in	with	a	 related	notion	of	 ‘samesaying’.	 Since	 the	 latter	has	 received	much	more	attention	 in	 the	 literature,	 I	 focus	 on	 utterances	 rather	 than	 thoughts	 when	discussing	this	broader	notion.	However,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	most	of	what	I	say	is	equally	 applicable	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 as	 it	 occurs	 in	 thoughts.	 The	 question	 I	address	in	the	final	chapter	is	how	someone	(typically	distinct	individuals	or	the	same	 individual	at	different	 times)	may	properly	be	said	 to	 think	or	 talk	about	the	 same	 topic	 despite	 their	 thoughts	 and	 utterances	 differing	 in	 their	 overall	semantic	properties.	In	the	next	section	I	will	give	some	more	background	to	the	debate	on	topic-continuity	in	cases	of	semantic	drift.		
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5.	Topics	
The	 final	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 concerns	 the	 broader	 understanding	 of	‘samethinking’	as	well	as	the	corresponding	notion	of	‘samesaying’.	It	focuses	on	the	possibility	that	two	thoughts	or	two	utterances	may	concern	the	same	topic	despite	a	difference	 in	 their	overall	 semantic	properties.	The	discussion	 in	 this	final	 paper	 does	 not	 build	 on	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters.	 It	 does,	however,	 concern	 the	 same	 general	 abstract	 theme:	 What	 is	 it	 for	 two	thoughts/utterances	to	be	‘the	same’	in	explanatorily	interesting	ways?	
The	 chapter	 engages	 with	 the	 recent	 literature	 on	 Conceptual	 Engineering.29	Conceptual	 Engineering	 is	 the	 process	 of	 assessing	 and	 improving	 our	representational	devices.	 In	the	chapter,	 I	consider	prominent	questions	within	this	 literature	 and	engage	with	 some	of	 the	 central	 views	on	 the	nature	of	 the	project.	I	do,	however,	combine	this	literature	with	considerations	familiar	from	the	literature	on	the	nature	of	thoughts	and	language.	
Semantic	 drift	 occurs	 whenever	 a	 word	 changes	meaning	 over	 time.	 This	 is	 a	common	phenomenon.	Consider	for	instance	the	word	‘clue’,	which	used	to	mean	a	ball	of	thread	(of	the	sort	that	would	help	guide	someone	out	of	a	labyrinth,	for	instance),	whereas	 today	 it	means	something	 like	evidence	or	 information	 that	helps	solve	a	given	task.	It	seems	that	the	meaning	of	the	word	has	changed.	This	kind	 of	 semantic	 drift	 often	 results	 in	 a	 change	 in	 the	 subject	matter	 that	 one	talks	 (or	 thinks)	 about	 when	 deploying	 such	 words.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	word	‘clue’:	People	who	used	the	word	at	a	time	when	the	word	picked	out	balls	of	 threads	 specifically	 did	 not	 talk	 about	 the	 same	 subject	matter	 as	 someone	who	uses	the	word	today.	In	cases	like	this,	there	has	been	a	change	in	topic	as	a	result	of	the	semantic	drift.		
Some	cases	of	semantic	drift,	however,	preserve	topic.	That	is,	there	are	cases	in	which	 it	 seems	 correct	 to	 say	 that	 a	 use	 of	 a	word	prior	 to	 a	 semantic	 change	concerns	the	same	subject	matter	as	a	use	of	the	very	same	word	type	after	such	
																																																								29	C.f.	Haslanger	2000,	Plunkett	&	Sundell	2013,	Cappelen	2018.	Plunkett	and	Sundell	(2013)	use	the	label	’conceptual	ethics’,	while	Haslanger	(2000)	uses	the	term	‘ameliorative	project’.	
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a	 change.	At	 the	beginning	of	 this	 introduction	 chapter,	we	 looked	at	one	 such	candidate.	In	the	case	of	the	word	‘fish’	it	seems	right	to	say	that	someone	who	used	the	word	at	a	time	when	they	thought	of	whales	as	a	species	of	fish	talked	about	 the	same	subject	matter	as	someone	who	uses	 the	word	 today,	although	such	a	person	would	not	consider	whales	a	type	of	fish.	This	 is	the	case	even	if	we	think	that	 the	meaning	of	 ‘fish’	has	changed	as	a	result	of	people	coming	to	think	that	whales	are	not	fish.30	
In	recent	years	the	notions	of	semantic	change	and	stability	of	topic	have	gained	currency	as	a	 result	of	 the	 increased	popularity	of	 revisionary	projects	such	as	conceptual	 engineering.	 Sometimes	 our	 representational	 devices	 do	 not	 work	the	way	we	want	them	to.31	There	are	various	ways	in	which	such	devices	may	be	sub-optimal:	For	 instance,	our	words	may	 fail	 to	 refer;	or	 they	may	refer	 to	more	things	than	we	would	like	them	to;	or	they	may	fail	to	pick	out	things	that	should	be	in	their	extension;	they	may	have	negative	consequences	for	a	society	and	so	on.	Philosophers	are	not	merely	in	the	business	of	describing	the	nature	of	our	representational	devices	–	sometimes	they	ask	what	our	representational	devices	should	be	like.		
Revisionary	projects,	such	as	conceptual	engineering,	involve	changing	semantic	aspects	 of	 representational	 devices.	 There	 is,	 however,	 a	 worry	 that	 such	changes	will	 lead	to	a	change	in	subject	matter,	resulting	in	people	talking	past	each	 other	 and	providing	 solutions	 to	 problems	 other	 than	 the	 ones	 originally	posed.	 This	 is	 the	 Strawsonian	 challenge	 (c.f.	 Strawson	 1963).	 In	 order	 to	respond	 to	 this	 challenge,	 many	 philosophers	 nowadays	 (e.g.	 Sawyer	 2018,	Cappelen	2018)	think	that	there	may	be	a	continuity	of	topic	despite	a	change	in	semantic	properties.	In	the	last	chapter	of	this	thesis,	I	consider	some	prominent	theories	 of	 how	 to	 best	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 continuance	 of	 topics	despite	such	semantic	drift.	 I	will	say	more	about	this	discussion	as	well	as	my	argument	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 where	 I	 give	 an	 overview	 of	 each	 of	 the	 thesis	chapters.																																																										30	I	borrow	the	case	of	’fish’	from	Sainsbury	(2014).	31 	I	 use	 the	 term	 ’representational	 device’	 rather	 than	 ’concept’	 since	 the	 former	 is	 less	committing	and	theory-laden.		
INTRODUCTION		
	 39	
	
6.	Chapter	Overview	and	Summaries		
The	thesis	consists	of	four	papers.	The	first	three	papers	concern	coordination	in	thought.	 The	 fourth	 paper	 concerns	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 continuance-of-topic	relation.	 In	 what	 follows	 I	 will	 give	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 discussion	 and	argument	of	each	chapter	in	turn.	
	
6.1.	Chapter	1:	‘Mental	Files:	In	Defence	of	Pointer	Relations’	
The	 first	 chapter	proposes	a	novel	way	of	understanding	coordination.	 It	 takes	the	mental	 file	 picture	 (c.f.	 Recanati	 2012,	 2016)	 as	 an	 outset	 and	 develops	 a	more	parsimonious	framework	for	accounting	for	the	nature	of	coordination	in	thought.	I	argue	that	the	mental	file	framework	is	 insufficient	when	it	comes	to	accounting	 for	 coordination	 of	 relational	 predicates.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 relational	predicates	coordination	relations	obtain	across	distinct	files	and	the	mental	file	theorist	cannot	account	for	this	purely	in	terms	of	co-location	of	information	in	a	single	file.	
I	consider	various	responses	on	behalf	of	the	mental	file	theorist	and	argue	that	in	 order	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 coordination	 of	 relational	 predicates,	 the	 file	framework	must	 be	 supplemented	with	 further	machinery.	More	 specifically,	 I	argue	that	the	mental	file	theorist	is	forced	to	introduce	pointer	relations	in	order	to	 account	 for	 this	 phenomenon.	 Such	 pointer	 relations	 account	 for	 the	possibility	of	positive	coordination	across	distinct	files.	
I	 then	argue	 that	 this	 further	machinery,	 i.e.	 the	pointers,	 in	 effect	 renders	 the	files	 themselves	 superfluous	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 accounting	 for	 coordination	 in	general.	 If	 pointers	 can	 account	 for	 coordination	 across	 distinct	 files	 they	 can	also	account	 for	 coordination	within	 files.	 If	we	grant	 this,	 the	 files	 themselves	are	 no	 longer	 needed	 to	 account	 for	 coordination	 of	 one-place	 predicates.	We	may	give	a	unified	account	of	coordination	in	terms	of	pointer	relations	without	
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invoking	the	notion	of	a	mental	file.	I	conclude	that	we	ought	to	we	give	up	the	explanation	 of	 coordination	 in	 terms	 of	 co-location	 of	 information	 in	 files	 and	instead	adopt	a	relational	account	of	coordination	in	terms	of	pointer	relations.	
I	 call	 the	 proposed	 framework	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 (c.f.	 section	 4	 above).	 This	framework	 has	many	 common	 features	with	 the	mental	 file	 framework	 and	 is	developed	partly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 engagement	with	 the	 literature	on	mental	 files.	The	 main	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 frameworks	 is	 that	 the	 mental	 file	framework	 is	 an	 intrinsicalist	 framework	 while	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 is	 a	relational	framework.	The	mental	file	theorist	explains	coordination	in	terms	of	sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 files,	whereas	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 takes	 the	 pointer	relations	as	 representational	primitives	 that	 cannot	be	 reduced	 to	 sameness	of	intrinsic	features	of	mental	representations.	
In	chapter	1	I	spell	out	the	key	claims	of	Vehicle	Relationism.	However,	the	view	is	only	worked	out	in	detail	in	chapter	2.	Before	giving	an	overview	of	chapter	2,	let	 me	 make	 a	 brief	 terminological	 point.	 When	 discussing	 coordination	 in	Chapter	1	I	use	the	term	‘de	jure	co-reference’	rather	than	‘positive	coordination’.	The	 terms	 pick	 out	 the	 same	 phenomenon,	 namely	 the	 relation	 that	 warrants	trading	on	identity.32	The	reason	why	I	choose	to	use	this	term	in	the	discussion	of	 the	mental	 file	 framework	 is	 that	 this	 is	 the	 term	used	by	Recanati	 himself.	This	makes	the	discussion	and	references	to	the	mental	file	literature	flow	more	easily.	 I	 ask	 the	 reader	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 there	 is	 only	 a	 terminological	difference	 (hence,	 no	 substantial	 difference)	 between	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 and	
positive	coordination.	
	
6.2.	Chapter	2:	‘Vehicle	Relationism:	In	Defence	of	Pointer	Relations’	
The	 second	 chapter	 develops	 the	 framework	 suggested	 in	 Chapter	 1	 further.	Here	 I	 spell	 out	 the	 details	 concerning	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 mental	representations	 on	 this	 framework.	 The	 key	 claims	 of	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 are																																																									32	Recanati	also	notes	this	synonymy	when	he	says	that,	“’coordination’	 is	another	name	for	co-reference	de	jure”	(Recanati	2016,	33).	
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the	 following.	 First,	 coordination	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 primitive	relational	 features	 of	 thoughts.	 Second,	 such	 relations	 obtain	 between	representational	vehicles.	I	develop	the	details	of	Vehicle	Relationism	by	appeal	to	the	notion	of	pointer	relations	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 use	 the	 positive	 view	 to	 account	 for	 certain	 long-standing	puzzles	within	the	philosophy	of	mind,	such	as	Frege’s	Puzzle	as	well	as	Kripke’s	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	I	argue	that	in	order	to	solve	these	puzzles	we	need	only	appeal	to	relational	differences	of	the	relevant	mental	representations.	
I	then	compare	the	positive	view	to	similar	views,	such	as	Heck’s	(2012)	Formal	
Relationism,	 Fodor’s	 (1975,	 2008)	 LOTH,	 and	 Fine’s	 (2007)	 Semantic	Relationism.	The	key	claim	of	Heck’s	formal	relationism	is	that	all	that	is	needed	to	 account	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	 is	 relational	 differences	 between	 the	 relevant	thoughts.	Heck	does	not	say	much	about	how	to	implement	such	relations.	They	do,	 however,	 say	 that	 they	 have	 an	 inclination	 to	 think	 that	 “the	 language	 of	thought	 hypothesis	 is	 true	 and	 that	 formal	 relations	 supervene	 on	 Mentalese	syntax”	 (Heck	 2012,	 159).	While	 I	 agree	with	 Heck’s	 general	 observation	 that	relational	aspects	of	thought	are	sufficient	to	explain	the	Fregean	data,	I	disagree	with	 their	 view	 about	 how	 to	 implement	 such	 relations	 if	 the	 syntax	 of	 the	language	 of	 thought	 is	 construed	 according	 to	 Fodor’s	 intrinsicalist	 view.	 This	leads	to	a	comparison	between	Fodor’s	LOTH	and	Vehicle	Relationism.	
As	we	have	seen,	Fodor’s	LOTH	and	Vehicle	Relationism	agree	on	several	central	issues.	 The	 key	 difference	 concerns	 how	 the	 two	 frameworks	 understand	 the	language	of	 thought.	Fodor	takes	the	elements	of	 the	 language	of	 thought	to	be	highly	 similar	 to	 sentences	 and	 words	 in	 natural	 language	 and	 thus	 takes	coordination	to	be	explained	in	terms	of	sameness	of	types	(which	is	determined	by	 something	 akin	 to	 shapes)	 of	 the	 “words”	 in	 the	 language	 of	 thought.	 In	contrast,	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 takes	 the	 relational	 aspect	 of	 mental	representations	 to	be	 representationally	primitive	 and	an	essential	 constituent	of	 the	 language	 of	 thought.	 On	 this	 view,	 the	 cognitive	 system	 “reads	 off”	 the	pointer	 relations	 directly,	 rather	 than	 recognizing	 coordination	 as	 a	 result	 of	encountering	the	same	or	different	symbols	in	the	language	of	thought.	
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Finally,	 I	 compare	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 to	 Semantic	 Relationism.	 I	 point	 to	problems	 with	 Semantic	 Relationism	 that	 are	 easily	 avoided	 by	 the	 proposed	account.	In	short,	I	argue	that	it	is	puzzling	how	coordinated	propositions	can	be	transparent	 to	 thinkers	 whereas	 classical	 Millian/Russellian	 propositions	 are	not.	 I	also	argue	that	Vehicle	Relationism	is	more	metaphysically	parsimonious	than	Semantic	Relationism	and	that,	as	a	result,	Vehicle	Relationism	provides	a	better	picture	of	coordination	in	thought.	
	
6.3.	 Chapter	 3:	 ‘Originalism	 and	 Coordination	 in	 Thought:	 In	 Defence	 of	 Vehicle	
Relationism’	
Chapter	 3	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 line	with	 the	 former	 two	 chapters.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	offer	 criticisms	 of	 one	 particular	 account	 of	 coordination,	 namely	 Originalism	(c.f.	 section	 3.3.	 above).	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 Originalist	 fails	 to	 account	 for	coordination	 in	 thought	and	that	we	 instead	should	adopt	a	Vehicle	Relationist	account	of	such	coordination.	
I	consider	two	constraints	on	concept	individuation	that	are	generally	accepted	in	the	literature,	but	that	are	jointly	inconsistent.	First,	according	to	the	Publicity	
Constraint	 on	 concept	 individuation,	 the	 nature	 of	 concepts	must	 be	 such	 that	distinct	 individuals	 may	 use	 the	 same	 concept	 or	 concept	 tokens	 of	 the	 same	type.	This	constraint	calls	for	a	coarse-grained	individuation	of	concepts.	
The	second	constraint	 is	 the	Fregean	Constraint.	According	 to	 this	constraint,	a	difference	 in	the	cognitive	role	of	 thoughts	and	concepts	must	be	reflected	 in	a	difference	 in	 concepts	 or	 concept	 types	 (c.f.	 section	 2	 above).	 This	 constraint	requires	fine-grained	individuation	conditions	for	concepts.	The	two	constraints	are	thus	 in	tension	(c.f.	Crimmins	1992,	Heck	2002,	Laurence	&	Margolis	2007,	Duahu	2012,	Onofri	2016).		
Given	 the	 nature	 of	 Originalism,	 the	 framework	 seems	 prima	 facie	 promising	when	it	comes	to	accounting	for	the	two	constraints.	First,	the	framework	takes	concepts	 (types)	 to	 be	 public	 and	 hence	 shareable.	 This	 is	 promising	 when	 it	
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comes	 to	 accounting	 for	 the	 Publicity	 Constraint.	 Second,	 the	 framework	 is	specifically	 branded	 as	 providing	 solutions	 to	 the	 longstanding	 puzzles	pertaining	to	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	It	should	therefore	be	able	to	account	for	the	Fregean	data.	
I	argue,	however,	that	Originalism	fails	to	provide	a	good	account	of	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	The	problem	is	that	the	Originalist	is	forced	to	say	that	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 concept	 type	 is	 not	 always	 transparent	 to	thinkers.	 Coordination	 relations	 are,	 however,	 always	 transparent.	 Hence,	Originalism	 fails	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 coordination	 and	 thus	 to	 give	 an	account	 of	 rational	 reasoning.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 framework	 fails	 to	 provide	satisfying	 solutions	 to	 classical	 puzzles	 of	 mind,	 such	 as	 Frege’s	 Puzzle	 and	Kripke’s	(1979)	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	
The	 problem	 posed	 for	 Originalism	 is	 a	 structural	 problem	 that	 affects	 any	theory	that	 takes	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	to	be	accounted	for	 in	terms	of	types	 of	 concepts,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 holds	 that	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	concept	types	is	not	transparent	to	thinkers.	I	suggest	a	minimal	addition	to	such	frameworks	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 account	 for	 a	 thinker’s	 rational	 cognitive	capacities.	I	propose	that	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	 of	 primitive	 relations	 (i.e.	 pointer	 relations)	 that	 obtain	 between	representational	 vehicles	 rather	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 features	 such	 as	representations	being	of	 the	same	type.	This	opens	up	the	possibility	of	having	coarse-grained	 individuation	 conditions	 for	 concepts	 (and	 thus	 respect	 the	Publicity	Constraint	on	concept	individuation),	and	at	the	same	time	do	justice	to	Frege’s	 observation	 without	 strictly	 speaking	 conforming	 to	 the	 Fregean	Constraint.		
	
6.4.	 Chapter	 4:	 ‘Staying	 on	 Topic:	 The	 Continuance-of-Topic	 Relation	 is	 Non-
Transitive’	
In	 chapter	 4	 I	 look	 at	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 continuance	 of	 topics	 in	 cases	 of	semantic	drift.	There	has	been	a	tendency	to	make	a	sharp	distinction	between,	
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on	the	one	hand,	cases	of	semantic	drift	where	the	topic	is	preserved	and,	on	the	other,	cases	of	semantic	drift	where	there	is	a	change	in	topics	(e.g.	Sawyer	2018,	Ball	 forthcoming).	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 accounting	 for	 continuance	 of	 topic	 the	dominant	 strategy	has	been	 to	 appeal	 to	 identity	of	 some	 sort.	 I	 show	 that	we	cannot	draw	a	clear	distinction	between	the	cases	of	semantic	drift	where	topics	are	preserved	and	those	where	they	are	not.	This	is	because	we	have	cases	that	in	some	sense	fall	 into	both	categories.	There	are	cases	of	semantic	drift	where	there	 is	 continuity	 of	 topic	 at	 any	 two	 minuscule	 time	 intervals	 through	 the	evolutionary	 chain	 of	 a	 term,	 but	 where	 there	 is	 discontinuity	 of	 topic	 at	 the	beginning	and	end	of	the	chain.	That	is,	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	non-transitive.	
By	 showing	 that	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 is	 non-transitive,	 I	 reveal	 a	structural	 problem	with	popular	 accounts	 of	 topic	 stability	 according	 to	which	continuance	of	topic	is	accounted	for	in	terms	of	identity	relations,	be	it	identity	of	 concepts	 (Sawyer	 2018,	 Richard	 forthcoming)	 or	 identity	 of	 meaning	 (Ball	forthcoming).	 I	 argue	 that	 all	 accounts	 that	 try	 to	 explain	 stability	 of	 topics	 in	terms	of	identity	relations	fail.	
Finally,	I	consider	Cappelen’s	(2018)	account	of	stability	of	topics,	and	argue	that	the	non-transitivity	of	 the	sameness-of-topic	relation	puts	some	restrictions	on	his	Contestation	Theory.	I	argue	that	a	consequence	of	the	finding	in	this	paper	is	that	 proponents	 of	 Cappelen’s	 Contestation	 Theory	 can	 only	 account	 for	continuance	of	topics	if	they	adopt	a	similarity	account	of	samesaying.	They	are	thus	forced	to	reject	Cappelen	&	Lepore’s	(2007)	argument	to	the	effect	that	the	samesaying	locution	is	necessarily	a	matter	of	identity.	
In	 the	 final	 section	 of	 this	 introduction	 chapter	 I	 will	 point	 to	 some	 of	 the	findings	 in	 this	 thesis.	 I	 will	 also	 suggest	 some	 future	 work	 based	 on	 these	findings.	
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7.	Findings	and	Further	Work		
The	thesis	proposes	a	novel	account	of	coordination	in	thought.	I	present	the	key	claims	of	Vehicle	Relationism	and	use	 it	 to	explain	 some	of	 the	 central	puzzles	pertaining	to	coordination	within	the	philosophy	of	mind.	I	compare	the	view	to	what	 I	 take	 to	 be	 the	 main	 competing	 frameworks	 given	 certain	 common	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	thoughts.	In	what	follows	I	will	point	to	some	of	the	 consequences	 of	 the	 proposed	 framework	 as	well	 as	 suggest	 some	 further	work.	
	
7.1.	Consequences	for	Trading	on	Identity	
One	interesting	consequence	of	Vehicle	Relationism	is	that,	if	correct,	the	validity	of	 an	 inference	and	 rational	 reasoning	 come	apart.	 In	presenting	 the	debate	 in	this	chapter	I	have	explained	the	relevant	notion	of	‘manifestness’	in	terms	of	its	role	 in	 giving	 warrant	 for	 an	 individual’s	 trading	 on	 identity.	 However,	 a	consequence	of	Vehicle	Relationism	is	that	one	may	be	warranted	in	trading	on	identity	 even	 in	 cases	where	 the	 relevant	 thoughts	 do	 not	 in	 fact	 concern	 the	same	individual	as	long	as	the	cognitive	system	(mistakenly)	treats	the	thoughts	as	 if	 they	 did	 concern	 the	 same	 referent.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 draw	 a	 distinction	between	manifest	and	apparent	co-reference:	
Manifest	 Co-reference:	 Two	mental	 representations	 are	manifestly	co-referential	if	and	only	if	they	are	positively	coordinated	and	share	reference.		
Apparent	Co-reference:	Two	mental	representations	are	apparently	co-referential	if	and	only	if	they	are	positively	coordinated	and	do	not	share	reference.		Both	 manifest	 and	 apparent	 co-reference	 are	 sub-classes	 of	 positive	coordination.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 warranted	 in	 trading	 on	 identity	 one	 only	 needs	positive	 coordination.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 apparent	 co-reference,	 someone	 may	 be	warranted	in	trading	on	identity	without	the	inference	being	valid.	The	semantic	
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constraint	 commonly	 taken	 to	 be	 the	mark	 of	 valid	 inferences	 says	 that,	 if	 the	premises	are	true,	then	so	necessarily	is	the	conclusion.	However,	in	the	case	of	apparent	 co-reference	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 premises	 are	 true,	 but	 that	 the	conclusion	is	false.	I	take	this	to	be	a	virtue	of	the	proposed	framework.	This	helps	us	explain	how	someone	 may	 reason	 in	 a	 rational	 way	 in	 cases	 of	 confusion.	 To	 illustrate,	suppose	 you	 see	 a	 snake	 on	 the	 ground	 and	 form	 the	 belief	 THAT	 SNAKE	 IS	VENOMOUS.	You	look	away	and	when	you	turn	back	you	see	what	you	take	to	be	the	same	snake	again	and	form	the	belief	THAT	SNAKE	ENJOYS	SUNBATHING.	You	would	then	be	rational	to	conclude	from	this	that	there	is	a	venomous	snake	that	enjoys	 sunbathing.	 However,	 unbeknownst	 to	 you,	 the	 apparent	 snake	 you’re	looking	at	turns	out	to	actually	be	two	distinct	snakes.	The	two	representations	are	positively	 coordinated	and	so	you	are	 rational	 in	 trading	on	 identity	 in	 the	inference.	However,	 since	 the	 two	positively	 coordinated	 representations	 refer	to	distinct	 individuals,	 the	argument	 is	not	valid.	A	consequence	of	 this	view	 is	that	positive	coordination	is	not	factive,	in	that	two	mental	representations	that	are	positively	coordinated	may	not	be	co-referential.	This	 contrasts	 with	 other	 views	 on	 coordination,	 such	 as	 Fine’s	 (2007)	 and	Recanati’s	(2016).	According	to	Fine,	positive	coordination	entails	co-reference:	“coordination	within	thought	is	taken	to	be	a	form	of	strict	co-representation,	in	analogy	 to	 […]	 coordination	 within	 language	 as	 a	 form	 of	 strict	 coreference”	(2007,	67),	and	“strict	co-reference	implies	coreference”	(Ibid.,	45).	In	the	case	of	the	snake	above,	he	would	either	have	to	claim	that	the	relevant	beliefs	are	not	positively	coordinated	or	that	they	actually	co-refer.33	
																																																								33	The	latter	alternative	seems	to	be	what	Fine	would	prefer.	He	might	say	that	all	three	tokens	of	THAT	 SNAKE	 in	 the	 beliefs	 figuring	 as	 premises	 and	 the	 conclusion	 have	 the	 same	 referent,	namely	 an	 amalgam	 of	 the	 two	 snakes:	 In	 cases	 of	 confusing	 two	 objects	 for	 one,	 ”we	 have	successful	 reference	 to	 some	 sort	 of	 amalgam	 of	 these	 objects”	 (Fine	 2007,	 126).	 Fine	 also	introduces	the	notion	of	putative	co-reference	which	corresponds	to	what	is	taken	to	be	a	matter	of	co-reference	from	the	subject’s	point	of	view.	This	notion	is	not	factive	(c.f.	Fine	2010b,	497).	Putative	coordination	explains	why	an	individual	may	trade	on	identity	in	cases	of	confusion.	In	such	 cases,	 the	 individual	 may	 trade	 on	 identity	 even	 though	 the	 relevant	 beliefs	 are	 not	positively	coordinated	(since	positive	coordination	is	a	matter	of	strict	co-reference	on	his	view).	I	 do,	 however,	 think	 that	 in	 order	 for	 coordination	 to	 be	 the	 right	 notion	 to	 explain	 cognitive	significance	 in	 general	 (including	 cases	 of	 confusion	 such	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	 inverse	Paderewski	puzzles	(c.f.	Recanati	2012,	115—116))	warrant	in	trading	on	identity	and	positive	coordination	should	not	come	apart.	
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Similarly,	 Recanati	 takes	 positive	 coordination	 to	 be	 factive.	 He	 takes	 positive	coordination	to	be	a	matter	of	knowledge	such	that,	if	two	terms	or	token	mental	representations	are	positively	coordinated	the	thinker	knows	that	they	co-refer	if	both	refer.34	He	thus	denies	that	cases	of	confusion,	such	as	the	one	involving	the	snake	above,	 involve	 reference	 to	 two	distinct	 referents.	 Instead,	he	would	 say	that	only	 the	 first	 token	of	 THAT	SNAKE	refers	 to	 the	 snake,	whereas	 the	other	fails	 to	 refer.	 He	 says	 that	 “if	 the	 subject	 is	 confused,	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 two	
singular	terms	must	fail	to	refer”	(Recanati	2016,	28).		
The	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 account	 of	 coordination	 thus	 differs	 from	 the	 accounts	offered	by	Fine	and	Recanati	in	that	the	Vehicle	Relationist	does	not	take	positive	coordination	 to	 be	 factive	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 yields	 (possibly	 conditional)	knowledge	of	co-reference.		
The	 fact	 that	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 positive	coordination	(and	hence	warrant	 in	 trading	on	 identity)	despite	a	difference	 in	referential	content	makes	the	view	similar	to	Lawlor’s	2010	account	of	 internal	
co-reference.35	According	to	Lawlor’s	account	“we	might	understand	internal	co-reference	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 chaining	 relation	 among	 token	 expressions	 in	 thought	and	language,	with	no	implication	of	successful	reference”	(2010,	493).	Lawlor’s	account	differs	from	that	of	Vehicle	Relationism	in	that	she	takes	such	chains	to	obtain	at	the	semantic	level.	
On	the	proposed	framework,	then,	we	only	get	validity	in	the	case	of	manifest	co-reference.	Only	in	the	case	of	manifest	co-reference	does	the	thinker	potentially	get	 new	 knowledge	 through	 an	 inference.	 But	 rationality	may	 endure	 even	 in	cases	where	this	is	not	the	case.	On	this	picture,	then,	the	notion	of	coordination	in	thought	is	first	and	foremost	tied	in	with	the	rationality	of	an	inference	–	the	class	of	inferences	that	yield	knowledge	(in	the	relevant	way)	is	only	a	subclass																																																									34	On	 this	 picture,	 positive	 coordination	 entails	 knowledge	 of	 conditional	 co-reference,	 i.e.	 that	there	is	co-reference	if	the	concepts	refer	at	all	(c.f.	Recanati	2016,	21).	35	See	 Lawlor	 (2010)	 for	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 this	 is	 the	 correct	 understanding	 of	 positive	coordination.	She	argues	that	we	need	“a	substantive	characterization	that	permits	us	to	say	how	inferences	 might	 be	 warranted	 from	 the	 subject’s	 point	 of	 view	 even	 if	 they’re	 not	 truth-preserving	 [and]	 strict	 coreference	doesn’t	work	 for	 confused	 inference”	 (2010,	493).	 See	Fine	(2010b)	for	a	response	to	Lawlor’s	argument.		
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of	inferences	that	involve	positive	coordination.	
	
7.2.	Consequences	for	the	Notion	of	a	Concept	
Another	 consequence	 of	 the	 view	proposed	 and	defended	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	talk	about	concepts	as	 the	constituents	of	 thoughts	 is	 less	explanatorily	 fruitful	than	 often	 assumed.	 What	 would	 talk	 about	 concepts	 even	 amount	 to	 on	 the	Vehicle	 Relationist	 account,	 one	 may	 ask.	 The	 question	 is	 a	 difficult	 one.	 One	possibility	 is	 to	 take	concepts	 to	be	mental	 tags.	Mental	 tags	are	 the	bearers	of	semantic	 content,	 and	 the	 content	 of	 a	 thought	 depends	 on	 the	 constituent	mental	tags	of	that	thought	and	how	they	are	structured.	If	we	take	concepts	to	be	tags	of	this	kind,	talk	of	concepts	provides	just	another	way	to	(indirectly)	talk	about	the	content	of	thoughts.	The	question,	then,	is	what	explanatory	work	this	further	notion	of	a	concept	might	do	that	could	not	be	done	equally	well	by	direct	appeal	 to	 the	 content	of	 the	 tags.	Further,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 traditional	 job	description	 usually	 assigned	 to	 concepts,	 such	 as	 accounting	 for	 cognitive	significance,	 mental	 tags	 do	 not	 in	 and	 of	 themselves	 play	 an	 interesting	explanatory	role.	Such	explanatory	tasks	pertaining	to	coordination	are	all	done	by	the	primitive	pointer	relations.	Another	possibility,	then,	is	to	take	concepts	to	be	pointer	relations.	This,	however,	would	lead	to	another	non-traditional	view	of	the	nature	of	concepts.	Concepts	are	usually	taken	to	be	the	sort	of	things	that	can	 be	 given	 individuation	 conditions.	 However,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 pointer	relations,	 talk	 about	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 types	 is	 misguided.	 Pointer	relations	 are	 specific	 instantiations	 of	 coordination	 relations	 in	 the	 mind	 of	single	 individuals.	 There	 is	 not	 much	 sense	 to	 be	 made	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 two	(token)	pointer	relations	being	of	the	same	type.		
The	notion	of	a	concept	can,	and	has	been,	understood	 in	a	variety	of	different	ways.	 Sometimes	 concepts	 are	 taken	 to	be	public	 and	 sharable	 and	 sometimes	they	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 individual	 and	 hence	 non-sharable.	 By	 adopting	 Vehicle	Relationism	we	may,	 so	 to	 speak,	 free	 the	notion	of	 ‘concepts’	 usually	 taken	 to	account	 for	 intrapersonal	workings	and	 reserve	 the	notion	 for	 the	explanatory	
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purposes	pertaining	to	interpersonal	phenomena.	The	result	would	be	that	there	would	no	longer	be	a	tension	between	the	Publicity	Constraint	and	the	Fregean	Constraint	on	concept	individuation	(c.f.	Crimmins	1992,	Heck	2002,	Laurence	&	Margolis	 2007,	 Duahu	 2012,	 Onofri	 2016),	 since	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 could	then	be	abandoned.	I	say	more	about	this	in	chapter	3	of	this	thesis.	
In	the	remaining	part	of	this	chapter	I	will	suggest	further	work	prompted	by	the	positive	proposal	in	this	thesis.	
	
7.3.	Further	Work:	Empirical	Findings	in	Psychology	
In	Chapter	1,	 I	argue	 that	explaining	coordination	 in	 terms	of	pointer	 relations	renders	the	mental	file	framework	superfluous.	The	files	are,	however,	designed	to	do	more	than	just	account	for	coordination.	Since	the	central	topic	of	the	three	first	papers	concerns	the	nature	of	coordination	in	thought	I	focus	specifically	on	this	 explanatory	 task	when	 discussing	 the	mental	 file	 framework.	 However,	 in	general,	 the	 frameworks	 are	 so	 similar	 that	 I	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 one	cannot	 do	 with	 pointers	 what	 has	 previously	 been	 done	 with	 files.	 But	 this	obviously	requires	discussion	going	beyond	what	I	consider	in	the	present	thesis.	
One	use	of	mental	 files	 that	 I	 find	particularly	 interesting	 is	 the	deployment	of	the	 framework	 in	 explaining	 the	 cognitive	 development	 of	 young	 children	 in	child	 psychology.	 In	 particular,	 psychologists	 have	 employed	 the	 notion	 of	 a	mental	 file	 in	 attempting	 to	 account	 for	 young	 children’s	 ability	 to	 pass	 false	belief	 tasks	(c.f.	Perner	et.al.	2015).	Future	development	of	Vehicle	Relationism	may	involve	an	assessment	as	to	whether	the	proposed	framework	can	perform	similar	 jobs.	 It	would,	 in	general,	be	interesting	to	see	how	well	the	framework	fits	 with	 empirical	 findings	 in	 psychology.	 This	 is	 one	 direction	which	 further	research	into	the	nature	of	pointer	relation	may	take.	
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7.4.	Further	Work:	Coordination	in	Language		
Another	 direction	 which	 future	 work	 on	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 may	 take	 is	research	 into	 the	 possible	 implication	 of	 the	 framework	 for	 coordination	 in	language.	In	this	thesis	I	focus	on	coordination	in	thought	rather	than	in	natural	languages.	 Given	 the	 close	 connection	 between	 thought	 and	 language,	 further	research	into	the	proposed	framework	might	give	new	insights	into	coordination	in	language	as	well.		
Here	 are	 some	 interesting	 questions	 concerning	 coordination	 that	 I	 will	 not	consider	 in	 much	 detail	 in	 this	 thesis:	 What	 is	 the	 connection	 between	coordination	in	thought	and	coordination	in	language?	Do	we	need	two	separate	frameworks	 in	 order	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 coordination	 in	 both	 realms?	 	 Can	coordination	 in	 thought	 and	 language	 come	 apart	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 someone	may	utter	a	negatively	coordinated	sentence	to	express	a	positively	coordinated	thought	and	vice	versa?	If	so,	what	is	the	coordinative	status	of	the	utterance	as	a	whole?	
Although	 the	 two	domains	 are	 closely	 related,	 I	 take	 it	 to	 be	unproblematic	 to	propose	an	account	of	coordination	in	thought	without	reference	to	coordination	in	 language	 in	 the	way	 done	 in	 this	 thesis.	 It	 seems	 plausible	 that	 Recanati	 is	right	when	he	claims	that	“coreference	de	jure,	even	though	it	manifests	itself	in	language,	is	first	and	foremost	a	phenomenon	at	the	level	of	thought”	(Recanati	2016,	 10).36,37	If	 this	 is	 right,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 one	 may	 develop	 an	 account	 of	coordination	 in	 thought	without	 reference	 to	 coordination	 in	natural	 language.	However,	it	would	seem	to	follow	that	the	converse	is	not	possible.	According	to	the	 mental	 file	 framework,	 “coreference	 de	 jure	 at	 the	 language	 level	 is	 to	 be	accounted	 for	 in	 terms	of	deployment	of	 the	 same	 file	 in	 thought.	The	 identity	which	grounds	coreference	de	jure	is	not	the	identity	of	expressions	but	identity																																																									36	Again,	de	jure	co-reference	is	the	same	as	positive	coordination.	37	Burge	(1979)	argues	that	even	Frege	was	primarily	interested	in	thoughts	when	he	developed	his	 account	 of	 sense:	 “Frege	 was	 primarily	 interested	 in	 the	 eternal	 structure	 of	 thought,	 of	cognitive	 contents,	 not	 in	 conventional	 linguistic	 meaning.	 He	 pursued	 this	 interest	 by	investigating	the	structure	of	language,	and	much	of	his	work	may	be	seen	as	directly	relevant	to	theories	of	linguistic	meaning.	But	the	epistemic	orientation	of	his	theorizing	leads	to	a	notion	of	sense	with	a	different	theoretical	function	from	modern	notions	of	meaning”	(1979,	398-399).	 	
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of	the	mental	file	associated	with	them”	(Recanati	2016,	12).	So	for	instance,	the	positive	 coordination	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 anaphoric	 statement,	 such	 as	 “Lisa	 is	home.	 She	 never	 left”	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 same	 mental	 file	 being	associated	with	both	‘Lisa’	and	‘She’.	That,	of	course,	is	not	to	say	that	the	identity	at	 the	 conceptual	 level	 cannot	 be	 encoded	 by	 the	 syntax	 of	 natural	 language.	Recanati	 suggests	 that	 there	 may	 be	 “recurrence	 constraints	 on	 conceptual	
elements	[…]	encoded	in	the	syntax	of	natural	language”	(Ibid.,	10).		
A	 similar	 explanation	 is	 available	 to	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist.	 On	 this	 view,	 one	may	hold	that	coordination	in	language	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	pointer	relations	 between	 the	 mental	 representations	 associated	 with	 the	 relevant	terms.	So,	for	instance,	in	the	case	of	a	statement	such	as	“Lisa	is	home.	She	never	left”,	‘Lisa’	is	associated	with	one	particular	mental	tag	instantiation	and	‘She’	is	associated	with	another	 instantiated	mental	 tag,	and	these	two	mental	 tags	are	connected	by	a	pointer.	The	pointer	relation	may	be	encoded	by	the	syntax	of	the	sentence,	but	ultimately	the	explanation	of	coordination	of	anaphoric	statements	depends	 on	 coordination	 in	 thought.	 Although	 this	 picture	 of	 coordination	 in	language	 fits	well	with	 the	 proposed	 framework,	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 is	 not	committed	to	this	particular	view	on	coordination	in	language.		
	
7.5.	Further	Work:	Understanding	the	Exact	Nature	of	the	Pointer	Relations	
I	have	said	that	 the	pointer	relation	 is	a	primitive	relation.	By	this,	 I	mean	that	the	pointers	are	representationally	primitive.	That	is,	they	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 intrinsic	 representational	 features	 of	 concepts	 and	thoughts.	The	pointers	are	a	representationally	irreducible	part	of	the	language	of	thought.		
That,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 pointer	 relations	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	sameness	or	difference	in	any	property.	I	have	not	said	anything	about	how	the	pointer	 picture	may	 be	 neurologically	 implemented,	 and	make	 no	 claim	 about	this	matter	in	this	thesis.	It	might	very	well	be	that	the	pointers	ultimately	obtain	
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or	 fail	 to	 obtain	 as	 a	 result	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 neurological	 firings.	 I	leave	this	as	a	topic	for	future	work.		
Although	 there	 is	 still	more	work	 to	be	done,	 I	 think	 the	 findings	 in	 this	 thesis	provide	a	foundation	for	such	future	enquiry.	
	
	
	
	
		
	 1			De	Jure	Co-Reference:	In	Defence	of	Pointers	
	
According	 to	 the	 popular	 Mental	 File	 view,	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 is	 to	 be	
accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 co-location	 of	 information	within	mental	 files.	 In	
this	paper	I	argue	that	the	mental	file	theorist	faces	problems	in	accounting	
for	de	jure	co-reference	of	relational	predicates	in	this	way.	I	show	that	in	the	
case	of	relational	predicates	she	is	forced	to	postulate	a	further	notion	–	the	
notion	of	a	pointer	relation	–	to	give	an	account	of	how	de	jure	co-reference	
may	obtain	between	pieces	of	 information	across	distinct	 files.	 I	 then	argue	
that	it	is	this	notion	and	not	the	notion	of	a	file	that	accounts	for	de	jure	co-
reference.	 The	 resulting	 view	 is	 a	 version	 of	 relationism,	 but	 it	 differs	 from	
other	versions	of	relationism	in	that	the	relevant	relations	hold	at	the	level	of	
representational	vehicles	rather	than	at	the	level	of	content.		
	
1.	Introduction	
This	paper	offers	 an	 account	 of	 samethinking.	As	 I	 use	 the	 term,	 samethinking	occurs	 whenever	 two	 thoughts	 concern	 the	 same	 referent.1	There	 are	 two																																																									1	By	‘thoughts’,	I	have	in	mind	psychologically	instantiated	mental	representations.	It	is	natural	to	think	 I	 thus	 have	 in	 mind	 thought	 tokens.	 However,	 I	 avoid	 framing	 the	 problem	 in	 terms	 of	thought	types	and	tokens.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this:	(i)	it	is	controversial	what	the	nature	of	
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different	 ways	 in	 which	 this	 can	 occur.	 First,	 there	 are	 cases	 in	 which	 co-reference	 is	manifest	 to	 the	 subject.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 thinker	 is	warranted	 in	trading	 on	 identity	 and	 thereby	 in	 inferentially	 exploiting	 the	 sameness	 of	reference	(c.f.	Campbell	1987,	1994,	2002).	Two	thoughts	that	are	related	in	this	way	 are	 de	 jure	 co-referential.	 Second,	 there	 are	 cases	 in	 which	 two	 thoughts	concern	the	same	referent,	but	where	the	sameness	of	reference	is	not	manifest	to	the	subject.	In	such	cases,	the	subject	is	not	warranted	in	trading	on	identity.	Such	thoughts	are	de	facto	co-referential.	This	means	that	two	pairs	of	thoughts	that	 are	 referentially	 equivalent	 may	 nonetheless	 play	 different	 roles	 in	cognition,	depending	on	whether	they	are	de	jure	or	de	facto	co-referential.	The	question	of	how	 to	 account	 for	 the	difference	between	de	jure	and	de	facto	co-reference	has	been	at	the	centre	of	many	debates	within	philosophy	of	language	and	mind	since	Frege	(1892).	The	account	of	samethinking	I	offer	 in	this	paper	claims	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 de	 jure	 and	 de	 facto	 co-reference	 is	 to	 be	understood	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 irreducible	 relation	 –	 the	 pointer	
relation	–	that	holds	at	the	level	of	representational	vehicles.2	
We	may	distinguish	between	two	classes	of	views	about	the	difference	between	
de	jure	and	de	facto	co-reference.	On	the	one	hand,	there	are	those	who	hold	that	the	 difference	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	properties,	 i.e.	 properties	 that	 do	 not	 concern	 relations	 to	 other	representations.3	I	will	call	such	views	intrinsicalist	views:		
Intrinsicalism:	The	difference	between	de	jure	co-reference	and	de	facto	co-reference	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	properties.																																																																																																																																																																the	type/token	distinction	is,	and	(ii)	the	notions	cannot	be	straightforwardly	applied	within	the	framework	 I	will	 develop	 in	 this	 paper.	 Further,	 in	 this	 paper	 I	 focus	 on	 singular	 thoughts,	 i.e.	thoughts	that	concern	a	single	entity	in	an	unmediated	way.	When	I	talk	about	reference,	I	thus	have	 in	mind	 the	 relation	between	a	mental	 representation	and	 the	 entity	 it	 represents	 rather	than	linguistic	reference.	2	By	this,	I	mean	that	the	relevant	relations	are	representationally	primitive.	That	is,	the	relations	cannot	be	 reduced	 to	 sameness	or	difference	 in	 intrinsic	 representational	 features	 of	 concepts	and	thoughts.		3	Importantly,	 on	 this	 construal	 having	 a	 reference	 is	 considered	 an	 intrinsic	 representational	feature	of	concepts	on	views	that	hold	 that	having	a	reference	does	not	depend	on	relations	 to	other	 representations.	 Exceptions	 include	 views	 according	 to	 which	 reference	 is	 determined	holistically,	i.e.	not	independently	of	the	content	of	other	representations.	
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 are	 those	 who	 hold	 that	 samethinking	 cannot	 be	accounted	 for	 purely	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features	 (c.f.	 Fine	2007,	Pinillos	2011).	According	to	such	views,	the	difference	between	de	jure	and	
de	 facto	 co-reference	 is	 essentially	 a	 matter	 of	 relational	 representational	features.	Whether	or	not	two	thoughts	are	de	jure	co-referential	depends	on	how	the	 thoughts	are	 related,	and	such	relations	cannot	be	 reduced	 to	 sameness	or	difference	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features.	 Such	 views	 are	 often	 labelled	
relationist	views:	
Relationism:	 The	 difference	 between	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 and	 de	 facto	 co-reference	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 irreducible	 relational	representational	features.		
I	 will	 motivate	 a	 version	 of	 relationism	 by	 criticising	 a	 particular	 strand	 of	intrinsicalist	 views,	 according	 to	which	 samethinking	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	terms	of	co-location	of	information	within	mental	files	(c.f.	Perry	1980,	Recanati	2012,	2016).	 I	argue	 that	on	 the	assumption	 that	we	want	a	unified	account	of	samethinking,	such	views	collapse	into	relationism.	I	then	develop	a	new	account	of	samethinking	in	terms	of	pointer	relations.		
	
2.	De	Jure	Co-Reference:	The	Phenomenon	
Two	sets	of	thoughts	may	be	referentially	equivalent	but	still	play	different	roles	in	 cognition.	 Assuming	 Millian/Russellianism	 about	 mental	 content	 (as	 I	 will	throughout	 this	 paper),4	if	 two	 inferences	 are	 referentially	 equivalent	 then	necessarily	if	one	of	them	is	truth-preserving	so	is	the	other.	Even	so,	one	of	the	inferences	may	turn	out	to	be	rationally	warranted	while	the	other	is	not.	That	is,	the	fact	that	a	certain	inference	is	truth-preserving	does	not	guarantee	that	the	inference	 is	 rationally	 warranted.	 Whether	 or	 not	 an	 inference	 is	 rationally	warranted	 depends,	 at	 least	 partly,	 on	 the	 way	 the	 referent	 is	 represented	 in	thought.	The	two	following	sets	of	beliefs	are	referentially	equivalent,	but	only	a																																																									4	More	 on	Millian/Russellianism	 and	my	motivation	 for	 assuming	 this	 view	 in	 section	 2	 in	 the	introduction	chapter.	
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subject	holding	the	first	set	of	beliefs	can	combine	the	beliefs	in	a	generalization:	[CICERO	WAS	ROMAN,	CICERO	WAS	AN	ORATOR],	[CICERO	WAS	ROMAN,	TULLY	WAS	AN	 ORATOR].	 For	 someone	 who	 only	 has	 the	 second	 pair	 of	 beliefs,	 the	generalization	 that	 someone	 is	 a	 Roman	 orator	 would	 only	 be	 rationally	warranted	 if	 she	 has	 the	 further	 belief	 CICERO	 =	 TULLY.	 In	 contrast,	 a	generalization	 from	 the	 first	 set	 of	 beliefs	 does	 not	 require	 any	 identity	judgements,	since	the	identity	is	manifest	to	the	thinker:	In	the	case	of	de	jure	co-reference,	the	thinker	knows	a	priori	that	the	relevant	terms	co-refer.5		
To	see	the	 importance	of	 the	phenomenon	at	hand,	 imagine	 if	 individuals	were	never	 rationally	 warranted	 in	 trading	 on	 identity	 of	 co-reference.	 What	 if	 all	rational	 inferences	 essentially	 required	 identity	 judgements?	 In	 the	 case	considered	above,	a	thinker	who	holds	the	first	set	of	beliefs	would	have	to	make	a	 judgement	 of	 the	 form	 CICERO	 =	 CICERO	 in	 order	 to	 rationally	 make	 the	generalization.	But	 if	 this	was	 the	 case	we	encounter	problems	when	 trying	 to	explain	 how	 this	 can	 have	 any	 effect	 on	 the	 inference:	 How	 can	 the	 subject	inferentially	exploit	this	information	if	she	can’t	trade	on	identity	of	the	concepts	occurring	 in	 the	 identity	 statement	 and	 the	 concept	 occurrences	 in	 the	 initial	beliefs?	If	there	were	no	trading	on	identity	we	would	have	to	account	for	this	in	terms	 of	 yet	 further	 identity	 judgements,	 but	 this	would	 just	 generate	 further	problems	of	the	same	nature.	Hence,	accounting	for	all	cases	of	knowledge	of	co-reference	 in	 terms	 of	 identity	 judgements	 is	 hopeless.	 There	must	 be	 cases	 in	which	 we	 can	 simply	 trade	 directly	 on	 identity	 of	 co-reference	 and	 these	 are	cases	where	the	co-reference	is	manifest	co-reference,	i.e.	de	jure	co-reference.6	
In	 the	case	of	natural	 language	 the	paradigmatic	case	of	de	jure	co-reference	 is	the	 case	 of	 anaphora.	 Someone	 who	 fully	 understands	 the	 sentence	 “Cicero	admired	 himself”	 cannot	 fail	 to	 know	 that	 “Cicero”	 and	 “himself”	 refer	 to	 the	same	individual.	In	contrast,	someone	may	fully	understand	the	sentence	“Cicero	admired	 Tully”	 without	 knowing	 that	 “Cicero”	 and	 “Tully”	 refer	 to	 the	 same	individual.	However,	as	Lawlor	(2002)	points	out,	it	is	doubtful	whether	there	is																																																									5	In	Chapter	2	I	will	qualify	this	claim.	For	now,	I	stick	to	Recanati’s	specific	understanging	of	de	
jure	co-reference.	Nothing	in	this	paper	hangs	on	this.	6	See	Campbell	(1994)	for	more	on	this.	
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anything	 that	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 anaphora	 in	 thought.	 Why	 think	 that	 we	 use	anaphoric	 concepts	 rather	 than	 simply	 reuse	 the	 relevant	 non-anaphoric	concept?	 The	 latter	 makes	 for	 a	 much	 more	 economical	 theory	 of	 mental	representations.	 In	 his	 (2016),	 Recanati	 suggests	 that	 whenever	 there	 is	anaphora	in	natural	language,	this	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	sameness	at	the	 conceptual	 level:	 ”The	 expressions	 ’John’	 and	 ’he’	 are	 not	 the	 same,	 in	 the	ordinary	sense	of	’expression’,	but	they	are	associated	with	the	same	conceptual	representation,	and	that	is	what	coindexing	indicates”	(2016,	9).7	Hence,	on	this	view,	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 anaphora	 in	 language	 is	 not	 mirrored	 in	 thought.	Instead	 it	must	be	explained	 in	 terms	of	a	 recurrence	of	 the	 same	concept	 (i.e.	file)	in	thought.	
Even	 if	 we	 do	 not	 find	 anaphora	 in	 thought,	 there	 is	 still	 something	 worth	labelling	de	jure	co-reference:	As	we	have	seen,	in	order	for	rational	reasoning	to	get	 off	 the	 ground,	we	must	 allow	 for	 cases	 in	which	 sameness	 of	 reference	 is	manifest	 to	 the	 thinker.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 sameness	 of	reference	is	not	enough	to	guarantee	that	a	thinker	will	know	that	two	concepts	are	co-referential.	Hence	there	must	be	something	more	to	the	nature	of	thought	beyond	 reference	 that	 explains	 why,	 in	 certain	 cases,	 co-reference	 is	manifest	while	in	other	cases	it	is	not.	In	this	paper	I	suggest	a	novel	way	of	understanding	what	 this	 ‘something	 more’	 can	 plausibly	 be.	 But	 before	 laying	 out	 my	 own	account,	 I	will	 critically	assess	an	alternative	account	 that	has	 received	a	 lot	of	attention	in	recent	years,	namely	the	mental	file	theory.	
	
3.	De	Jure	Co-Reference	and	Mental	Files	
According	 to	 the	 mental	 file	 framework,	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 is	 explained	 in	terms	 of	 information	 clustering	 within	 mental	 files:	 All	 pieces	 of	 information	contained	within	a	single	file	are	de	jure	co-referential.	What	file	a	given	piece	of	information	 is	 stored	 in	 wholly	 depends	 on	 the	 acquaintance	 relation	 (or	
																																																								7	This	is	put	in	contrast	with	Fiengo	and	May	(1996,	1998),	according	to	whom	anaphora	involve	retokening	a	linguistic	expression	of	the	same	type.	
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epistemically	rewarding	relations,	as	Recanati	(2012)	calls	them)	through	which	it	was	 gained.	All	 pieces	 of	 information	 gained	 through	 the	 same	acquaintance	relation	 go	 into	 the	 same	 file	 and	 thereby	become	de	 jure	co-referential.	 Being	gained	 through	 a	 given	 acquaintance	 relation	 counts	 as	 an	 intrinsic	representational	 feature.	 This	 is	 because	 being	 gained	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 given	acquaintance	 relation	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 relations	 to	 other	 representations.	Likewise,	being	stored	in	a	given	file	does	not	depend	on	relations	to	the	other	pieces	of	information	that	may	be	in	that	file.	Since	the	explanation	of	de	jure	co-reference	is	given	in	terms	of	sameness	of	intrinsic	representational	features,	the	mental	file	picture	is	an	intrinsicalist	view	about	de	jure	co-reference.	
A	mental	file	contains	information	in	the	form	of	predicates	taken	by	the	subject	to	 be	 satisfied	 by	 the	 referent	 of	 a	 file.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 my	mental	 file	 about	Cicero	contains	information	such	as	‘was	Roman’,	‘was	an	orator’,	and	so	on.	On	this	picture,	two	pieces	of	information,	i	and	j,	are	de	jure	co-referential	if	“i	and	j	occur	 in	 the	 same	 file	 without	 the	 benefit	 of	 a	 prior	 judgement	 of	 identity”	(Recanati	2012,	95).8	This	means	that	the	fact	that	the	two	pieces	of	information	‘was	Roman’	and	‘was	an	orator’	are	stored	within	one	and	the	same	file	is	what	warrants	an	inference	directly	from	this	to	the	conclusion	that	one	and	the	same	person	was	a	Roman	orator.	So,	on	this	picture	every	piece	of	information	that	is	taken	to	concern	the	same	referent	is	stored	within	the	same	file.9		
In	 contrast,	 two	 pieces	 of	 information	 being	 stored	 in	 distinct	 files	 is	 an	indication	that	the	information	is	taken	to	concern	two	different	referents.	Let’s	say	 that	 instead	 of	 having	 both	 ‘was	Roman’	 and	 ‘was	 an	 orator’	 stored	 in	 the																																																									8	To	say	that	two	pieces	of	information	are	de	jure	co-referential	might	seem	like	an	odd	way	of	expressing	 the	 point,	 but	 the	 idea	 is	 simply	 that	 in	 such	 cases	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 two	 pieces	 of	information	regard	the	same	referent	is	manifest	to	the	thinker.	I	borrow	this	terminology	from	Recanati	(2012,	2016).	9	This	 picture	 becomes	 a	 bit	more	 complicated	 on	 Recanati’s	 account,	 according	 to	which	 two	pieces	 of	 information	 might	 be	 taken	 to	 concern	 the	 same	 referent	 as	 a	 result	 of	 an	 identity	judgement	 and	 still	 they	 need	 not	 be	 stored	 in	 the	 same	mental	 file.	 In	 such	 cases	 there	 is	 an	operation	on	files	that	allows	for	information	to	be	shared,	but	that	does	not	need	to	entail	that	every	piece	of	information	is	actually	stored	in	the	same	file.	For	more	on	this	operation,	called	
linking,	 see	Recanati	 (2012,	 42-53).	 For	 an	 alternative	 view	on	how	 to	 account	 on	 informative	identity	judgements	on	the	mental	file	view	see	Lockwood	(1971),	Strawson	(1974)	and	Recanati	(2016).	 According	 to	 such	 views,	 informative	 identity	 judgements	 are	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	terms	of	merging	of	 two	 (or	more)	 files.	 For	 criticism	of	 the	merge	model,	 see	Millikan	 (1997,	508).		
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same	 file,	 I	have	 the	 first	predicate	 stored	 in	 the	CICERO	file	 (i.e.	 a	 singular	 file	referring	to	Cicero)	and	the	second	predicate	stored	in	another	file,	namely	my	TULLY	file	(i.e.	another	singular	file	that	also	refers	to	Cicero).	Let’s	also	assume	that	I	am	not	aware	that	Cicero	is	Tully.	Now,	since	the	two	pieces	of	information	are	stored	in	distinct	files,	I	am	not	warranted	in	inferring	from	these	two	pieces	of	 information	alone	that	someone	was	a	Roman	orator.	The	 information	being	stored	 in	 distinct	 files	 entails	 that	 the	 two	 pieces	 of	 information	 are	 not	accessible	from	one	and	the	same	file:	“to	say	that	there	are	two	distinct	mental	files	is	to	say	that	the	information	in	one	file	is	insulated	from	information	in	the	other”	 (Recanati	 2012,	 42).	 This	 is	why	 one	 cannot,	without	 violating	 rational	norms,	trade	on	identity	of	two	pieces	of	information	that	are	stored	in	distinct	files.	 This	 is	 also	 what	 accounts	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 rational	 individuals	ascribing	 contradictory	predicates	 to	 the	 same	 individual:	 Since	a	difference	 in	files	 makes	 it	 the	 case	 that	 the	 information	 is	 insulated,	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	prevents	me	from	storing	the	predicate	‘was	Roman’	in	the	CICERO	file	and	‘was	not	Roman’	 in	 the	TULLY	file,	 since	 the	 contradiction	 is	not	manifest	 to	me.	On	this	 picture,	 then,	 “information	 integration	 and	 inferential	 exploitation	 of	information	only	takes	place	within	files”	(Ibid.,	43).		
	
4.	De	Jure	Co-Reference	of	Two-Place	Predicates	
The	cases	we	have	 looked	at	 thus	 far	have	been	cases	 involving	only	one-place	predicates.	However,	some	of	 the	 information	we	gain	about	 the	reference	of	a	file	will	be	relational,	and	hence	some	of	the	information	within	the	files	will	be	relational	 predicates.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 two-place	 predicates,	 for	 instance,	 the	information	predicates	 a	 relation	between	 the	 referent	 of	 the	 file	 in	which	 the	information	is	stored	and	some	other	object	or	individual.10	Consider	the	thought	CICERO	LOVED	CAESAR:	In	this	case,	the	thought	predicates	about	Cicero	that	he	loved	Caesar.	 If	someone	comes	to	form	this	belief,	 the	predicate	 ‘loved	Caesar’	will	go	into	that	individual’s	CICERO	file.	Now,	in	many	cases	a	subject	will	believe																																																									10	In	particular,	I’ll	focus	on	relational	predicates	that	contain	two	(or	more)	singular	concepts,	as	opposed	to	predicates	that	contain	a	singular	concept	and	a	general	concept	(such	as	’Lisa	likes	cats’).		
DE	JURE	CO-REFERENCE:	IN	DEFENCE	OF	POINTERS	 		 	 	
	60	
multiple	relational	predicates	concerning	 the	same	 individuals.	For	 instance,	 in	addition	to	having	the	predicate	‘loved	Caesar’	in	her	CICERO	file,	someone	might	also	 have	 the	 predicate	 ‘killed	 Caesar’	 in	 her	 CICERO	 file,	 if	 she	 believes	 that	Cicero	 killed	 Caesar.	 According	 to	 the	mental	 file	 framework,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	two	 occurrences	 of	 CICERO	 in	 the	 thoughts	 CICERO	 LOVED	 CAESAR	 and	 CICERO	KILLED	CAESAR	are	de	jure	co-referential	is	explained	by	the	concept	occurrences	being	associated	with	the	same	file.	Further,	the	two	pieces	of	information	being	taken	 to	 concern	 the	 same	 individual,	 Cicero,	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 the	information	 being	 located	 within	 the	 same	 file:	 The	 co-location	 ensures	 the	coordination	of	the	first	relata	(i.e.	CICERO	and	CICERO).		
However	–	and	this	 is	where	the	problem	arises	–	we	also	need	to	explain	why	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	are	de	jure	co-referential,	and	why	the	two	pieces	of	 information	are	taken	to	concern	the	same	individual,	Caesar.	 It	 is	clear	 that	they	 are	de	 jure	co-referential,	 because	 the	 subject	 need	 not	make	 the	 explicit	judgement	 that	 CAESAR	 (figuring	 in	 the	 first	 piece	 of	 information)	and	 CAESAR	(figuring	in	the	second	piece	of	information)	are	co-referential	in	order	to	make	the	 inference	 that	 there	 is	an	 individual	 such	 that	he	was	both	 loved	by	Cicero	and	killed	by	Cicero	–	or	simply	that	there	is	an	individual	such	that	he	was	both	loved	 and	 killed	 by	 one	 and	 the	 same	 person.	 How	 are	 we	 to	 explain	 this	phenomenon	on	the	mental	file	framework?	We	clearly	cannot	account	for	this	in	terms	of	the	occurrences	of	CAESAR	being	located	in	the	CICERO	file;	appeal	to	the	CICERO	file	can	only	explain	the	CICERO	occurrences	being	de	jure	co-referential.	On	 the	 current	picture,	 co-location	within	mental	 files	 can	only	 explain	de	jure	co-reference	of	the	first	relata	(e.g.	the	two	occurrences	of	CICERO),	but	not	of	the	second	relata	(e.g.	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR)	of	two-place	predicates.	The	CICERO	occurrences	are	related	to	the	CICERO	file	in	this	specific	way	in	virtue	of	being	located	in	that	file,	whereas	we	do	not	have	a	similar	relation	that	we	can	appeal	to	when	it	comes	to	the	occurrences	of	CAESAR.		
In	his	(1980)	Perry	foreshadows	this	worry	for	the	mental	file	picture.	In	offering	an	account	of	singular	thought	in	terms	of	an	analogy	with	files,	he	says	that	“in	the	 analogy	 I	 have	 presented,	 there	 is	 really	 no	 provision	 for	 handling	[relational]	 predicates”	 (Perry	 1980,	 20).	 However,	 without	 spelling	 out	 any	
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details	 about	 the	nature	of	 this	problem	he	 continues	by	 saying	 that	he	would	like	 “to	 end	 by	 pointing	 out	 how	 considerable	 relational	 information	 can	nevertheless	 be	 handled	 in	 such	 a	 system,	 for	 this	 is	 a	 point	 that	 seems	importantly	 related	 to	 the	 study	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 think	 from	 a	 position	 in	 the	world”	 (Ibid.).	The	 relations	Perry	has	 in	mind	are	 the	ones	 that	hold	between	the	 observer	 and	 the	 object	 that	 is	 observed.	 For	 instance,	 if	 one	 of	 your	 files	contains	 the	predicate	 ‘x	 sits	 to	 the	 left’,	what	you	believe	 is	 that	x	 sits	 to	your	left.	Having	this	sort	of	information	in	a	file	thus	involves	predicating	a	relation	between	the	referent	of	the	file	and	yourself.	Perry’s	response	is	to	say	that	the	fact	 that	 the	 file	 is	your	file	explains	any	relation	 the	referent	may	bear	 to	you.	His	explanation	thus	accounts	for	a	specific	class	of	relational	predicates;	namely	the	ones	having	oneself	as	one	of	the	relata.		
However,	 while	 this	 may	 explain	 this	 specific	 class	 of	 relational	 predicates,	Perry’s	explanation	is	not	applicable	to	the	case	at	hand.	There	is	nothing	in	the	nature	 of	 either	 CICERO	 or	 CAESAR	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 reduce	 the	 relational	predicates	 to	 one-place	 predicates	 in	 the	 same	way	we	may	when	 the	 thinker	herself	 figure	as	one	of	 the	 relata	 in	 the	particular	way	addressed	by	Perry.	 In	what	 follows	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 in	 order	 to	 give	 a	 full	 account	 of	 relational	predicates	 the	 mental	 file	 theorist	 is	 forced	 to	 postulate	 a	 relation	 between	pieces	of	information	across	distinct	files.	In	our	case,	she	must	say	that	there	is	a	certain	relation	between	the	occurrences	of	CAESAR	stored	in	the	CICERO	file,	and	the	CAESAR	file	itself	that	accounts	for	the	concept	occurrences	being	de	jure	co-referential.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 that	 this	 relation	 cannot	 be	explained	in	terms	of	information	clustering	within	mental	files.	If	I	am	right,	we	need	something	over	and	above	the	notion	of	information	clustering	in	order	to	give	a	full	account	of	co-reference	de	jure.	
	
5.	Information	Distribution	in	Mental	Files	
Since	co-location	of	information	within	one	mental	file	is	not	sufficient	to	explain	
de	 jure	 co-reference	 in	 cases	 of	 relation	 predicates	 we	 need	 to	 appeal	 to	
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something	 more	 in	 order	 to	 give	 a	 full	 account	 of	 de	 jure	 co-reference.	 The	question,	then,	is	what	this	‘something	more’	can	plausibly	be	on	the	mental	file	framework.	Perhaps	understanding	the	way	in	which	information	in	the	form	of	relational	predicates	is	distributed	in	the	files	can	be	of	help	in	this	enquiry.	After	all,	understanding	the	information	distribution	of	non-relational	predicates	helps	in	 accounting	 for	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 in	 such	 cases:	 The	 information	 being	clustered	 together	 in	 the	 same	 file	 explains	 why	 the	 information	 is	 taken	 to	concern	the	same	individual	without	a	prior	judgement	of	identity.	In	his	(2012),	Recanati	 says	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 relational	 predicates	 information	 “is	 shared	between	two	files”	(Recanati	2012,	50).	Exactly	what	this	sharing	of	information	amounts	to	 is	unclear,	but	he	mentions	two	possibilities:	One	possibility	 is	that	information	in	the	form	of	relational	predicates	is	duplicated	into	all	the	relevant	files,	 thereby	making	 the	 information	 accessible	 from	 each	 of	 them.	 The	 other	possibility	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 information	 is	 not	 duplicated,	 but	 instead	 we	introduce	 a	 pointer	 into	 one	 of	 the	 files	 that	 takes	 us	 to	 the	 file	 in	 which	 the	information	is	stored.	I	return	to	the	latter	alternative	and	the	notion	of	a	pointer	in	 section	 6,	 but	 first	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 first	 option	 and	 argue	 that	 simply	duplicating	 the	 information	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 of	relational	predicates.		
According	 to	 the	 duplication	 strategy,	 the	 information	 in	 question	 is	 stored	 in	both	 the	 CICERO	 file	 and	 the	 CAESAR	 file.	 So	 the	 CICERO	 file	 will	 contain	 the	predicates	 ‘loved	Caesar’,	 ‘killed	Caesar’	while	 the	CAESAR	 file	will	 contain	 the	predicate	‘is	loved	by	Cicero’,	‘was	killed	by	Cicero’	and	so	on:	
	
Cicero	 	 	 Caesar	 		…	loved	Caesar		…	killed	Caesar	
	…	was	loved	by	Cicero	
	…was	killed	by	Cicero	
		Fig.	1		
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The	 subject	 may	 then	 inferentially	 exploit	 the	 information	 stored	 in	 each	 file.	From	 the	 information	 in	 the	 CICERO	 file	 she	 can	 infer	 that	 one	 and	 the	 same	person	both	loved	Caesar	and	killed	Caesar.	From	the	information	in	the	CAESAR	file	she	can	infer	that	one	and	the	same	person	was	loved	by	Cicero	and	killed	by	Cicero.	 This	 picture	 looks	 a	 lot	 like	 the	 original	 picture	 involving	 monadic	predicates;	 the	 only	 difference	 is	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 relational	 predicates	 the	information	 in	question	goes	 into	multiple	 files.	The	duplication	 strategy,	 then,	does	not	really	add	much	to	the	original	picture.	In	what	follows	I	will	argue	that	as	a	result,	the	strategy	on	its	own	does	not	provide	us	with	a	framework	capable	of	handling	de	jure	co-reference	of	relational	predicates.	
Consider	again	the	inference	from	‘Cicero	loved	Caesar’	and	‘Cicero	killed	Caesar’	to	 ‘someone	was	loved	and	killed	by	one	and	the	same	person’.	 In	the	previous	section	we	saw	 that	 from	 the	 information	 stored	 in	 the	CICERO	 file	 the	 thinker	can	 infer	 that	 (i)	 someone	both	 loved	Caesar	and	killed	Caesar.	 Likewise,	 from	the	 information	 in	 the	 CAESAR	 file	 she	 could	 infer	 that	 (ii)	 someone	was	 both	loved	by	Cicero	and	killed	by	Cicero.	However,	on	the	current	picture	she	cannot	infer	 from	 these	 two	 pieces	 of	 information	 alone	 that	 (iii)	 someone	 was	 both	loved	 and	 killed	 by	 the	 same	 person.	 Remember	 that	 on	 the	 mental	 file	framework	 what	 warrants	 trading	 on	 identity	 is	 co-location	 of	 information	 in	files.	 Even	 though	 the	 two	 occurrences	 of	 CAESAR	are	 located	 in	 the	 same	 file	they	are	not	related	to	the	same	file	in	the	right	way.	It	cannot	be	that	co-location	of	 information	guarantees	co-reference	of	 the	concept	occurrences	 that	are	not	themselves	 associated	with	 the	 file	 in	which	 the	 information	 is	 stored.	 To	 see	this,	 consider	 having	 a	 further	 piece	 of	 information	 in	 the	 CICERO	 file,	 namely	‘Cicero	 feared	Cleopatra’.	 If	 co-location	of	 information	 guaranteed	 co-reference	amongst	 concept	 occurrences	 that	 are	 not	 associated	with	 the	 file	 in	 question,	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	as	well	as	the	occurrence	of	CLEOPATRA	would	be	
de	 jure	 co-referential,	 and	 the	 subject	 would	 be	 warranted	 in	 inferring	 that	someone	 loved,	 killed	 and	 feared	 one	 and	 the	 same	 person.	 But	 this	 is	 clearly	wrong.	Hence	someone	cannot	on	the	current	picture	infer	(iii)	without	judging	that	 Cicero	 (figuring	 in	 the	 first	 piece	 of	 information)	is	 Cicero	 (figuring	 in	 the	second	 piece	 of	 information)	 or	 that	 Caesar	 (figuring	 in	 the	 first	 piece	 of	
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information)	is	Caesar	(figuring	in	the	second	piece	of	information).	But	we	have	already	established	that	a	thinker	can	infer	directly	from	the	information	‘Cicero	loved	Caesar’	and	‘Cicero	killed	Caesar’	that	someone	was	loved	and	killed	by	the	same	 person,	 without	 having	 to	make	 any	 kind	 of	 identity	 judgement.	 On	 the	current	picture,	the	mental	file	framework	fails	to	account	for	this.			
The	 problem	 with	 the	 duplication	 strategy	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 postulate	 any	relation	between	 the	 two	occurrences	of	 CAESAR	 in	 the	CICERO	file,	nor	does	 it	postulate	 any	 relation	 between	 the	 occurrences	 of	 CICERO	 in	 the	 CAESAR	 file.	Further,	 there	 is	nothing	 in	 this	 story	 that	explains	how	the	 information	 in	 the	CICERO	file	relates	to	the	information	in	the	CAESAR	file	or	that	file	itself	(and	vice	versa).	 Recall	 that	 on	 the	 mental	 file	 framework	 information	 integration	 and	inferential	 exploitation	of	 information	only	 takes	place	within	 files	 (unless	you	have	two	files	that	are	linked	as	a	result	of	an	identity	judgement):	“Exploitation	of	 information	 is	 blocked	 if	 the	 relevant	 information	 is	 distributed	 in	 distinct	files,	 for	 then,	 there	 is	 no	presupposition	 that	 all	 the	 information	derives	 from	the	 same	 object”	 (Recanati	 2012,	 43).	 Since	 on	 the	 current	 picture,	 the	information	 is	 stored	 in	 distinct	 files,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 further	mechanism	 that	relates	the	pieces	of	information	in	one	of	the	files	to	pieces	of	information	in	the	other	 (see	 Fig.1),	 we	 simply	 do	 not	 have	 the	 resources	 needed	 to	 give	 a	satisfactory	account	of	de	jure	co-reference	of	relational	predicates.	Duplication	of	 information	 can	only	explain	why	 two	pieces	of	 information	within	one	and	the	same	file	comes	to	be	de	jure	co-referential,	and	hence	the	duplication	does	not	 add	 anything	 of	 explanatory	 interest	 to	 the	 initial	 picture	 of	 de	 jure	 co-reference.	Since,	as	we	have	seen	(c.f.	section	4),	the	initial	picture	is	insufficient	for	 explaining	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 of	 relational	 predicates,	 the	 duplication	strategy	fails	to	give	a	full	account	of	the	phenomenon.		
In	the	next	section	I	turn	to	the	alternative	story	about	information	distribution	of	relational	predicates,	namely	the	story	that	appeals	to	the	notion	of	a	pointer.	I	will	argue	that	 this	strategy	 is	on	the	right	 track,	but	 that	 it	ultimately	 leads	 to	the	 conclusion	 that	mental	 files	 are	 redundant	when	 it	 comes	 to	 explaining	de	
jure	 co-reference.	 Since	 this	 is	 arguably	 the	 central	 purpose	 of	 the	 file	framework,	this	is	a	significant	blow	to	the	theory.	
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6.	Introducing	Pointers	
The	 problem	 with	 the	 duplication	 strategy	 was	 that	 on	 this	 picture	 there	 is	nothing	that	relates	the	occurrences	of	CAESAR	in	the	CICERO	file	to	each	other,	or	to	the	CAESAR	file	itself.	Once	this	observation	is	made,	appealing	to	the	second	way	 of	 representing	 information	 sharing	 suggested	 by	 Recanati	 seems	 more	promising.	According	to	this	suggestion,	information	sharing	amounts	to	“storing	the	information	in	a	single	file	and	introducing	into	the	other	file	a	pointer	to	the	first	 file	 so	 as	 to	make	 the	 shared	 information	accessible	 from	 the	 second	 file”	(Recanati	 2012,	 50).	 Again,	 this	 is	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 information	 is	distributed	 in	 the	 files.	 However,	 introducing	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 pointer	 that	indicates	 a	 relation	 between	 files	 might	 be	 exactly	 what	 we	 need	 in	 order	 to	explain	 the	 cases	we	 have	 looked	 at.11	Returning	 to	 our	 example,	 according	 to	this	view,	the	information	‘Cicero	loved	Caesar’	and	‘Cicero	killed	Caesar’	would	only	be	located	in	the	CICERO	file	and	not	in	the	CAESAR	file.	But	even	though	the	information	is	not	stored	in	the	CAESAR	file,	it	is	still	accessible	from	that	file	in	virtue	 of	 the	pointer	 that	 takes	us	 from	 the	 CAESAR	 file	 to	 the	 CICERO	 file.	 The	current	picture,	then,	looks	like	this:	
	
Cicero	 	 	 Caesar	 		…	loved	Caesar		…	killed	Caesar		
	
è	Cicero	
	
è	Cicero	
Fig.	2		
																																																								11	Recanati	 doesn’t	 discuss	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 pointers,	 but	 in	 a	 footnote	 he	 refers	 to	 Hendriks’	(2002),	 in	 which	 Hendriks	 discusses	 Vallduví’s	 (1992)	 theory	 of	 information	 packaging.	According	 to	 him,	 the	 pointer-mechanism	 is	 “'much	 more	 efficient'	 than	 a	 straightforward	multiple	 recording	 of	 information	 on	 cards”	 (Hendriks	 2002,	 80).	 Note	 that	 Vallduví	 calls	 the	pointer	’a	linking	mechanism’,	but	this	is	not	what	Recanati	has	in	mind	when	he	uses	the	term	’linking’.	
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This	picture	avoids	some	of	the	problems	posed	for	the	duplication	strategy.	We	now	have	a	direct	relation	between	the	two	files,	and	this	helps	us	overcome	the	problem	of	insulation	of	information	exploitation	in	files.	
However,	 while	 this	 is	 an	 improvement,	 the	 picture	 is	 still	 not	 quite	what	we	need.	One	problem	with	the	current	notion	of	a	pointer	is	that	the	pointer	seems	to	be	a	mechanism	that	connects	 files	rather	 than	pieces	of	 information.	 In	our	case,	the	pointers	signal	that	there	is	some	information	about	the	referent	of	the	CAESAR	file	 located	somewhere	 in	 the	CICERO	 file.	But	 then	 the	question	 is	 this:	Given	that	our	CICERO	file	may	contain	various	further	predicates,	some	of	which	may	not	concern	Caesar,	how	do	we	know	which	predicates	are	the	ones	related	to	the	CAESAR	file?		
One	 possibility	 is	 that	 the	 pointer	 tells	 us	 to	 go	 to	 a	 general	 file	 and	 then	 the	cognitive	 system	 searches	 through	 all	 the	 information	 in	 that	 file	 until	 it	 finds	some	 predicate(s)	 concerning	 the	 referent	 of	 the	 file	 in	 which	 the	 pointer	 is	located.	 However,	 there	 are	 two	 problems	 with	 this	 strategy:	 First,	 this	 story	seems	 too	 inefficient;	 it	 seems	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 in	 order	 to	 come	 to	 the	conclusion	(iii)	someone	was	killed	and	loved	by	the	same	person	(without	making	any	 identity	 judgements	 of	 the	 form	 CAESAR	 (figuring	 in	 the	 first	 piece	 of	information)	 =	 CAESAR	 (figuring	 in	 the	 second	 piece	 of	 information)),	 the	cognitive	 system	would	 need	 to	 run	 through	 all	 the	 information	 stored	 in	 the	
CAESAR	file	itself.	
																																																								12	Alternatively	one	might	say	that	on	this	picture	sameness	in	Mentalese	typography	is	explained	in	terms	of	sameness	of	files.	
CICERO	file.	Second,	even	if	we	allow	for	such	inefficiency,	we	would	have	no	way	of	 explaining	 how	 the	 system	 would	 be	 able	 to	 recognize	 which	 pieces	 of	information	concern	the	referent	of	the	file	in	which	the	pointer	is	located.	Keep	in	mind	that	on	the	mental	file	framework	sameness	of	mental	representations	is	not	accounted	for	in	terms	of	sameness	in	Mentalese	typography	or	the	like,	but	rather	in	terms	of	sameness	of	mental	files.12	On	the	current	picture	we	have	no	story	 to	 tell	 as	 to	 how	 the	 cognitive	 system	 is	 able	 to	 recognize	 that	 the	 two	occurrences	 of	 CAESAR	 in	 the	 CICERO	 file	 stand	 in	 the	 relevant	 relation	 to	 the	
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All	of	this	indicates	that	in	order	for	the	notion	of	a	pointer	to	be	of	any	help,	the	pointer	must	be	such	that	it	takes	us	directly	to	the	relevant	information,	rather	than	to	the	general	file	in	which	the	information	is	stored.	Luckily	there	seems	to	be	 no	 principled	 reason	why	we	 cannot	 adopt	 this	 notion	 of	 a	 pointer	 on	 the	mental	file	picture.	The	current	picture,	then,	is	this:	
	
Cicero	 	 	 Caesar	 		…	loved	Caesar		…	killed	Caesar		
			
Fig.	3	
	The	pointers	indicate	what	information	in	the	other	file	involves	the	referent	of	the	file	in	which	the	pointer	is	based.	Since	there	can	be	various	different	pieces	of	 information	 stored	 in	 another	 file	 that	 concerns	 the	 referent	 of	 the	 file	 in	which	the	pointer	is	based,	we	need	one	pointer	for	each	piece	of	information.		
While	 this	 is	 a	 further	 step	 in	 the	 right	 direction	 there	 is	 one	 further	 problem	with	the	current	notion	of	a	pointer.	According	to	the	notion	at	work,	a	pointer	is	something	that	takes	us	from	the	file	associated	with	the	second	relatum	of	two-place	 predicates	 to	 the	 information	 stored	 in	 the	 file	 associated	with	 the	 first	relatum.	 In	 the	 case	 at	 hand	 (Fig.	 3),	 if	 we	 go	 to	 the	 CAESAR	 file	 we	 find	something	along	the	lines	of	a	command	that	tells	us	to	go	to	the	CICERO	file.	In	contrast	we	find	no	command	similar	to	this	 in	the	CICERO	file.	That	 is,	 there	is	nothing	 in	the	CICERO	file	 that	 tells	us	what	 file	 the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	are	associated	with.	Moreover,	there	is	nothing	in	the	CICERO	file	that	tells	us	that	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	are	related	to	the	same	mental	file,	and	thus	that	they	are	co-referential	de	jure.	 Just	 the	 fact	 that	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	are	being	pointed	to	is	not	sufficient	for	them	being	de	jure	co-referential.	After	all,	 the	 thinker	might	 have	 further	 relational	 predicates	 in	 her	 CICERO	 file.	 For	instance,	 if	 she	 thinks	 that	 Cicero	 admired	 Aristotle,	 she	 would	 also	 have	 the	
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information	‘admired	Aristotle’	in	her	CICERO	file.	In	this	case,	there	would	be	a	pointer	anchored	in	the	thinker’s	ARISTOTLE	file	pointing	to	the	relevant	piece	of	information	in	the	CICERO	file.	Hence,	the	occurrence	of	ARISTOTLE	would	also	be	pointed	to,	but	the	occurrence	of	ARISTOTLE	is	not	de	jure	co-referential	with	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	that	are	also	being	pointed	to.		
The	 problem	 is	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	 CICERO	 file	 that	 tells	 the	 cognitive	system	which	of	the	pointers	are	anchored	in	the	same	or	different	files.	The	one-way	pointer	can	only	do	its	job	after	we	have	established	a	relation	between	the	CAESAR	 occurrences	 in	 the	 CICERO	 file	 and	 the	 CAESAR	 file.	 But	 in	 order	 to	establish	this	relation	we	need	something	that	takes	us	from	the	file	in	which	the	information	in	question	is	stored	(i.e.	the	CICERO	file)	to	the	file	associated	with	the	second	relatum	(i.e.	the	CAESAR	file).	Only	if	we	trace	the	pointer	back	to	the	file	in	which	it	is	anchored	(i.e.	the	CAESAR	file)	does	it	become	clear	that	the	two	occurrences	of	CAESAR	are	related	to	each	other,	 in	that	they	stand	in	a	pointer	relation	 to	 the	 same	 mental	 file.	 In	 order	 to	 give	 a	 full	 account	 of	 jure	 co-reference,	 then,	we	 need	 a	 notion	 of	 a	 pointer	 according	 to	which	 the	 pointer	goes	both	ways;	the	pointer	must	not	only	take	us	from	the	file	associated	with	the	second	relatum	to	the	file	associated	with	the	first	relatum,	but	it	must	also	take	us	from	the	file	associated	with	the	first	relatum	to	the	file	associated	with	the	second	relatum:		
	
Cicero	 	 	 Caesar	 		…	loved	Caesar		…	killed	Caesar		
			
Fig.	4	
	The	 resulting	 picture,	 then,	 is	 one	 in	 which	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 is	 not	 simply	explained	in	terms	of	information	clustering	in	files,	but	also	in	terms	of	relations	between	 information	 in	distinct	 files.	 Even	 though	 information	 integration	 and	
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inferential	exploitation	of	 information	only	take	place	within	 files,	 it	essentially	depends	on	relational	mechanisms	across	 files.	 In	 the	next	section,	 I	will	argue	that	 as	 long	 as	 we	 have	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 pointer	 relation,	 we	 do	 not	 need	 the	notion	of	a	file	to	account	for	de	jure	co-reference.	
	
7.	De	Jure	Co-Reference	and	Pointer	Relations	
We	have	seen	that	we	cannot	give	a	full	account	of	de	jure	co-reference	simply	in	terms	of	information	clustering	within	mental	files.	This	is	because,	in	the	case	of	relational	predicates,	 the	 information	 is	clustered	 in	 two	distinct	 files	 in	such	a	way	 that	 we	 cannot	 inferentially	 exploit	 the	 information	 without	 introducing	further	 machinery.	 	 In	 order	 to	 account	 for	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 of	 relational	predicates,	 then,	 we	 need	 a	 further	 notion;	 such	 as	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 pointer.	 A	pointer,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 to	be	understood	as	a	 relation	 that	holds	between	mental	representations,	 and	 whenever	 this	 relation	 holds	 the	 relata	 are	 de	 jure	 co-referential.	 The	 mental	 file	 theorist,	 as	 I	 have	 argued,	 needs	 the	 notion	 of	 a	pointer	in	addition	to	the	notion	of	a	file.	She	would	have	to	say	that	while	de	jure	co-reference	of	one-place	predicates	 is	explained	 in	terms	of	co-location	within	files,	de	jure	co-reference	of	 two-place	predicates	 is	 to	be	explained	 in	 terms	of	the	specific	relations	that	hold	across	files.	But,	then,	there	seems	to	be	a	pressing	question:	If	we	are	to	explain	de	jure	co-reference	in	terms	of	pointer	relations	in	the	 case	 of	 relational	 predicates,	why	 think	 that	we	 should	 explain	de	 jure	co-reference	of	one-place	predicates	 in	 terms	of	 co-location	of	 information	within	mental	files?	If	we	can	explain	de	jure	co-reference	of	one-place	predicates	in	the	same	way	we	explain	de	jure	co-reference	in	the	case	of	relational	predicates,	we	do	not	need	the	mental	files	to	explain	de	jure	co-reference	in	the	simpler	cases.13		
																																																								13	One	might	think	that	even	though	de	jure	co-reference	is	not	to	be	explained	in	terms	of	mental	files,	there	is	still	some	job	left	for	the	mental	files	to	do.	I	think	this	is	not	the	case;	whatever	the	notion	of	mental	files	can	do,	we	can	do	in	terms	of	pointers.	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	give	an	argument	to	this	effect.	For	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	we	may	allow	that	an	appeal	to	the	notion	of	mental	files	is	warranted	in	some	cases.	The	important	point	is	that	when	it	comes	to	de	jure	co-reference	we	must	abandon	an	explanation	in	terms	of	files.	If	anything,	the	mental	file	 theorist	 has	 it	 the	 wrong	 way	 around:	 the	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 relation	 is	 what	 explains	certain	aspects	of	mental	files,	c.f.	Fine:	“mental	files	should	be	seen	as	a	device	for	keeping	track	
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The	mental	 file	 theorist	might	 respond	by	 saying	 that	we	do,	 at	 the	very	 least,	need	 files	 to	 ‘anchor’	 the	 pointers.	 That	 is,	 she	might	 say	 that	we	 cannot	 have	pointers	all	 the	way	down	–	the	pointers	must	be	anchored	in	something	more	fundamental.	I	agree	that	pointers	must	have	anchoring	points,	but	I	do	not	agree	that	such	anchoring	points	must,	or	should,	be	characterized	as	mental	files.	As	long	as	we	have	pointers	to	account	for	the	de	jure	co-reference	relation,	files	are	no	longer	doing	any	real	work	in	the	explanation	of	this	phenomenon.	A	mental	file	 is	 a	 metaphysically	 demanding	 notion:	 In	 postulating	 mental	 files	 we	postulate	small	containers	for	each	and	every	one	of	our	mental	representations	(i.e.	concepts),	and	each	of	the	containers	contain	pieces	of	information	–	some	of	which	involve	occurrences	of	terms	associated	with	different	files.		
I	suggest	that	we	give	up	on	the	idea	of	mental	containers	and	instead	we	appeal	to	a	notion	of	a	mental	tag,	or	the	like.	A	tag,	I	suggest,	is	to	be	understood	as	a	meeting	 point	 for	 pointers.	 Mental	 tags	 have	 two	 roles	 relevant	 to	 the	explanation	 of	 de	 jure	 co-reference:	 (i)	 mental	 tags	 are	 meeting	 points	 for	pointers,	 and	 (ii)	 mental	 tags	 have	 semantic	 contents.	 They	 are	 mental	representations,	building	blocks	of	thoughts.	As	such	they	should	be	understood	as	representational	vehicles.	Whether	or	not	 two	tags	are	de	jure	co-referential	wholly	depends	on	whether	or	not	they	are	connected	by	a	pointer.	De	facto	co-reference	occurs	whenever	two	thoughts	concern	the	same	referent,	but	where	the	relevant	tags	are	not	connected	by	pointers.			
I	suggest,	 then,	 that	 the	reason	why	we	can	 infer	 from	CICERO	WAS	ROMAN	and	CICERO	WAS	AN	ORATOR	that	someone	was	a	Roman	orator	without	an	additional	premise	of	 the	form	CICERO	=	CICERO	is	 that	there	 is	a	pointer	between	the	two	occurrences	of	CICERO	relating	them	in	such	a	way	as	 to	explain	them	being	de	
jure	co-referential.	In	our	case	of	information	in	the	form	of	two-place	predicates,	the	first	and	second	relata	are	not	connected	by	pointers.	We	may	illustrate	the	pointer	picture	thus	(although	I	will	qualify	this	shortly):	
																																																																																																																																																														of	when	objects	are	coordinated	(represented	as	the	same)	[i.e.	de	jure	co-referential]	and,	rather	than	 understand	 coordination	 [i.e.	 de	 jure	 co-reference]	 in	 terms	 of	 mental	 files,	 we	 should	understand	 the	 workings	 of	 mental	 files	 in	 terms	 of	 coordination	 [i.e.	 de	 jure	 co-reference]”	(2007,	68).		
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Cicero	loved	Caesar	
	
Cicero	killed	Caesar	
Fig.	5		The	picture	I’m	suggesting	is	metaphysically	sparse.	We	only	need	the	notion	of	a	tag	 and	 the	 relations	between	 these,	 in	 addition	 to	 a	 simple	Millian/Russellian	picture	 of	 the	 propositional	 content	 of	 thoughts.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	framework	 is	explanatorily	powerful	 in	that	 it	accounts	 for	the	phenomenon	of	samethinking	 just	 as	 well	 as	 the	 mental	 file	 picture	 arrived	 at	 in	 the	 end	 of	section	6.		
The	 pointer	 relation	 is	 representationally	 primitive.	 That	 is,	 the	 relation	 that	accounts	for	de	jure	co-reference	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	of	type	of	tags,	or	the	like.	In	particular,	the	pointer	relation	does	not	hold	in	virtue	of	sameness	of	intrinsic	syntactic	properties,	such	as	sameness	of	Mentalese	symbols.	On	the	pointer	picture,	the	intrinsic	syntactic	properties	of	mental	representations	play	no	role	in	determining	when	two	representations	are	–	or	fail	to	be	–	de	jure	co-referential.	 The	 framework	has	 a	minimum	of	metaphysical	 commitments,	 and	this	 makes	 the	 framework	 much	 more	 flexible	 than	 theories	 that	 account	 for	samethinking	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features,	 including	 the	mental	 file	account.	To	see	why	this	 is	a	great	virtue	of	the	theory	consider	the	following	cases:	
1) We	 were	 debating	 whether	 to	 investigate	 both	 Hesperus1	 and	Phosphorus2;	 but	 when	 we	 got	 evidence	 of	 their	 true	 identity,	 we	immediately	sent	probes	there1,2.		2) 	Hesperus1	 is	 Phosphorus2	 after	 all,	 so	 Hesperus-slash-Phosphorus1,2	must	be	a	very	rich	planet.	
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In	both	cases	we	have	two	concepts	that	are	de	jure	co-referential	with	the	latter	concept	 (i.e.	 ‘there’	 and	 ‘Hesperus-slash-Phosphorus’),	 but	 that	 are	 not	de	 jure	co-referential	with	 each	other.	 In	 his	 (2011)	Pinillos	 uses	 these	 cases	 to	 argue	that	de	jure	co-reference	is	a	non-transitive	relation.	If	this	is	correct,	this	creates	huge	problems	for	any	theory	that	attempts	to	account	for	de	jure	co-reference	in	terms	 of	 identity	 relations	 of	 any	 kind	 (be	 it	 sameness	 of	 Mentalese	 type	 or	mental	files	or	the	like).	 If	de	jure	co-reference	were	a	matter	of	 identity	of	this	sort,	the	relation	would	be	transitive.	Hence,	if	Pinillos	is	right,	such	intrinsicalist	views	fails	to	give	a	general	account	of	de	jure	co-reference.				
Note	 that	 (1)	 is	 a	 case	 of	 anaphora.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier	 (section	 2)	 it	 is	controversial	whether	or	not	we	have	 anaphora	 in	 thought	 –	why	not	 just	 use	our	 non-anaphoric	 concepts	 twice?	 Those	 who	 hold	 this	 view	 might	 find	 (2)	more	convincing.	 In	 this	 case	we	do	not	have	anaphora,	but	 instead	we	have	a	slash-concept	–	the	kind	of	concept	that	(in	normal	circumstances)	results	from	an	 informative	 identity	 judgement.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 after	 having	 made	 the	judgement	we	get	a	new	concept	that	is	a	merging	of	the	two	(or	more)	original	concepts.14	One	may	of	course	question	whether	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	slash-concept.	But	then	one	would	have	to	give	an	account	of	why	Pinillos’	argument	has	 a	 strong	 intuitive	 appeal.	 The	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 there	 are	 such	things	as	slash-concepts	requires	further	investigation.	What’s	important	for	this	paper	 is	 simply	 that	 the	 pointer	 picture	 –	 unlike	 the	 mental	 file	 view	 –	 is	compatible	with	either	outcome:	If	it	turns	out	that	de	jure	co-reference	is	in	fact	a	 non-transitive	 relation,	 this	 would	 not	 pose	 any	 problems	 for	 the	 pointer	picture,	since	on	this	framework	we	do	not	explain	de	jure	co-reference	in	terms	of	identity	relations.		
Since	mental	 tags	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 as	meeting	 points	 for	 pointers,	 rather	than	Mentalese	symbols	or	the	like,	a	more	correct	way	to	illustrate	the	pointer	picture	is	this:	
	
																																																								14	Such	a	view	can	be	found	in	Recanati	2016.	
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________	loved	________	
	
________	killed	________	
Fig.	6	The	 empty	 spaces	 represent	 (instantiated)	 mental	 tags.	 What	 matters	 for	 the	explanation	 of	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 is	 merely	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 tags	 are	connected	by	pointers.	From	the	case	 illustrated,	we	can	conclude	directly	 that	someone	was	both	 loved	and	killed	by	 the	 same	person	as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 tags	being	related	by	pointers	in	this	specific	way.	We	may,	then,	illustrate	the	case	of	non-transitivity	of	de	jure	co-reference	discussed	above	thus:			
				
______________	is	______________	after	all,	so	_____________________	must	be	a	very	rich	planet.				
				Fig.	7		The	 first	 and	 second	mental	 tag	 stand	 in	pointer	 relations	 to	 the	 last	one	 (the	slash-concept),	but	they	do	not	stand	in	pointer	relations	to	each	other.	On	this	picture,	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 is	 fully	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 the	 mental	representations	are	related	to	each	other.		
A	further	virtue	of	the	pointer	picture	is	that	it	is	capable	of	explaining	de	jure	co-reference	between	all	the	different	propositional	attitudes	and	not	just	doxastic	states.	A	mental	file,	recall,	is	by	definition	a	cluster	of	information	taken	by	the	subject	to	be	true	about	the	referent.	What	this	in	effect	means	is	that	the	mental	file	 framework	 cannot	 give	us	 an	 explanation	of	 how	a	desire	 and	 a	 belief	 can	
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stand	in	the	de	jure	co-reference	relation.	However,	a	subject’s	ability	to	combine	beliefs	and	desires	in	a	way	that	does	not	involve	identity	judgements	is	crucial	for	 explaining	 behavioural	 dispositions.	 The	 problem	 does	 not	 arise	 for	 the	pointer	 picture	 because	 it	 does	 not	 make	 a	 principled	 distinction	 between	different	attitudes.	If	you	desire	to	read	a	book	about	Cicero	and	you	believe	that	going	 to	 the	 library	 is	 a	 good	 way	 to	 read	 about	 Cicero	 these	 two	 thoughts	involve	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 and	 combining	 them	 will	 result	 in	 you	 having	 a	(rational)	behavioural	disposition	to	go	to	the	library.	The	desire	and	the	belief	are	de	jure	co-referential	because	they	stand	in	a	pointer	relation.	
The	mental	files	theorist	also	has	problems	in	accounting	for	reasoning	involving	doxastic	 attitudes	 other	 than	 belief.	 Consider	 suppositional	 reasoning.	 In	 such	reasoning,	 the	 premises	 are	 not	 taken	 to	 be	 true	 by	 the	 subject.	 Yet	 they	may	enter	into	de	jure	co-reference	relations	–	either	to	each	other,	or	to	information	stored	within	mental	 files.	Consider	also	deliberation	about	e.g.	whether	or	not	you	want	to	read	more	about	Cicero.	In	this	case,	it	might	be	relevant	to	take	into	account	your	beliefs	about	Cicero.	If	so,	 it	 is	crucial	that	the	cognitive	system	is	able	 to	detect	which	beliefs	are	 relevant	 for	your	deliberation,	and	 this	as	well	involves	de	jure	co-reference.15	
The	 pointer	 picture	 has	 no	 problem	 here.	 Again,	 it	 predicts	 that	 de	 jure	 co-reference	may	obtain	across	all	kinds	of	propositional	attitudes.	It	is	a	mistake	to	make	a	distinction	between	the	different	attitudes	when	it	comes	to	de	jure	co-reference.	
In	 the	next	 section,	 I	will	 show	how	 the	pointer	 picture	 accounts	 for	 cognitive	significance.	 I	will	also	compare	the	pointer	picture	to	other	theories	according	to	which	de	 jure	co-reference	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 relational	 properties.	 In	particular,	I	will	point	to	differences	between	the	pointer	picture	and	the	sort	of	
semantic	relationism	found	in	Fine	(2007).	
	
																																																								15	Similar	issues	also	arise	for	the	mental	file	account	when	it	comes	to	accounting	for	de	jure	co-reference	in	imagining	(cf.	Ninan	2015).		
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8.	The	Pointer	Picture,	Cognitive	Significance	and	Relationism	
In	recent	years	there	has	been	a	trend	in	the	debate	about	de	jure	co-reference	to	appeal	to	relational	properties	of	concepts	and	words	in	order	to	account	for	the	phenomenon	 (e.g.	 Fine	 2007,	 Pinillos	 2011).	 On	 such	 views,	 the	 relevant	relational	 aspects	 are	 primitive,	 and	 thus	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 simply	 in	terms	of	intrinsic	representational	features.	The	pointer	picture	is	to	be	seen	in	line	 with	 such	 relationist	 theories.	 On	 the	 framework	 I’m	 proposing	 there	 is	nothing	about	the	intrinsic	nature	of	the	two	tags	involved	in	thinking	CICERO	IS	ROMAN	and	 TULLY	 IS	ROMAN	 that	 tells	 us	whether	 or	 not	 the	 thoughts	 are	 the	same.	 It	 is	 only	 once	we	 see	 how	 the	 beliefs	 relate	 to	 each	 other	 (i.e.	whether	they	are	connected	by	pointers	or	not)	that	we	can	know	whether	or	not	it	is	in	fact	 the	 same	belief.	 In	what	 follows,	 I	will	 show	how	 this	 framework	explains	how	two	referentially	 identical	 thoughts	may	nonetheless	play	distinct	 roles	 in	cognition.	
	
8.1.	Cognitive	Significance	
Pointers	account	 for	 the	role	a	given	belief	plays	 in	thought.	We	can,	 therefore,	account	for	the	cognitive	significance	of	different	beliefs	by	appealing	to	pointer	relations.	 Take	 for	 instance	 the	 two	 thoughts	 CICERO	 IS	 CICERO	 and	 CICERO	 IS	TULLY.	In	the	former	thought,	the	two	tags	are	connected	by	pointers,	whereas	in	the	second	they	are	not.	We	may	then	explain	the	difference	in	informativeness	in	terms	of	how	the	beliefs	interact	with	a	person’s	other	beliefs.	That	is,	we	may	understand	the	cognitive	impact	of	the	two	beliefs	in	terms	of	how	they	relate	to	one’s	already	existing	belief	base.	Cognitive	impact	is	understood	as	the	result	of	a	new	belief’s	being	taken	as	input	to	an	already	existing	base	of	beliefs	(c.f.	Fine	2007).	 Now,	 let’s	 say	 that	 a	 given	 individual’s	 belief	 base	 does	 not	 already	include	 the	 belief	 CICERO	 IS	 TULLY.	 The	 two	 thoughts	 CICERO	 IS	 CICERO	 and	CICERO	IS	TULLY	will	differ	in	how	they	relate	to	this	individual’s	belief	base,	and	thus	 in	 their	 cognitive	 impact.	 In	 the	 first	 case	 the	 two	 mental	 tags	 are	themselves	 connected	 by	 pointers.	When	 someone	 forms	 this	 belief,	 both	 tags	
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will	enter	 into	the	exact	same	pointer	relations:	Both	tags	will	stand	 in	pointer	relations	 to	 those	 beliefs	 in	 the	 belief	 base	 that	 the	 individual	 might	 express	using	 the	 name	 ‘Cicero’.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 cognitive	 impact	will	 be	minimal:	 The	individual	will	not	be	able	to	exploit	the	pointer	relations	in	such	a	way	as	to	gain	new	knowledge.	In	contrast,	if	the	person	formed	the	belief	CICERO	IS	TULLY,	the	two	mental	tags	would	not	be	connected	by	pointers.	The	two	mental	tags	would	enter	 into	 different	 pointer	 relations.	 The	 first	 tag	 would	 stand	 in	 pointer	relations	to	all	beliefs	 in	the	belief	base	that	the	individual	might	express	using	the	name	‘Cicero’,	whereas	the	second	tag	would	stand	in	pointer	relations	to	all	of	the	beliefs	she	might	express	using	the	name	‘Tully’.	In	this	case	the	individual	may	exploit	the	new	pointer	relations	and	draw	new	inferences.	For	instance,	if	she	 has	 the	 belief	 CICERO	 IS	 ROMAN	 and	 TULLY	 IS	 AN	 ORATOR,	 the	 pointer	relations	going	between	each	of	 these	beliefs	and	 the	new	belief	 (i.e.	 CICERO	IS	TULLY)	will	warrant	the	conclusion	that	someone	is	a	Roman	orator.		
Importantly,	 coming	 to	 know	 that	 Cicero	 is	 Tully	 does	 not	 have	 the	 cognitive	result	that	occurrences	of	CICERO	and	TULLY	enter	 into	direct	pointer	relations.	Pointer	relations	only	hold	in	cases	where	the	recognition	of	co-reference	is	not	due	 to	 a	 prior	 identity	 judgement	 (cf.	 Recanati’s	 claim	 that	 two	 pieces	 of	information	 in	 a	 file	 are	de	jure	co-referential	 only	 if	 their	being	 located	 in	 the	same	 file	 is	 not	 due	 to	 a	 prior	 judgement	 of	 identity	 (see	 section	 2)).	 Instead,	what	 happens	 in	 the	 case	 of	 informative	 identity	 judgements	 is	 that	 one	may	draw	 new	 inferences	 that	 one	 was	 previously	 not	 warranted	 in	 making.	 The	identity	 judgement	 functions	 as	 an	 implicit	 premise	 and	 thereby	 rationally	allows	the	thinker	to	draw	new	conclusions	from	premises	that	are	only	de	facto	co-referential.	We	 see,	 then,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 relative	 difference	 in	 the	 cognitive	impact	 of	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 identity	 judgements.	 This,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 what	 the	difference	in	cognitive	significance	of	trivial	and	informative	identity	judgements	amounts	to.	
Pointers	 also	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 rational	 individuals	 ascribing	contradictory	 predicates	 to	 the	 same	 referent.	 Recall	 that	 on	 the	 mental	 file	framework	 the	 explanation	 was	 that	 information	 stored	 in	 distinct	 files	 are	insulated	 from	 each	 other.	 The	 explanation	 in	 terms	 of	 pointers	 appeals	 to	
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whether	 or	 not	 the	 beliefs	 stand	 in	 pointer	 relations	 to	 each	 other.	 In	 cases	where	a	subject	rationally	believes	two	incompatible	propositions,	as	in	the	case	of	someone	believing	that	Cicero	is	bald	and	also	that	Tully	is	not	bald,	the	two	beliefs	 –	 or	 more	 specifically,	 the	 belief	 constituents	 –	 are	 not	 connected	 by	pointers.	If	two	beliefs	are	not	connected	by	pointers,	they	are	not	taken	by	the	subject	 to	concern	the	same	referent.	 If	 they	happen	to	be	co-referential	 this	 is	not	manifest	to	the	thinker.	This	 is	why	one	may	rationally	believe	of	the	same	referent	both	that	he	is	bald	and	that	he	is	not	bald.	The	explanation	in	terms	of	pointers	does	an	equally	good	job	of	explaining	such	cases	as	does	the	mental	file	framework.	 But	 the	 pointer	 picture	 has	 the	 benefit	 of	 not	 having	 to	 appeal	 to	identity	relations	(i.e.	identity	of	files).	As	we	have	seen,	theories	that	appeal	to	identity	 relations	 face	problems	 in	 accounting	 for	 the	possibility	 of	 de	 jure	 co-reference	being	non-transitive.		
In	 the	 next	 sub-section	 I	will	 point	 to	 similarities	 and	differences	 between	 the	pointer	 picture	 and	 other	 relationist	 accounts	 found	 in	 the	 literature,	 such	 as	those	of	Fine	(2007)	and	Pinillos	(2011).		
	
8.2.	Different	Versions	of	Relationism	
I	 take	 the	main	 claim	 of	 relationism	 (about	 thoughts)	 to	 be	 that	 samethinking	cannot	 be	 explained	 purely	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 features	 of	 concepts	 and	thoughts,	and	that	we	need	to	take	the	relational	aspects	of	thinking	into	account	in	order	to	give	a	full	account	of	de	jure	co-reference.	While	relationists	such	as	Fine	 and	 Pinillos	 hold	 that	 the	 relevant	 relations	 hold	 at	 the	 level	 of	propositional	content,16	the	picture	I	have	suggested	does	not	commit	us	to	say	that	the	relational	properties	relevant	to	the	explanation	of	de	jure	co-reference	in	 thought	 are	 part	 of,	 or	 affect,	 the	 propositional	 content	 of	 thoughts.	 It	 is	compatible	 with	 the	 pointer	 picture	 to	 say	 that	 the	 two	 thoughts	 CICERO	 IS	CICERO	and	CICERO	 IS	TULLY	have	 the	 same	propositional	 content.	What	makes	the	cognitive	difference	is	how	the	representational	vehicles	relate	to	a	thinker’s																																																									16	I	set	out	Semantic	Relationism	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2.		
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other	representational	vehicles.	This	 is	why	 the	pointer	picture	can	allow	 for	a	simple	 (i.e.	 non-relational)	 Millian/Russellian	 account	 of	 mental	 content.	 The	pointer	picture	(or	what	one	may	call	Vehicle	Relationism)	provides	a	relationist	explanation	 of	 de	 jure	co-reference	 but	 it	 does	 so	without	 invoking	 a	 complex	semantics.	As	far	as	I	can	see,	when	it	comes	to	explaining	de	jure	co-reference	in	thought,	there	is	nothing	the	semantic	relationist	can	do	that	can’t	be	done	on	the	pointer	 framework,	 and	 the	 suggested	 framework	 is	 compatible	 with	 a	parsimonious	semantics,	which	counts	in	its	favour.		
A	notable	 feature	of	 the	pointer	picture	 is	 that,	 if	 correct,	 contrary	 to	what	has	often	been	assumed	in	the	debate,	the	explanation	of	de	jure	co-reference	is	not	fundamentally	 a	matter	 of	 semantic	 properties.	 Rather,	 de	 jure	co-reference	 is	essentially	 a	 matter	 of	 relations	 between	 representational	 vehicles.	 Two	thoughts	such	as	HESPERUS	IS	HESPERUS	and	HESPERUS	IS	PHOSPHORUS	may	have	the	same	content,	but	still	play	different	roles	in	cognition.	De	jure	co-reference	is	at	the	heart	of	many	of	the	classical	puzzles	within	the	philosophy	of	mind,	and	the	 pointer	 picture	 predicts	 that	 trying	 to	 explain	 such	 puzzles	 in	 terms	 of	semantic	 sameness	 or	 difference	 has	 it,	 at	 best,	 the	 wrong	 way	 around:	 The	explanation	is	essentially	non-semantic	in	nature.17		
	
9.	Conclusion	
I	have	argued	that	the	mental	file	theorist	cannot	account	for	de	jure	co-reference	of	 relational	 predicates	 in	 terms	 of	 co-location	 in	 files.	 I	 considered	 the	 two	strategies	available	 to	 the	mental	 file	 theorist:	 the	duplication	strategy	and	 the	strategy	of	appealing	to	pointer	relations.	I	argued	that	the	duplication	strategy	does	 not	 add	 anything	 of	 explanatory	 interest	 to	 the	 original	 picture.	 I	 then	showed	 that	 the	 strategy	 of	 appealing	 to	 pointer	 relations	 undermines	 the	mental	file	picture:	I	argued	that	the	explanation	of	de	jure	co-reference	in	terms	of	pointer	relations	can	be	generalized	to	cases	of	monadic	predicates.	Finally,	I	argued	that	it	is	the	notion	of	a	pointer	rather	than	the	notion	of	a	file	that	is	of																																																									17	I	develop	the	pointer	picture	further	in	Chapter	2.		
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explanatory	 interests	 in	 the	 case	of	de	jure	co-reference.	As	a	 result	we	 should	abandon	talk	of	mental	files	in	favour	of	a	unified	account	of	de	jure	co-reference	in	terms	of	pointer	relations.		
The	positive	view	has	several	virtues.	First,	 it	 is	much	simpler	 than	 the	mental	file	 framework:	 both	 views	 are	 in	 need	 of	 pointers,	 but	 on	 the	 view	 I’ve	suggested	 we	 do	 not	 need	 any	 further	 apparatus	 to	 account	 for	 de	 jure	 co-reference.	Second,	 the	 framework	makes	no	principled	distinction	between	 the	different	 propositional	 attitudes;	 whereas	 the	 mental	 file	 framework	 only	accounts	 for	 de	 jure	 co-reference	 of	 doxastic	 states,	 the	 pointer	 picture	 can	account	for	how	the	relation	may	obtain	across	all	kinds	of	attitudes.	Third,	the	suggested	framework	is	highly	flexible	which	allows	for	the	possibility	of	de	jure	co-reference	being	a	non-transitive	relation.	Finally,	since	pointer	relations	hold	at	 the	 level	 of	 representational	 vehicles	 rather	 than	 at	 the	 level	 of	 content,	appealing	 to	 pointers	 allows	 us	 to	 account	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	 within	 a	Millian/Russellian	 framework.	The	notion	of	a	pointer	 is	a	minimal	addition	 to	the	 classical	 Millian/Russellian	 picture,	 but	 it	 is	 explanatorily	 powerful.	 I’ve	suggested	how	it	can	account	for	the	difference	between	trivial	and	informative	identity	 judgements	 and	 for	 how	 someone	 may	 be	 rational	 in	 ascribing	contradictory	 properties	 to	 the	 same	 referent.	 Both	 explanations	 essentially	appeal	 to	 the	 way	 beliefs	 are	 related	 to	 each	 other	 and	 a	 thinker’s	 already	existing	base	of	beliefs.	The	pointer	picture	provides	a	metaphysically	sparse	and	unified	 account	 of	 samethinking	 by	 appealing	 to	 a	 notion	 that	 the	 mental	 file	theorist	is	forced	to	posit,	but	it	does	so	without	invoking	the	notion	of	a	mental	file.		
These	considerations	open	up	a	new	area	of	 research,	where	 the	nature	of	 the	pointer	 relation	 becomes	 a	 central	 issue.	 On	 my	 framework	 the	 pointers	 are	primitive,	 but	 there’s	more	 to	 say:	When	 does	 a	 pointer	 come	 into	 existence?	What	sustains	 its	existence?	Further	research	on	 the	pointer	relation	will	yield	new	insights	into	the	nature	of	samethinking.		

	
	 2	
	Vehicle	Relationism:	In	Defence	of	Pointers	
	
	
A	pair	of	 thoughts	may	be	 such	 that	whether	or	not	 they	concern	 the	 same	
referent	 is	directly	manifest	 to	the	thinker.	However,	sameness	or	difference	
in	reference	is	not	always	manifest	to	thinkers	in	this	way.	Manifestness	of	co-
reference	 can	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 coordination	
relations:	If	co-reference	is	manifest,	the	thoughts	are	positively	coordinated,	
while	in	cases	where	co-reference	is	not	manifest,	the	thoughts	are	negatively	
coordinated.	An	important	question,	then,	is	this:	How	should	we	account	for	
such	 coordination	 relations.	 In	 this	 paper	 I	 propose	 a	 novel	 account	 of	
coordination	relations	in	thought.	I	argue	that	coordination	is	to	be	explained	
in	 terms	 of	 primitive	 relations	 having	 representational	 vehicles	 as	 relata.	 I	
call	this	view	‘Vehicle	Relationism’.	I	show	that	Vehicle	Relationism	provides	
solutions	to	some	of	the	longstanding	puzzles	within	the	philosophy	of	mind.	I	
also	 compare	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 to	 similar	 accounts	 and	 argue	 that	 the	
proposed	account	is	superior.	
	
1.	Introduction	
It	 seems	 intuitively	 plausible	 that	 people	 can	 know	 the	 content	 of	 their	 own	thoughts.	In	particular,	the	content	of	singular	thoughts	–	thoughts	that	are	about	single	 individuals	 in	 a	 direct	 way	 –	 seems	 to	 be	 transparent	 to	 thinkers.	 For	
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instance,	 if	 you	believe	 that	Ringo	Starr	was	 the	drummer	 for	 the	Beatles,	 you	have	a	particular	person	in	mind	and	you	believe	of	that	particular	person	that	he	has	a	certain	property.	
It	 may	 then	 seem	 equally	 plausible	 that	 one	 can	 know	 whether	 or	 not	 two	thoughts	 concern	 the	 same	 referent.	 After	 all,	 if	 you	 have	 a	 further	 belief	 that	Ringo	 Starr	 is	 from	 Liverpool	 it	 will	 be	 obvious	 to	 you	 that	 the	 two	 thoughts	concern	 the	 same	 referent,	 and	 you	 can	 use	 this	 information	 to	 infer	 that	someone	who	was	the	drummer	for	the	Beatles	is	from	Liverpool.	However,	it	is	not	the	case	that	such	sameness	of	reference	is	always	transparent	to	thinkers.	
Suppose	 you	 have	 a	 further	 belief	 that	 Richard	 Starkey	 was	 a	 member	 of	 the	band	 Rory	 Storm	 and	 the	 Hurricanes.	 This	 thought	 concerns	 the	 same	 person	that	 you	 believe	 to	 be	 the	 drummer	 for	 the	 Beatles	 and	 who	 was	 born	 in	Liverpool.	In	this	case,	it	is	possible	that	you	are	not	aware	of	this	fact;	you	may	fail	to	know	that	Richard	Starkey	and	Ringo	Starr	are	one	and	the	same	person.	Even	though	you	may	know	the	content	of	the	singular	thoughts	in	isolation,	you	may	fail	to	know	whether	or	not	the	two	thoughts	concern	the	same	individual.	We	see,	then,	that	singular	thought	is	only	transparent	to	a	certain	degree:	One	may	properly	be	said	to	know	the	referent	of	singular	representations	and	still	fail	 to	 know	 whether	 or	 not	 two	 singular	 representations	 concern	 the	 same	referent.		
Whenever	 two	mental	 representations	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 thing,	 and	 this	 fact	 is	manifest	 to	 the	 thinker	 without	 her	 having	 to	 make	 an	 explicit	 identity	judgement,	we	say	that	the	representations	are	positively	coordinated.1	The	two	tokens	 of	 RINGO	 STARR	 in	 the	 example	 considered	 above	 are	 positively	coordinated	 since	 the	 thinker	does	not	need	 to	make	an	 identity	 judgement	 in	order	to	be	warranted	in	inferentially	exploiting	the	information.	In	contrast,	the	token	 of	 RICHARD	 STARKEY	 is	negatively	 coordinated	with	 the	 tokens	 of	 RINGO	STARR,	since	the	co-reference	is	not	manifest	to	the	thinker	in	the	same	way.	In																																																									1 	In	 this	 paper	 I	 assume	 that	 there	 are	 mental	 representations	 and	 that	 such	 mental	representations	are	structured	 in	such	a	way	 that	 they	have	representational	proper	parts	and	that	 these	 parts	 have	 reference.	 The	 content	 of	 a	 thought	 depends	 on	 the	 content	 of	 its	constituent	parts	and	how	these	are	structured.		
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order	for	the	thinker	to	be	warranted	in	inferentially	exploiting	the	co-reference	of	 these	mental	 representations	 she	must	make	 the	 identity	 judgement	 to	 the	effect	 that	 Ringo	 is	 Richard.	 How	 should	 we	 account	 for	 such	 coordination	relations?		
Some	 have	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 more	 to	 the	 content	 of	 our	 thoughts	 than	reference	and	structured	propositions	(e.g.	Frege	1892).	Such	philosophers	hold	that	 the	 full	 content	of	 singular	 representations	 is	 transparent	 to	 thinkers,	 and	that	only	the	two	tokens	of	RINGO	STARR	have	the	same	content	in	this	respect.	Although	 RINGO	 STARR	 and	 RICHARD	 STARKEY	 share	 the	 same	 referent,	 their	overall	 content	 differ.	 In	 this	 way	 transparency	 of	 co-reference,	 and	 also	 the	limits	thereof,	is	explained	in	terms	of	the	semantic	content	of	our	thoughts:	The	full	content	of	thoughts	is	transparent,	and	this	accounts	for	how	we	may	know	–	or	fail	to	know	–	that	two	representations	are	co-referential.		
Traditionally,	this	line	of	thought	is	found	within	the	Fregean	tradition,	and	such	philosophers	hold	that	coordination	relations	are	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	identity	of	intrinsic	representational	features	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	Intrinsic	representational	features	are	those	that	can	be	stated	without	reference	to	other	mental	 representations	 (c.f.	 Gray	 2017).	 In	 recent	 years,	 however,	 some	philosophers	 within	 the	 referentialist	 tradition	 have	 made	 a	 similar	 move:	According	to	Fine	(2007),	there	is	more	to	the	semantic	content	of	thoughts	than	just	 classical	 Millian/Russellian	 propositions.	 However,	 he	 denies	 that	 this	‘something	more’	 is	 to	be	 construed	as	 a	 further	 layer	of	 semantics	 a	 la	Frege.	Fine	claims	 that	 the	referentialist	propositions	 themselves	contain	 the	relevant	information.	This	information	is	of	the	form	of	primitive	semantic	relations	that	hold	between	the	constituents	of	the	proposition.	So	when	you	know	a	priori	that	Ringo	 is	Ringo	this	 is	because	you	stand	in	a	relation	to	a	proposition	 in	which	the	object	occupying	 the	 first	and	second	slot	stand	 in	such	primitive	semantic	relations.	 In	 contrast,	when	 you	 form	 the	 belief	 that	 Ringo	 is	 not	 Richard,	 you	stand	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 proposition	 whose	 constituents	 do	 not	 stand	 in	 such	semantic	relations.	On	this	view,	then,	coordination	is	accounted	for	in	terms	of	primitive	semantic	relations.	
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In	this	paper	I	offer	and	develop	a	novel	account	of	coordination	relations.2	I	call	this	 view	Vehicle	Relationism.	After	 having	 spelt	 out	 the	 positive	 view	 in	 some	detail	 I	 argue	 that	we	 have	 reasons	 to	 prefer	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 to	 Semantic	Relationism.	 In	 fact,	 I	 will	 argue	 that,	 even	 though	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 and	Semantic	Relationism	are	in	theory	compatible,	when	it	comes	to	coordination	in	thought	we	have	reasons	to	reject	Semantic	Relationism	all	together	in	favour	of	Vehicle	Relationism.	
Here	is	the	plan	for	the	paper.	In	section	2,	I	spell	out	the	details	of	my	positive	view.	 In	 section	 3,	 I	 show	 how	Vehicle	 Relationism	 solves	 some	 of	 the	 central	problems	within	the	philosophy	of	mind	pertaining	to	cognitive	significance.	 In	section	4,	 I	 compare	 the	proposed	 view	 to	 some	 similar	 accounts	 found	 in	 the	literature,	 such	 as	Heck’s	 (2012)	Formal	Relationism	and	Fodor’s	 (1975,	 2008)	
Language	of	Thought	Hypothesis.	 In	 part	 5,	 I	 compare	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 and	Semantic	Relationism	and	offer	arguments	to	the	effect	that	Vehicle	Relationism	provides	a	better	framework	for	understanding	coordination	in	thought.	Finally,	in	part	6,	I	set	out	some	objections	to	my	positive	account	and	respond	to	these	worries.		
	
2.	Vehicle	Relationism	
We	 may	 distinguish	 between	 two	 classes	 of	 views	 about	 how	 to	 account	 for	coordination	 relations:	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 are	 those	 that	 hold	 that	coordination	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	properties,	i.e.	properties	that	do	not	concern	relations	to	other	representations.	I	call	such	views	 intrinsicalist	views.	Intrinsicalism	has	been	the	dominant	view	of	coordination	throughout	the	20th	century.3	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 are	 those	 that	 hold	 that	 coordination	 cannot	 be	accounted	 for	 purely	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features	 (c.f.	 Fine	2007,	 Heck	 2012,	 Pinillos	 2011).	 According	 to	 such	 views,	 coordination	 is																																																									2	This	is	a	further	development	of	the	framework	suggested	in	Chapter	1	of	this	thesis.	3	For	more	on	this,	see	the	introduction	chapter,	section	3.1.	
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essentially	a	matter	of	relational	representational	features.	Such	views	are	called	
relationist	views.	The	view	developed	in	this	paper	is	a	version	of	relationism.		
The	basic	idea	of	relationism	is	that	coordination	is	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	primitive	 relational	 features	 (c.f.	 Gray	 2017).	 That	 is,	 according	 to	 this	 view,	coordination	 is	 essentially	 a	 relational	 phenomenon	 that	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	sameness	or	difference	in	intrinsic	representational	features.	A	further	question	concerns	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 relations.	 In	 particular,	what	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	relata?	 According	 to	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 the	 relations	 in	 question	 have	representational	vehicles	–	i.e.	non-semantic	mental	particulars	–	as	relata.	This	is	where	Vehicle	Relationism	and	Semantic	Relationism	part	ways:	According	to	the	Semantic	Relationists	the	relations	are	constituents	of	propositions.	On	this	view,	the	relations	have	objectual	constituents	of	propositions	as	relata.	The	core	claim	of	Vehicle	Relationism	is	this:	
Vehicle	Relationism:	Coordination	is	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	primitive	relations	between	representational	vehicles.	
In	 what	 follows	 I	 will	 elaborate	 on	 this	 view.	 There	 might	 be	 other	 ways	 of	cashing	out	the	core	claim	of	Vehicle	Relationism,	but	I	do	so	in	terms	of	pointer	
relations	and	mental	tags.	
	
2.1.	Pointer	Relations	and	Mental	Tags		
I	use	the	notion	of	pointer	relations	to	denote	the	relevant	primitive	relations.	A	pointer,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 relation	 that	 holds	 between	representational	vehicles.	Whenever	this	relation	holds	the	relata	are	positively	coordinated.4	Importantly,	 the	 pointer	 relations	 do	 not	 reduce	 to	 sameness	 of																																																									4	The	 notion	 of	 a	 pointer	 is	 originally	 found	within	 the	 literature	 on	 information	 packaging	 in	linguistics	(c.f.	Vallduví,	1992).	This	literature	appeals	to	information	clustering	on	file	cards	(c.f.	Heim	1982,	1983)	 in	order	 to	model	 information	 storage.	There	 the	need	 for	pointer	 relations	arises	in	cases	where	information	about	the	referent	of	a	file	card	is	stored	within	a	different	file.	This	 may,	 for	 instance,	 take	 place	 in	 cases	 of	 relational	 predicates,	 where	 the	 information	concerns	two	distinct	individuals.	In	such	cases	the	information	is	stored	on	one	of	the	relevant	file	cards,	while	a	pointer	is	introduced	into	the	other,	giving	instructions	to	go	to	the	other	file.	
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intrinsic	 representational	 features	 of	 the	 relata.	 That	 is,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	determine	 whether	 or	 not	 two	 representational	 vehicles	 are	 positively	coordinated	merely	by	looking	at	the	properties	of	the	two	vehicles	in	isolation.	According	 to	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 two	 representational	 vehicles	may	 share	 the	exact	same	intrinsic	properties	–	including	their	semantic	content	–	and	still	fail	to	be	positively	coordinated.	
I	 call	 the	 representational	 vehicles	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 entering	 into	 pointer	relations	 mental	 tags.	 Together	 with	 pointer	 relations,	 mental	 tags	 are	 the	building	 blocks	 of	 thoughts,	 and	 as	 such	 they	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 individual	concepts.	 However,	 I	 propose	 that	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	coordination	 there	 is	 nothing	 of	 interest	 to	 be	 learned	 from	 looking	 at	 the	intrinsic	 features	 of	 the	 tags	 –	 only	 relational	 features	 are	 explanatorily	interesting	when	it	comes	to	coordination.	Mental	tags	have	two	roles	relevant	to	the	explanation	of	coordination:	(i)	mental	tags	are	meeting	points	for	pointers,	and	 (ii)	 mental	 tags	 have	 a	 semantic	 content.	 I	 say	 more	 about	 the	 semantic	content	of	mental	tags	in	the	next	section.			
We	now	have	the	following	characterization	of	coordination	relations:	
Positive	Coordination:	Two	mental	tags	are	positively	coordinated	if	and	only	if	they	are	connected	by	pointers.	
Negative	Coordination:	Two	mental	tags	are	negatively	coordinated	if	and	only	if	they	are	not	connected	by	pointers.		
Whether	or	not	two	tags	are	positively	coordinated	fully	depends	on	whether	or	not	they	are	connected	by	pointers.	Even	if	two	tags	refer	to	the	same	individual,	they	may	fail	to	be	connected	by	pointers.	This	is	what	explains	the	possibility	of	rational	individuals	having	semantically	contradictory	beliefs.	I	return	to	this	in	section	 3	 where	 I	 use	 the	 pointer	 picture	 to	 solve	 some	 of	 the	 classical	philosophical	problems	pertaining	to	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts.																																																																																																																																																															In	Chapter	1	I	argued	that	we	ought	to	give	up	on	the	file	metaphor	when	it	comes	to	thoughts,	but	I	find	the	pointer	relation	helpful.	Thus,	since	my	framework	does	not	appeal	to	file	cards	or	the	like,	the	notion	of	a	pointer	is	understood	slightly	differently	from	how	it	is	understood	in	the	literature	on	information	packaging.	
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2.2.	Mental	Content	
Vehicle	 Relationism	 is	 primarily	 a	 view	 about	 representational	 vehicles.	 In	theory	the	framework	could	be	combined	with	a	number	of	different	accounts	of	mental	 content.	 I	 am,	 however,	 independently	 motivated	 to	 adopt	 a	 classical	Millian/Russellian	account	of	propositions.	According	to	this	view,	propositions	are	 understood	 as	 structured	 complexes	 having	 objects	 and	 relations	 as	constituents. 5 	Millian/Russellianism	 is	 the	 most	 parsimonious	 account	 of	propositions.	The	main	challenge	for	the	account	is	to	explain	how	it	can	be	that	two	 pairs	 of	 co-referential	 concepts	 may	 nonetheless	 differ	 in	 coordination	relations.	In	section	3,	I	show	how	one	can	give	a	Millian/Russellian	reply	to	this	challenge	 if	 one	 combines	 this	 account	 of	 mental	 content	 with	 Vehicle	Relationism.	In	the	rest	of	this	paper	I	will	simply	assume	Millian/Russellianism	about	mental	content.		
On	 the	picture	 I	have	 in	mind,	 the	reference	of	a	 singular	 representation	(i.e.	a	mental	 tag)	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 relation	 the	 representation	 bears	 to	 the	referent	(and	not	e.g.	by	the	referent	satisfying	a	set	of	descriptions).	Whenever	someone	forms	a	belief	as	a	result	of	standing	in	a	direct	or	indirect	relation	to	an	object,	the	relevant	mental	tag	refers	to	the	object	to	which	they	are	related.6	
In	the	rest	of	this	section	I	will	draw	some	explanatorily	interesting	distinctions	that	 follow	 naturally	 from	 Vehicle	 Relationism.	 In	 particular,	 I	 will	 say	 more	about	what	 the	difference	between	manifest	and	opaque	co-reference	amounts	to	on	this	framework.	In	short,	the	difference	turns	out	to	be	wholly	a	matter	of	whether	or	not	the	relevant	mental	tags	stand	in	pointer	relations.	I	also	draw	a	distinction	 between	 two	 sorts	 of	 positive	 coordination,	 namely	 manifest	 and	
																																																								5	More	on	Millian/Russellianism	in	the	introduction	chapter,	especially	section	2.2.	6	Here	 I	 have	 in	mind	 something	 along	 the	 line	 of	Recanati’s	 (2012)	notion	of	 an	Epistemically	
Rewarding	 (ER)	 relation.	 Such	 ER	 relations	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 acquaintance	 relations	broadly	construed,	so	that	a	thinker	may	stand	in	ER	relations	to	objects	even	in	cases	where	the	information	is	gained	though	i.e.	testimony.	Note	that	the	Vehicle	Relationist	is	not	committed	to	this	particular	view	of	 reference-fixing.	The	viability	of	 the	 framework	does	not	depend	on	 the	viability	of	ER	relations	or	the	like.	
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apparent	co-reference.	In	this	case,	the	difference	is	fully	a	result	of	a	difference	in	content.	
	
2.2.1.	Manifest	Co-Reference	and	Opaque	Co-Reference	
On	the	view	I’m	suggesting,	propositional	attitudes	are	triadic	relations	holding	between	individuals,	representational	vehicles	and	propositions.	The	idea	is	that	individuals	 do	 not	 stand	 in	 direct	 relations	 to	 the	 propositional	 content	 of	thoughts,	but	rather	they	stand	in	relations	to	such	contents	only	indirectly,	via	representational	 vehicles. 7 	This	 claim,	 while	 not	 uncontroversial,	 is	 widely	accepted	(e.g.	Fodor	1975,		2008,	Fodor	&	Pylyshyn	1988,	Laurence	&	Margolis	1999,	 2007).8	It	 is	 possible,	 then,	 that	 a	 thinker	may	 unknowingly	 believe	 the	same	proposition	twice	if	she	has	numerically	distinct	representational	vehicles	that	 express	 the	 same	 proposition,	 and	 these	 representational	 vehicles	 (.i.e.	
mental	tags)	are	not	connected	by	pointers.	For	 instance,	 in	the	case	of	someone	having	 the	 beliefs	 RINGO	 STARR	 IS	 FROM	 LIVERPOOL	 and	 RICHARD	 STARKEY	 IS	FROM	 LIVERPOOL	 the	 thinker	 has	 two	 numerically	 distinct	 beliefs	 that	 both	express	the	same	proposition.	The	beliefs	are	distinct	as	a	result	of	the	fact	that	the	relevant	singular	mental	tags	are	not	connected	by	pointers.		
From	the	definition	of	negative	coordination	above	(i.e.	section	2.1.)	we	see	that	two	beliefs	may	be	negatively	coordinated	even	 in	cases	where	they	happen	to	be	 co-referential.	 This	 is	 how	we	 account	 for	 the	 distinction	 between	manifest	and	opaque	co-reference	 on	 the	 proposed	 framework.	 The	 set	 of	 propositional	attitudes	that	are	manifestly	co-referential	is	a	subclass	of	the	attitudes	that	are	positively	 coordinated.	 The	 other	 subclass	 of	 positively	 coordinated	propositional	 attitudes	 consists	 of	 attitudes	 that	 contain	 mental	 tags	 that	 are	connected	by	pointers	but	that	are	not	actually	co-referential	(I	return	to	this	in	section	2.2.2.).	The	set	of	propositional	attitudes	that	are	opaquely	co-referential																																																									7	I	 borrow	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 ’triadic	 relation’	 from	 Aydede’s	 (2010)	 characterization	 of	 Fodor’s	LOTH.	8 	I	 motivate	 the	 need	 for	 representational	 vehicles	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	coordination	in	thought	further	in	section	5.2	below.	
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is	a	subclass	of	the	attitudes	that	are	negatively	coordinated.	The	other	subclass	of	negative	coordination	is	the	set	of	negatively	coordinated	beliefs	that	are	not	co-referential.	 Importantly,	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 thinker,	 there	 is	 no	difference	between	cases	of	negative	coordination	in	which	the	relevant	mental	tags	refer	to	distinct	entities	and	cases	in	which	they	refer	to	the	same	entity.	
We	may	thus	define	the	difference	between	manifest	and	opaque	co-reference	in	thought	as	follows:	
Manifest	 Co-reference:	 Two	mental	 representations	 are	manifestly	co-referential	if	and	only	if	they	are	positively	coordinated	and	share	reference.		
Opaque	Co-reference:	Two	mental	representations	are	opaquely	co-referential	 if	 and	 only	 if	 they	 are	 negatively	 coordinated	 and	 share	reference.		
We	may	illustrate	these	distinctions	thus:		
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Fig.	1	
	The	 dotted	 arrows	 represent	 reference	 relations,	 while	 the	 unbroken	 arrows	illustrate	 pointer	 relations.	 We	 see	 that	 on	 the	 proposed	 picture,	 positive	coordination	is	a	more	general	notion	than	manifest	co-reference.	In	the	bottom	case	 of	 positive	 coordination	 there	 is	 only	 apparent	 co-reference,	 since	 the	mental	tags	do	not	actually	co-refer.	I	discuss	the	notion	of	apparent	co-reference	further	in	the	next	section.	
	
2.2.2.	Apparent	Co-Reference	
In	 the	 previous	 section	 we	 saw	 that	 there	 is	 another	 class	 of	 positively	coordinated	propositional	 attitudes	 in	 addition	 to	 attitudes	 that	 are	manifestly	co-referential.	 Such	attitudes	 involve	apparent	co-reference.	 	Cases	of	 apparent	co-reference	 include	 cases	 that	 are	 often	 called	 inverse	Paderewski	 cases	 (c.f.	Recanati	2012).	 In	 inverse	Paderewski	cases	 there	 is	a	 subject	who	mistakenly	takes	two	distinct	referents	to	be	the	same.	In	such	cases	there	are	two	tags	that	are	connected	by	pointers	but	refer	to	distinct	individuals.		
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Consider	for	instance	Pam,	who	every	morning	watches	the	mail	carrier	through	her	 window.	 She	 has	 various	 beliefs	 about	 the	 mail	 carrier,	 such	 as	 SHE	 IS	ALWAYS	 ON	 TIME,	 SHE	 HAS	 BROWN	 HAIR,	 SHE	WEARS	 COMFY	 SHOES	 and	 so	 on.	Unbeknownst	 to	 Pam,	 however,	 there	 is	 not	 one	 but	 two	 mail	 carriers	 who	happen	to	be	twins.	The	twins	work	every	other	day	and	Pam	never	sees	them	at	the	 same	 time.	 Now	 Pam’s	 beliefs	 are	 connected	 by	 pointers	 and	 so	 they	 are	positively	 coordinated.	 However,	 the	 various	 beliefs	 actually	 concern	 two	distinct	individuals.	But	then	they	are	not	co-referential	and	so	this	is	not	a	case	of	 manifest	 co-reference.	 The	 structure	 of	 Pam’s	 beliefs	 is	 that	 of	 positive	coordination	without	manifest	co-reference	(c.f.	Fig.	1).9		
We	see,	 then,	 that	 it	 is	possible	 for	two	mental	representations	to	be	positively	coordinated	 without	 being	 manifestly	 co-referential.	 But	 if	 two	 mental	representations	 are	 manifestly	 co-referential	 they	 are	 necessarily	 positively	coordinated.		
I	 take	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 framework	 allows	 us	 to	 draw	 a	 distinction	 between	manifest	and	apparent	co-reference	to	be	a	virtue	of	the	proposed	framework.	It	allows	 us	 to	 explain	 the	 difference	 between	 successful	 and	 unsuccessful	 (or	lucky)	 action.	 A	 precondition	 for	 successful	 action	 is	 that	 the	 motivating	belief/desire	 pair	 concerns	 the	 same	 individual.10	To	 see	 why	 this	 is	 the	 case,	let’s	say	Pam	forms	a	desire	on	Monday	to	meet	that	person,	referring	to	twin1.	On	Tuesday	she	notices	the	mail	carrier	wearing	salsa	shoes	and	forms	the	belief	that	 a	way	 for	her	 to	meet	 that	person,	 referring	 to	 twin2,	 is	 to	 go	 to	 the	 local	salsa	club.	The	only	way	for	Pam	to	satisfy	her	desire	is	to	meet	twin1.	However,	twin2	 is	 the	 only	 one	 of	 the	 two	 who	 enjoys	 salsa,	 and	 so	 even	 though	 Pam’s	attitudes	are	positively	coordinated,	her	going	to	the	salsa	club	will	result	in	an	unsuccessful	action	since	she	does	not	get	to	satisfy	her	desire	to	meet	twin1.	We																																																									9	There	are	ways	of	 spelling	out	 the	details	of	 this	case	 that	make	 it	 seem	 likely	 that	Pam	 is	so	confused	that	the	relevant	mental	tags	fail	to	refer	altogether.	Singular	mental	tags	may	only	have	one	 referent.	 If	 the	 scenario	 were	 spelt	 out	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 makes	 it	 seem	 prima	 facie	plausible	 that	 each	 of	 Pam’s	 beliefs	 would	 refer	 to	 both	 twins,	 I	 would	 simply	 say	 that	 the	relevant	mental	 tags	 fail	 to	refer.	However,	 there	seem	to	be	ways	of	spelling	out	 the	details	of	the	story,	according	to	which	it	seems	more	likely	that	Pam	forms	specific	beliefs	each	day	and	that	each	belief	refers	to	either	twin1	or	twin2,	but	not	both.		10	I	 assume	 again	 here	 a	 simple	 belief/desire	 account	 of	 agency	 (cf.	 Davidson	 1963).	 Nothing	hangs	on	this.	
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could,	of	course,	 imagine	a	scenario	in	which	both	twins	enjoyed	salsa	dancing;	in	that	case,	going	to	the	salsa	club	would	actually	result	in	Pam	meeting	twin1.	This,	 however,	 is	 not	 successful	 action	 in	 the	 relevant	 sense,	 since	 it	 is	merely	lucky	 that	 twin1	has	 the	 same	hobby	as	her	 sister.	 In	 general,	 if	 a	belief/desire	pair	is	positively	coordinated,	the	resulting	behaviour	will	only	be	successful	 in	the	 relevant	 sense	 (and	 not	merely	 lucky)	 if	 the	 belief	 and	 desire	 are	 actually	manifestly	co-referential.		
The	 broader	 notion	 of	 positive	 coordination	 is	 of	 interest	 for	 psychological	generalizations,	since	it	captures	behavioural	dispositions	regardless	of	outcome.	From	 the	 thinker’s	 perspective,	manifest	 co-reference	 is	 the	 same	 as	 apparent	co-reference.	To	see	this,	imagine	a	different	scenario	in	which	Pam	is	right	and	there	 is	 actually	 just	 one	mail	 carrier.	 In	 an	 important	 sense	 Pam’s	 behaviour	would	 be	 the	 same	 in	 both	 cases.	 Pam	 would	 have	 the	 same	 behavioural	dispositions	 in	 the	 case	 of	 manifest	 co-reference	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 merely	apparent	co-reference:	 In	both	cases	she	would	go	to	the	salsa	club	 in	order	to	satisfy	her	desire.	We	see,	then,	that	the	suggested	framework	has	the	virtue	of	explaining	behavioural	dispositions	in	general	as	well	as	the	distinction	between	successful	and	unsuccessful	action	by	appeal	 to	a	minimal	amount	of	entities	–	referentialist	 content	 together	with	pointer	 relations	 and	mental	 tags	 is	 all	we	need.		
I	have	presented	the	key	claims	of	Vehicle	Relationism.	In	the	next	subsection	I	will	expound	briefly	on	why	pointers	obtain	or	fail	to	obtain.11	We	shall	see	that	the	pointers	are	a	result	of	our	general	capacity	to	keep	track	of	entities.	
	
2.3.	Keeping	Track	of	Objects		
Our	 cognitive	 systems	 function	 so	 as	 to	 keep	 track	 of	 objects	 over	 time	 and	across	different	sensory	modalities.	For	instance,	if	you	see	a	white	cup	in	front	of	you	and	at	the	same	time	touch	that	cup,	you	may	end	up	with	beliefs	such	as																																																									11	The	 account	 I	 will	 provide	 is	 a	 mere	 sketch.	 The	 issues	 I	 will	 discuss	 in	 section	 2.3	 open	interesting	avenues	for	future	research.	
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THAT	 CUP	 IS	WHITE	 and	 THAT	 CUP	 IS	 SOLID.	 In	 normal	 cases,	 the	 sameness	 in	reference	will	 be	manifest	 to	 you	 and	you	may	 trade	on	 identity	 and	 conclude	that	something	that	is	white	is	solid.	The	reason	why	you	may	do	so	is	that	your	sub-personal	cognitive	mechanisms	package	the	information	in	such	a	way	that	each	 piece	 of	 information	 is	 treated	 as	 concerning	 the	 same	 object.	 Campbell	(1987)	makes	a	similar	point:	
It	 is	 true	that	cognitive	skills	of	 the	thinker	are	 in	play	[in	cases	 like	the	 one	 above],	 as	 he	 keeps	 track	 of	 the	 object	 from	 modality	 to	modality.	 But	 these	 are	 not	 conceptual	skills	 of	 the	 thinker:	 they	do	not	 have	 to	 do	 with	 his	 abilities	 in	 conceptual	 reasoning.	 […]	 The	cognitive	skills	 in	question	here	belong	to	a	sub-personal	 level;	 they	are	 part	 of	 the	 cognitive	 substratum	 that	 makes	 a	 conceptual	 life	possible	at	all.	(Campbell	1987,	283)	
One’s	 person-level	 conceptual	 skills	 depend	 partly	 on	 such	 sub-personal	cognitive	 binding	 mechanisms.	 The	 fact	 that	 two	 token	 representations	 are	treated	as	though	they	concern	the	same	object	at	the	conceptual	level	is	a	result	of	our	more	fundamental	ability	to	keep	track	of	objects	in	general.		
As	Campbell	notes,	parallel	remarks	can	be	made	concerning	our	ability	to	track	an	object	through	time:		
The	sameness	of	the	objects	around	one	which	one	encounters	from	time	 to	 time	 is	not	an	ordinary	empirical	hypothesis,	 established	by	investigation	on	 the	part	of	 the	subject,	on	 the	strength	of	which	he	takes	 a	 particular	 sequence	of	 encounters	with	 the	 same	 thing.	And	though	keeping	track	of	objects	from	moment	to	moment	is	certainly	a	 cognitive	 skill,	 it	 belongs	 to	 a	 more	 rudimentary	 level	 than	conceptual	computation.	(Ibid.)	
Again,	 the	 conceptual	 capacities	 involved	 in	 trading	 on	 identity	 depend	 on	 the	cognitive	system’s	keeping	track	of	the	relevant	object	at	a	sub-personal	level.	If	a	subject	forms	two	beliefs	at	different	times,	the	subject	will	only	be	rational	in	
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trading	 on	 identity	 if	 the	 two	 beliefs	 are	 partly	 a	 result	 of	 the	 tracking	mechanism	treating	the	information	as	if	it	concerned	the	same	object.		
We	see,	then,	that	our	sub-personal	cognitive	capacity	to	keep	track	of	objects	is	a	prerequisite	for	our	ability	to	trade	on	identity.	What	I	suggest	is	that	pointer	relations	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 result	 of	 such	 sub-personal	 tracking	mechanisms.	 Whenever	 the	 cognitive	 system	 binds	 different	 pieces	 of	information	together	as	 though	they	concern	the	same	 individual,	 the	resulting	beliefs	have	constituents	that	stand	in	pointer	relations.12		
Such	tracking	mechanisms	are,	of	course,	not	infallible.	For	instance,	sometimes	the	tracking	mechanism	binds	pieces	of	information	together	in	such	a	way	that	they	 are	 treated	 as	 concerning	 the	 same	 object	 even	 though	 the	 pieces	 of	information	concern	different	objects.	Imagine	for	instance	looking	at	a	snake	on	the	ground,	following	it	with	your	eyes,	thinking	you’ve	been	looking	at	the	same	snake	 the	 entire	 time.	 However,	 unbeknownst	 to	 you,	 the	 initial	 snake	 was	swapped	by	a	different	indistinguishable	snake	at	the	blink	of	an	eye.	In	this	case,	your	 cognitive	 system	 is	working	 normally,	 but	 due	 to	 uncooperative	 external	circumstances	it	binds	the	information	together	as	though	it	concerned	the	same	animal.	The	result	is	that	you	will	form	beliefs	which	constituents	are	related	by	pointers,	but	that	actually	concern	distinct	objects.13		
Recall	 that,	 on	 the	 picture	 I	 have	 in	 mind,	 the	 reference	 of	 a	 singular	representation	 (i.e.	 a	 mental	 tag)	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 relation	 the	representation	bears	to	the	referent	(as	opposed	to	e.g.	the	referent	satisfying	a	set	of	descriptions).	 In	the	case	of	 the	snake,	 then,	 the	singular	representations	have	 different	 referents.	 However,	 since	 the	 relevant	 beliefs	 are	 related	 by	pointers	(given	the	bindings	effected	by	sub-personal	tracking	mechanisms),	you	will	have	a	rational	disposition	to	trade	on	identity.	This	is	a	case	of	apparent	co-reference,	as	defined	in	the	previous	section.																																																										12 	Recanati	 (2012,	 e.g.	 98)	 also	 appeals	 to	 such	 sub-personal	 binding	 mechanisms	 when	accounting	for	information	distribution	in	mental	files.	13	This	 case	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Pam	 being	 confused,	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 The	 reason	why	Pam’s	beliefs	are	pointer	related	even	though	they	refer	to	distinct	individual	is	that	her	cognitive	tracking	mechanisms	treat	information	from	both	of	the	twins	as	though	it	concerned	the	same	individual.	
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The	suggestion,	then,	is	this:	Pointer	relations	are	(part	of)	the	representational	output	of	sub-personal	 tracking	mechanisms.	 If	 the	cognitive	system	binds	 two	pieces	 of	 information	 together	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 such	 tracking	mechanisms,	 the	 result	 is	 that	 the	 subsequent	 attitudes	 stand	 in	 pointer	relations.	If	the	cognitive	system	does	not	bind	information	together	in	this	way,	there	will	be	no	pointer	relations	between	the	relevant	attitudes.	The	key	claim,	then,	 is	 that	nothing	else	 is	needed	to	account	 for	coordination	 in	 thought.	The	pointer	relations	are	direct	outputs	of	sub-personal	binding	mechanisms,	and	do	not	reduce	to	sameness	or	difference	of	intrinsic	properties	of	representations	at	the	conceptual	level.	
In	the	next	section	I	will	show	how	the	suggested	framework	provides	solutions	to	some	of	the	longstanding	puzzles	within	the	philosophy	of	mind.		
	
3.	Vehicle	Relationism	and	Cognitive	Significance	
I	 started	out	by	presenting	one	of	 the	 central	puzzles	within	 the	philosophy	of	mind:	 If	 all	 there	 is	 to	 the	content	of	 singular	 representations	 is	 their	 referent,	how	 can	 it	 be	 that	 co-referential	 representations	 may	 play	 distinct	 roles	 in	cognition?	 This	 question,	 of	 course,	 goes	 back	 to	 Frege’s	 (1982)	 puzzle	 of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus.	The	puzzle	is	this:	In	Ancient	Babylonia	people	used	the	name	‘Phosphorus’	to	denote	the	brightest	star	visible	in	the	morning.	They	used	 the	 name	 ‘Hesperus’	 to	 denote	 the	 brightest	 star	 visible	 in	 the	 evening.	Unbeknownst	 to	 them,	 ‘Hesperus’	 and	 ‘Phosphorus’	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 object,	namely	 the	 planet	 Venus.	 Even	 so,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 important	 difference	between	knowing	that	Hesperus	 is	Hesperus	and	that	Hesperus	 is	Phosphorus:	The	former	is	trivial,	while	the	latter	involves	new	knowledge	about	the	world.		
Further,	 in	 the	 evening	 the	 Ancient	 Babylonians	 believed	 that	 Hesperus	 was	visible	 and	 that	 Phosphorus	 was	 not	 visible.	 If	 there	 is	 nothing	 more	 to	 the	content	 of	 thoughts	 than	 Millian/Russellian	 propositions,	 the	 Ancient	Babylonians	 seem	 to	 have	 had	 conflicting	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 same	proposition.	Assuming	they	were	rational,	how	can	this	be?	
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One	of	the	key	assumptions	of	Vehicle	Relationism	relevant	to	this	puzzle	is	that	thinking	 is	 a	 triadic	 relation.	 This	 means	 that	 thinkers	 are	 related	 to	propositional	 content	 only	 indirectly,	 via	 representational	 vehicles.	 On	 this	framework	the	cognitive	role	of	mental	representations	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	semantic	 content.	 Hence,	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 need	 not	 introduce	 a	 more	complex	 theory	 of	 content	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 mental	representations.	 What	 accounts	 for	 the	 Ancient	 Babylonians	 being	 rational	 in	holding	 contradictory	 beliefs	 is	 that	 the	 singular	 mental	 tags	 in	 the	 relevant	beliefs	were	not	related	by	pointers.	Since	they	did	not	stand	in	pointer	relations,	the	co-reference	of	the	mental	tags	was	not	manifest.	As	long	as	the	co-reference	is	not	manifest	it	is	rationally	permissible	for	a	subject	to	attribute	contradictory	properties	to	the	same	referent.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 trivial	 versus	 informative	 identity	 judgements,	 the	 Vehicle	Relationist	appeals	to	the	cognitive	effect	of	the	different	beliefs.	Cognitive	effect	is	the	result	of	taking	a	given	belief	as	input	to	an	already	existing	belief	base	(c.f.	Fine	 2007,	 78—85).	 For	 the	 Ancient	 Babylonians,	 their	 belief	 base	 included	various	beliefs	about	the	same	object,	but	not	all	of	these	beliefs	were	connected	by	pointers.	More	precisely,	they	had	two	sets	of	beliefs	each	of	which	contained	beliefs	that	were	pointer	related	to	the	other	beliefs	in	the	set,	but	none	of	which	were	pointer	related	to	the	beliefs	in	the	other	set.	If	we	take	the	belief	HESPERUS	IS	 HESPERUS	 as	 input	 to	 such	 a	 belief	 base	 this	 would	 have	 minimal	 effect.	 If	instead	we	take	the	belief	HESPERUS	IS	PHOSPHORUS	as	input,	the	cognitive	effect	will	 be	 significant.	 The	 singular	 vehicles	 of	 the	 input	 belief	 (i.e.	 HESPERUS	 and	PHOSPHORUS)	 enter	 into	 pointer	 relations	 with	 one	 set	 of	 beliefs	 each.	 The	identity	 then	 allows	 the	 thinker	 to	 combine	 the	 information	 in	 each	 set	 –	something	that	was	not	warranted	prior	to	the	informative	identity	judgement	–	and	 as	 a	 result	 she	may	make	 new	 inferences.	 After	 having	made	 the	 identity	judgement	 the	 thinker	 is,	 for	 instance,	 in	 a	 position	 to	 infer	 that	 one	 and	 the	same	object	is	visible	in	the	morning	and	in	the	evening.		
We	started	out	with	the	claim	that	given	that	the	content	of	singular	thought	is	transparent	 to	 thinkers,	 it	 seems	 plausible	 that	 whether	 or	 not	 two	 thoughts	express	 the	 same	 singular	 proposition	 should	be	 transparent	 to	 the	 thinker	 as	
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well.	The	Millian/Russellian	would	have	 to	deny	 this.	 Someone	 can	believe	 the	same	 Millian/Russellian	 proposition	 twice	 without	 being	 aware	 of	 this	 fact.	When	 the	 Ancient	 Babylonians	 believed	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 a	 star	 and	 also	 that	Phosphorus	is	a	star,	 they	believed	the	proposition	<Venus,	being	a	star>	twice	without	 being	 aware	 that	 the	 two	 thoughts	 concerned	 the	 same	 object.	 Given	that	sameness	of	Millian/Russellian	proposition	is	not	transparent	to	the	thinker,	the	classic	Millian/Russellian	 is	 in	a	good	position	when	 it	comes	 to	explaining	how	thinkers	may	fail	 to	recognize	sameness.	However,	 it	 is	clear	that	we	have	cases	in	which	the	thinker	does	recognize	sameness	of	reference,	and	does	so	in	a	systematic	way.	We	will	see	that	the	pointer	picture	offers	an	account	of	such	systematicity	within	a	Millian/Russellian	framework.	
	
3.1.	The	Systematicity	of	Recognition	
The	 fact	 that	 recognition	 of	 sameness	 of	 propositional	 content	 is	 systematic	becomes	particularly	clear	in	cases	where	two	pairs	of	beliefs	express	the	exact	same	pair	of	Millian/Russellian	propositions,	but	where	which	belief	pair	a	given	individual	 entertains	 makes	 a	 difference	 to	 her	 behavioural	 dispositions.	Consider	 for	 instance	 Lex	 Luthor	wanting	 to	 kill	 Superman.	He	 believes	 that	 a	way	 to	 kill	 Superman	 is	 to	 shoot	 him	 with	 his	 nuclear	 kryptonite	 ray	 gun.	Carrying	his	ray	gun	in	his	suitcase	he	sees	Superman	in	front	of	him,	but	does	nothing.	 How	 can	 this	 be?	When	 seeing	 Superman	 in	 front	 of	 him	 he	 forms	 a	belief	 that	 has	 the	 singular	 proposition	 <Superman,	 being	 in	 front	 of	 me>	 as	content.14	Still,	 this	belief	does	not	 interact	with	his	other	beliefs	 in	such	a	way	that	he	will	choose	to	shoot	the	guy	in	front	of	him.	Why	is	this?	
Lex	Luthor	has	two	distinct	sets	of	singular	beliefs	concerning	Superman.	Some	of	these	express	the	propositions	<Superman,	wearing	a	red	cape>,	<Superman,	wearing	 blue	 tights>,	 <Superman,	 being	 called	 ‘Superman’>	 and	 so	 on.	 At	 the																																																									14	In	 the	case	of	 ‘Superman’	and	 ‘Clark	Kent’	we	do	not	have	a	neutral	way	of	 talking	about	 the	referent.	 In	the	case	of	 ’Hesperus’	and	 ’Phosphorus’	we	can	use	 ’Venus’	 to	signal	neutrality,	but	we	 do	 not	 have	 anything	 similar	 in	 the	 case	 at	 hand.	 Hence,	 whenever	 ’Superman’	 is	 used	 to	indicate	 the	 individual	as	a	constituent	of	a	proposition	 I	 intend	 the	use	 to	be	neutral	between	beliefs	representing	him	as	Superman	or	as	Clark	Kent.	
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same	time,	he	has	a	set	of	beliefs	concerning	Superman	that	express	propositions	such	 as	 <Superman,	 wearing	 glasses>,	 <Superman,	 wearing	 grey	 suits>,	<Superman,	being	called	‘Clark	Kent’>	and	so	on.	The	person	Luthor	sees	in	front	of	 him	 fits	 the	 latter	 set	 of	 descriptions.	 As	 a	 result,	 Luthor’s	 new	 belief	 that	expresses	 the	 proposition	 <Superman,	 being	 in	 front	 of	 me>	 will	 enter	 into	pointer	relations	with	the	beliefs	in	the	latter	set	and	not	with	the	beliefs	in	the	set	consisting	of	beliefs	about	Superman	being	dressed	in	a	cape	and	tights.		
At	the	same	time,	Luthor’s	desire	to	kill	Superman	and	also	his	belief	that	a	way	to	kill	Superman	is	to	shoot	him	with	his	ray	gun	stand	in	pointer	relations	to	the	set	 of	 beliefs	 taking	 Superman	 to	 be	 wearing	 the	 superhero	 costume.	 The	belief/desire	 pair	 is,	 however,	 not	 pointer	 related	 to	 the	 set	 of	 beliefs	 that	 his	newly	formed	belief	is	pointer	related	to.	This	explains	why,	in	a	systematic	way,	Luthor	 only	 acts	 on	 his	 desire	 to	 kill	 Superman	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	namely	the	circumstances	in	which	the	person	he	sees	fits	the	relevant	beliefs	in	the	set.	Importantly,	what	set	Luthor’s	newly	formed	belief	is	pointer	related	to	is	a	result	of	sub-personal	cognitive	binding	mechanisms	(c.f.	section	2.3.	above).	
We	see	that	which	pointer	relations	a	given	representation	enters	into	depends,	at	least	in	some	cases,	on	the	thinker’s	already	existing	beliefs	about	the	referent.	Importantly,	however,	this	 is	very	different	from	the	Fregean	account	of	senses	construed	 as	 definite	 descriptions.	 On	 the	 pointer	 picture	 there	 is	 no	 abstract	public	entity	that	one	grasps	in	virtue	of	acquiring	a	certain	concept.	Nor	is	the	referent	of	mental	tags	determined	by	such	associations.	An	individual	may	have	false	 beliefs	 about	 a	 given	 individual	 and	 still	 successfully	 have	 a	 singular	thought	 about	 that	 individual.15	Similarly,	 a	 single	 individual	may	associate	 the	exact	same	properties	with	two	distinct	individuals	and	still	successfully	refer	to	each	 one	 of	 them	 individually.	 According	 to	 the	 particular	 version	 of	 Vehicle	Relationism	I	have	 in	mind,	 the	referent	of	a	singular	thought	 is	not	picked	out	via	 the	 descriptions	 the	 thinker	 associates	 with	 the	 referent.	 However,	 the	associated	 descriptions	 (partly)	 explain	 the	 way	 information	 is	 stored	 in																																																									15	The	suggested	framework	thus	resembles	the	mental	file	framework	(discussed	in	Chapter	1)	in	that	the	reference	of	a	singular	thought	is	not	established	satisfactionally	(c.f.	Recanati	2012,	57).	
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cognition.	Importantly,	these	descriptions	are	not	part	of	the	semantic	content	of	the	singular	representations	referring	to	the	object	in	question.	Wearing	certain	clothes	is	not	part	of	the	content	of	Luthor’s	mental	tags	referring	to	Superman	–	the	content	of	singular	mental	tags	are	just	their	referents.	
In	 order	 to	 explain	 systematicity	 in	 behavioural	 dispositions,	 then,	 we	 cannot	just	 appeal	 to	 the	 propositional	 content	 alone.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 section	 2.2,	psychological	 generalizations	 also	 depend	 on	 pointer	 relations.	 In	 order	 to	explain	and	predict	how	an	 individual	will	behave	we	need	 to	 take	 the	pointer	relations	 into	 account.	 A	 related	 question	 concerns	 the	 relation	 between	 an	individual’s	propositional	attitudes	and	her	utterances.	 If	an	 individual	has	two	distinct	beliefs	expressing	the	same	propositional	content,	how	can	it	be	that	an	assertion	expressing	 the	very	 same	proposition	may	express	only	one	of	 these	beliefs?	In	what	follows	I	will	give	an	account	of	this	in	terms	of	pointer	relations.	
	
3.2.	The	Relation	between	Propositional	Attitudes	and	Utterances	
Given	 that	 the	 ancient	 Babylonians	 had	 two	 distinct	 beliefs	 expressing	 the	proposition	<Venus,	being	a	 star>,	how	can	 it	 be	 that	only	one	of	 these	beliefs	was	expressed	by	 their	utterances	of	 the	 sentence	 “Hesperus	 is	 a	 star”?	Here	 I	take	the	explanation	to	be	partly	metalinguistic.	The	belief	HESPERUS	IS	A	STAR	is	pointer	 related	 to	 a	 belief	 that	 expresses	 the	 proposition	 <Venus,	 being	 called	‘Hesperus’>.	In	contrast,	the	belief	PHOSPHORUS	IS	A	STAR	is	pointer	related	to	a	belief	 expressing	 the	 proposition	 <Venus,	 being	 called	 ‘Phosphorus’>.	 This,	 of	course,	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 every	 time	 someone	 expresses	 a	 belief	 she	 has	 to	consciously	access	such	metalinguistic	beliefs.	Rather,	the	mere	existence	of	such	beliefs	explains	our	general	ability	to	express	our	attitudes	 linguistically.	These	beliefs	 are	 available	 to	 our	 cognitive	 systems	 (e.g.	 the	 language	 faculty)	 even	though	individuals	may	not	be	consciously	aware	that	such	beliefs	are	exploited.		
But,	 now,	 what	 are	 we	 to	 say	 about	 Peter	 from	 Kripke’s	 (1979)	 puzzle	 of	Paderewski?	 According	 to	 the	 story,	 Peter	 encounters	 the	 same	 person,	Paderewski,	on	two	separate	occasions	without	recognizing	him	as	the	same.	He	
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forms	 various	 beliefs	 about	 Paderewski,	 but	 only	 some	 of	 the	 beliefs	 are	recognized	by	Peter	as	concerning	the	same	individual.	Peter	recognizes	that	all	of	the	beliefs	concerning	Paderewski	formed	on	their	first	encounter	concern	the	same	 individual.	 Similarly,	he	 recognises	 that	all	beliefs	 formed	on	 the	basis	of	their	second	encounter	concern	the	same	individual.	But	he	does	not	know	that	the	beliefs	formed	on	the	first	encounter	concern	the	same	person	as	the	beliefs	formed	on	 the	basis	of	 the	 second	encounter.	On	 the	 first	day,	Peter	 forms	 the	belief	that	Paderewski	has	musical	talent.	On	the	second	day,	he	forms	the	belief	that	Paderewski	does	not	have	musical	talent.	According	to	the	story,	Peter	has	good	 reasons	 to	 accept	 both	 of	 these	 claims,	 and	 so	 he	 is	 rational	 in	 holding	seemingly	contradictory	beliefs.	How	can	this	be?	
This	puzzle	creates	problems	for	Frege.	Frege	(e.g.	1892)	famously	appeals	to	a	distinction	between	sense	and	reference,	where	senses	account	for	coordination.	As	 we	 have	 seen,	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 reference	 may	 come	 apart	 from	sameness	or	difference	 in	 the	cognitive	role	of	concepts.	At	 the	same	time,	 two	concepts	that	are	positively	coordinated	always	play	the	same	role	in	cognition.	Likewise,	negatively	coordinated	concepts	will	not	play	the	same	cognitive	role	in	this	way.	If	senses	are	to	explain	coordination,	then,	sameness	or	difference	of	sense	cannot	 come	apart	 from	coordination.	Frege	made	a	distinction	between	subjective	associated	descriptions	(what	he	calls	 ideas	(1892))	and	senses.	The	latter	are	taken	to	be	public	and	sharable.	The	puzzle	of	Paderewski	shows	that	sameness	of	sense	does	not	guarantee	that	two	concepts	will	play	the	same	role	in	cognition,	since	there	is	only	one	public	sense	associated	with	Paderewski.	If	this	is	the	case,	senses	cannot	account	for	coordination.		
While	this	creates	problems	for	Frege	due	to	there	only	being	one	public	sense	associated	 with	 Paderewski,	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 explanation	 of	 how	 Peter	may	be	rational	despite	believing	contradictory	things	about	the	same	person	is	the	 same	 as	 in	 the	 puzzle	 of	 Hesperus	 and	 Phosphorus:	 Peter’s	 beliefs	 about	Paderewski	are	not	connected	by	pointers.	Someone	can	be	rational	in	believing	contradictory	 propositions	 as	 long	 as	 the	 contradiction	 is	 not	 manifest	 to	 the	thinker.	In	this	particular	case,	the	contradiction	is	manifest	only	as	long	as	the	co-reference	of	 the	 two	 tokens	of	 PADEREWSKI	 is	manifest.	The	 co-reference	 is	
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not	 manifest	 to	 Peter,	 since	 the	 relevant	 mental	 tags	 are	 not	 connected	 by	pointers.	 In	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 relation	 between	 Peter’s	 beliefs	 and	 his	assertions,	 however,	 we	 need	 to	 give	 further	 specifications	 of	 the	 general	relation	between	attitudes	and	utterances.	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 explaining	 the	 relation	 between	 Peter’s	 beliefs	 and	 his	assertions,	 there	are	two	questions:	First,	how	can	it	be	that	Peter	may	use	the	same	English	sentence	to	express	two	distinct	beliefs?	To	be	clear,	the	puzzle	is	not	how	anyone	ever	can	use	the	same	sentence	to	express	different	beliefs	–	it	is	obvious	that	the	same	sentence	may	be	uttered	twice	to	express	different	beliefs	due	to	a	difference	in	context.	Rather,	the	puzzle	concerns	the	fact	that	it	seems	possible	 for	 Peter	 to	 express	 two	 distinct	 beliefs	 by	 the	 same	 sentence	 in	 the	same	 context.	 Consider	 Peter	 uttering:	 “Paderewski	 is	 a	 human	 being”.	 This	sentence	 expresses	 the	 proposition	 <Paderewski,	 being	 a	 human	 being>,	 a	proposition	which	 Peter	 happens	 to	 believe	 twice,	 in	 two	 different	ways.	How	can	 it	 be	 that	when	 Peter	 utters	 this	 sentence	 he	 only	 expresses	 one	 of	 these	beliefs?	Further,	how	do	we	determine	which	of	the	two	beliefs	he	expresses	on	a	given	occasion?			
Just	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus,	Peter	has	 some	metalinguistic	beliefs.	 He	 believes	 the	 propositions	 <Paderewski,	 being	 called	 ‘Paderewski’>.	This	 time,	 however,	 the	 case	 is	 slightly	 different,	 since	 Peter’s	 relevant	metalinguistic	 beliefs	 express	 the	 very	 same	 proposition.	 Even	 though	 Peter	takes	there	to	be	two	public	names	‘Paderewski’	this	is	not	actually	the	case.	The	two	tokens	of	 the	name	 ‘Paderewski’	 in	the	metalinguistic	beliefs	actually	refer	to	the	same	public	name.	How,	then,	do	we	explain	this?		
According	to	Vehicle	Relationism,	two	beliefs	that	express	the	same	proposition	may	nonetheless	 be	 distinct	 beliefs.	 Synchronic	 identity,	 i.e.	 identity	 at	 a	 given	time,	 of	 propositional	 attitudes	 requires	 sameness	 of	 content	 plus	 identity	 of	pointer	relations.	Since	Peter’s	 two	metalinguistic	beliefs	are	pointer	related	to	different	attitudes	they	are	distinct	beliefs.		
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When	Peter	utters,	“Paderewski	is	a	human	being”,	his	cognitive	system	takes	a	certain	 route:	 Very	 crudely,	 it	 starts	 at	 one	 of	 Peter’s	 two	 beliefs	 expressing	<Paderewski,	being	a	human	being>,	and	goes	either	directly	or	indirectly	via	the	metalinguistic	 belief	 that	 is	 pointer	 related	 to	 the	 belief	 he	 intends	 to	 express.	Even	 though	 both	 routes	 from	 Peter’s	 two	 beliefs	 have	 the	 result	 of	 Peter	expressing	 the	same	English	sentence	with	 the	same	propositional	content,	 the	cognitive	 route	 causing	 the	 utterance	 is	 different.	 This	 is	 why,	 even	 though	Peter’s	utterances	mean	the	same	regardless	of	which	belief	he	expresses,	Peter	only	 expresses	 one	 of	 these	 beliefs	 by	 any	 given	 utterance	 of	 the	 relevant	sentence.		
Note	 that	 the	 pair	 of	 beliefs	 at	 each	 stage	 has	 the	 same	propositional	 content:	First,	both	of	Peter’s	beliefs	concerning	Paderewski	being	a	human	being	express	the	 same	proposition.	Second,	both	 the	metalinguistic	beliefs	express	 the	 same	proposition	due	to	there	being	only	one	linguistic	term	‘Paderewski’.	Finally,	the	resulting	utterance	will	express	the	same	proposition	regardless	of	which	of	the	two	 beliefs	 Peter	 intends	 to	 express.	 The	 representational	 vehicles	 are	 thus	explanatorily	 essential	 to	 any	 theory	 that	 takes	 content	 to	 be	 classic	Millian/Russellian	propositions.		
I	 have	 shown	 how	 one	may	 account	 for	 some	 of	 the	 central	 difficulties	 facing	Millian/Russellian	accounts	of	mental	content.	If	we	take	thinking	to	be	a	triadic	relation	 in	 which	 the	 thinker	 stands	 in	 a	 direct	 relation	 to	 representational	vehicles	and	in	an	indirect	relation	to	propositional	content	via	such	vehicles,	we	may	account	for	the	cognitive	role	of	thoughts	in	terms	of	relational	features	of	such	vehicles	(i.e.	whether	or	not	two	vehicles	stand	in	pointer	relations)	rather	than	by	a	direct	appeal	to	the	content	of	thoughts.	
In	what	follows	I	offer	a	comparison	between	Vehicle	Relationism	and	two	views	that	 in	 many	 ways	 resemble	 the	 proposed	 framework,	 namely	 Heck’s	 (2012)	Formal	Relationism	and	Fodor’s	(1975,	2008)	Language	of	Thought	Hypothesis	(LOTH).	This	will	help	make	the	proposed	framework	clearer.			
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4.	Comparison	with	other	Views	
Although	the	view	I	propose	in	this	paper	offers	a	new	account	of	coordination	in	thought,	 it	 bears	 some	 similarities	 to	 certain	 well-known	 theories.	 In	 what	follows,	 I	will	point	to	similarities	and	differences	between	Vehicle	Relationism	and	Heck’s	(2012)	Formal	Relationism	as	well	as	Fodor’s	(1975,	2008)	LOTH.	We	may	 distinguish	 between	 two	 distinct	 although	 highly	 related	 questions	 in	connection	 to	 coordination	 relations:	 (i)	 what	 distinguishes	 two	 thoughts	 that	express	 the	 same	 Millian/Russellian	 proposition	 but	 that	 nonetheless	 play	distinct	roles	in	cognition?	and	(ii)	in	virtue	of	what	do	coordination	relations	in	thought	 obtain?	 Heck	 only	 thoroughly	 addresses	 the	 first	 question,	 but	 they	allude	to	what	they	suspect	might	be	a	correct	response	to	the	second	question,	namely	 that	 coordination	 relations	 hold	 in	 virtue	 of	 a	 Fodor	 style	 language	 of	thought.	As	will	become	clear,	I	agree	with	Heck’s	response	to	the	first	question,	but	I	will	argue	that	if	combined	with	Fodor	style	LOTH	the	framework	is	not	a	genuine	 relationist	 account	 as	 defined	 at	 the	 outset.	 By	 ‘genuine	 relationism’	 I	mean	views	that	give	relationist	answers	to	both	questions.	I	will	then	spell	out	the	 alternative	 response	 to	 question	 (ii)	 that	 follows	 from	 the	 pointer	 picture	discussed	 above.	 The	 suggested	 view	 is	 a	 genuine	 relationist	 account	 of	coordination	relations.		
	
4.2.	Comparison	with	Heck’s	Formal	Relationism	
In	their	(2012),	Heck	develops	the	framework	of	Formal	Relationism.	They	argue	that	the	key	to	solving	Frege’s	puzzle	for	thought	is	not	to	look	at	the	content	of	thoughts,	but	rather	to	look	at	how	the	relevant	thoughts	are	formally	related	to	each	 other.	 Such	 relations,	 they	 argue,	 need	 not	 supervene	 on	 sameness	 or	difference	in	content.		
Heck	considers	the	difference	in	the	cognitive	role	of	(1)	and	(2):	
1) SAMUEL	CLEMENS	HAS	DIED	2) MARK	TWAIN	HAS	DIED		
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CLEMENS	and	TWAIN	refer	to	the	same	individual,	but	as	we	have	seen,	this	is	no	guarantee	 that	 they	 play	 the	 same	 role	 in	 cognition.	 Heck	 illustrates	 this	 by	considering	a	case	involving	an	individual,	Fred,	who	when	he	comes	to	believe	(1)	gets	devastated,	whereas	he	does	not	get	equally	saddened	when	coming	to	believe	(2).	Heck	argues	that		
1. What	 distinguishes	 the	 belief	 that	 Clemens	 has	 died	 from	 the	belief	 that	 Twain	 has	 died	 is	 nothing	 intensional.	 In	 particular,	these	beliefs	have	the	same	content.		2. If	we	are	to	be	able	to	explain	Fred’s	behavior	in	cognitive	terms,	there	must	be	some	difference	between	these	beliefs	that	plays	a	role	 in	 psychological	 explanation.	 But	 no	 intrinsic	 difference	between	 these	 beliefs	 plays	 that	 role.	 The	 explanatorily	 relevant	difference	 is	 an	 extrinsic,	 relational	 one.	 It	 concerns	 how	 these	beliefs	are	related	to	other	of	Fred’s	beliefs.	(Heck	2012,144)	
The	basic	claim	is	this:	Frege	cases	show	that	 inferential	patterns	of	beliefs	are	partly	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 stand	 in	 a	 certain	 formal	relation.	 Such	 formal	 relations	 are	 similar	 to	 the	 ones	 found	 in	 formal	 logic	 in	inferences	 where	 sameness	 of	 reference	 is	 presupposed	 rather	 than	 stated	explicitly:		
Saying	that	Fred’s	belief	that	Clemens	has	died	is	‘formally	related’	to	his	belief	that	Clemens	is	his	neighbor	means	that	the	beliefs	have	the	feature	we	 aim	 to	 capture	 in	 formal	 logic	when	we	 represent	 them	this	way:	D(c),	c	=	the	N;	rather	than	this	way:	D(t),	c	=	the	N.	 (Ibid.,	145)		
This,	they	argue,	is	all	that	is	really	established	by	Frege	cases.	It	does	not	follow	directly	 from	 Frege’s	 puzzle	 that	 there	 must	 be	 a	 difference	 in	 content	 of	CLEMENS	 and	TWAIN.	Rather,	what	 follows	 from	such	Frege	 cases	 is	 that	 there	must	 be	 a	 relational	 difference	 between	 the	 pairs	 [CLEMENS,	 CLEMENS]	 and	[CLEMENS,	TWAIN].		
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I	 agree	with	Heck	 that	 the	 relational	aspects	of	mental	 representations	are	 the	key	 to	 understanding	 cognitive	 significance	 and	 that	 nothing	 about	 content	follows	directly	from	Frege’s	observation.	In	fact,	I	take	this	to	be	one	of	the	key	claims	of	Vehicle	Relationism.		
Heck’s	 main	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 Frege	 cases	 for	 intentional	explanation	 and	 in	 stating	 intentional	 laws.	 They	 argue	 that	 for	 this	 specific	purpose	 we	 only	 need	 the	 formal	 relations	 and	 as	 such,	 “the	 sorts	 of	 formal	relations	 among	 beliefs	 that	 must	 be	 mentioned	 may	 be	 treated	 as	psychologically	 primitive:	We	 can	make	 reference	directly	 to	 these	 relations	 in	giving	intentional	explanations	and	in	stating	intentional	laws”	(Heck	2012,	157).	As	 a	 result,	 psychological	 generalizations	 only	 require	 Millian/Russellian	propositions	and	direct	reference	to	the	relations	between	thoughts.	This	takes	us	back	to	the	discussion	in	section	2	above.	Behavioural	dispositions	do	not	only	depend	on	the	propositional	content	of	desires	and	beliefs,	but	also	on	whether	or	not	the	desires	and	beliefs	are	positively	coordinated.	We	may	make	a	more	general	relationist	claim	based	on	Heck’s	argument:	
General	Relationist	Claim:	All	that	is	needed	to	account	for	Frege	cases	are	relational	aspects	of	thought.	
All	 relationists	 are	 committed	 to	 this	 general	 claim.	 However,	 as	 mentioned,	there	 is	a	 further	question	concerning	coordination	relations:	 In	virtue	of	what	do	such	relations	obtain?	Heck	sets	this	question	aside,	but	they	suggest	that	“it	may	well	be	 that	 two	beliefs’	 standing	 in	 such	a	 relation	 is,	 as	a	matter	of	 fact,	ultimately	 to	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 facts	 about	 how	 cognitive	 states	 are	implemented”	(Heck	2012,	157).		
In	 this	 regard,	 the	 framework	 in	 terms	 of	 pointer	 relations	 suggested	 in	 this	paper	goes	one	 step	 further	 than	Heck’s	 formal	 relationism:	Heck	only	aims	at	answering	 the	 first	 question,	 about	 what	 it	 is	 that	 distinguishes	 two	 thoughts	that	express	 the	same	Millian/Russellian	proposition	but	 that	nonetheless	play	distinct	roles	in	cognition.	In	contrast,	in	addition	to	answering	the	first	question,	the	Vehicle	Relationist	 offers	 a	 response	 to	 the	 second	question	of	 in	 virtue	of	
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what	 coordination	 relations	 in	 thoughts	 obtain.	 I	 will	 elaborate	 on	 this	 is	 in	section	4.1.	below.		
Heck	makes	clear	that	they	do	not	want	to	deny	Fodor	style	LOTH:		
It	would	be	strange	to	regard	the	‘formal	relations’	as	brute.	So	their	obtaining	or	failing	to	obtain	must	supervene	on	something	else.	But	it	 is	no	part	of	my	view	here	to	say	what	 that	 is.	 It	might	be	a	 lot	of	things.	 For	 what	 it’s	 worth,	 I	 suspect	 that	 the	 language	 of	 thought	hypothesis	 is	true	and	that	 formal	relations	supervene	on	Mentalese	syntax.	(Heck	2012,	159)	
I	 will	 argue	 that	 if	 combined	 with	 Fodor	 style	 LOTH,	 Formal	 Relationism	becomes	a	version	of	Intrinsicalism,	as	defined	at	the	outset,	rather	than	genuine	Relationism	about	coordination	in	thought.	In	order	to	see	why	this	is	the	case,	let’s	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 Fodor’s	 framework	 and	 how	 it	 relates	 to	 Vehicle	Relationism.	
	
4.1.	Comparison	with	Fodor’s	Language	of	Thought	Hypothesis	
The	key	claim	of	Fodor’s	LOTH	is	that	thinking	takes	place	in	a	mental	language,	usually	 just	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘Mentalese’.	 This	 language	 is	 much	 like	 natural	languages	in	that	it	is	made	up	of	syntactic	entities	that	compose	into	sentence-like	structures:	
This	 language	 consists	 of	 a	 system	 of	 representations	 that	 is	physically	 realized	 in	 the	 brain	 of	 thinkers	 and	 has	 a	 combinatorial	syntax	 (and	 semantics)	 such	 that	 operations	 on	 representations	 are	causally	sensitive	only	to	the	syntactic	properties	of	representations.	(Aydede	2010)	
On	 this	 view,	 then,	 thoughts	 are	 mental	 representations	 that	 have	 a	compositional	 semantics.	 Fodor	 thus	 accepts	 a	 version	 of	 the	 representational	
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theory	 of	 mind	 (RTM),	 which	 is	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 propositional	 attitudes	consist	of	relations	between	subjects	and	mental	representations:		
RTM	is	a	claim	about	the	metaphysics	of	cognitive	mental	states	and	processes:	Tokens	of	 cognitive	mental	 states	 are	 tokens	of	 relations	between	creatures	and	their	mental	representations.	(Fodor	2012,	5)	
Further,	he	says	that	
according	to	RTM,	Mentalese	singular	terms,	predicates,	and	the	like	refer	to	things	in	the	world	and	[...]	expressions	of	Mentalese	are	the	representations	 over	 which	 mental	 processes	 are	 defined.	 (Fodor	2008,	93)	
According	to	this	view,	mental	representations	stand	in	relations	to	things	in	the	world,	but	the	cognitive	system	is	only	directly	sensitive	to	the	syntactic	features	of	 thought,	 and	 computes	 on	 syntactically	 specified	mental	 representations.	 In	this	 way,	 thinking	 becomes	 a	 triadic	 relation	 between	 thinker,	 mental	representations	and	propositional	content;	thinkers	are	related	to	propositional	content	via	representational	vehicles.	
It	 becomes	 clear	 that	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 bears	 many	 similarities	 to	 Fodor’s	LOTH.	Both	frameworks	take	thinking	to	be	a	triadic	relation	between	thinkers,	representational	 vehicles	 and	 propositions.	 Both	 theories	 hold	 that	 cognitive	processes	 are	 only	 sensitive	 to	 syntactic	 features	 of	 thoughts	 (i.e.	representational	 vehicles).	 Both	 frameworks	 thus	 take	 the	 explanation	 of	coordination	 to	 essentially	 be	 a	 matter	 of	 syntactic	 features:	 Co-referential	mental	 representations	 may	 differ	 only	 in	 properties	 found	 at	 the	 level	 of	representational	vehicles.		
The	main	difference	between	Fodor’s	LOTH	and	Vehicles	Relationism	is	how	the	frameworks	construe	the	syntax	of	the	language	of	thought.	Fodor	takes	mental	vehicles	to	be	highly	similar	to	words	in	natural	language:	They	can	be	construed	
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as	 having	 syntactic	 forms	 that	 are	 recognized	 by	 the	 cognitive	 system.16	Two	vehicle	 tokens	 that	 have	 the	 same	 syntactic	 form	 are	 of	 the	 same	 type	 and	 so	they	play	the	same	role	in	cognition.	In	other	words,	on	this	view	coordination	is	explained	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 such	 syntactic	 forms.	 This	provides	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 second	 question	 concerning	 in	 virtue	 of	 what	coordination	relations	obtain	(or	fail	to	obtain):	Two	vehicles	that	have	the	same	form	are	positively	coordinated,	while	two	vehicles	that	have	distinct	forms	are	negatively	coordinated.	
We	 see	 then	 that	 Fodor’s	 view	 is	 an	 intrinsicalist	 account	 of	 coordination:	Coordination	 is	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features,	namely	 vehicles	 being	 of	 a	 certain	 type	 in	 virtue	 of	 having	 a	 certain	 syntactic	form.17	This	is	a	good	point	at	which	to	return	to	Heck’s	inclination	to	think	that	“the	language	of	thought	hypothesis	is	true	and	that	formal	relations	supervene	on	Mentalese	syntax”	(Heck	2012,	159).	If	this	is	correct	and	Mentalese	syntax	is	construed	the	way	Fodor	suggests,	Formal	Relationism	is	not	really	a	relationist	account	 of	 coordination.	 This	 is	 because	 coordination	 relations,	 on	 this	 view,	ultimately	 are	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features	 of	thoughts	and	thought	constituents.	On	this	picture	it	is	the	case	that,	although	it	might	 be	 correct	 that	 only	 the	 formal	 relations	 are	 needed	 for	 psychological	generalizations,	 such	 relations	 could	 ultimately	 be	 reduced	 to	 intrinsic	representational	 features	 of	 thoughts.	Whether	 or	 not	 Formal	 Relationism	 is	 a	genuine	relationist	framework	thus	depends	on	what	theory	of	implementation	one	adopts.		
Vehicle	Relationism	offers	an	alternative	story	of	how	the	coordination	relations																																																									16	Note	 that	 the	 talk	 about	 forms	 is	 of	 course	 purely	 metaphorical:	 type	 identity	 of	 primitive	Mentalese	 concepts	 is	 not	 determined	 by	 their	 physical	 ’shape’	 in	 the	 brain,	 since	 the	 same	concept	may	be	physically	realized	 in	many	different	ways	 in	 the	head	of	different	 thinkers,	or	even	the	same	thinker	at	different	times.	The	metaphor	comes	from	Fodor	(2008,	80)	where	he	illustrates	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 primitive	 concept	 types	 by	 appeal	 to	 how	we	 determine	sameness	of	types	of	letters:	”We	distinguish	’dog’	tokens	from	’cat’	tokens	by	their	spelling,	but	we	don’t	 distinguish	 ’a’	 tokens	 from	 ’b’	 tokens	 that	way,	 since	 ’a’	 and	 ’b’	 don’t,	 of	 course,	have	spellings.	What	 they	have	 is	shapes;	 and	 their	 shapes	are	different	 in	ways	 to	which	our	visual	system	is	responsive;	if	they	weren’t,	we	wouldn’t	be	able	to	read.	Likewise	mutatis	mutandis	for	the	way	the	minds	draw	type	distinctions	between	tokens	of	basic	mental	representations”.		17	Again,	I	base	the	notion	of	an	intrinsic	representational	feature	on	Gray	(2017).	As	mentioned	previously,	 the	 relevant	 features	 are	 those	 that	 can	 be	 stated	 without	 reference	 to	 another	representation.	See	the	Introduction	chapter,	section	3.1,	for	elaboration	on	this	notion.	
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are	implemented.	According	to	Vehicle	Relationism,	we	do	not	need	to	appeal	to	syntactic	 forms	 or	 the	 like	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	 coordination	 in	 thought.	Instead,	 the	 syntax	 of	 the	 language	 of	 thought	 must	 be	 supplemented	 with	pointer	relations	that	hold	between	mental	tags.	When	it	comes	to	coordination,	the	cognitive	system	is	sensitive	to	such	relations	rather	than	intrinsic	syntactic	features	of	 the	vehicles.	Representational	vehicles	 construed	as	mental	 tags	do	not	have	distinct	syntactic	forms.	At	the	level	of	vehicles,	all	mental	tags	have	the	same	intrinsic	features.	Tags	only	differ	to	the	extent	that	they	stand	in	different	pointer	 relations	 or	 express	 different	 semantic	 contents.	 If	 two	 thoughts	 are	positively	 coordinated	 the	 cognitive	 system	 “reads	 off”	 this	 relation	 directly,	rather	 than	 treating	 the	 representations	 as	 the	 same	 due	 to	 their	 intrinsic	features.	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 the	 pointer	 relations	 are	 representationally	primitive.18		
The	 formal	 relationist	 who	 takes	 coordination	 relations	 to	 supervene	 on	 the	syntax	of	the	language	of	thought	thus	has	a	choice	between	on	the	one	hand	a	classical	 Fodor	 style	 construal	 of	 the	 language	 of	 thought,	 which	 renders	 the	theory	 an	 Intrinsicalist	 account	 of	 coordination	 relations,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	Vehicle	 Relationism	 which	 takes	 the	 language	 of	 thought	 to	 be	 irreducibly	relational.	Both	alternatives	are	 compatible	with	 the	General	Relationist	Claim,	but	 only	 the	 latter	 is	 compatible	 with	 genuine	 relationism	 about	 coordination	relations.	
A	natural	question	to	ask	at	this	point	is	whether	or	not	we	have	any	reason	to	think	 that	 the	 language	of	 thought	 is	 irreducibly	 relational,	 except	 from	simply	presupposing	 relationism	 about	 coordination.	 One	 such	 reason	 can	 be	 drawn	from	 Pinillos’	 (2011)	 argument	 that	 coordination	 is	 a	 non-transitive	 relation.	Consider	the	following	thought:	
																																																								18	By	this	I	mean	that	the	pointers	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	or	difference	in	other	features	of	mental	representations.	That,	of	course,	is	not	to	say	that	pointer	relations	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	or	difference	in	any	property.	I	have	not	said	anything	about	how	the	pointer	picture	may	be	neurologically	implemented,	and	make	no	claim	about	this	matter	in	this	paper.	It	might	turn	 out	 that	 the	 pointers	 ultimately	 obtain	 (or	 fail	 to	 obtain)	 as	 a	 result	 of	 sameness	 or	difference	in	neurological	firings.	
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1) HESPERUS1	 IS	 PHOSPHORUS2	 AFTER	 ALL,	 SO	 HESPERUS-SLASH-PHOSPHORUS1,2	MUST	BE	A	VERY	RICH	PLANET.	In	this	case,	each	of	the	simple	representations	(i.e.	HESPERUS	and	PHOSPHORUS)	are	 positively	 coordinated	 with	 the	 slash-concept	 (i.e.	 HESPERUS-SLASH-PHOSPHORUS),	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 simple	 representations	 are	 negatively	coordinated	with	 each	 other.	 Such	 slash-concepts	 are	 the	 result	 of	 informative	identity	 judgements	 of	 the	 form	 a	 =	 b.	When	 someone	 learns	 that	Hesperus	 is	Phosphorus	they	will	in	normal	circumstances	form	a	new	representation	of	the	form	 seen	 in	 (1).	 This	 new	 concept	 is	 the	 one	 that	 will	 normally	 figure	 in	thoughts	 after	 the	 individual	 has	made	 such	 identity	 judgements.	 Even	 so,	 the	individual	 is	 still	 able	 to	 use	 the	 simple	 representations,	 as	 seen	 in	 (1).	 If	 this	were	not	the	case,	people	could	not	rationally	think	thoughts	such	as	I	USED	TO	THINK	THAT	A	WAS	NOT	B,	after	having	formed	the	belief	A	=	B.	
If	 this	 is	 correct,	 coordination	 relations	 are	 non-transitive. 19 	However,	 if	coordination	relations	supervene	on	Fodor	style	LOTH,	the	coordination	relation	would	be	transitive	since	identity	of	syntactic	form	is	a	transitive	relation.	If,	 in	contrast,	 coordination	 relations	 supervene	 on	 the	 language	 of	 thought,	relationally	construed,	we	face	no	problem	accounting	for	Pinillos’	observation.	There’s	 nothing	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 pointer	 relations	 that	 gives	 us	 reason	 to	think	that	they	are	transitive.	The	possibility	of	coordination	relations	being	non-transitive	 gives	 us	 at	 least	 one	 reason	 to	 prefer	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 to	 the	traditional	LOTH.		
To	sum	up:	I	agree	with	Heck	that	all	that	is	needed	for	psychological	explanation	is	 content,	 understood	 as	Millian/Russellian	 propositions,	 as	well	 as	 relational	features	 of	 thought.	 I	 disagree,	 however,	 with	 Heck	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the																																																									19	Soames	(2010)	also	suggests	that	coordination	is	a	non-transitive	relation.	His	example	is	(26):	”John	 fooled	 Mary	 into	 thinking	 he	 wasn’t	 John”.	 He	 suggests	 that	 we	 “revise	 the	 notions	 of	coordination	 and	 representing	as	the	same	 so	 that	 the	 term-occurrences	 in	 the	 complement	 of	(26)	can	be	coordinated	with	the	subject	of	‘fooled’	without	being	coordinated	with	each	other”	(Soames	2010,	474	n.1).			
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implementation	of	such	relations.	According	to	Vehicle	Relationism,	coordination	relations	hold	in	virtue	of	primitive	relations	between	representational	vehicles	rather	than	in	virtue	of	representational	vehicles	being	of	the	same	type.	Only	if	we	 combine	 Formal	 Relationism	 with	 a	 relational	 framework	 of	 how	coordination	 relations	 are	 implemented	 will	 the	 framework	 be	 a	 genuine	relationist	account	of	coordination.		
In	the	next	section	I	will	compare	Vehicle	Relationism	to	Fine’s	(2007)	Semantic	Relationism.	Vehicle	Relationism	combines	some	elements	of	Fodor	style	LOTH	with	 elements	 of	 Semantic	 Relationism.	 Like	 the	 Fodorian	 LOTH	 it	 holds	 that	thinking	is	a	triadic	relation,	and	like	Semantic	Relationism	it	takes	coordination	to	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 relational	 properties	 of	 mental	 states	 rather	 than	intrinsic	 features.	 However,	 the	 proposed	 framework	 differs	 significantly	 from	both	of	these	other	accounts	of	coordination.	Ultimately	I	will	argue	that	Vehicle	Relationism	is	preferable	to	Semantic	Relationism.		
	
5.	Vehicle	Relationism	vs.	Semantic	Relationism	
Thus	far	I	have	spelt	out	the	central	details	of	Vehicle	Relationism:	Coordination	relations	are	construed	as	pointer	relations	that	have	mental	tags	as	relata.	The	positive	account	is	compatible	with	a	highly	minimal	classical	Millian/Russellian	view	 of	 propositional	 content.	 Coordination	 obtains	 at	 the	 level	 of	representational	 vehicles	 and	 manifest	 co-reference	 is	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	coordination	 plus	 sameness	 of	 reference.	 The	 pointer	 picture	 combined	 with	classical	 Millian/Russellianism	 about	 propositional	 content	 is	 thus	 a	 highly	attractive	 framework	 due	 to	 its	 explanatory	 power	 and	 parsimony.	 In	 what	follows,	I	will	point	to	similarities	and	differences	between	this	framework	and	Semantic	Relationism.		
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5.1.	Comparison	with	Semantic	Relationism	
Fine’s	(2007)	Semantic	Relationism	is	first	and	foremost	a	theory	of	coordination	in	language.	Even	so,	he	expands	his	view	and	argues	that	
just	as	there	are	semantic	relationships	between	expressions	that	are	not	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	their	intrinsic	semantic	features,	so	there	are	representational	relationships	between	the	constituents	of	thought	 that	 are	 not	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	representational	 features.	 […]	 If	 this	 is	 right,	 then	 it	means	 that	 the	apparatus	 of	 coordinated	 content	 is	 equally	 applicable	 within	 the	realm	of	thought	(Fine	2007,	66).		
Further,	he	says	that		
for	a	thought	or	thoughts	to	represent	an	object	as	the	same	is	for	it	to	be	 a	 representational	 requirement	 that	 the	 object	 of	 the	 thought	 or	thoughts	is	the	same.	[…]	the	intentionality	of	thought	will	be	given	by	a	 body	 of	 representational	 requirements,	 which	 indicate	 how	 our	various	 thoughts	 represent	 what	 they	 do;	 and	 coordination	 will	 be	achieved	in	either	case	when	those	requirements	demand	an	identity	in	what	the	language	of	thought	is	about	(Ibid.,	72).		
To	 say	 that	 a	 thought	 represents	 an	 object	 as	 the	 same,	 as	 opposed	 to	representing	 the	 object	 to	 be	 the	 same,	 is	 just	 to	 say	 that	 the	 relevant	representations	 are	 positively	 coordinated.	 Thus	 far,	 the	 general	 idea	 is	 that	there	are	representational	relationships	that	are	to	be	taken	as	primitives	rather	than	reduced	to	sameness	of	intrinsic	representational	features.	I	agree	with	this	general	idea.	
As	mentioned,	 the	main	 difference	 between	 Semantic	 Relationism	 and	 Vehicle	Relationism	is	what	the	views	say	about	the	nature	of	coordination	relations.	We	may	 ask:	 what	 are	 the	 relata	 of	 the	 coordination	 relations?	 The	 Vehicle	Relationist	holds	 that	 the	 relations	are	 realized	at	 the	 level	of	 representational	vehicles:	There	are	primitive	relations	holding	directly	between	such	vehicles.	As	
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I	have	shown,	this	view	is	compatible	with	a	classical	Millian/Russellian	view	of	propositions.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Semantic	 Relationist	 takes	 the	 relata	 of	coordination	 relations	 to	 be	 constituents	 of	 propositions.	 Unlike	 the	 Vehicle	Relationist,	then,	the	Semantic	Relationist	is	committed	to	a	relational	account	of	propositions:		
The	content	of	a	belief	will	be	given	by	a	coordinated	rather	than	by	an	uncoordinated	proposition.	Thus	we	may	distinguish	between	the	content	of	the	belief	that	Cicero	is	Tully	(where	this	is	the	negatively	coordinated	proposition)	from	the	content	of	the	belief	that	Cicero	is	Cicero	(where	this	 is	 the	positively	coordinated	proposition).	This	 is	already	 a	 great	 advantage	 on	 the	 usual	 referentialist	 view,	which	 is	unable	 to	 make	 any	 such	 distinction	 without	 either	 distorting	 the	logical	 form	 or	 appealing	 to	 some	 notion	 of	 sense	 or	 “guises”	 (Fine	2007,	77).	
In	section	1,	I	mentioned	that	the	Semantic	Relationist	approach	to	coordination	is	 similar	 to	 the	 Fregean	 approach	 in	 that	 the	 Semantic	 Relationist	 takes	cognitive	 difference	 to	 imply	 a	 difference	 in	 semantic	 content.	 That	 is,	 on	 this	view	sameness	of	propositional	content	is	transparent	to	thinkers.	Even	though	the	 Semantic	 Relationist	 denies	 that	 reference	 is	 all	 there	 is	 to	 the	 semantic	content	of	 thoughts	 the	account	 is	 supposed	 to	be	Millian/Russellian	 in	nature	(c.f.	Fine	2007,	53-54).	According	to	Semantic	Relationists	the	semantic	content	of	HESPERUS	is	just	its	referent.	Likewise	the	semantic	content	of	PHOSPHORUS	is	also	 its	 referent.	 Hence,	 the	 two	 concepts	 have	 the	 same	 intrinsic	 semantic	properties.	 Even	 so,	 the	 pairs	 [HESPERUS,	 HESPERUS]	 and	 [HESPERUS,	PHOSPHORUS]	 differ	 in	 their	 overall	 semantic	 properties	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 first	pair	 being	 positively	 coordinated	 while	 the	 latter	 is	 negatively	 coordinated.	Semantic	 Relationists	 thus	 hold	 that	 the	 thoughts	 HESPERUS	 IS	 HESPERUS	 and	HESPERUS	IS	PHOSPHORUS	differ	in	their	overall	semantic	content,	and	this	is	why	the	two	thoughts	may	play	different	roles	in	cognition.	Note	that	by	making	this	claim,	the	semantic	relationist	rejects	compositionality:	Two	thoughts	may	have	the	same	structure	and	contain	constituent	concepts	that	are	true	synonyms	but	
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still	fail	to	express	the	same	propositional	content,	as	in	the	case	of	the	thoughts	HESPERUS	IS	HESPERUS	and	HESPERUS	IS	PHOSPHORUS.	
Note	 the	 last	 sentence	 of	 the	 quote	 above,	 where	 Fine	 says	 that	 Semantic	Relationism	 does	 not	 need	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 sense	 or	 “guises”.	 In	 the	next	 section,	 we	 shall	 see	 that	 this	 is	 not	 actually	 the	 case.	 In	 what	 follows	 I	provide	 arguments	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 provides	 a	 better	account	of	coordination	than	Semantic	Relationism.	The	first	argument	concerns	the	difference	in	complexity	of	propositional	content.	Semantic	Relationism	ends	up	having	to	postulate	further	levels	of	semantic	content	in	addition	to	classical	Millian/Russellian	 propositions.	 This	 is	 where	 the	 Semantic	 Relationist	 seems	committed	 to	 something	 akin	 to	 “guises”.	 The	 second	 argument	 concerns	 the	nature	of	the	semantic	relations	and	how	they	may	account	for	cognitive	effect.	I	argue	 that	 in	order	 to	account	 for	 the	cognitive	effect	of	 coordination	relations	the	 semantic	 relationist	must	 postulate	 something	 akin	 to	 pointer	 relations.	 If	the	 semantic	 relationist	 needs	 pointers	 and	 the	 pointer	 picture	 can	 do	 all	explanatory	work	without	having	to	invoke	an	unnecessary	complex	semantics,	the	 pointer	 picture	 –	 and	 thereby	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 –	 would	 be	 the	 better	relationist	alternative.		
	
5.2.	Semantic	Relationism:	Propositional	content	
According	to	the	semantic	relationist,	the	difference	between	the	two	sentences	“Hesperus	 is	 Hesperus”	 and	 “Hesperus	 is	 Phosphorus”	 is	 that	 the	 former	expresses	 a	 positively	 coordinated	 proposition	whereas	 the	 latter	 expresses	 a	negatively	coordinated	proposition.	But	what	about	sentences	that	contain	only	one	objectual	 component,	 such	 as	 “Hesperus	 is	 a	planet”	 and	 “Phosphorus	 is	 a	planet”?	 In	 such	 cases,	 there	 are	 no	 two	 concepts	 that	 may	 be	 coordinated.	Hence,	 the	 sentences	 seem	 to	 express	 the	 very	 same	proposition	 and	have	 the	same	truth	conditions.		
In	his	(2010a)	Fine	develops	the	framework	of	Semantic	Relationism	further	as	a	response	to	criticism	made	by	Soames	(2010).	Soames	criticises	Fine’s	account	of	
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the	semantics	of	belief	reports.	Given	that	two	sentences	such	as	“Hesperus	is	a	planet”	 and	 “Phosphorus	 is	 a	 planet”	 express	 the	 same	 proposition	 on	 Fine’s	view,	what	 is	the	Semantic	Relationist	to	say	about	belief	reports	such	as	“John	believes	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 a	 planet”	 and	 “John	 believes	 that	 Phosphorus	 is	 a	planet”?	It	seems	that	the	two	reports	will	express	the	same	proposition,	but	at	the	same	time	it	appears	that	one	may	be	true	while	the	other	may	be	false.	The	focus	of	this	paper	is	not	on	the	semantics	of	language,	including	belief	reports.	I	will	 therefore	 put	 aside	 this	 specific	 worry	 for	 now.	 However,	 I	 will	 raise	 a	problem	 about	 thoughts	 that	 I	 think	 forces	 the	 semantic	 relationist	 to	 give	 a	response	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 given	 as	 a	 response	 to	 Soames’	 objection.	 In	what	follows	 I	 present	 the	 objection.	 I	 then	 present	 the	 further	 developments	 of	Semantic	 Relationism	 that	 Fine	makes	 as	 a	 response	 to	 Soames’	 objection	 and	show	how	this	also	provides	a	response	to	my	objection.	Finally,	I	argue	that	the	resulting	 Semantic	 Relationist	 account	 becomes	 extremely	 metaphysically	complex	and	as	a	result	it	becomes	an	unattractive	alternative	for	those	who	are	sympathetic	to	referentialism.	
	
5.2.2.	The	Objection	
We	 saw	 that,	 for	 the	Semantic	Relationist,	 the	 thoughts	HESPERUS	 IS	HESPERUS	and	HESPERUS	IS	PHOSPHORUS	differ	in	their	overall	semantic	content	as	a	result	of	 the	 former	 expressing	 a	 proposition	 in	which	 the	 objectual	 constituents	 are	positively	 coordinated	whereas	 the	 latter	expresses	a	proposition	 in	which	 the	objectual	 constituents	 are	 negatively	 coordinated.	 We	 also	 saw	 that	 two	structurally	 identical	 thoughts	 that	 contain	 concept	 tokens	 with	 the	 same	intrinsic	 semantic	 features	 and	 that	 do	 not	 contain	 any	 coordination	 relations	have	the	same	overall	semantic	value.	This	renders	the	thoughts	HESPERUS	IS	A	PLANET	 and	 PHOSPHORUS	 IS	 A	 PLANET	 semantically	 identical.	 But,	 then,	 the	question	 is	 this:	 If	 the	 Ancient	 Babylonians	 had	 the	 belief	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 a	planet	and	then	formed	the	belief	that	Phosphorus	is	a	planet,	how	can	the	latter	be	a	new	belief	given	that	 they	already	believed	that	very	proposition?	That	 is,	we	see	why	someone	who	already	knows	that	Hesperus	is	Hesperus	would	form	
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a	new	belief	when	 informed	that	Hesperus	 is	Phosphorus;	 the	overall	semantic	properties	of	the	proposition	already	believed	differs	from	the	overall	semantic	properties	of	the	proposition	that	is	the	content	of	the	newly	formed	belief.	But	in	 the	case	at	hand,	 the	proposition	believed,	namely	 that	Hesperus	 is	a	planet	has	 the	 same	 overall	 semantic	 properties	 as	 the	 content	 of	 the	 newly	 formed	belief	that	Phosphorus	is	a	planet.	
Further,	 what	 can	 the	 Semantic	 Relationist	 say	 about	 someone	 believing	 and	denying	the	same	proposition	in	cases	such	as	someone	thinking	that	Hesperus	is	visible	but	that	Phosphorus	is	not	visible?	How	can	someone	at	the	same	time	both	believe	and	deny	this	proposition,	assuming	that	sameness	or	difference	in	semantic	 content	 is	 transparent	 to	 thinkers?	 There	 is	 nothing	 more	 to	 Fine’s	framework	of	coordination	than	propositions.	On	his	account	thinking	is	a	dyadic	relation	 holding	 between	 thinkers	 and	 propositions.20	What,	 then,	 is	 going	 on	when	someone	believes	and	denies	the	same	proposition	or	when	someone	gains	new	information	despite	already	believing	that	very	proposition?	
As	far	as	I	can	see,	the	only	way	for	the	Semantic	Relationists	to	respond	to	this	worry	 is	 for	 them	 to	make	 further	developments	of	 their	 framework	along	 the	lines	of	Fine	(2010a).	In	what	follows	I	will	spell	out	the	details	of	this	proposal	and	explain	why	this	would	provide	a	solution	to	the	worries	raised	above.		
	
5.2.3.	Fine’s	Reply		
As	mentioned,	Fine	develops	his	framework	further	specifically	as	a	response	to	Soames’	criticism	pertaining	to	 the	semantics	of	belief	reports.	However,	as	we	shall	see,	these	developments	also	provide	a	solution	to	the	worry	raised	above.	Let’s	take	a	look	at	Fine’s	reply.	
																																																								20	Fine	does	not	say	much	about	 the	metaphysics	of	 thoughts.	What’s	 important	 is	 that	he	does	not	give	any	explanatory	 import	to	the	notion	of	representational	vehicles	or	the	 like.	He	holds	that	 ”thoughts	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 clear	 syntax	 as	 sentences.	 […]	 this	provides,	by	the	way,	yet	another	reason	not	to	think	of	coordination	syntactically	in	terms	of	the	repeated	use	of	the	same	symbol”	(Fine	2007,	73).	
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Fine	 (2007)	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 uncoordinated	 and	 coordinated	propositions.	 	The	former	amount	to	what	he	calls	primary	content	and	are	just	classical	Millian/Russellian	propositions.	Coordinated	propositions	are	what	he	calls	 secondary	 content,	 and	 these	 are	 Millian/Russellian	 plus	 coordination	relations.	This	means	that	the	beliefs	that	Cicero	is	Cicero	and	that	Cicero	is	Tully	have	 the	 same	 primary	 propositional	 content,	 but	 since	 they	 differ	 in	coordination	relations	 they	express	different	 secondary	propositional	 contents.	We	see	that	the	primary	propositions	are	multiplied	at	the	secondary	level.	The	two	propositions	that	Cicero	is	Cicero	and	that	Cicero	is	Tully	are	the	same	at	the	primary	level,	but	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	coordination	relations	they	must	be	 distinct	 at	 the	 secondary	 level.	 However,	 the	 thoughts	 HESPERUS	 IS	 VISIBLE	and	 PHOSPHORUS	 IS	 VISIBLE	express	 the	 same	 primary	 and	 secondary	 content	since	there	are	no	two	occurrences	of	individuals	to	be	coordinated.		
Fine	(2010a)	introduces	a	further	layer	of	content,	namely	tertiary	content.	The	tertiary	content	is	the	universal	body	of	coordinated	propositions.	Here	we	find	all	the	various	secondary	propositions:	
Consider	all	of	the	propositions	that	are	realized	in	propositional	acts	such	as	believing,	asserting,	 intending	and	the	like.	They	form	a	vast	coordinated	body	of	propositions,	where	some	of	the	occurrences	of	any	 given	 individual	 in	 these	 propositions	 are	 linked	 to	 others	 and	some	are	not.	(Fine	2010a,	479)	
At	 this	 level,	 the	 coordinated	 propositions	 do	 not	 only	 have	 their	 intrinsic	coordination	 relations	 (i.e.	 coordination	 relations	within	 a	 single	 proposition),	they	 also	 enter	 into	 coordination	 relations	 with	 each	 other.	 For	 instance,	 the	proposition	 that	 Cicero	 is	 Cicero	 will	 have	 two	 coordination	 links	 to	 the	 first	relatum	of	the	proposition	that	Cicero	is	Tully.		
Further,	at	the	level	of	tertiary	content,	there	will	be	more	than	one	occurrence	of	 a	 single	 secondary	 proposition.	 That	 is,	 some	 secondary	 propositions	 are	further	multiplied	at	the	tertiary	level.	For	instance,	since	the	beliefs	HESPERUS	IS	A	 PLANET	and	PHOSPHORUS	 IS	 A	 PLANET	 involve	 the	 same	 first	 and	 secondary	
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proposition,	 but	 nonetheless	 enter	 into	 different	 coordination	 relations	 at	 the	tertiary	 level,	 there	 must	 be	 two	 distinct,	 although	 intrinsically	 identical,	propositions	in	the	universal	body	of	coordinated	propositions.	Fine	calls	the	propositions	at	the	tertiary	level	of	content	token	propositions,	and	says	 that	 “the	 identity	 of	 a	 token	 proposition	 is	 partly	 given	 by	 its	 intrinsic	content,	 i.e.	 by	 the	 underlying	 coordinated	 proposition,	 and	 partly	 by	 its	coordinative	 links	 to	 other	 token	 propositions”	 (Fine	 2010a,	 479).	 In	 order	 to	posit	 relata	 for	 the	 coordination	 relations	 at	 the	 tertiary	 level	 Fine	 also	introduces	the	notion	of	token	individuals,	which	are	the	objectual	constituents	of	token	 propositions.	 He	 says	 that	 “token	 individuals	 are	 a	 little	 like	 ‘guises’	 or	individual	 concepts,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 special	 descriptive	 content	 or	 mode	 of	presentation	with	which	they	must	be	associated”	(Ibid.,	480).		One	thing	to	note	at	this	point	is	that	Fine	explicitly	appeals	to	something	that	is,	as	 he	 says,	 a	 little	 like	 ‘guises’.	 Although	 he	 rejects	 the	 Fregean	 idea	 that	 such	guises	have	descriptive	contents,	these	guises	seem	to	be,	in	one	way	or	another,	ways	 of	 representing	 the	 referent.	 Even	 though	 there	 may	 be	 no	 intrinsic	semantic	 difference	 between	 such	 guises	 that	 explain	 how	 they	 may	 play	different	roles	in	cognition	–	there	may	be	only	relational	differences	–	it	is	still	a	fact	that	the	semantic	relationist	needs	this	further	level	of	semantics	in	addition	to	the	Millian/Russellian	propositions	in	order	to	give	a	full	account	of	cognitive	significance.	It	is	only	once	we	have	this	further	level	of	semantics	that	we	may	posit	a	response	to	the	objection	raised	in	the	previous	section:	The	reason	why	it	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 think	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 visible	 and	 another	 to	 think	 that	Phosphorus	is	visible	is	that	these	propositions	are	different	token	propositions,	and	 that	 is	 just	 to	 say	 that	 the	 propositions	 enter	 into	 different	 coordination	relations	in	the	universal	body	of	propositions.	This	is	a	good	point	at	which	to	highlight	a	central	difference	between	Semantic	Relationism	and	Vehicle	Relationism.	The	Vehicle	Relationist	would	explain	the	difference	between	the	two	beliefs	that	Hesperus	is	visible	and	that	Phosphorus	is	visible	by	saying	 that	 the	 representational	vehicles	which	constitute	 the	 two	thoughts	are	not	 related	by	pointer	 relations.	Further,	 the	 two	 thoughts	would	
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enter	 into	 different	 pointer	 relations	 if	 the	 thinker	 has	 more	 propositional	attitudes	 concerning	 Venus.	 The	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 does	 not	 need	 to	 posit	 a	semantic	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 thoughts;	 according	 to	 this	 view,	coordination	in	thought	is	not	explained	in	terms	of	propositional	content.		In	 contrast,	 Fine	 needs	 to	 introduce	 multiple	 tokens	 of	 the	 same	Millian/Russellian	proposition	in	order	to	account	for	the	different	coordination	relations	 it	 may	 enter	 into.	 Fine’s	 ‘guises’	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	representational	 vehicles;	 they	 are	 semantic	 in	 nature.	 For	 every	 possible	combination	 of	 coordination	 relations,	 Fine	 must	 say	 that	 there	 are	 distinct	token	propositions	and	token	 individuals.	Given	the	vast	variety	of	how	people	may	fail	to	know	that	concept	tokens	are	co-referential,	this	creates	a	vast	body	of	 token	propositions.	 Take	 for	 instance	 Peter,	 from	Kripke’s	 Paderewski	 case.	His	 belief	 that	 Paderewski	 is	 a	 politician	 would	 create	 a	 new	 token	 of	 that	proposition,	since	the	proposition	believed	by	Peter	is	not	coordinated	with	the	token	 proposition	 that	 Paderewski	 is	 a	 musician.	 Imagine	 further	 that	 Peter	believes	that	Paderewski	the	musician	has	red	hair.	Picture	a	further	individual,	Petra,	 who	 is	 also	 confused	 about	 Paderewski.	 She	 believes	 the	 same	uncoordinated	token	propositions	as	Peter,	but	she	believes	that	it	is	Paderewski	the	 politician	 who	 has	 red	 hair.	 This	 would	 generate	 yet	 further	 token	propositions,	 since	 the	 propositions	 Petra	 believes	 do	 not	 stand	 in	 the	 same	coordination	 relations	 as	 those	 that	 Peter	 believes.	 We	 could	 continue	 this	forever:	 Imagine	 individuals	 who	 believe	 the	 same	 set	 of	 Millian/Russellian	propositions,	 but	 that	 differ	 in	 their	 coordination	 relations.	 People	 make	mistakes	like	this	all	the	time,	and	for	every	Millian/Russellian	proposition	there	must	be	enough	token	propositions	to	account	for	these	kinds	of	mistakes.	Thus,	by	appealing	 to	 tertiary	 content	we	are	 committed	 to	 the	existence	of	possibly	indefinitely	many	 token	 propositions	 in	addition	 to	 classical	Millian/Russellian	propositions.	We	are	beginning	 to	 see	 that	 the	 Semantic	Relationist	 framework	 is	 extremely	complex.	 In	 order	 to	 give	 a	 full	 account	 of	 cognitive	 significance,	 the	 Semantic	Relationist	 is	 forced	 to	 posit	 a	 very	 complex	 semantics	 and	with	 that	 comes	 a	complex	 metaphysics:	 There	 are	 three	 levels	 of	 content	 and	 the	 third	 level	
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generates	 indefinitely	many	abstract	entities,	namely	token	propositions.	Fine’s	framework	 is	 supposed	 to	 provide	 a	 way	 to	 explain	 coordination	 within	 a	general	Millian/Russellian	framework	without	having	to	appeal	to	the	notion	of	Fregean	 senses	 or	 the	 like.	 However,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 attractive	 features	 of	Millian/Russellianism	 is	 that	 it	 comes	 with	 minimal	 propositional	 complexity	and	commitments.	Even	though	Fine’s	framework	does	not	invoke	the	notion	of	descriptive	senses,	it	invokes	the	notion	of	‘guises’	and	these	(whatever	they	are)	exist	at	a	different	semantic	level	than	classical	Millian/Russellian	propositions.	As	 a	 result,	 I	 suspect	 that	 Fine’s	 view	 would	 not	 be	 compelling	 to	 most	Millian/Russellians,	 including	 those	 who	 are	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 core	commitments	of	relationism.	Moreover,	if	we	have	an	alternative	framework	that	is	 (at	 least)	equally	explanatorily	powerful	but	 that	does	not	need	 to	postulate	such	a	complex	semantics,	this	framework	would	be	preferable.		I	think	Vehicle	Relationism	is	such	a	framework.	As	long	as	we	take	thinking	to	be	a	triadic	relation	it	is	possible	that	a	thinker	may	stand	in	relation	to	the	same	proposition	 in	 two	 different	 and	 numerically	 distinct	 ways.	 A	 thinker	 may	believe	the	very	same	proposition	twice	but	in	different	ways.	All	this	amounts	to	is	 just	 for	 the	 thinker	 to	 have	 two	 sequences	 of	 mental	 tags	 that	 are	 not	connected	 by	 pointers	 but	 that	 happen	 to	 express	 the	 same	 proposition.	Similarly,	we	may	allow	that	one	 thought	may	negate	what	 the	other	states,	as	long	 as	 we	 have	 the	 option	 of	 appealing	 to	 a	 difference	 at	 the	 level	 of	representational	vehicles.	Importantly,	Vehicle	Relationists	do	so	without	having	to	postulate	multiple	levels	of	semantics	or	duplicating	propositions.		
I’ve	 already	 illustrated	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist	framework	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 solving	 some	 of	 the	 central	 puzzles	 within	 the	philosophy	 of	 mind.	 If	 both	 frameworks	 are	 equally	 suited	 to	 explain	 such	puzzles	 we	 ought	 to	 choose	 the	 framework	 with	 fewer	 metaphysical	commitments	 and	 this,	 I	 have	argued,	 is	Vehicle	Relationism.	 In	what	 follows	 I	will	provide	a	further	argument	in	favour	of	Vehicle	Relationism.	I	will	question	the	 cognitive	 effect	 of	 semantic	 coordination	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 Semantic	Relationist	must	posit	something	akin	to	pointer	relations	in	order	to	account	for	how	 coordination	 relations	 can	 be	 cognitively	 causally	 efficacious.	 If	 the	
	 VEHICLE	RELATIONISM:	IN	DEFENCE	OF	POINTERS		
	 121	
Semantic	 Relationist	 needs	 pointers	 and	 the	 Vehicle	 Relationist	 does	 not	 need	semantic	relations,	Vehicle	Relationism	is	the	better	option	since	the	framework	is	more	parsimonious.	
	
5.3.	Semantic	Relationism:	Cognitive	Effect	
The	reason	why	classical	Millian/Russellians	 face	problems	with	Frege	cases	 is	that	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 Millian/Russellian	 propositions	 is	 non-transparent,	and	as	a	result	individuals	may	be	mistaken	about	such	sameness	or	difference	in	propositional	content.	That	is,	as	we	have	seen	a	person	can	believe	the	same	Millian/Russellian	proposition	 twice	without	being	aware	of	 this.	Put	differently,	 two	 thoughts	 may	 have	 the	 same	 Millian/Russellian	 propositional	content	 but	 nonetheless	 play	 different	 roles	 in	 the	 cognitive	 life	 of	 a	 single	individual.	Coordination	relations,	however,	are	not	 the	kind	of	 things	 thinkers	can	 be	 mistaken	 about	 in	 this	 way.	 That	 is,	 necessarily	 if	 two	 thoughts	 are	positively	coordinated	a	thinker	treats	them	as	concerning	the	same	referent.21	
According	to	the	Semantic	Relationist,	coordination	relations	are	abstract	objects	of	a	 certain	 sort.	They	are	constituent	parts	of	propositional	 contents.	As	 such,	they	 are	 not	 really	 “in	 the	 mind”	 of	 the	 thinker.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Vehicle	Relationist	 takes	 such	 relations	 to	be	elements	of	mental	 representations;	 they	are	proper	constituents	of	the	language	of	thought.	As	such,	they	have	physical-causal	 (presumably	neurological)	properties	 in	addition	 to	semantic	properties	(c.f.	Fodor	1987).		
In	order	 for	semantic	relations	 to	account	 for	coordination,	 it	must	be	possible	for	such	relations	to	have	a	causal	effect	on	the	cognitive	workings	of	individuals.	
																																																								21	Importantly,	the	claim	here	is	not	that	one	has	infallible	higher-order	knowledge	regarding	the	coordination	 relations	 of	 first	 order-beliefs.	 That	 is,	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 for	 someone	 to	 have	positively	coordinated	first-order	beliefs,	and	then	at	a	later	time	wonder	whether	or	not	those	beliefs	actually	concerned	the	same	referent	without	violating	rational	norms.	Rather,	the	claim	is	that,	 if	 two	thoughts	are	positively	coordinated,	 the	cognitive	system	will	 treat	them	as	such.	Likewise,	 if	 two	 thoughts	 are	 negatively	 coordinated,	 the	 cognitive	 system	 will	 treat	 them	accordingly.	 In	other	words,	 one	 cannot	have	positively	 coordinated	beliefs	without	 also	being	rationally	disposed	to	trading	on	identity.			
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If	 they	 didn’t,	 we	 could	 imagine	 someone	 believing	 a	 positively	 coordinated	proposition	and	fail	to	have	the	sort	of	behavioural	and	rational	dispositions	that	are	 associated	with	 positive	 coordination,	 such	 as	 a	 disposition	 to	 trade	 upon	identity.	 In	 other	 words,	 thinkers	 cannot	 wrongly	 have	 a	 positively	 (or	negatively)	coordinated	thought.	If	 they	could,	we	would	have	failed	to	account	for	Frege’s	puzzle,	since	someone	could	have	two	thoughts	whose	content	is	the	same	 coordinated	 proposition	 but	 that	 nonetheless	 play	 different	 roles	 in	cognition.	We	would	then	have	to	introduce	a	further	notion	in	order	to	explain	the	 difference	 in	 cognitive	 significance	 of	 two	 thoughts	 that	 express	 the	 same	coordinated	proposition.		
The	 question,	 then,	 is	 this:	 what	 warrants	 the	 assumptions	 that	 semantic	relations	 are	 of	 the	 right	 kind	 to	 have	 the	 relevant	 causal	 effects	 in	 cognition?	Fine	 would	 have	 to	 say	 that	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 uncoordinated	 (i.e.	primary)	propositions	is	not	manifest,	but	that	somehow	sameness	or	difference	of	coordinated	(i.e.	secondary	and	tertiary)	propositions	is	manifest	to	thinkers.	This	would,	however,	be	very	puzzling.	Propositions	–	even	the	coordinated	ones	–	 are	 abstract	 and	 mind-external	 on	 Fine’s	 view.	 As	 such,	 they	 seem	 to	 fall	outside	 of	 the	 realm	 of	 physical	 causation.	 How,	 then,	 can	 our	 standing	 in	relation	 to	 such	 entities	 help	 explain	 our	 cognitive	 dispositions?	We	 all	 agree	that	 a	 thinker	 may	 fail	 to	 know	 that	 two	 uncoordinated	 (i.e.	 primary)	propositions	 co-refer.	 But	 what	 is	 it	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 coordinated	 	 (i.e.	secondary	 and	 tertiary)	 propositions	 that	 makes	 it	 possible	 for	 us	 to	 have	infallible	 cognitive	 access	 to	 them	 when	 we	 do	 not	 have	 such	 access	 to	uncoordinated	 propositions,	 given	 that	 both	 sorts	 of	 propositions	 are	 abstract	entities?		
Fodor	makes	 a	 similar	point	 regarding	Fregean	 senses.	He	 considers	 the	 claim	that	 senses,	 which	 are	 mind-external,	 abstract	 objects,	 are	 such	 that	 they	 can	have	causal	effects	on	cognition:	
The	question	 thus	arises	what,	 if	 anything,	 is	 supposed	 to	 legitimize	this	assumption.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	unless	you’re	prepared	to	give	up	
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[the	 thesis	 that	 senses	are	abstract	and	hence	non-mental],	 the	only	answer	a	Fregean	theory	allows	you	is:	sheer	stipulation.	(1998,	17)	
The	point	holds	for	all	theories	that	take	coordination	to	be	explained	in	terms	of	non-mental,	abstract	entities.	We	have	no	reason	to	believe	that	such	entities	are	of	the	right	kind	to	have	the	sort	of	causal	effect	on	cognition	needed	to	explain	coordination.	 In	particular,	 anyone	who	accepts	 that	 sameness	or	difference	 in	classical	Millian/Russellian	propositions	is	not	manifest	to	thinkers,	as	Fine	does,	would	 have	 to	 provide	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 other	abstract	entities,	such	as	for	instance	Fine’s	token	propositions,	can	be	manifest	to	thinkers.	As	for	now	we	have	no	reason	to	think	that	this	is	the	case.	
The	 only	 plausible	 explanation	 of	 how	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 token	propositions	(i.e.	Millian/Russellian	proposition	plus	coordination	relations)	can	be	manifest	to	thinkers,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	is	that	the	coordination	relations	must	somehow	be	reflected	in	something	that	is	of	such	a	nature	that	they	may	enter	into	 cognitive	 causal	 relations,	 namely	 mental	 representations.	 Again,	 Fodor	makes	the	same	point:		
Whatever	 distinguishes	 coextensive	 concepts	 is	 ipso	 facto	 ’in	 the	head’.	This	means,	something	like	that	it’s	available	to	be	a	proximal	cause	(/effect)	of	mental	processes.	(Fodor	1998,	15)		
This,	 of	 course,	 does	 not	 rule	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 there	 being	 a	 difference	 of	coextensive	 concepts	 both	 in	 representational	 vehicles	 and	 in	 the	 semantic	properties	 of	 concepts.	What’s	 important	 is	 that	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 in	 order	 to	account	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 co-referential	 concepts	 playing	 distinct	 roles	 in	cognition,	 there	must	be	a	difference	 in	mental	representations.22	As	a	result,	 it	seems	 that	 in	 order	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 concepts	 and	thoughts,	the	semantic	relationist	also	needs	to	appeal	to	coordination	of	mental	representations.		
																																																								22	Laurence	&	Margolis	 (2007)	 use	 a	 similar	 argument	 in	 order	 to	 argue	 that	we	 need	mental	representations	in	addition	to	propositional	content.	
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In	fact,	Fine	says	that	he	does	not	“wish	to	deny	that	the	semantic	relationship	–	of	 representing-as-the-same	 –	might	 hold	 in	 virtue	 of	 a	 syntactic	 relationship”	(Fine	 2007,	 41).23	He	 says	 this	 in	 connection	 to	 coordination	 in	 language,	 but	later	on	he	draws	a	close	connection	between	the	representational	character	of	language	and	thought:		
For	 one	 thing,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 to	 what	 extent	 there	 are	 two	systems	of	representation.	 […]	even	 if	 the	systems	of	representation	are	by	and	large	disjoint	[…]	how	can	the	vehicle	of	representation	–	be	 it	 speech	 or	 writing	 or	 thought	 –	 make	 any	 difference	 to	 its	representational	character?	(Fine	2007,	77)	
Hence,	it	seems	plausible	that	if	coordination	in	language	holds	in	virtue	of	syntactic	properties,	so	does	coordination	in	thought.		
This,	 in	and	of	 itself,	does	not	commit	 the	Semantic	Relationist	 to	Vehicle	Relationism	 specifically	 –	 there	 are	 other	 alternatives	 to	 how	 we	 may	explain	coordination	of	mental	representations,	such	as	Fodor	style	LOTH.	However,	Fine	himself	highlights	the	non-transitive	nature	of	coordination	relations	 when	 explaining	 the	 intersubjective	 puzzle	 stemming	 from	 the	puzzle	of	Paderewski	(Fine	2007,	105-115).	For	this	reason,	 it	seems	that	Vehicle	Relationism	would	be	a	more	suitable	framework.24		
If	 this	 is	 correct,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 Semantic	Relationists	must	 posit	 something	akin	 to	 pointer	 relations	 in	 order	 to	 give	 a	 full	 account	 of	 coordination	 in	thought:	The	 fact	 that	 coordination	 relations	must	 be	 such	 that	 they	 can	 enter	into	 causal	 relations	 in	 cognition	 implies	 that	 coordination	 relations	 must	 be	instantiated	at	the	level	of	mental	representations.	If	coordination	relations	are	non-transitive,	the	pointer	picture	is	the	best	framework	for	giving	an	account	of	how	such	coordination	relations	are	implemented.		
We	 see	 that	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 and	 Semantic	 Relationism	 are	 not	 mutually	exclusive.	 However,	 it	 seems	 that	 postulating	 a	 complex	 relationist	 semantics																																																									23	Again,	”representing-as-the-same”	just	means	that	there	is	positive	coordination.	24	See	section	4.1.	above.	
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would	be	unmotivated.	If	we	accept	Vehicle	Relationism,	and	Vehicle	Relationism	does	 the	 relevant	explanatory	work,	 semantic	 relations	do	not	add	anything	of	explanatory	value	when	it	comes	to	the	explanation	of	coordination	in	thought.	Hence,	 I	 suggest	 that	 our	 best	 option	 is	 to	 reject	 Semantic	 Relationism	 about	coordination	 in	 thought	 in	 favour	 of	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 plus	 (classical)	Millian/Russellianism	about	propositional	content.		
In	the	next	and	penultimate	section	of	this	paper	I	will	set	out	some	objections	to	what	I’ve	been	arguing	this	far.	I	will	suggest	some	replies	to	these	worries.	
	
6.	Objections	and	Replies	
Vehicle	Relationism	is	a	novel	account	of	coordination	relations.	I’ve	spelt	out	the	central	 claims	 of	 the	 view	 and	 compared	 it	 to	 other	 related	 and	 competing	frameworks.	Of	course,	more	work	 is	needed	before	we	can	be	certain	that	 the	framework	provides	a	satisfactory	account	of	coordination	relations	in	thought.	In	what	 follows	 I	will	 consider	 some	objections	and	respond	 to	 them	 in	 turn.	 I	will	signal	where	more	work	is	needed.	
Objection:	 You	have	not	 said	 enough	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 pointer	 relations.	What	are	 they	and	 in	virtue	of	what	do	 they	obtain?	The	general	notion	seems	highly	mysterious.	
Reply:	The	notion	of	pointers	 is	a	 functional	one.	The	cognitive	system,	 I	 claim,	essentially	 functions	 so	 as	 to	 store	 information	 based	 on	 what	 is	 taken	 to	 be	sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 reference	 (c.f.	 Campbell	 1987,	 see	 also	 section	 2.3.	above).	 There	 are	 all	 kinds	 of	 pragmatic	 explanations	 of	 why	 co-reference	 is	recognized	in	certain	cases	and	not	in	others.	The	main	claim	is	that	an	essential	part	of	 information	processing	 involves	categorizing	and	recognizing	sameness	or	difference	between	 the	object	of	 a	new	 input	belief	 and	 the	objects	of	one’s	already	existing	propositional	attitudes.	In	this	respect,	the	framework	is	similar	to	 Fodor’s	 language	 of	 thought	 hypothesis,	 according	 to	 which	 information	 is	labelled	according	to	sameness	or	difference	in	reference	and	to	the	mental	file	
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framework	 (discussed	 in	 chapter	 1),	 according	 to	which	 information	 is	 sorted	into	files	based	on	recognition	of	sameness	or	difference	in	reference.		
Objection:	The	pointer	picture,	as	you	admit	yourself,	is	in	many	ways	similar	to	other	more	well-known	 frameworks,	 such	as	Fodor’s	LOTH	and	 the	mental	 file	framework.	It	seems	more	convenient	to	use	the	notion	of	sameness	of	syntactic	form	or	sameness	of	files	to	talk	about	these	relations,	so	why	should	we	use	the	more	complex	language	that	comes	with	the	pointer	metaphor?	
Reply:	 I	discussed	one	reason	 to	not	use	 the	classical	Fodorian	LOTH	earlier	 in	this	paper,	when	I	presented	an	argument	to	the	effect	that	coordination	is	non-transitive.	 This	 also	 provides	 a	 reason	 to	 reject	 the	 mental	 file	 framework.	Further,	 in	 Chapter	 1	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 file	 framework	 fails	 to	 account	 for	coordination	 in	 the	 case	 of	 relational	 predicates.	 Hence,	 I	 think	 that	 strictly	speaking	 none	 of	 these	 frameworks	 can	 provide	 a	 satisfactory	 and	 unified	account	of	coordination	 in	 thought.	That	said,	 the	notion	of	a	syntactic	 form	or	that	 of	 a	 mental	 file	 do	 come	 in	 handy	 in	 many	 cases.	 In	 normal	 cases	 of	coordination	(i.e.	cases	not	displaying	non-transitivity)	of	one-place	predicates	it	is	 often	 helpful	 to	 think	 of	 cognitive	 processing	 in	 terms	 of	 files	 or	 the	 like.	However,	my	point	is	that,	strictly	speaking,	such	metaphors	only	take	us	so	far:	when	things	become	more	complex	we	need	the	more	general	notion	of	pointer	relations.	Importantly,	the	simple	cases	can	also	be	explained	in	terms	of	pointer	relations,	 and	 so	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 provides	 a	 general	 unified	 account	 of	coordination.	
Objection:	 You	 are	 not	 really	 solving	 the	 problem	 of	 coordination	 in	 thought.	Rather,	you	are	merely	re-describing	the	phenomenon.	
Reply:	 I	 have	 provided	 an	 account	 of	 how	 it	 is	 that	 coordination	 is	 realized	 in	thought.	 Coordination	 relations,	 recall,	 are	 just	 those	 relations	 that	 obtain	whenever	someone	is	rationally	warranted	in	trading	on	identity.	Note	that	I	am	not	claiming	that	these	relations	are	primitive.	Rather,	I	argue	that	coordination	relations	 hold	 in	 virtue	 of	 further	 relations	 –	 relations	 that	 are	 understood	 as	proper	 parts	 of	 the	 language	 of	 thought.	 These	 relations,	 I	 have	 argued,	 are	
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representationally	primitive,25	but	 that	 is	not	 to	say	 that	coordination	relations	themselves	are	primitive.		
This	 account	 differs	 from	 the	 traditional	 accounts	 of	 coordination	 that	 explain	such	 relations	 in	 terms	 of	 intrinsic	 representational	 features	 of	 concepts	 and	thoughts.	The	difference,	however,	lies	in	what	the	frameworks	have	to	say	about	in	virtue	of	what	such	coordination	relations	obtain,	rather	than	whether	or	not	we	can	give	an	account	of	such	coordination	relations.	I	have	shown	that	Vehicle	Relationism	 solves	 some	of	 the	 central	 puzzles	within	 the	 philosophy	 of	mind.	Given	 the	explanatory	power	of	 the	 framework,	 it	would	be	a	mistake	 to	 insist	that	coordination	in	thought	must,	somehow,	ultimately	be	reducible	to	intrinsic	representational	features	of	concepts	and	thoughts.		
Objection:	You	only	talk	about	thoughts,	whereas	some	of	the	competing	views,	such	 as	 Semantic	 Relationism,	 also	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 coordination	 in	language.	 Without	 further	 evidence	 that	 your	 framework	 can	 enlighten	 us	 on	coordination	in	language,	what	reasons	do	we	have	to	prefer	your	framework	to	that	of	e.g.	Semantic	Relationism?	You	might	need	semantic	relations	in	the	case	of	 language,	 so	maybe	 the	 two	versions	of	 relationism	are	not	 that	different	 in	complexity	after	all.		
Reply:	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	give	an	account	of	coordination	in	language.	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 is	 in	 theory	 compatible	 with	 any	 account	 of	coordination	 in	 language.	 Even	 so,	 some	 things	 seem	 to	 follow	 naturally	(although	not	necessarily)	about	the	semantics	of	natural	 language	from	what	I	say	about	the	semantic	content	of	thoughts.	When	it	comes	to	thoughts,	I	would	say	 that	 two	 thoughts	 such	 as	 NO	ONE	WHO	KNOWS	THAT	GREEKS	 ARE	 GREEKS	DOUBTS	THAT	GREEKS	ARE	GREEKS	and	NO	ONE	WHO	KNOWS	THAT	GREEKS	ARE	GREEKS	DOUBTS	THAT	GREEKS	ARE	HELLENES26	have	 the	 same	semantic	 content	and	 so	 they	 have	 the	 same	 truth	 conditions.	 Even	 so,	 they	may	 play	 different	roles	 in	 cognition	 due	 to	 a	 difference	 in	 pointer	 relations.	 When	 it	 comes	 to																																																									25	That	is,	they	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	or	difference	in	intrinsic	representational	features	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	The	pointers	are	a	representationally	irreducible	part	of	the	language	of	thought.	26	Cases	such	as	these	are	generally	known	as	Mates	cases	(see	Mates	1952).	
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sentences	 expressing	 such	 beliefs,	 I	 would	 therefore	 find	 it	 natural	 to	 say	 the	same	thing:	The	sentences	have	the	same	truth	conditions.	Either	both	are	true	or	both	 are	 false.	 In	 the	 actual	world,	 both	 sentences	 are	 false,	 since	 there	 are	clearly	people	who	doubt	that	Greeks	are	Hellenes.	Even	so,	the	sentences	clearly	differ	 in	 syntax,	 since	 they	 contain	words	 of	 different	 types.	 This	 difference	 is	enough	to	explain	why	someone	might	come	to	think	that	one	is	true	while	the	other	 is	 false,	 just	 like	 someone	 who	 hears	 the	 two	 sentences	 “Hesperus	 is	 a	planet”	and	“Phosphorus	is	a	planet”	might	come	to	think	that	one	is	true	while	the	other	is	false.	However,	our	epistemic	dispositions	need	not	reflect	an	actual	difference	in	semantic	content.		
I	am,	of	course,	aware	that	this	view	of	linguistic	meaning	is	controversial;	much	of	the	discussion	within	the	philosophy	of	language	since	Frege,	even	within	the	Millian/Russellian	tradition,	has	focused	on	exactly	how	to	avoid	this	conclusion.	I	find	the	parsimonious	ontology	of	the	view	appealing,	but	Vehicle	Relationism	is	 by	 no	 means	 committed	 to	 this	 specific	 view	 of	 linguistic	 meaning.	 The	question,	 however,	 still	 stands:	 By	 adopting	 this	 view	 of	 linguistic	meaning,	 is	Vehicle	Relationism	as	explanatorily	powerful	as	Semantic	Relationism	when	 it	comes	 to	 coordination	 in	 language?	 Only	 future	 development	 of	 the	 Vehicle	Relationist	 framework	 will	 show.	 Perhaps	 all	 we	 need	 for	 coordination	 in	language	is	formal	relations	à	la	Heck	(2012).	For	what	it’s	worth,	I	suspect	this	might	be	the	case.	
	
7.	Conclusion	
I	have	proposed	a	novel	framework	for	understanding	the	nature	of	coordination	in	 thought.	 According	 to	 this	 framework	 coordination	 in	 thought	 is	 to	 be	explained	 in	 terms	 of	 representationally	 primitive	 relations	 that	 have	representational	vehicles	(i.e.	mental	tags)	as	relata.	On	this	framework,	we	get	a	natural	 distinction	 between	 manifest	 and	 opaque	 co-reference	 as	 well	 as	between	manifest	and	apparent	co-reference.	Such	distinctions	are	important	for	the	explanation	of	cognitive	significance	and	psychological	generalizations.		
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I	have	shown	how	the	Vehicle	Relationist	framework	can	solve	some	of	the	long-standing	 puzzles	 within	 the	 philosophy	 of	 mind	 pertaining	 to	 cognitive	significance.	 The	 explanation	 in	 terms	 of	 pointer	 relations	 is	 compatible	 with	classical	Millian/Russellianism	about	propositional	content.			
I	have	also	compared	the	suggested	 framework	to	similar	views.	The	proposed	framework	draws	on	insights	from	relationists	such	as	Heck	and	Fine	as	well	as	Language	of	Thought	theorists	such	as	Fodor,	but	combines	these	elements	in	a	novel	 way.	 I	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 is	 preferable	 to	 these	competing	views	of	coordination	in	thought.	
In	general,	the	framework	of	Vehicle	Relationism	provides	a	highly	parsimonious	account	 of	 coordination	 in	 thought.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 framework	 is	explanatorily	powerful.	This	gives	us	reason	to	think	that	Vehicle	Relationism	is	the	best	contender	for	an	account	of	coordination	in	thought.	
	
	
	
	
	
	 3			 Originalism	and	Coordination	in	Thought:		In	Defence	of	Vehicle	Relationism		
	
According	to	the	Publicity	Constraint	on	concept	individuation,	the	nature	of	
concepts	must	be	such	that	distinct	individuals	may	use	the	same	concept	or	
concept	 tokens	 of	 the	 same	 type.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 concepts	 are	 taken	 to	
explain	 intrapersonal	 cognitive	 capacities,	 such	 as	 rational	 reasoning.	 This	
indicates	that	a	difference	in	cognitive	role	must	be	reflected	in	a	difference	in	
concepts	 or	 concept	 types.	 This	 is	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 on	 concept	
individuation.	 There	 is	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 Publicity	 Constraint	 and	 the	
Fregean	 Constraint.	 The	 former	 seems	 to	 require	 a	 coarse-grained	
individuation	of	concepts	while	the	latter	requires	fine-grained	individuation	
conditions.	 In	 this	 paper	 I	 assess	 a	 recent	 account	 of	 the	 individuation	 of	
concepts	 that	purports	 to	overcome	such	difficulties.	According	to	this	view,	
Originalism,	 concepts	 are	 public	 and	 sharable	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
framework	 is	 specifically	 developed	 to	 account	 for	 intrapersonal	 rational	
reasoning.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 theory	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	
concepts.	I	then	suggest	a	minimal	addition	to	the	framework	that	allows	it	–	
or	more	generally	any	theory	that	takes	concepts	to	be	public	–	to	account	for	
an	individual’s	rational	cognitive	capacities.		
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1.	Introduction	
It	 seems	 intuitively	 plausible	 that	 distinct	 individuals	 can	 and	 must	 have	thoughts	that	in	one	way	or	another	are	the	same.	For	instance,	if	you	and	I	both	believe	that	Bob	Dylan	is	American	it	seems	natural	to	say	that	we	have	the	same	belief.	 Many	 philosophers	 have	 traditionally	 taken	 the	 job	 description	 for	thoughts	and	concepts	to	require	the	nature	of	concepts	to	be	such	that	distinct	individuals	may	entertain	the	very	same	concept	or	concept	tokens	of	the	same	type.	One	task	assigned	to	concepts	that	seems	to	require	them	to	be	public	and	shareable	 is	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 communication.1	Heck	(2002)	puts	what	they	call	the	naïve	conception	of	communication	thus:2	
What	is	the	purpose	of	communication?	At	a	minimum,	it	would	seem,	part	 of	 its	 purpose	 is	 to	 transfer	 information	 from	 one	 speaker	 to	another:	I	have	a	belief,	or	take	myself	to	know	something,	and	I	want	to	get	you	to	believe	the	same	thing.	[...]	when	you	grasp	the	content	of	my	assertion,	you	thereby	grasp	the	very	Thought	I	believe	and	am	trying	to	communicate	to	you.	[...]	when	I	communicate,	I	am	trying	to	bring	 it	 about	 that	 someone	 else	 should	 come	 (to	 have	 the	opportunity)	to	share	a	belief	with	me	[...].	(Heck	2002,	6)		
If	this	is	correct,	communication	requires	thoughts	and	concepts	to	be	public,	i.e.	their	 nature	 must	 be	 such	 that	 distinct	 individuals	 can	 share	 concepts	 and	thoughts.	We	thus	get	the	following	constraint	on	concepts:	
																																																								1	Other	such	tasks	include	accounting	for	psychological	generalizations	(e.g.	Fodor	1998,	28—29,	Prinz	2002,	14—15)	and	accounting	for	agreement	and	disagreement	(e.g.	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	21).		2	Heck	says	that	”there	is	evidence	that	Frege	held	such	a	view	of	communication”	(Heck	2002,	7)	and	 points	 to	 Frege’s	 (1892,	 159—162)	 arguments	 against	 the	 claim	 that	 thoughts	 are	 ideas.	Without	 going	 into	Frege	 exegesis,	 this	 seems	 correct.	 Frege	 says	 that	 senses	 ‘[...]	may	well	 be	common	property	of	many	and	is	therefore	not	a	part	or	mode	of	the	single	person’s	mind:	for	it	cannot	 well	 be	 denied	 that	 mankind	 possesses	 a	 common	 treasure	 of	 thoughts	 which	 is	transmitted	from	generation	to	generation.’	(Frege	1892,	188).	
ORIGINALISM	AND	COORDINATION	IN	THOUGHT		
	 133	
Publicity	 Constraint:	 The	 nature	 of	 concepts	 is	 such	 that	 they	 can	 be	shared	between	distinct	individuals.3		
The	publicity	constraint	 is	accepted	by	many	philosophers	(e.g.	Peacocke	1992,	Rey	1994,	Fodor	1998,	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012).	This	constraint,	however,	seems	to	be	in	tension	with	another	plausible	assumption	about	the	nature	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	
Concepts	 play	 an	 important	 role	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 explaining	 our	 cognitive	rational	workings.	Concepts	are	the	constituents	of	thoughts,	and	the	inferential	relations	 between	 thoughts	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 features	 of	 their	 constituent	concepts.	 If	 two	 thoughts	 are	 referentially	 equivalent,	 but	 nonetheless	 play	different	roles	in	cognition,	this	is	usually	taken	to	be	due	to	a	difference	in	the	constituent	 concepts	 of	 the	 two	 thoughts.	 Hence,	 concepts	 play	 an	 essential	explanatory	role	when	it	comes	to	rational	 intrapersonal	processes.	The	nature	of	concepts	must	thus	be	such	that	it	reflects	individuals’	cognitive	workings.	
It	 is	commonly	agreed	 that	 it	 is	possible	 for	an	 individual	 to	have	 two	singular	thoughts	concerning	the	same	referent	without	the	sameness	of	reference	being	transparent	 to	 the	 thinker.	 Frege’s	 (1892)	puzzle	 of	Hesperus	 and	Phosphorus	illustrates	this:	the	Ancient	Babylonians	used	the	term	‘Hesperus’	to	refer	to	the	brightest	visible	object	on	the	evening	sky	and	the	term	‘Phosphorus’	to	refer	to	the	 brightest	 object	 visible	 on	 the	 morning	 sky.	 Unbeknownst	 to	 them,	‘Hesperus’	 and	 ‘Phosphorus’	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 heavenly	 body.	 The	 Ancient	Babylonians	may	have	had	beliefs	about	Hesperus	without	having	corresponding	beliefs	–	or	perhaps	even	contradictory	beliefs	–	about	Phosphorus.	They	were	warranted	 in	 this,	 since	 the	 co-reference	 of	 the	 concepts	 HESPERUS	 and	PHOSPHORUS	were	not	manifest	to	them.	Frege’s	observation	puts	the	following	constraint	on	the	nature	of	concepts	and	thoughts:	
	
																																																									3	c.f.	Onofri	2016,	Duhau	2012.	
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The	Fregean	Constraint:	If	a	subject	can	rationally	believe	of	x	that	it	is	F	under	thought	ta,	and	at	the	same	time	believe	of	x	that	it	is	not	F	under	tb	then	ta	and	tb	are	different	thoughts.4	
How	 best	 to	 account	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 manifest	 co-reference	 has	 been	 a	 central	question	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 mind	 and	 language	 since	 Frege.	 The	 pairs	[HESPERUS,	 HESPERUS]	 and	 [HESPERUS,	 PHOSPHORUS]	 contain	 concept	 tokens	with	the	same	referent,	but	only	in	the	former	pair	is	the	co-reference	manifest.	Someone	who	has	two	beliefs,	each	of	which	contains	a	token	of	HESPERUS,	may	exploit	 this	 manifestness	 of	 co-reference	 and	 combine	 the	 two	 beliefs	 in	 a	generalization.	 For	 instance,	 if	 someone	 believes	 both	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 visible	and	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 bright,	 they	 may	 infer	 that	 something	 that	 is	 bright	 is	visible.	They	may	do	so	directly,	without	having	to	make	any	further	judgements	to	 the	 effect	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 Hesperus.	 This	 is	 what	 Campbell	 (1987)	 calls	
trading	 on	 identity	 of	 co-reference.	 I	 will	 say	 that	 two	 concept	 tokens	 that	 are	manifestly	co-referential	in	this	way	are	positively	coordinated.	
In	 contrast,	 two	 concept	 tokens	 that	 are	 not	 manifestly	 co-referential	 are	
negatively	coordinated.	In	cases	where	co-reference	is	not	manifest,	the	thinker	is	not	 rationally	 warranted	 in	 trading	 on	 identity	 when	 making	 generalizations	without	making	 a	 further	 identity	 judgement.	 For	 instance,	 if	 someone	has	 the	belief	that	Hesperus	is	visible	and	also	believes	that	Phosphorus	is	bright,	she	is	not	warranted	 in	 inferring	 from	 these	 two	beliefs	 alone	 that	 something	 that	 is	bright	 is	 visible.	 In	 order	 to	make	 this	 generalization,	 she	 would	 also	 have	 to	believe	that	Hesperus	is	Phosphorus.	Since	someone	may	rationally	believe	that	Hesperus	 is	 visible	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 doubt	 that	 Phosphorus	 is	 visible,	 it	follows	 from	 Frege’s	 constraint	 that	 the	 concepts	 HESPERUS	 and	 PHOSPHORUS	must	 be	 distinct	 concepts,	 since	 the	 two	 thoughts	 are	 otherwise	 structurally	identical.		
Like	 the	Publicity	Constraint,	 then,	 the	 Fregean	Constraint	 puts	 restrictions	 on	the	 individuation	 of	 concepts:	 it	 requires	 concepts	 to	 be	 such	 that	 they	 can	account	 for	 intrapersonal	 coordination	 relations.	 However,	 as	 several	 authors																																																									4	c.f.	Onofri	2018,	6.	
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have	argued	(e.g.	Crimmins	1992,	Heck	2002,	Laurence	&	Margolis	2007,	Duahu	2012,	Onofri	 2016)	 there	 is	 a	 tension	between	 the	Fregean	Constraint	 and	 the	Publicity	 Constraint.	 In	 order	 for	 concepts	 to	 be	 public	 and	 shareable	 their	individuation	conditions	must	be	coarse-grained	so	that	it	is	possible	for	distinct	individuals	to	have	the	same	thought	or	thoughts	of	the	same	type.	For	instance,	it	seems	that	you	and	I	may	both	have	the	belief	that	Bob	Dylan	is	American	even	though	we	have	very	different	conceptions	and	beliefs	regarding	Dylan	himself.	Hence,	 in	 order	 for	 concepts	 to	 be	 public,	 their	 nature	 must	 be	 such	 that	sameness	or	difference	of	concepts	does	not	fully	depend	on	the	mental	lives	of	single	individuals.		
At	the	same	time,	it	seems	that	in	order	for	concepts	to	account	for	intrapersonal	coordination	 relations	 their	 individuation	 condition	must	 be	 fine-grained.	That	is,	 the	 nature	 of	 concepts	 must	 be	 such	 that	 it	 reflects	 how	 rational	 subjects	reason.	Consider	again	the	case	of	Bob	Dylan.	Let’s	say	I	am	confused	and	come	to	 think	 that	 there	 are	 two	distinct	people	named	 ‘Bob	Dylan’.	 I	 come	 to	 think	that	Dylan	the	musician	is	a	different	person	than	Dylan	the	Nobel	Price	winner.	I	may	then	rationally	believe	the	proposition	that	Dylan	won	a	Nobel	Price	and	at	the	same	time	doubt	that	Dylan	won	a	Nobel	Price.	But,	then,	from	the	Fregean	Constraint	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 two	 concepts	 DYLAN(the	musician)	and	 DYLAN(the	Nobel	Price	winner)	are	distinct	concepts.	At	the	same	time,	from	the	publicity	constraint	it	seems	 that	 each	 of	 my	 DYLAN	 concepts	 are	 the	 same	 as	 your	 DYLAN	 concept,	since	I	may	successfully	communicate	with	you	using	either	concept.		
Cases	 like	 these	 are	 well-known	 and	 were	 first	 introduced	 by	 Kripke	 (1979).	They	create	a	problem	for	those	who	want	to	claim	both	that	concepts	are	public	and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 they	 explain	 intrapersonal	 coordination.	 Hence,	 it	seems	 that	 we	 are	 forced	 to	 abandon	 one	 of	 the	 constraints.	 According	 to	 a	recent	 theory	 of	 concepts,	 however,	 such	 complications	 can	 be	 overcome.	Sainsbury	 and	 Tye	 (2011,	 2012)	 propose	 a	 novel	 account	 of	 the	 nature	 of	concepts,	which	 supposedly	 does	 justice	 to	 both	 constraints.	 According	 to	 this	view,	Originalism,	 concepts	 are	 public	 and	 so	 it	 follows	 naturally	 that	 distinct	individuals	 can	 share	 concepts.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 view	 is	 specifically	developed	 to	 solve	 some	 of	 the	 longstanding	 puzzles	within	 the	 philosophy	 of	
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mind	pertaining	to	intrapersonal	cognitive	capacities	of	individuals.	If	the	view	is	successful	 in	 doing	 this,	 it	 would	 be	 exceedingly	 promising,	 since	 it	 would	 do	justice	to	both	the	Publicity	Constraint	and	the	Fregean	Constraint.	
In	 this	paper,	 however,	 I	will	 argue	 that	Originalism	 fails	 to	 give	 a	 satisfactory	account	of	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts.	According	to	Originalism	concepts	are	individuated	 by	 their	 historical	 origins.	 On	 this	 view,	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	concepts	is	explained	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types.	At	the	same	time,	however,	traditional	puzzles	such	as	Kripke’s	(1979)	Paderewski	case	force	 the	 originalist	 to	 say	 that	 such	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 type	 is	 not	transparent	to	thinkers.		
I	 will	 point	 to	 a	 structural	 problem	 with	 this	 kind	 of	 view.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	Originalism	 –	 or	 more	 generally	 any	 theory	 that	 takes	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	concepts	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	types	of	concepts,	but	at	the	same	time	holds	that	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types	is	not	transparent	to	thinkers	–	fails	to	account	for	rational	reasoning.		
I	will	suggest	a	minimal	addition	to	such	frameworks	that	allows	them	to	account	for	a	 thinker’s	 rational	cognitive	capacities.	 I	propose	 that	 the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	 is	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 primitive	 relations	 that	 obtain	between	 representational	 vehicles	 rather	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 features	 such	 as	representations	being	of	 the	same	type.	This	opens	up	the	possibility	of	having	coarse-grained	 individuation	 conditions	 for	 concepts	 (and	 thus	 respect	 the	Publicity	Constraint	on	concept	individuation),	and	at	the	same	time	do	justice	to	Frege’s	 observations	 without	 strictly	 speaking	 conforming	 to	 the	 Fregean	Constraint.		
In	 section	 2,	 I	 present	 the	 key	 claims	 of	 Originalism.	 In	 section	 3,	 I	 assess	 the	Originalist	 account	 of	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 concepts	 by	 looking	 at	 how	Originalists	explain	the	puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus	as	well	as	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	 In	section	4,	 I	argue	that	 the	originalist	account	of	 the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	is	untenable.	In	section	5	I	make	a	positive	proposal	as	to	how	originalists	–	or,	more	generally,	any	theorist	who	takes	concepts	to	be	public	–	
ORIGINALISM	AND	COORDINATION	IN	THOUGHT		
	 137	
may	account	for	rational	reasoning	by	making	a	minimal	addition	to	their	theory.	In	 short,	 the	 suggested	 view	 takes	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 concept	 types	(individuated	 coarsely)	 to	 be	 non-transparent	 to	 thinkers	 while	 explaining	rational	 reasoning	 in	 terms	 of	 primitive	 relational	 features	 of	 mental	representations	rather	than	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types.	Finally,	 I	 consider	 a	 similar	 move	 suggested	 in	 the	 literature	 (Prosser	 2018)	according	 to	which	 the	explanation	of	 coordination	 in	 intrapersonal	 cases	may	come	apart	from	coordination	in	interpersonal	cases.	This	view	differs	from	the	proposal	 made	 in	 this	 paper	 in	 that	 it	 takes	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 to	 be	accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 concepts,	 whereas	communication	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 relational	 aspects	 of	 thoughts.	 In	contrast,	 according	 to	 the	 framework	 proposed	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	 Publicity	Constraint	 is	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 concepts,	whereas	 the	 Fregean	 observations	 are	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 relational	features	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	
	
2.	Originalism			
Originalism	 is	 specifically	 branded	 as	 providing	 solutions	 to	 long-standing	puzzles	within	the	philosophy	of	mind	pertaining	to	intrapersonal	coordination.	At	the	same	time	concepts	are	taken	to	be	shareable	in	that	distinct	individuals	may	use	concepts	of	the	same	type.	In	what	follows	I	will	present	the	key	claims	of	 Originalism.	 I	 start	 out	 by	 making	 clear	 what	 exactly	 the	 Originalists	understand	by	‘concepts’.	
Originalists	take	concepts	to	be		
mental	 representations	 of	 a	 sort	 deployed	 in	 thought;	 they	 are	representational	 constituents	 of	 thoughts.	 Thoughts	 are	made	 up	 of	concepts,	 and	 what	 thoughts	 as	 a	 whole	 represent	 is	 a	 function	 of	their	 component	 concepts:	 what	 they	 represent	 and	 how	 they	 are	combined.	 […]	 Since	 concepts	 represent	 things	 and	 they	 make	 up	thoughts,	 they	 too	have	representational	contents.	 (Sainsbury	&	Tye	
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2012,	1)	
Concepts	are	vehicles	of	representation,	tools	for	thinking	(Sainsbury	and	Tye	2011,	101).		
On	 this	 view,	 thinkers	 do	 not	 stand	 in	 direct	 relation	 to	 the	 content	 of	 the	concepts	 deployed	 in	 thought.	 Thinkers	 are	 directly	 related	 to	 concepts	(understood	 as	 vehicles	 of	 representation)	 and	 related	 to	 the	 content	 of	 such	concepts	 via	 such	 representational	 vehicles.	 Originalists	 hold	 that	 “cognitive	processing	 depends	 not	 directly	 on	 content	 but	 on	 the	 vehicles	 of	 content:	concepts	 and	 thoughts”	 (Sainsbury	 and	 Tye	 2012,	 57).	 This	 opens	 up	 the	possibility	 of	 two	 concepts	 having	 the	 same	 content,	 but	 nonetheless	 playing	different	roles	in	cognition	due	to	a	difference	in	the	representational	vehicles.		
Since	 concepts	 are	 the	 constituents	 of	 thoughts,	 the	 same	 point	 applies	 to	thoughts	as	well:	“distinct	thoughts,	even	if	they	are	referentially	isomorphic,	can	play	different	cognitive	roles”	(Sainsbury	and	Tye	2011,	101—102).	This	is	how	originalists	account	 for	 the	Fregean	constraint.	 I	 return	 to	 this	 in	part	3	below,	where	I	spell	out	the	originalist	solution	to	some	of	the	central	puzzles	within	the	philosophy	of	mind.		
When	an	individual	deploys	a	given	concept	in	thought,	she	entertains	a	concept	
token.	Concept	tokens	enter	 into	causal	computational	relations	 in	cognition.	 In	contrast,	concept	types	are	non-eternal	abstract	objects:		
Thoughts	are	structures	of	concepts,	so	if	one	can	say	what	thoughts	are	one	is	well	on	the	way	to	saying	what	concepts	are.	Thoughts	are	abstract	things	that	can	be	evaluated	as	true	or	false,	can	be	believed	or	 doubted,	 stand	 in	 logical	 relations,	 can	 be	 shared	 by	 different	thinkers	and	can	 typically	be	expressed	by	 indicative	 sentences.	 […]	Non-eternal	 abstract	 continuants	 […]	 is	 the	 category	 to	 which	concepts	belong.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	63)		
Since,	on	this	view,	concepts	and	thoughts	are	abstract	objects	it	 is	possible	for	distinct	 individuals	 to	use	 (i.e.	 token)	 concepts	 and	 thoughts	 of	 the	 same	 type.	
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Although	 different	 individuals	 use	 distinct	 thought	 tokens,	 the	 publicity	constraint	can	be	respected	by	an	appeal	to	sameness	or	difference	in	types.	The	concept	 types	 are	 thus	 public	 and	 as	 such	 “concepts	 are	 typically	 shareable”	(Sainsbury	and	Tye	2012,	59).5	Individuals	have	their	concepts	in	virtue	of	being	part	of	a	 language	community,	and	the	participants	 in	the	 language	community	share	concepts.6		
We	now	have	some	understanding	of	the	originalist	account	of	the	metaphysics	of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts.	 A	 further	 question	 concerns	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	concept	 types.	 More	 specifically,	 what	 are	 the	 individuation	 conditions	 for	concepts?	
As	 mentioned,	 originalists	 hold	 that	 concepts	 (types)	 are	 non-eternal	 entities.	They	come	into	existence	at	a	particular	time	in	history	and	they	may	go	out	of	existence	at	a	later	time.	The	point	in	history	at	which	a	given	concept	comes	into	existence	 is	 the	originating	use	of	 that	 concept.	The	key	claim	of	originalism	 is	that	 two	concept	 tokens	are	of	 the	same	type	 if	and	only	 if	 they	have	the	same	historical	origin:		
Originalism:	Concept	C1	=	concept	C2	if	and	only	if	the	originating	use	of	C1	=	the	originating	use	of	C2	(c.f.	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2011,	105).		
On	this	view,	it	is	the	case	that	for	every	concept	there	is	just	one	originating	use	and	that	every	originating	use	of	a	concept	is	the	origin	of	one	concept	only	(c.f.	
																																																								5	The	exception	is	indexical	concepts,	which	are	not	shared	between	distinct	individuals.	Even	so,	such	indexical	concepts	are	shaped	by	shared	requirements:	“Indexical	concepts	are	copied	from	templates	that	impose	more	or	less	specific	requirements	on	the	use	of	the	concept	they	shape”	(Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	 2012,	 85).	 Importantly,	 “a	 concept-template	 is	 not	 a	 concept,	 but	 rather	 a	recipe	 for	 forming	 concepts,	 a	 pigeon-hole	 to	 hold	 many	 different	 but	 similar	 concepts”	(Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	 2012,	 51).	 Hence,	 indexical	 concepts	 are	 not	 shared	 between	 distinct	individuals,	but	they	are	similar	due	to	being	shaped	by	the	same	requirements.	6	Note	 that	 young	 children	may	 come	 to	 form	 their	 own	 individual	 concepts	when	 interacting	with	 the	 world.	 For	 instance,	 they	 may	 form	 a	 specific	 concept	 when	 interacting	 with	 cats.	However,	 the	 individual	 concepts	 children	acquire	at	 a	 young	age	will	 typically	be	 replaced	by	public	concepts	when	the	children	interact	with	others	in	their	 language	community.	Sainsbury	and	Tye	take	children’s	willingness	to	accept	correction	to	be	an	indication	that	children	replace	their	individual	concepts	with	public	concepts	at	some	point	in	early	development	(2012,	60).	On	the	originalist	account,	the	concept	a	child	has	for	picking	out	cats,	introduced	independently	of	other	 participants	 in	 her	 language	 community,	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 concept	 CAT	 she	 uses	 after	having	acquired	the	public	concept.	
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Sainsbury	&	Tye	2011,	104).7		
There	are	two	sufficient	conditions	for	a	use	of	a	concept	to	be	non-originating:		
1)	The	use	involves	deference	to	other	uses,	by	the	same	subject	or	other	subjects.	2)	The	use	 involves	 informational	 accumulation	 from	other	uses,	 by	 the	same	subject	or	other	subjects.	(c.f.	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2011,	102)	
If	 a	 concept	 token	belongs	 to	a	 chain	of	deference	and	 is	not	 itself	 the	 starting	point	 of	 such	 a	 chain,	 the	use	 is	 a	 non-originating	use.	 That	 is,	 if	 an	 individual	intends	to	use	a	concept	the	same	way	as	others	in	her	language	community,	her	use	is	a	non-originating	use.		
On	this	view,	knowledge	of	the	content	of	concepts	is	not	necessary	for	someone	using	 a	 given	 concept:	 “Concept	 possession	 is	 consistent	 with	 all	 sorts	 of	mistakes	and	misunderstandings	about	the	concept’s	subject	matter”	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	55).	Further,	Originalists	“have	no	room	for	a	notion	of	the	“correct”	use	 of	 a	 concept	 […]	 for	 originalism	 there	 is	 simply	 the	 question	 whether	 a	subject	uses	or	does	not	use	a	concept	on	an	occasion.	If	it	is	used	at	all,	then	it	is	used	“correctly””	(Ibid.,	85).	If	the	subject	defers	to	other	uses	of	a	given	concept	this	 guarantees	 that	 she	 uses	 that	 concept,	 even	 if	 she	 is	 mistaken	 about	 the	subject	matter.	Hence,	 on	 this	 view,	 concept	 individuation	does	not	depend	on	details	about	the	inner	workings	of	single	individuals.	The	result	is	that	concepts	are	 individuated	 in	 a	 coarse-grained	 way,	 making	 it	 possible	 for	 distinct	individuals	to	have	concept	tokens	of	the	same	type.	Originalism	thus	adheres	to	the	Publicity	Constraint	on	concept	individuation.	
																																																								7	A	 complication	 for	 the	Originalist	 theory	 is	 that	 some	 concepts	 often	 are	 taken	 to	have	more	than	 one	 originating	 use.	 In	 order	 to	 account	 for	 this,	 the	 Originalists	 introduce	 the	 notion	 of	
conceptual	fusion.	In	the	case	of	conceptual	fusion,	two	(or	more)	concepts	fuse	into	one	concept.	At	the	time	of	a	conceptual	fusion	the	concepts	that	fuse	together	go	out	of	existence	and	a	new	concept	 comes	 into	 being.	 The	 new	 concept	 originates	 at	 the	 point	 of	 fusion.	 Another	complication	 for	 Originalism	 is	 that	 two	 or	 more	 concepts	 often	 are	 taken	 to	 have	 the	 same	origin.	In	order	to	account	for	this,	the	Originalists	introduce	the	notion	of	conceptual	fission.	 In	the	case	of	a	conceptual	fission,	one	concept	fissions	into	two	(or	more)	concepts.	In	this	case,	the	original	 concept	 is	 of	 a	 different	 type	 than	 the	 new	 concepts	 that	 come	 into	 being.	 The	 new	concepts	that	come	out	of	the	fission	have	their	origin	in	the	first	 intentional	use	of	each	of	the	concepts	introduced	by	the	fission	(c.f.	Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	66—68).		
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To	 sum	 up,	 originalists	 take	 concept	 tokens	 to	 be	 representational	 vehicles,	constituents	 of	 thoughts.	 Such	 concept	 tokens	 enter	 into	 causal	 relations	 in	cognitive	 computation.	 Concept	 types	 are	 abstract	 entities	 that	 are	 publicly	available	 in	 such	a	way	 that	distinct	 individuals	may	use	 concepts	of	 the	 same	type.	Concepts	are	individuated	by	their	historical	origins.	In	this	way,	concepts	are	similar	 to	words	 in	 language;	words	are	 individuated	by	 their	etymological	history	and	different	speakers	may	use	words	of	the	same	type.	This	is	how	the	Originalists	account	for	the	Publicity	Constraint.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	take	a	closer	 look	 at	 how	 the	 Originalists	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 by	looking	at	their	proposed	solutions	to	puzzles	pertaining	to	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	and	thoughts.	
	
3.	Originalism	and	the	Fregean	Constraint	
In	this	section	we’ll	see	in	more	detail	how	originalists	account	for	the	Fregean	Constraint.	There	are	two	puzzles	in	particular	that	are	of	special	interest	when	it	 comes	 to	 the	Fregean	Constraint.	 First,	 there’s	 Frege’s	 (1892)	own	puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus.	Second,	there’s	Kripke’s	(1979)	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	I’ll	present	the	originalists’	proposed	solution	to	each	puzzle	in	turn.		
	
3.1.	The	Puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus	
Frege’s	(1892)	puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus	gave	the	 foundation	for	the	Fregean	 Constraint.	 According	 to	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint,	 recall,	 a	 rational	individual	can	only	think	of	the	same	referent	that	it	is	F	and	that	it	is	not-F	at	the	same	 time	 if	 the	 individual	 thinks	 of	 the	 referent	 in	 different	 ways,	 i.e.	 by	deploying	distinct	 thoughts.	This	 observation	 coincides	with	what	 Sainsbury	&	Tye	call	a	Fregean	Datum:	
A	 Fregean	 datum	 is	 that	 it’s	 one	 thing	 to	 think	 that	 Hesperus	 is	Hesperus,	 and	 another	 to	 think	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 Phosphorus;	 one	
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thing	 to	 think	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 visible,	 another	 to	 think	 that	Phosphorus	is	visible.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	53)	
Originalists	 accept	 this,	 and	 it	 follows	 that	 the	beliefs	HESPERUS	 IS	VISIBLE	and	PHOSPHORUS	IS	VISIBLE	must	be	distinct	thoughts,	since	rational	individuals	may	form	one	of	the	beliefs	while	rejecting	the	other:	
We	agree	[with	the	Fregean	datum].	Different	thoughts	are	involved,	that	is,	different	structures	of	concepts,	since	the	concept	HESPERUS	is	distinct	from	the	concept	PHOSPHORUS	(Ibid.).		
Even	though	the	two	concepts	refer	to	the	same	object,	they	may	play	different	roles	in	cognition	due	to	them	being	of	different	types.	The	originalists	disagree,	however,	with	Frege’s		(1982)	conclusion	that		
the	difference	requires	postulating	any	additional	semantic	layer.	[…]	Distinct	 concepts	 can,	 and	 typically	 will,	 play	 different	 roles	 in	 our	cognitive	activities,	even	if	they	have	the	same	content.	[…]	The	work	supposedly	 done	 by	 difference	 of	 sense	 can	 be	 done	 better	 by	difference	of	concepts.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	53—54)	
Hence,	 on	 the	 Originalist	 framework	 we	may	 account	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	 in	terms	 of	 a	 difference	 in	 types	 of	 representational	 vehicles	 rather	 than	 a	difference	in	semantic	content.8		
According	 to	 the	 Originalists,	 the	 concepts	 HESPERUS	 and	 PHOSPHORUS	 are	 of	different	types	as	a	result	of	them	having	distinct	historical	origins.	The	Ancient	Babylonians	 introduced	HESPERUS	 in	 the	 evening,	while	 PHOSPHORUS	was	 first	used	 in	 the	morning.	Hence,	 the	 originating	 use	 of	 HESPERUS	 ≠	 the	 originating	use	of	PHOSPHORUS.	Since	 referentially	 isomorphic	 thoughts	 that	differ	only	by																																																									8	Fodor	(2008)	agrees	with	the	originalists	that	Frege	cases	can	be	explained	without	appeal	to	semantics	 that	 goes	beyond	 reference.	However,	 the	 two	 theories	disagree	on	 several	matters.	One	 such	matter	 is	 this:	While	 originalists	 take	 concepts	 to	 be	 individuated	historically,	 Fodor	thinks	 that	 such	 entities	 are	 of	 different	 types	 “when	 they	 differ	 in	 the	 (presumably	 physical)	properties	to	which	mental	processes	are	sensitive”	(Fodor	2008,	79).	On	Fodor’s	view,	subjects	cannot	be	mistaken	about	the	type	and	number	of	concepts	deployed	in	thought.	In	(3.2)	we’ll	see	that	originalists	disagree;	they	deny	that	concepts	are	transparent	to	the	thinker.	In	part	4	I	argue	that	this	claim	creates	problems	for	the	Originalist	account	of	coordination	in	thought.	
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the	 substitution	 of	 HESPERUS	 for	 PHOSPHORUS	 are	 of	 different	 types,	 the	 two	thoughts,	if	tokened	by	a	single	individual,	may	play	different	roles	in	cognition.	This	 is	why	 someone	may	 rationally	 endorse	 one	 of	 the	 thoughts	while	 at	 the	same	time	rejecting	the	other.9	
In	the	case	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus,	then,	the	Originalist	account	of	concepts	successfully	 respects	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 on	 concept	 individuation	 since	 it	seems	plausible	 that	 the	concepts	 in	question	(i.e.	HESPERUS	and	PHOSPHORUS)	have	 distinct	 historical	 origins.	 This,	 however,	 may	 just	 be	 a	 historical	coincidence.	 If	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 concept	 types	 are	 to	 account	 for	 the	Fregean	data	 the	 individuation	 conditions	 of	 concepts	 need	 to	 be	 such	 that	 all	concept	 tokens	 that	 play	 distinct	 roles	 in	 cognition	 come	out	 as	 distinct	 types.	This	means	that	if	two	concept	tokens	play	distinct	roles	in	the	mind	of	a	single	individual	 they	 better	 be	 tokens	 of	 concept	 types	 with	 distinct	 origins.	 In	 the	specific	 case	 of	 HESPERUS	 and	 PHOSPHORUS	 the	 originalist	 is	 lucky,	 because	 it	seems	plausible	that	the	concepts	were	introduced	at	different	points	in	history.	However,	there	are	other	puzzles,	such	as	Kripke’s	(1979)	puzzle	of	Paderewski,	which	 renders	 the	 appeal	 to	 distinctness	 of	 concept	 types	 impossible	 for	 the	Originalist.	This	forces	the	Originalist	to	pursue	a	different	strategy.	In	the	next	section	I	will	present	the	Originalists’	proposed	solution	to	this	puzzle.	
	
3.2.	The	Puzzle	of	Paderewski	
Kripke’s	(1979)	puzzle	of	Paderewski	runs	as	follows:	Ignace	Paderewski	was	a	popular	Polish	pianist.	He	was	also	engaged	in	politics	and	after	the	First	World	War	 he	 became	 the	 Polish	 prime	minister.	Now	 consider	 a	 person,	 Peter,	who	independently	 comes	 to	 know	 about	 Paderewski	 the	 piano	 player	 and	Paderewski	the	politician	without	realizing	that	they	are	in	fact	the	same	person.																																																									9	Originalism	 coincides	 with	 Ruth	 Millikan’s	 theory	 of	 concepts	 in	 certain	 respects:	 Millikan	agrees	with	Sainsbury	and	Tye	that	Fregean	data	are	to	be	explained	by	appeal	to	sameness	and	difference	 in	 vehicles	 of	 content	 rather	 than	 the	 content	 expressed	 by	 such	 entities.	 They	 also	agree	that	concepts	are	to	be	individuated	by	way	of	their	historical	properties.	However,	while	originalists	take	concepts	to	be	public,	Millikan	thinks	concepts	are	individual	and	not	sharable:	“I	have	concepts	and	you	have	completely	other	concepts,	though	many	of	them	may	be	concepts	be	of	the	same	thing”	(Millikan	2011,	6).	
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Instead	Peter	believes	that	 it	 is	a	case	of	two	different	people	sharing	the	same	name.	Having	been	to	one	of	Paderewski’s	concerts,	Peter	comes	to	believe	that	Paderewski	has	musical	talent.	However,	Peter	also	believes,	on	good	authority,	that	no	politicians	have	musical	talent	and	that	no	pianists	are	politicians.	Thus	it	also	 seems	 plausible	 to	 attribute	 to	 Peter	 the	 belief	 that	 Paderewski	 lacks	musical	 talent.	The	puzzle,	 then,	 is	 this:	Peter	 is	 rational,	but	he	seems	 to	have	contradictory	beliefs;	how	can	this	be?		
The	problem	is	that,	if	we	assume	that	concepts	are	public,	there	should	be	only	one	 concept	 PADEREWSKI.	Hence,	when	Peter	uses	 the	 concept	 PADEREWSKI	at	the	concert	he	uses	the	very	same	concept	as	others	in	his	language	community.	At	 the	same	 time,	when	Peter	uses	 the	concept	PADEREWSKI	at	a	 rally,	Peter	 is	also	 using	 the	 same	 concept	 as	 others	 in	 his	 language	 community.	 Hence,	 by	transitivity,	 Peter	 is	 using	 the	 same	 concept	 both	when	 forming	his	 belief	 that	Paderewski	has	musical	talent	and	also	when	forming	the	belief	that	Paderewski	does	not	have	musical	talent.	But	then	Peter’s	beliefs	are	contradictory.		
When	Peter	forms	his	beliefs	he	defers	to	other	uses	in	his	language	community.	According	 to	 the	Originalist,	 this	 ensures	 that	he	uses	 the	 same	concept	as	 the	others.	There	is	only	one	public	concept	PADEREWSKI	so	Peter	must	be	using	the	same	concept	when	forming	both	beliefs.	This	is	true	on	the	Originalist	account	of	 concepts	 as	 well,	 since	 it	 seems	 implausible	 that	 there	 is	 more	 than	 one	originating	use	of	PADEREWSKI.	Hence,	originalists	face	problems	accounting	for	Peter’s	being	rational,	since	both	of	Peter’s	PADEREWSKI	tokens	are	of	the	same	type	due	to	there	only	being	one	public	concept	PADEREWSKI:	
According	 to	 originalism,	 there	 is	 just	 one	 public	 concept	PADEREWSKI,	 which	 Peter	 exercises	 both	 when	 he	 forms	 the	 belief	that	Paderewski	has	musical	talent,	and	when	he	forms	the	belief	that	Paderewski	 lacks	musical	 talent.	 In	 the	 originalist	 framework,	 Peter	has	 contradictory	 beliefs:	 apart	 from	negation,	 the	 beliefs	 are	made	up	of	just	the	same	concepts	in	the	same	position.	The	challenge	is	to	explain	 how	 Peter	 can,	 nonetheless,	 be	 rational.	 (Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	2012,	113—114)	
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The	originalist	cannot	account	for	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski	in	the	same	way	they	accounted	for	the	puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus.	What,	then,	can	they	do?	
Two	possible	solutions	seem	to	arise:	First,	one	may	deny	that	rationality	hinges	directly	on	the	type	of	the	concepts	involved	in	cognitive	processing.	Second,	one	may	supplement	the	theory	with	 further	machinery	 in	order	to	account	 for	 the	cognitive	role	of	concepts.	Originalists	choose	the	first	option.	In	what	follows,	I	will	present	this	approach.	In	section	4,	I	will	assess	this	account	and	argue	that	the	suggested	solution	fails	to	account	for	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski	and	also	that	this	 approach	 renders	 the	Originalist	 account	 incapable	of	 explaining	 cognitive	significance	 in	 general.	 In	 section	 5,	 I	 will	 propose	 a	 solution	 in	 line	 with	 the	second	 alternative:	 I	 will	 suggest	what	 I	 take	 to	 be	 a	minimal	 addition	 to	 any	account	 that	 takes	 concepts	 to	 be	 public	 and	 show	 how	 this	 will	 allow	 such	theorists	to	give	a	unified	account	of	the	intrapersonal	cognitive	role	of	concepts	and	thoughts.		
The	Originalist	account	of	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski	ultimately	involves	denying	that	rationality	hinges	directly	on	the	type	of	the	concepts	involved	in	cognitive	processing.	The	originalists	propose	an	account	of	rationality	according	to	which	individuals	can	be	wrong	about	the	number	of	concepts	they	possess.	A	common	view	 is	 that	 individuals	 have	 privileged	 access	 to	 their	 own	 conscious	mental	states,	 including	 their	 thoughts.	 That	 is,	 it	 seems	 intuitively	 plausible	 that	someone	is	in	a	position	to	know	whether	their	thoughts	are	of	the	same	type	or	not.	 Intuitively,	one	can	know	which	concepts	one	possesses	and	whether	 they	are	 of	 the	 same	 type	 or	 not.	 The	 thesis	 of	 introspective	 knowledge	 of	comparative	 concepts	 (IKCC)	 may	 be	 stated	 as	 follows	 (c.f.	 Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	2012,	92):		
IKCC:	 When	 our	 faculty	 of	 introspection	 is	 working	 normally,	 we	 can	know	apriori	via	introspection	with	respect	to	any	two	present,	occurrent	thoughts	whether	they	exercise	the	same	or	different	concepts.		
	
	
ORIGINALISM	AND	COORDINATION	IN	THOUGHT		 	
	146	
Originalists	reject	IKCC.	They	thus	reject	Kripke’s	claim	that	“Anyone	[…]	is	in	a	position	to	notice	and	correct	contradictory	beliefs	if	he	has	them”	(Kripke	1979,	122).	
In	the	case	of	Peter	in	the	Paderewski	puzzle,	Peter	does	not	know	that	his	belief	that	 Paderewski	 has	musical	 talent	 contains	 the	 same	 concept	 PADEREWSKI	 as	his	 belief	 that	 Paderewski	 lacks	 musical	 talent;	 he	 thinks	 his	 two	 thoughts	contain	 different	 concepts.	 This	 is	 what	 accounts	 for	 Peter	 being	 rational	 in	holding	contradictory	beliefs:	
Peter	 thinks,	 at	 the	 rally,	 that	 he	 has	 learned	 a	 new	 concept	PADEREWSKI,	different	 from	the	PADEREWSKI	concept	he	had	earlier	acquired	at	the	concert.	He	is	wrong.	But	this	is	a	reasonable	mistake,	it	is	one	that	makes	it	reasonable	for	him	to	believe	that	his	thoughts	are	 not	 contradictory.	He	 reasonably	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	that	 the	one	thought	consists	 in	 the	other	embedded	 in	a	concept	of	negation.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	134)		
Since	 Peter	 has	 false	 beliefs	 concerning	 the	 identity	 of	 his	 deployed	 concept	tokens,	 “it’s	 rationally	 required	 of	 Peter	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 thoughts	 do	 not	contradict”	 (Ibid.,	 135).	This	 is	 so,	 even	 though	Peter’s	 two	 thoughts	do	 in	 fact	constitute	a	contradiction.		
In	what	 follows	 I	will	 argue	 that	 this	 does	not	 solve	 the	puzzle	 of	 Paderewski.	One	 of	 the	 questions	 raised	 by	 the	 puzzle	 concerns	 how	 Peter’s	 tokens	 of	PADEREWSKI	may	play	distinct	roles	in	cognition	despite	being	of	the	same	public	type.	The	proposed	solution	does	not	give	a	satisfactory	explanation	of	how	this	can	 be	 the	 case.	 Finally,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 abandoning	 of	 IKCC	 renders	 the	Originalist	 account	 of	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 concepts	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 and	difference	of	concept	type	untenable	in	general.	
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4.	Originalism	Fails	to	Account	for	Cognitive	Significance	
In	what	follows,	I	will	argue	that	there	are	several	problems	with	the	Originalist	approach	to	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	First,	I	will	argue	that	the	account	involves	over-intellectualization,	 and	 that	 this	 makes	 it	 unlikely	 that	 Originalism	 can	provide	 a	 general	 account	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 cognitive	 processing	 involved	 in	 the	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	Second,	 I	will	argue	that	the	account	fails	to	explain	how	certain	of	Peter’s	beliefs	concerning	Paderewski	are	positively	coordinated	while	others	are	not.	Two	concepts	being	positively	coordinated,	recall,	just	means	that	co-reference	is	manifest	and	as	a	result	the	concept	tokens	play	the	same	role	in	cognition.	 Finally,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 abandoning	 IKCC	 renders	 the	 originalist	account	of	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	untenable	in	general.	
	
4.1.	Over-Intellectualization	
The	 originalists	 explain	 the	 possibility	 of	 someone	 having	 contradictory	 first-order	 beliefs	 in	 terms	 of	 false	 second-order	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 sameness	 or	difference	of	constituent	concepts	of	their	first-order	beliefs.	In	the	case	of	Peter,	he	 has	 a	 false	 second-order	 belief	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 singular	 concepts	deployed	in	his	beliefs	that	Paderewski	has	musical	talent	and	that	Paderewski	lacks	musical	 talent	 are	 distinct.	 Although	 Peter	 is	 in	 fact	 deploying	 the	 same	concept	in	both	thoughts,	Peter	does	not	know	this.	
The	 initial	 problem	 with	 this	 account	 is	 that	 people	 rarely	 form	 higher-order	beliefs	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 their	 first-order	 beliefs.	 It	 is,	 for	instance,	unlikely	that	Peter	consciously	forms	the	belief	that	the	two	tokens	of	PADEREWSKI	are	distinct	concepts.		
Sainsbury	&	Tye	 foreshadows	 this	worry	and	 say	 that	 the	 sort	of	higher-order	beliefs	in	question	need	not	be	explicitly	formed:	
One’s	 introspective	 awareness	 that	 one	 is	 thinking	 that	 p,	 need	 not	itself	 be	 manifest	 in	 consciousness	 by	 an	 occurrent	 thought	 […]	 to	
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count	as	introspective	knowledge,	a	belief	need	not	itself	be	manifest	in	 consciousness	 by	 an	 occurrent	 thought.	 For	 instance,	 one	 might	introspectively	 know	 that	 one	 is	 thinking	 that	 water	 is	 a	 liquid	 on	occasions	 in	which	 the	 only	 occurrent	 thought	 one	 is	 having	 is	 that	water	is	a	liquid.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	90	n.	1)	
It	seems,	then,	that	the	originalist	can	respond	to	the	initial	worry	by	saying	that	Peter	need	not	explicitly	form	the	relevant	higher-order	belief,	but	instead	that	it	is	sufficient	for	his	rationality	that	he	implicitly	believes	the	proposition.	
However,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 not	 required	 that	 individuals	 explicitly	 form	 the	relevant	higher-order	beliefs,	they	must	still	have	the	disposition	to	do	so.	One’s	disposition	to	believe	something	depends	partly	on	the	concepts	one	possesses.	For	 instance,	 if	 someone	 lacks	 the	concept	CAT,	 this	 individual	does	not	at	 that	very	moment	have	the	disposition	to	form	any	beliefs	involving	the	concept	CAT.	Some	 have	 argued	 that	 young	 children	 under	 the	 age	 of	 four	 lack	 the	 concept	BELIEF	 (c.f.	 Gopnik	 1993,	 Perner	 1991).	 It	 is,	 in	 general,	 far	 from	 obvious	 that	young	 children	 can	 entertain	 complex	 thoughts	 involving	 concepts	 such	 as	BELIEF,	 CONCEPT	 etc.	 Such	 children	 would	 not	 have	 the	 disposition	 to	 form	higher-order	 beliefs	 concerning	 their	 first-order	 beliefs	 or	 those	 beliefs’	conceptual	constituents.	Even	so,	it	seems	that	such	children	could	fall	victim	to	the	 sort	of	 confusion	 involved	 in	 the	Paderewski	 case.	That	 is,	 they	could	have	first-order	 beliefs	 deploying	 the	 same	 public	 concept	without	 recognizing	 that	the	beliefs	 concern	 the	same	referent.	 If	 individuals	may	be	 in	Paderewski-like	situations	 without	 having	 the	 ability	 to	 form	 higher-order	 beliefs	 we	 cannot	account	for	their	rationality	by	appeal	to	false	higher-order	beliefs.	
The	originalists	might	object	 that	 they	do	not	require	the	 individual	 to	actually	form	such	higher-order	beliefs	to	the	effect	that	their	first-order	beliefs	contain	distinct	concepts.	Rather,	the	mere	lack	of	a	belief	–	explicit	or	 implicit	–	to	the	effect	that	PADEREWSKI	(figuring	in	belief	1)	is	of	the	same	type	as	PADEREWSKI	(figuring	 in	 belief	 2)	 is	 enough	 for	 an	 individual	 such	 as	 Peter	 to	 be	 rational.	Young	 children	may	 then	 count	 as	 rational	 even	 in	 a	 Paderewski-like	 case,	 as	long	 as	 they	 have	 no	 higher-order	 beliefs	 regarding	 the	 sameness	 of	 the	
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conceptual	constituents	of	their	first-order	beliefs.	This	account,	however,	over-generalizes.	If	the	absence	of	such	higher-order	beliefs	is	enough	for	a	person	to	have	negatively	 coordinated	beliefs,	 small	 children	would	never	have	 thoughts	that	are	positively	coordinated,	since	the	absence	of	higher-order	beliefs	secures	negative	 coordination.	 This	 is	 obviously	wrong;	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 young	 children	may	 have	 positively	 coordinated	 thoughts.	 For	 instance,	 they	 can	 trade	 on	identity	 in	 making	 basic	 inferences	 about	 things	 in	 their	 environment.	 Hence,	this	move	is	untenable.	
Whether	or	not	young	children	have	concepts	such	as	BELIEF	and	CONCEPT	is,	of	course,	 an	 empirical	 question.	 However,	 even	 if	 it	 should	 turn	 out	 that	 young	children	actually	do	possess	such	concepts,	 there	are	 further	and	more	serious	problems	with	the	Originalist	account	of	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	
	
4.2.	The	Problem	of	Coordination	
It	seems	that,	according	to	the	Originalists,	Peter	being	rational	depends	on	him	making	(or	being	disposed	to	make)	something	like	the	following	inference:	
1)	PADEREWSKI	HAS	MUSICAL	TALENT	2)	PADEREWSKI	DOES	NOT	HAVE	MUSICAL	TALENT	3)	PADEREWSKI	≠	PADEREWSKI	4)	BELIEF	(1)	AND	(2)	ARE	NOT	CONTRADICTORY	
The	worry,	then,	is	that	is	highly	puzzling	how	(3)	can	do	the	necessary	job	in	the	inference.	 	 In	 order	 for	 (3)	 to	 do	 the	 necessary	 job,	 the	 two	 tokens	 of	PADEREWSKI	 figuring	 in	 the	 belief	 must	 be	 positively	 coordinated	 with	 the	tokens	 of	 PADEREWSKI	 in	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 respectively.	 We	 may	 visualize	 it	 thus	(where	the	arrows	represent	positive	coordination,	while	an	absence	of	arrows	represents	negative	coordination):	
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	But	how	is	the	Originalist	able	to	account	 for	this?	According	to	the	Originalist,	all	four	tokens	of	PADEREWSKI	are	of	the	same	type.	Still,	somehow	Peter	ends	up	having	only	two	pairs	of	positively	coordinated	concepts.	
Appealing	 to	 identity	 judgments	 (or	 in	 this	 case,	 a	 judgment	 to	 the	 effect	 that	there	 is	 no	 identity)	 in	 accounting	 for	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 concepts	 is	notoriously	 problematic.	 Campbell	 (1994)	 addresses	 this	 when	 he	 considers	accounting	for	coordination	in	terms	of	implicit	or	suppressed	identity	premises:	
If	 this	view	were	correct,	we	would	also	need	to	make	sure	 that	 the	uses	of	 [PADEREWSKI]	 in	 the	 suppressed	premise	 are	 linked	with	 the	uses	 of	 [PADEREWSKI]	 in	 the	 explicit	 premises,	 and	we	would	 need	further	 suppressed	 premises	 to	 secure	 these	 connections.	 The	problem	recurs,	and	we	are	embarking	on	a	regress.	(Campbell	1994,	75)10	
The	originalists	face	the	same	problem	in	accounting	for	the	inference	from	(1—4):	 If	 sameness	 of	 type	 does	 not	 guarantee	 positive	 coordination,	 how	 do	 we	account	 for	 the	 positive	 coordination	 relations	 between	 the	 tokens	 of	PADEREWSKI	in	(3)	with	the	tokens	of	PADEREWSKI	in	(1)	and	(2)	respectively?	Appealing	 to	 Peter’s	 higher-order	 belief	 concerning	 the	 identity	 (and	 lack	thereof)	 of	 the	 constituent	 concepts	 in	 his	 first-order	 beliefs	 would	 lead	 to	 a	vicious	regress.	
Hence,	by	giving	up	on	the	idea	that	sameness	of	concept	type	is	transparent	to	thinkers	the	Originalists	thereby	give	up	on	the	idea	that	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types	can	account	for	coordination.	As	a	result,	the	Originalists	fail	to																																																									10	Campbell	uses	’Hesperus’	as	an	example	rather	than	’Paderewski’.		
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account	 for	 Peter’s	 rational	 processes.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	abandonment	 of	 IKCC	 has	 more	 far-reaching	 consequences	 than	 those	concerning	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski.	I	argue	that	abandoning	IKCC	renders	the	Originalist	 account	 of	 coordination	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 and	 difference	 of	concept	type	untenable	in	general.		
	
4.3.	Originalists	Fail	to	Account	for	the	Fregean	Data	
Let’s	return	to	the	puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus.	In	this	puzzle	we	want	to	know	why	it	is	the	case	that	the	members	of	the	pair	[HESPERUS,	HESPERUS]	are	positively	coordinated	while	the	members	of	the	pair	[HESPERUS,	PHOSPHORUS]	are	negatively	coordinated.	As	we	saw	in	3.1,	the	Originalists’	solution	was	to	say	that	in	the	former	case	the	two	concept	tokens	are	of	the	same	type	due	to	them	having	 the	 same	 originating	 use,	 whereas	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 the	 two	 concept	tokens	are	of	distinct	types	due	to	having	distinct	historical	origins.			
However,	as	we	have	seen,	if	IKCC	is	false,	this	means	that	two	concepts	that	are	of	the	same	type	may	nonetheless	play	different	cognitive	roles.	In	contrast,	two	concepts	 that	are	positively	coordinated	will,	necessarily,	play	 the	same	role	 in	cognition.	If	 this	were	not	the	case,	coordination	would	not	be	the	sort	of	thing	that	could	account	 for	 the	Fregean	data.	That	 is,	 if	 coordination	relations	come	apart	from	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts,	it	would	be	possible	for	individuals	to	have	two	concept	tokens	that	were	positively	coordinated	but	that	nonetheless	played	 different	 roles	 in	 cognition.	 We	 would	 then	 have	 to	 introduce	 further	notions	in	order	to	explain	how	someone	could	fail	to	recognize	the	co-reference	of	positively	coordinated	concepts.	If	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types	is	not	transparent	to	thinkers	(or,	more	specifically,	their	cognitive	computational	systems),	 coordination	 and	 concept	 types	 come	 apart,	 and	 as	 a	 result	coordination	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	concepts.	We	are	 left	with	the	 following	question:	 If	sameness	of	 type	does	not	guarantee	 that	 two	 concept	 tokens	 are	 positively	 coordinated,	 why,	 in	 this	specific	 case,	 do	 the	 two	 tokens	 of	 HESPERUS	 end	 up	 being	 positively	
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coordinated?			
It	is	of	little	help	when	the	Originalist	claims	that		
The	mechanism	that	leads	to	treating	things	as	the	same	or	different	is	a	pretty	reliable	one,	and	it	is	essential	to	reasoning.	One	lesson	of	the	 puzzle	 of	 Paderewski	 is	 that	 the	 mechanism	 is	 not	 infallible.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	136)	
Peter’s	 cognitive	 mechanisms	 are	 normal,	 i.e.	 not	 malfunctioning.	We	 want	 to	explain	 why	 some	 of	 his	 thoughts	 concerning	 Paderewski	 are	 positively	coordinated,	 i.e.	 manifestly	 co-referential,	 whereas	 other	 of	 his	 beliefs	concerning	 Paderewski	 are	 negatively	 coordinated,	 meaning	 that	 the	 co-reference	 is	not	manifest	to	Peter.	We	still	need	to	answer	the	question	of	why	the	sameness	 is	 recognized	by	 the	cognitive	system	 in	some	cases	while	not	 in	others.	If	the	cognitive	system	can	be	wrong	about	the	sameness	or	difference	in	types	 of	 concepts	 entertained	 in	 thought,	 such	 sameness	 or	 difference	 cannot	explain	rational	reasoning.	This	 is	 the	case	even	 in	non-Paderewski	style	cases,	since	 there	 is	 no	 principled	 distinction	 between	 the	 cognitive	 workings	 of	someone	 in	a	Paderewski	 case	and	 someone	 like	 the	Ancient	Babylonians.	The	only	difference	between	 the	 two	cases	 is	 that	 in	 the	 former	only	one	person	 is	unaware	of	the	co-reference	of	the	relevant	concept	tokens,	while	in	the	latter	an	entire	 community	 lacks	 such	 knowledge.	 This,	 however,	 cannot	 make	 a	difference	to	the	intrapersonal	cognitive	mechanisms	of	single	individuals.	
When	discussing	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski,	the	Originalists	spell	out	the	story	of	Peter	 in	 some	 more	 detail.	 They	 say	 that	 pragmatic	 facts	 concerning	 the	circumstances	of	how	he	acquires	the	concepts	as	well	as	other	beliefs	Peter	may	have,	 play	 a	 part	 in	 how	 he	 is	 rational	 in	 holding	 contradictory	 beliefs.	Experiencing	 the	 same	 object	 twice	 does	 not	 guarantee	 that	 the	 sameness	 of	reference	is	recognized;	this	much	is	established	by	the	puzzle	of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus.		
Further,	Sainsbury	&	Tye	consider	a	related	puzzle,	namely	the	puzzle	about	Paul	who	believes	that	cats	have	tails	and	also	that	chats	have	tails,	but	who	doesn’t	
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know	that	cats	are	chats.	We	may	assume	that	CAT	and	CHAT	is	the	same	concept	with	a	common	origin.	In	this	case,	the	Originalists	say	that		
the	 explanation	 must	 be	 linguistic.	 In	 using	 the	 word	 “cat”,	 Paul,	before	his	 “discovery”,	wrongly	 takes	himself	 to	 exercise	 a	 different	concept	 from	 the	 concept	 he	 exercises	 using	 the	 word	 “chat”.	(Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	128)		
Ultimately,	then,	the	explanation	of	coordination	seems	not	to	rest	on	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types,	but	rather	in	whether	or	not	the	thinker	takes	the	concepts	to	be	the	same.	Whether	or	not	an	individual	takes	two	concept	tokens	to	 be	 the	 same	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 actually	 the	 same	concept,	but	rather	it	seems	to	fully	depend	on	pragmatic	facts	about	the	specific	circumstances	in	which	a	thinker	acquires	the	concept.		
I	 think	 this	 insight	 is	ultimately	correct.	Coordination	 in	 thought	does	not	map	onto	 sameness	 or	 difference	 of	 public	 concept	 types.	 Instead,	 I	 suggest,	 it	 is	 a	primitive	fact	about	how	the	cognitive	system	stores	and	computes	information.	In	the	next	section	I	will	suggest	a	minimal	addition	to	the	Originalist	framework	–	or	more	generally,	any	account	 that	 takes	concepts	 to	be	public	–	 that	allows	such	 theories	 to	 account	 for	 the	 interpersonal	 explanatory	 job	 traditionally	assigned	 to	 concepts,	 such	 as	 accounting	 for	 communication,	 as	 well	 as	coordination	in	thought.	
	
5.	Positive	Proposal:	Vehicle	Relationism	
I	propose	that	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts	is	not	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 types	 of	 concept	 tokens,	 but	 rather	 it	 is	 to	 be	accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 primitive	 representational	 relations.	 The	 relations	being	 primitive	 means	 that	 they	 do	 not	 hold	 in	 virtue	 of	 intrinsic	representational	 features	 of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts.	 Intrinsic	 representational	features	are	those	properties	of	a	concept	that	can	be	stated	without	reference	to	
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another	representation.11		
The	framework	I	have	in	mind	is	that	of	Vehicle	Relationism	(c.f.	Chapter	1	and	2	in	 this	 theses).	According	 to	Vehicle	Relationism,	 intrapersonal	 coordination	 is	accounted	 for	 in	 terms	of	pointer	relations	and	mental	tags.	 I	 use	 the	notion	of	‘pointer	 relations’	 to	denote	 the	sort	of	primitive	relations	 that	account	 for	 the	cognitive	 role	 of	 mental	 representations.	 A	 pointer	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	relation	 that	 holds	 between	 representational	 vehicles.	 Whenever	 this	 relation	holds	the	relata	are	positively	coordinated.	Importantly,	the	pointer	relations	do	not	reduce	to	sameness	of	intrinsic	representational	features	of	the	relata.	That	is,	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	determine	whether	or	not	 two	representational	vehicles	are	 positively	 coordinated	 merely	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 two	vehicles	 in	 isolation.	 According	 to	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 two	 representational	vehicles	may	share	the	exact	same	intrinsic	properties	–	including	the	semantic	content	 they	 express	 –	 and	 still	 fail	 to	 be	 positively	 coordinated.	 Further,	 two	mental	 representations	 that	 are	 not	 connected	 by	 pointers	 are	 negatively	coordinated.		
I	 use	 the	notion	of	 ‘mental	 tags’	 to	denote	 those	 representational	 vehicles	 that	are	capable	of	entering	into	pointer	relations.	Mental	tags	and	pointer	relations	are	the	building	blocks	of	thoughts.	The	central	claim	relevant	to	our	purposes	in	this	chapter	is	that,	when	it	comes	to	explaining	coordination	there	is	nothing	of	interest	 to	 be	 learned	 from	 looking	 at	 the	 intrinsic	 features	 of	 the	 tags	 –	 only	relational	 features	 are	 explanatorily	 interesting	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 explaining	coordination	in	thought.	
What	 I	 propose	 is	 that	 the	 Fregean	 data	 that	 appeared	 to	 impose	 the	 Fregean	Constraint	 on	 concept	 individuation	 are	 not	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 term	 of	sameness	or	difference	in	types	of	concepts	and	thoughts,	but	rather,	all	we	need	to	account	 for	 the	data	 is	 a	 relational	difference	between	 the	pairs	of	 concepts	[HESPERUS,	HESPERUS]	and	[HESPERUS,	PHOSPHORUS].12		
																																																								11	C.f.	Gray	(2017,	4).	12	For	 a	 thorough	 explanation	 of	 how	Vehicle	Relationism	 accounts	 for	 the	 puzzle	 of	Hesperus	and	Phosphorus	as	well	as	the	puzzle	of	Paderewski	see	Chapter	2,	section	3.	
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Heck	 (2012)	 argues	 for	 the	 same	 conclusion.	 They	 consider	 the	 difference	 in	cognitive	role	of	(1)	and	(2):	
1) SAMUEL	CLEMENS	HAS	DIED	2) MARK	TWAIN	HAS	DIED		
The	 two	 singular	 representations,	 CLEMENS	 and	 TWAIN	 are	 co-referential.	Nonetheless	 they	may	play	different	 roles	 in	 cognition.	Heck	 illustrates	 this	by	considering	a	case	involving	an	individual,	Fred,	who	when	he	comes	to	believe	(1)	gets	devastated,	whereas	he	does	not	get	equally	saddened	when	coming	to	believe	(2).	Heck	argues	that	
1. What	distinguishes	the	belief	that	Clemens	has	died	from	the	belief	that	 Twain	 has	 died	 is	 nothing	 intensional.	 In	 particular,	 these	beliefs	have	the	same	content.		2. If	we	 are	 to	 be	 able	 to	 explain	 Fred’s	 behavior	 in	 cognitive	 terms,	there	must	 be	 some	 difference	 between	 these	 beliefs	 that	 plays	 a	role	 in	 psychological	 explanation.	 But	 no	 intrinsic	 difference	between	 these	 beliefs	 plays	 that	 role.	 The	 explanatorily	 relevant	difference	 is	 an	 extrinsic,	 relational	 one.	 It	 concerns	 how	 these	beliefs	are	related	to	other	of	Fred’s	beliefs.	(Heck	2012,144-145)	
Heck	 focuses	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 Fregean	 data	 for	 intentional	explanation	 and	 in	 stating	 intentional	 laws.	 They	 argue	 that	 for	 this	 specific	purpose	 we	 only	 need	 the	 coordination	 relations	 (what	 they	 call	 formal	
relations)	and	as	such,	“the	sorts	of	formal	relations	among	beliefs	that	must	be	mentioned	may	be	treated	as	psychologically	primitive:	We	can	make	reference	
directly	 to	 these	 relations	 in	 giving	 intentional	 explanations	 and	 in	 stating	intentional	 laws”	(Ibid.,	157).	The	key	claim	of	Vehicle	Relationism	is	 that	such	relations	 obtain	 as	 a	 result	 of	 primitive	 relational	 features	 of	 mental	representations.		
The	originalists	themselves	point	to	the	explanatory	importance	of	the	sameness	or	difference	in	relational	properties:	
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[One]	 role	 for	 concepts	 in	 cognition	 is	 that	 their	 sameness	 and	difference	generate	relational	effects:	 the	pattern	exemplified	by	 the	thought	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 Hesperus	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 pattern	exemplified	by	 the	 thought	 that	Hesperus	 is	Phosphorus.	 (Sainsbury	&	Tye	2012,	53)	
However,	as	we	have	seen	 they	 take	such	relational	effects	 to	hold	 in	virtue	of	intrinsic	 representational	 features,	 namely	 concept	 tokens	 being	 of	 the	 same	type	or	not:	
In	 [the	 thought	 that	Hesperus	 is	Hesperus],	 a	 single	 concept	 is	used	twice.	In	the	[thought	that	Hesperus	is	Phosphorus],	two	concepts	are	each	used	once.	This	may	have	an	impact	on	informativeness.	(Ibid.)	
I	 think	this	 is	misguided,	and	that	 this	 is	 the	reason	why	the	Originalists	 fail	 to	account	 for	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 concepts	 and	 thoughts.	 Publicly	 sharable	concepts	 are	 too	 coarse-grained	 to	 account	 for	 the	 cognitive	 role	 of	 mental	representations.	 Instead,	 we	 should	 follow	 Heck	 in	 taking	 the	 relational	properties	 as	 primitive	 and	 account	 for	 the	 Fregean	 data	 in	 terms	 of	 such	relations	 rather	 than	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 concept	 types.	 Heck’s	 general	observation	 is,	 however,	 compatible	 with	 coordination	 relations	 ultimately	supervening	on	intrinsic	representational	features	of	concepts,	such	as	sameness	or	difference	in	types	(c.f.	Heck	2012,	159).	I	suggest,	however,	that	we	should	go	one	step	further	and	say	that	such	relations	hold	in	virtue	of	primitive	relations	obtaining	at	the	level	of	representational	vehicle,	such	as	pointers.13		
There	 are	 several	 virtues	 of	 adopting	 this	 view	 of	 intrapersonal	 coordination.	One	such	virtue	is	that	concept	types	do	nothing	of	explanatory	interest	when	it	comes	 to	 intrapersonal	 cognitive	workings.	 The	 relevant	 rational	 capacities	 of	individuals	are	fully	accounted	for	in	terms	of	primitive	relational	properties	of	mental	 representations.	 This	means	 that	 the	Fregean	Constraint	 is	 no	 longer	 a	constraint	on	concept	 individuation,	since	 there	 is	no	 longer	a	need	to	say	 that	concepts	 that	 play	 distinct	 roles	 in	 cognition	 differ	 in	 anything	 beyond	 their																																																									13	For	a	motivation	for	making	this	further	step,	see	chapter	2,	section	4.	
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relational	 properties.	 The	 data	 that	 impose	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 in	 the	 first	place	 are	 accounted	 for	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 there’s	 no	 constraint	 on	 concept	individuation	 that	 requires	 the	 sort	 of	 fine-grained	 individuation	 conditions	usually	 taken	 to	 be	 required	 due	 to	 the	 supposed	work	 done	 by	 sameness	 or	difference	in	concepts	in	intrapersonal	coordination.	
This	 leaves	 us	 with	 the	 Publicity	 Constraint	 on	 concept	 individuation.	 What	 I	suggest,	then,	is	that	we	individuate	concepts	in	a	coarse-grained	manner	so	as	to	account	 for	 interpersonal	 explanatory	 tasks	 such	 as	 communication.	 In	 other	words,	 if	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 concepts	 does	 not	 explain	 intrapersonal	cases,	we	avoid	the	Fregean	Constraint	and	are	thus	free	to	say	that	the	nature	of	concepts	is	such	that	they	can	be	shared	by	distinct	individuals.		
A	 further	 question,	 then,	 concerns	 the	 exact	 nature	 of	 concepts.	 The	 nature	 of	concepts	 must	 be	 such	 that	 they	 explain	 communication.	 Note	 that	 we	 still	cannot	say	 that	concepts	are	 individuated	by	their	referents,	since	 this	renders	the	individuation	conditions	too	coarse-grained	to	explain	communication.	That	is,	 we	 still	 want	 to	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 a	 case	 in	 which	 two	 distinct	individuals	 believe	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 a	 planet	 and	 cases	 where	 one	 subject	believes	 that	 Hesperus	 is	 a	 planet	 and	 the	 other	 that	 Phosphorus	 is	 a	 planet.	Another	option	would	be	to	individuate	concepts	by	way	of	their	senses,	or	the	like.	 Note	 that	 by	 giving	 up	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 a	 difference	 in	 cognitive	 role	 is	explained	in	terms	of	a	difference	in	concepts	we	thereby	also	abandon	Frege’s	initial	motivation	for	introducing	senses.		
A	 further	 option	 is	 to	 individuate	 concepts	 not	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 semantic	contents,	 but	 rather	 in	 terms	of	 something	non-semantic.	Originalism	provides	one	 such	 alternative.	 That	 is,	 although	 Originalist	 concepts	 cannot	 explain	intrapersonal	cognitive	processing,	they	can	explain	interpersonal	cases,	such	as	communication.	 HESPERUS	 and	 PHOSPHORUS	 having	 distinct	 origins	 (and	 thus	being	of	distinct	types)	would	explain	the	difference	between	two	thinkers	both	believing	that	Hesperus	is	visible	and	a	case	in	which	one	believes	that	Hesperus	is	visible	while	 the	other	believes	 that	Phosphorus	 is	visible.	At	 the	same	time,	there	 is	 only	 one	 public	 concept	 PADEREWSKI,	which	would	 explain	why	Peter	
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could	 possibly	 successfully	 communicate	 with	 non-confused	 individuals	 about	Paderewski.	For	instance,	if	Peter	says	“Paderewski	has	musical	talent”	to	a	non-confused	 individual,	 it	 seems	 like	 a	 case	 of	 successful	 communication	 if	 the	hearer	forms	the	appropriate	thought	deploying	the	public	concept	PADEREWSKI.	Likewise,	 if	 Peter	 says	 “Paderewski	 is	 a	 politician”,	 it	 seems	 that	 he	 could	 also	communicate	 successfully	 with	 non-confused	 individuals	 if	 they	 interpret	 the	utterance	by	deploying	their	concept	PADEREWSKI.14		
The	notion	of	pointer	 relations	 is	 a	minimal	 addition	 to	Originalism	–	or	more	generally,	 any	 theory	 that	 takes	 concepts	 to	 be	 public.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 it	 is	explanatorily	 powerful.	 One	 could	 maintain	 that	 concepts	 are	 individuated	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 Publicity	 Constraint,	 and	 that	 the	 relevant	 interpersonal	phenomena,	 such	 as	 communication,	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	difference	 in	 concept	 types.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 one	 would	 have	 to	 reject	 that	coordination	in	thought	is	to	be	explained	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	in	such	 concepts.	 Hence,	 supplementing	 any	 theory	 that	 provides	 a	 good	explanation	of	the	public	aspect	of	concepts	with	pointer	relations	has	the	virtue	of	 enabling	 the	 framework	 to	 account	 for	 both	 the	 intrapersonal	 and	 the	interpersonal	consideration	traditionally	assigned	to	concepts.15		
In	 recent	 years	 other	 views	 that	 make	 a	 similar	 move	 have	 been	 proposed.	Prosser	(2018)	argues	that	by	combining	traditional	views	of	 the	 individuation	of	 concepts	 with	 a	 view	 that	 posits	 primitive	 epistemic	 relations	 we	 can	 do	justice	to	both	the	data	that	support	the	Fregean	Constraint	as	well	as	the	data	that	support	the	Publicity	Constraint.	In	the	next	section	I	compare	the	proposed	view	to	Prosser’s	account.																																																									14	There	might,	of	course,	arise	some	confusion	at	some	point	during	such	a	conversation.	If	Peter	says	both	that	Paderewski	has	musical	talent	and	that	Paderewski	does	not	have	musical	talent,	the	hearer	will	most	likely	think	that	Peter	is	irrational	or	she	might	question	what	Peter	is	trying	to	 communicate.	 Such	 confusion	 might,	 however,	 arise	 in	 any	 conversation	 in	 which	 what	someone	says	conflicts	with	our	beliefs	about	the	speaker	or	the	general	states	of	affairs.	 If,	 for	instance,	you	tell	me	that	the	earth	is	flat,	I	might	think	that	you	are	crazy	or	that	you	were	not	really	 saying	 what	 it	 seemed	 like	 you	 were	 saying.	 This	 kind	 of	 confusion,	 however,	 is	 not	explained	in	terms	of	a	lack	of	coordination	between	our	thoughts.	15	Note	that	I	do	not	intend	this	to	be	a	defence	of	Originalism	about	publicly	sharable	concepts.	There	might	be	further	problems	for	Originalism	when	it	comes	to	explaining	communication	(or	other	tasks	for	concepts	that	require	them	to	be	sharable).	There	might	be	other	coarse-grained	ways	of	individuating	concepts	that	are	preferable	to	the	Originalist	way	of	doing	it.	If	this	is	the	case,	we	may	combine	such	views	with	Vehicle	Relationism	and	get	the	desired	result.		
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6.	An	Alternative	Approach		
Thoughts	 can	 be	 positively	 coordinated	 within	 the	 mind	 of	 single	 individuals.	They	can	also	be	positively	coordinated	across	speakers.	I	have	argued	that	one	way	 to	 account	 for	 this	 is	 to	 take	 coordination	 in	 thought	 to	 be	understood	 in	terms	 of	 primitive	 relations,	 and	 that	 this	 would	 allow	 us	 to	 account	 for	coordination	between	different	individuals	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types.	In	what	follows,	I	will	sketch	an	alternative	approach,	which	takes	the	 opposite	 route:	 It	 takes	 coordination	 across	 distinct	 individuals	 to	 be	accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 relational	 features	 of	 thought.	 This	 opens	 up	 the	possibility	 of	 accounting	 for	 the	 intrapersonal	 cognitive	 data	 in	 terms	 of	sameness	or	difference	in	concepts.		
Positive	 coordination	 relations,	 as	 I	have	understood	 them	here,	 are	 just	 those	relations	in	virtue	of	which	(putative)	co-reference	is	manifest	to	the	thinker(s).	Positive	coordination	thus	gives	warrant	for	trading	on	identity.	The	view	I	want	to	 sketch	here	 is	one	 that	 takes	 interpersonal	 coordination	 to	hold	 in	virtue	of	relational	features	of	thoughts	within	the	minds	of	distinct	individuals.	The	kind	of	view	I	have	in	mind	is	one	that	claims	that	such	relations	cannot	be	reduced	to	sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 the	 type	 of	 the	 concepts	 and	 thoughts	 in	 question.	There	 are	 some	accounts	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 could	potentially	be	 compatible	with	 this	 claim.	 For	 instance,	 Prosser	 (2018)	 holds	 that	 interpersonal	coordination	 holds	 in	 virtue	 of	 epistemic	 relations	 between	 thoughts	 in	 the	minds	of	distinct	thinkers.		
Roughly,	 Prosser’s	 central	 claim	 is	 that	 singular	 concepts	 –	 or	 modes	 of	presentations	(MOPs)	–	are	shared	between	distinct	 individuals	 just	 in	case	co-reference	 is	 transparent	 to	 thinkers	 in	 communication	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 they	may	trade	on	identity:		
I	 suggest	 that	 in	 cases	 of	 transparent	 communication,	 where	 the	speakers	 trade	 on	 identity	 rather	 than	 relying	 on	 interpretive	
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premises,	 the	 speakers	 think	 of	 the	 reference	 under	 the	 same	MOP.	(Prosser	2018,	8-9)	
He	accounts	for	such	transparent	communication	in	terms	of	individuals	sharing	a	 language	and	 intending	 to	use	 the	words	 in	 this	 language	 in	accordance	with	how	 others	 in	 their	 language	 community	 use	 these	 words.	 That	 is,	 on	 this	account,	deference	to	others	plays	an	important	role	in	linguistic	communication.	A	precondition	 for	 transparent	communication	–	 i.e.	 the	sort	of	communication	where	the	interlocutors	trade	on	identity	–	is	that	the	interlocutors	share	words	in	this	way.16		
There	 is,	 in	 particular,	 one	 pertinent	 interesting	 feature	 of	 the	 epistemic	relations	Prosser	has	in	mind.	He	says	that	
Strictly	 speaking	 the	 relation	 that	 we	 capture	 by	 saying	 that	 [S1]	thinks	of	O	under	the	same	MOP	as	[S2]	is	not	an	identity	relation	but	an	intransitive	transparency	relation.	(Ibid.,	15)	
Since	the	relevant	relations	are	not	transitive	they	cannot	be	further	accounted	for	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	in	concept	types,	since	sameness	of	type	is	transitive. 17 	Rather,	 on	 this	 view,	 interpersonal	 coordination	 is	 essentially	accounted	for	 in	terms	of	relational	 features	of	 thoughts.	On	this	account,	 then,	the	observations	that	gave	rise	to	the	Publicity	Constraint	is	accounted	for	not	in	terms	of	concept	types,	but	rather	in	terms	of	relational	features	of	concepts	and	thoughts.		As	a	result,	we	no	longer	have	to	consider	the	Publicity	Constraint	as	providing	constraints	on	concept	individuation.		
This	opens	up	the	possibility	of	individuating	concepts	in	a	fine-grained	way,	in	accordance	with	the	Fregean	Constraint.	We	could	then	explain	the	intrapersonal																																																									16	Prosser	notes	that	“strictly	speaking	it	is	not	shared	words	per	se	that	facilitate	interpersonal	trading	on	identity;	it	is	their	coordinating	role	that	matters”	(Prosser	2018,	16).	17	Note	 that	 this	 is	 not	 always	 the	 case	 in	 diachronic	 intrapersonal	 cases.	 For	 instance,	 if	 we	construe	 singular	 concepts	 as	 mental	 files	 we	 can,	 for	 instance,	 imagine	 cases	 in	 which	 two	distinct	files	merge	into	one	file	over	time	as	a	result	of	an	identity	judgement	(c.f.	Recanati	2016,	Prosser	2018).	In	this	case,	the	resulting	file	may	be	seen	as	a	continuance	of	each	of	the	previous	files.	Even	though	each	of	the	early	files	are	distinct	form	each	other,	they	are	in	a	sense	the	same	as	the	merged	file.	Hence,	transitivity	fails.		
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cognitive	 data	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 types	 of	 concepts	 and	thoughts.	Prosser’s	general	view	would,	for	instance,	be	compatible	with	Fodor’s	(1975,	2008)	Language	of	Thought	Hypothesis,	according	to	which	coordination	is	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 or	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 Mentalese	 syntactic	symbols.	 It	 is	 also	 compatible	with	 the	mental	 file	 account	of	 coordination	 (c.f.	Perry	1980,	Recanati	2012,	2016),	according	to	which	coordination	is	accounted	for	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	in	such	files.		
It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	determine	which	framework	is	preferable.	The	main	aim	of	this	section	has	been	to	compare	the	proposed	view	to	another	similar	possibility	and	in	doing	so	illustrate	the	novelty	of	the	proposed	account	of	 coordination.	 Note	 also	 that	 the	 framework	 of	 Vehicle	 Relationism	 is	 not	committed	to	accounting	for	interpersonal	coordination	in	terms	of	sameness	or	difference	 in	 types	 of	 concepts.	 This	 will	 only	 be	 a	 viable	 option	 if	 there	 is	 a	theory	of	concepts	that	allows	us	to	give	such	an	account.	Another	possibility	is	to	combine	Vehicle	Relationism	with	an	account	of	interpersonal	coordination	in	terms	 of	 epistemic	 relations	 along	 the	 way	 of	 Prosser	 (2018).	 In	 short,	 any	account	 that	 does	 well	 in	 explaining	 interpersonal	 coordination	 may	 adopt	Vehicle	Relationism	about	intrapersonal	coordination	(and	vice	versa).		
	
7.	Conclusion	
We	have	seen	that	there	are	two	plausible	constraints	on	concept	individuation:	The	 Publicity	 Constraint	 and	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint.	 Both	 constraints	 seem	intuitively	plausible	on	their	own,	but	jointly	they	appear	to	be	incompatible.	The	reason	is	that	the	Publicity	Constraint	requires	concepts	to	be	individuated	in	a	coarse-grained	 way,	 whereas	 the	 Fregean	 Constraint	 requires	 concepts	 to	 be	individuated	in	a	fine-grained	fashion.	In	this	paper	I	have	assessed	one	view	of	concept	 individuation,	 namely	 Originalism,	 which	 promises	 to	 overcome	 such	difficulties.	
I	have	argued	that	Originalism	about	concepts	 fails	 to	account	 for	the	cognitive	role	of	concepts.	The	reason	why	Originalism	fails	to	do	so	is	that	the	puzzle	of	
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Paderewski	 forces	the	Originalist	 to	say	that	sameness	or	difference	 in	concept	type	 is	 not	 transparent	 to	 thinkers.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 concept	 types	 and	coordination	come	apart.	This	observation	may	be	generalized:	Any	account	that	takes	 coordination	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	concept	 types	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	holds	 that	 such	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	concepts	is	non-transparent	to	thinkers	fails	to	account	for	coordination.	This	is	because	coordination	relations	are,	necessarily,	transparent	to	thinkers.		
I	 have	 suggested	 that	 by	 making	 a	 minimal	 addition	 to	 theories	 that	 take	concepts	to	be	public,	such	as	Originalism,	we	may	overcome	such	worries.	The	suggested	idea	is	to	take	coordination	in	thought	to	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	primitive	 relations	 holding	 between	 the	 vehicles	 of	 representation.	 We	 thus	avoid	the	Fregean	Constraint	on	concept	individuation.	We	may	then	individuate	concepts	 coarsely	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 we	 satisfy	 the	 Publicity	 Constraint.	 The	resulting	 framework	 has	 the	 virtue	 of	 accounting	 for	 both	 intrapersonal	coordination	as	well	as	interpersonal	coordination.	
	 4		
	Staying	on	Topic:	The	Continuance-of-Topic	Relation	is	Non-Transitive	
	
Semantic	 drift	 occurs	 whenever	 a	 term	 changes	 meaning	 over	 time.	
Sometimes	 such	 change	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 change	 in	 topic,	 while	 other	
times	 the	 topic	 remains	 stable.	 It	 may	 seem	 natural	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	
distinction	between	cases	of	semantic	drift	in	which	the	topic	is	preserved	and	
cases	in	which	it	is	not.	In	this	paper	I	argue	that	things	are	not	always	this	
easy.	I	argue	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	non-transitive.	By	doing	
this,	 I	 reveal	 a	 structural	 problem	with	 popular	 accounts	 of	 topic	 stability	
according	to	which	continuance	of	topic	is	accounted	for	in	terms	of	identity	
relations,	be	it	identity	of	concepts	(c.f.	Sawyer	2018,	Richard	forthcoming)	or	
identity	of	meaning	(Ball	forthcoming).		
	
1.	Introduction	
Semantic	 drift	 occurs	 whenever	 a	 word	 changes	meaning	 over	 time.	 This	 is	 a	common	phenomenon.	Consider	 for	 instance	 the	word	 ‘clue’.	 It	used	to	mean	a	ball	of	thread	(of	the	sort	that	would	help	guide	someone	out	of	a	labyrinth,	for	instance),	whereas	 today	 it	means	something	 like	evidence	or	 information	 that	helps	solve	a	given	task.	The	meaning	of	the	word	has	thus	changed.	In	this	case,	
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the	semantic	drift	has	resulted	in	a	change	of	topic:	If	someone	were	to	utter		
1.	The	police	officers	are	looking	for	clues	
in	 the	 17th	 century,	 they	 would	 be	 talking	 about	 something	 different	 than	someone	uttering	 (1)	 today.	The	17th-century	person	would	be	 saying	 that	 the	police	 are	 looking	 for	 balls	 of	 threads,	 whereas	 a	 speaker	 uttering	 (1)	 today	would	be	saying	that	the	officers	are	looking	for	any	information	that	may	help	them	 solve	 a	 crime.	The	 two	utterances	would	have	different	 truth	 conditions.	Importantly,	 the	difference	 in	 truth-condition	of	 an	utterance	of	 (1)	 in	 the	17th	century	 and	 today	 is	 not	 due	 to	 any	 relevant	 changes	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 balls	 of	threads	or	the	like.	Rather,	the	change	is	purely	due	to	a	change	of	the	semantic	properties	of	 ‘clue’.	As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 change,	 the	17th-century	person	and	 the	current-day	 individual	 are	not	 talking	about	 the	 same	 thing	when	uttering	 (1).	This	is	because	there	has	been	a	change	in	topic.	Semantic	drift	often	results	in	a	change	in	topic	in	this	way.	
Some	 cases	 of	 semantic	 drift,	 however,	 preserve	 topic.	 Take	 for	 instance	 the	word	‘fish’.	When	people	in	the	15th	century	thought	and	talked	about	fish,	their	utterances	 of	 this	word	were	used	 to	 pick	 out	whales	 as	well	 as	 other	 aquatic	animals.	Today,	however,	we	no	longer	use	the	term	‘fish’	to	pick	out	whales.	If	we	assume	that	a	community’s	use	of	a	term	should	be	reflected	in	the	meaning	of	 that	 term,	 this	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 word	 ‘fish’	 when	 uttered	 in	 the	 15th	century	meant	 something	different	 than	what	 the	word	means	 today.	 Even	 so,	this	case	seems	to	be	different	from	the	case	of	 ‘clue’	in	an	interesting	way.	For	instance,	if	someone	in	the	15th	century	uttered		
2.	Fish	are	aquatic	animals	
it	seems	correct	to	say	that	they	were,	at	least	in	some	way,	saying	the	same	as	someone	uttering	the	same	sentence	today.	Further,	it	seems	fine	for	someone	to	say,	 “People	 used	 to	 think	 that	 whales	 are	 fish”.	 Contrast	 this	 with	 someone	today	saying,	“People	used	to	think	that	only	balls	of	threads	could	be	clues”.	The	latter	seems	at	best	highly	misleading.	The	relevant	difference	between	the	two	cases	is	this:	the	case	of	‘clue’	involves	a	change	in	topic,	whereas	in	the	case	of	
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‘fish’	there	has	been	stability	of	topic.	This	is	so	despite	the	semantic	drift.1		
In	 recent	 years	 the	notions	of	 semantic	drift	 and	 stability	 of	 topic	have	 gained	currency	as	a	 result	of	 the	 increased	popularity	of	 revisionary	projects	such	as	
conceptual	engineering.	 Conceptual	 engineering	 is	 the	process	 of	 assessing	 and	improving	 our	words	 and	 other	 representational	 devices	 (c.f.	 Cappelen	 2018).	Revisionary	 projects	 involve	 changing	 semantic	 aspects	 of	 representational	devices,	 but	 in	 many	 cases	 we	 still	 want	 to	 say	 that	 the	 topic	 of	 such	representational	 devices	 has	 remained	 the	 same.	 The	 issue,	 however,	 is	 more	far-reaching:	Without	stability	of	topic	despite	semantic	change,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	 scientists	 can	 engage	 with	 pre-theoretic	 questions,	 given	 how	 scientific	endeavour	often	requires	a	sharpening	of	our	representational	devices.	Further,	scientific	progress	would	be	hard,	since	many	of	 the	debates	 that	drive	science	forward	involve	disagreement	on	the	exact	semantic	properties	of	central	terms.	Even	so,	much	of	the	work	done	on	topic	stability	in	recent	years	is	found	within	the	debate	on	conceptual	engineering.		
There	 has	 been	 a	 tendency	 to	 make	 a	 sharp	 distinction	 between,	 on	 the	 one	hand,	 cases	 of	 semantic	 drift	 where	 the	 topic	 is	 preserved	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	cases	of	semantic	drift	where	there	is	a	change	in	topic	(e.g.	Sawyer	2018).	When	it	comes	to	accounting	for	continuance	of	topic	the	dominant	strategy	has	been	to	 appeal	 to	 identity	 of	 some	 sort.	 Some	 hold	 that	 sameness	 of	 topic	 is	 to	 be	explained	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 of	 concepts	 (e.g.	 Sawyer	 2018,	 Richard	forthcoming).	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 continuance	 of	 topic	 is	 compatible	 with	semantic	 drift.	 	 Others	 argue	 that	 stability	 of	 topics	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	stability	of	meaning,	but	 that	meaning	does	not	change	 in	 the	way	we	typically	assume	 (c.f.	 Ball	 forthcoming).	 These	 accounts	 fall	 under	 a	 general	 approach,																																																									1	I	 use	 the	 case	 of	 ’fish’	 to	 illustrate	 the	 issue	 in	 an	 intuitive	 way.	 I	 base	 this	 example	 on	Sainsbury’s	 (2014)	use	 of	 the	 term	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 semantic	 drift	 and	 continuity	 of	 topic	(see	Sawyer	(2018)	for	this	interpretation	of	Sainsbury’s	puzzle).	Later	in	this	paper	I	will	discuss	a	view	that	denies	the	possibility	of	continuance	of	topic	despite	semantic	drift:	According	to	Ball	(forthcoming)	 continuance	 of	 topic	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 of	 meaning.	 Although	 I	accept	 the	possibility	of	 topic	stability	despite	semantic	drift,	 I	do	not	wish	to	beg	the	question	against	Ball’s	view.	I	will	say	more	about	Ball’s	view	on	topic	stability	and	how	it	relates	to	the	argument	 in	 this	 paper	 in	 section	 (3.2.).	 What’s	 important	 is	 that	 proponents	 of	 Ball’s	 model	would	agree	that	in	the	case	of	’clue’	there	has	been	a	change	in	topic,	whereas	in	the	case	of	’fish’	there	has	been	continuance	of	topic.		
STAYING	ON	TOPIC	 	 		
	166	
which	 I	 will	 call	 The	 Identity	 Approach	 to	 Topic	 Continuity.	 This	 includes	 all	accounts	that	explain	continuity	of	topics	in	terms	of	identity	relations.		
In	 this	 paper	 I	 argue	 that	 all	 accounts	 that	 try	 to	 explain	 stability	 of	 topics	 in	terms	 of	 identity	 relations	 fail.	 I	 show	 that	we	 cannot	 draw	 a	 clear	 distinction	between	the	cases	of	semantic	drift	 that	preserve	 topics	and	those	 that	do	not.	This	is	because	we	have	cases	that	in	some	sense	fall	into	both	categories.	Some	cases	 of	 semantic	 drift	 preserve	 topic	 along	 the	 way	 but	 still	 there	 is	discontinuity	of	topic	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	evolutionary	chain.	That	is,	I	will	 show	 that	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 is	non-transitive.	As	 a	 result,	the	identity	approach	fails,	since	identity	is	transitive.			
The	structure	of	the	paper	is	this.	In	section	2,	I	say	more	about	continuance	of	topics	 and	why	we	 ought	 to	 think	 that	 there	 can	 be	 such	 stability	 in	 cases	 of	semantic	drift.	In	doing	this,	I	will	make	clear	what	explanatory	work	the	notion	of	 continuance	 of	 topics	 is	 supposed	 to	 do.	 In	 section	 3,	 I	 elaborate	 on	 the	different	 versions	 of	 the	 Identity	 Approach	 mentioned	 above.	 In	 section	 4,	 I	argue	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	non-transitive.	Finally,	 in	section	5,	 I	 address	 Cappelen’s	 (2018)	 account	 of	 stability	 of	 topics.	 According	 to	 this	view,	the	Contestation	Theory	of	the	Limits	of	Revision,	we	cannot	give	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	 for	sameness	of	 topics.	 In	short,	 the	view	seems	to	be	that	 there	 is	 not	 too	 much	 we	 can	 say	 in	 general	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	continuance-of-topic	 relation;	 topic	 continuity	 is	 established	 on	 a	 case-to-case	basis.	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	not	to	propose	a	novel	theory	of	how	to	account	for	 continuance-of-topic	 relations.	For	all	 I	 know,	Cappelen	might	be	 right	 that	there	is	not	an	easy	answer	to	this	question.	However,	I	will	argue	that	the	non-transitivity	 of	 topic	 continuity	 puts	 some	 restrictions	 on	 our	 account	 of	continuance	 of	 topics.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 contestation	 theory	 can	 be	 correct	only	as	long	as	we	accept	certain	views	about	samesaying.	
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2.	Continuance	of	Topic	and	Semantic	Drift	
I	 take	 the	 possibility	 of	 topic	 stability	 despite	 semantic	 drift	 as	 a	 data	 point.	However,	 some	 philosophers,	 most	 famously	 Strawson	 (1963),	 has	 raised	objections	 that	 may	 challenge	 this	 assumption.	 Why,	 one	 may	 ask,	 is	 it	 so	important	 to	 think	 that	 there	 can	 be	 stability	 of	 topic	 despite	 semantic	 drift?	Wouldn’t	it	be	easier	to	just	assume	that	all	semantic	drift	necessitates	a	change	in	topic?	There	are	several	reasons	why	we	really	ought	to	insist	on	stability	of	topics.	In	this	section	I	will	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the	central	reasons	why	we	need	to	do	so.	First,	we	want	to	explain	how	there	can	be	continuity	of	 inquiry	despite	 semantic	 drift.	 Second,	 it	 seems	 highly	 plausible	 that	 individuals	 who	disagree	 on	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 a	 certain	 representational	 device	 are	 having	 a	substantial	disagreement	and	not	merely	a	verbal	dispute.	As	we’ll	 see,	both	of	these	explanatory	 tasks	seem	to	require	stability	of	 topics.	 I	 take	 this	 to	be	 the	main	explanatory	 tasks	 for	which	we	need	 the	notion	of	 topic	continuity.	 I	will	consider	and	elaborate	on	each	explanatory	task	in	turn.		
	
2.1.	Continuity	of	Inquiry	
In	philosophical	and	scientific	theorizing	we	often	take	pre-theoretic	notions	as	outset	and	improve	on	such	notions	in	order	to	have	a	more	fruitful	discussion.		The	 process	 of	 improving	 our	 pre-theoretical	 notions	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 clarity	 in	scientific	 theorizing	 is	 explicitly	 defended	 by	 Carnap	 in	 his	 (1950),	 where	 he	develops	 his	 account	 of	 explication.	 In	 this	 process,	 an	 imprecise	 ordinary	expression	 is	 transformed	 into	 an	 exact	 expression	 suitable	 for	 scientific	endeavour.	The	central	example	given	by	Carnap	involves	the	relation	between	the	 pre-theoretic	 notions	 of	 ‘warm’	 (classificatory)	 and	 ‘warmer	 than’	(comparative)	 and	 the	 more	 scientifically	 useful	 notion	 of	 ‘temperature’	(quantitative).	He	says	that,		
A	quantitative	concept	serves	to	describe	something	with	the	help	of	numerical	values	(e.g.,	temperature)	[…]	Quantitative	concepts	are	no	
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doubt	the	most	effective	instruments	in	the	scientific	arsenal.	(Carnap	1950,	8-9)		
Carnap	 thus	 held	 a	 view	 according	 to	which	 our	 representational	 devices	may	undergo	 changes	 in	 order	 to	 yield	 a	 more	 fruitful	 scientific	 investigation.	 In	short,	scientists	are	often	trying	to	answer	questions	asked	at	the	pre-theoretic	outset	by	deploying	new	or	improved	representational	devices.	
As	a	response	to	Carnapian	explication,	Strawson	raises	the	following	problem:		
Typical	 philosophical	 problems	 about	 the	 concepts	 used	 in	 non-scientific	discourse	cannot	be	solved	by	laying	down	the	rules	of	exact	and	 fruitful	 concepts	 in	 science.	 To	 do	 this	 last	 is	 not	 to	 solve	 the	typical	 philosophical	 problem,	 but	 to	 change	 the	 subject.	 (Strawson	1963,	505)2		
Further,	he	says	that,	
However	much	or	 little	 [Carnap’s	method	of	explication]	 is	 the	right	means	of	getting	an	idea	into	shape	for	use	in	the	formal	or	empirical	sciences,	 it	 seems	 prima	 facie	 evident	 that	 to	 offer	 formal	[explications]	 of	 key	 terms	 of	 scientific	 theories	 to	 one	 who	 seeks	philosophical	 illumination	 of	 essential	 concepts	 of	 non-scientific	discourse,	 is	 to	 do	 something	 utterly	 irrelevant—	 is	 a	 sheer	misunderstanding,	like	offering	a	text-book	on	physiology	to	someone	who	says	(with	a	sigh)	that	he	wished	he	understood	the	workings	of	the	human	heart.	(Ibid.,	504–505)	
That	 is,	 if	we	change	our	representational	devices	 in	such	ways,	we	seem	to	no	longer	 be	 concerned	 with	 the	 questions	 we	 were	 asking	 at	 the	 pre-theoretic	outset.	 If	 this	 is	 correct,	 philosophers	 are	 not	 really	 in	 the	 business	 of	investigating	 pre-theoretic	 questions,	 but	 rather	 they	 seem	 to	 be	 working	exclusively	within	their	own	bubble.																																																										2	I	take	’topic’	and	’subject	matter’	to	be	synonymous.	A	change	in	subject	thus	means	a	change	in	topic.	I	use	these	terms	interchangeably	throughout	the	paper.	
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Although	 Strawson’s	 criticism	 is	 specifically	 directed	 towards	 Carnapian	explication,	 the	 challenge	 can	 be	 generalized	 to	 all	 processes	 that	 involve	significant	 changes	 to	 our	 representational	 devices	 but	where	we	 still	want	 to	say	 that	 people	 are	 talking	 about	 the	 same	 subject	matter.	With	 the	 increased	popularity	 of	 revisionary	 projects	 such	 as	 conceptual	 engineering,	 Strawson’s	challenge	 is	 as	 relevant	 as	 ever.	The	generalized	Strawsonian	 challenge	 is	 this:		All	projects	that	involve	changing	the	semantics	of	key	terms	change	the	topic	of	the	 investigation,	 resulting	 in	 people	 talking	 past	 each	 other	 and	 philosophers	providing	 solutions	 to	 problems	 other	 than	 the	 ones	 originally	 posed.	 This,	 of	course,	 is	by	no	means	specific	to	philosophy:	As	progress	and	new	discoveries	are	made,	key	terms	change	within	all	sciences.3	If	all	semantic	drift	results	in	a	change	 in	 subject	 matter,	 how	 can	 we	 ever	 make	 progress?	 The	 view	 that	semantic	drift	necessitates	a	change	in	topic	thus	threatens	scientific	progress	in	general	and	should	be	avoided	if	possible.	
The	 general	 response	 to	 the	 Strawsonian	 challenge	 is	 to	 simply	 deny	 that	 a	change	in	semantics	necessitates	a	change	in	topic.	One	reason	to	think	that	this	response	is	correct	is	that	two	words	uttered	may	differ	in	their	overall	semantic	value	 but	 still	 we	 judge	 them	 to	 concern	 the	 same	 subject	 matter.	 Cappelen	(2018,	 110)	 suggests	 one	 such	 example:	 Imagine	 two	 speakers,	 A	 and	 B,	 both	uttering	 the	 sentence	 “Serena	 is	 really	 smart”.	 Even	 if	we	assume	 that	 the	 two	speaker’s	contexts	differ	in	many	ways,	including	their	exact	assumptions	about	smartness	so	that	A	and	B’s	respective	contexts	fix	somewhat	different	extension	and	intension	for	‘smart’,	there	are	contexts	in	which	it	is	true	to	say	that	A	and	B	both	said	that	Serena	is	really	smart,	or	simply	that	A	and	B	said	the	same	thing	about	Serena.	That	is,	Strawson’s	insistence	that	semantic	change	necessitates	a	change	in	topic	does	not	fit	well	with	our	everyday	assessment	of	whether	or	not	two	utterances	concern	the	same	topic.	 In	general,	without	 further	argument	 it	seems	highly	unlikely	that	just	because	our	ways	of	describing	the	world	become	more	precise	and	fruitful,	 it	 follows	that	we	are	not	talking	about	and	trying	to	understand	the	same	subject	matter.		
																																																								3	See	 for	 instance	Brigandt	 (2010)	 for	an	overview	of	how	 the	word	 ‘gene’	has	 changed	within	biology.	Other	examples	include	the	terms	‘species’	and	‘planet’	(c.f.	Bokulich	2014).	
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One	of	the	central	explanatory	tasks	for	the	notion	of	continuance	of	topic	is	thus	to	account	for	the	possibility	of	continuance	of	inquiry	in	cases	of	semantic	drift.	If	 there	 is	 continuity	 of	 inquiry	 despite	 semantic	 drift	 of	 key	 terms,	 this	 is	because	 there	 is	 topic	 continuity.	 I	now	 turn	 to	 the	 second	reason	 for	 thinking	that	we	may	have	stability	of	topic	despite	semantic	drift,	namely	the	need	for	an	account	of	substantial	disagreement.	
	
2.2.	Disagreement	
Let’s	return	to	the	case	of	‘fish’	discussed	at	the	outset,	and	consider	a	case	posed	by	 Sainsbury	 (2014).	 Sainsbury	 tells	 the	 story	 of	 James	Maurice,	who	 in	 1818	was	the	 inspector	of	 fish	oil	and	tax	collector	of	New	York	City.	Maurice	 filed	a	lawsuit	 against	a	man	named	Samuel	 Judd,	 accusing	him	of	 labelling	barrels	of	whale	oil	wrongly	 in	order	to	avoid	paying	fees.	 Judd	responded	by	saying	that	he	was	not	to	pay	the	fees	for	fish	oil,	since	the	oil	in	his	barrels	were	whale	oil,	and	whales	are	not	fish.	In	front	of	the	jury	each	side	invited	experts	on	the	topic	in	order	to	convince	the	jury	that	they	were	right.	Anatomists	argued	that	whales	are	not	fish	while	merchants	and	seafarers	argued	that	whales	are	indeed	fish.	In	the	end,	the	jury	ruled	in	favour	of	Maurice,	ruling	that	whales	are	fish.	Sainsbury	describes	the	process	thus:	
The	 parties	 offered	 significant	 reasons	 for	 their	 opinions.	 The	victorious	 side	 reasoned	 from	 the	 premises	 that	 sea-creatures	 are	fish,	 and	whales	are	 sea-creatures.	The	 first	premise	 is	enshrined	 in	much	popular	opinion,	 including	creation	stories	according	to	which	God	made	 the	 creatures	 of	 the	 air	 (birds),	 the	 creatures	 of	 the	 land	(beasts)	and	the	creatures	of	the	sea	(fish).	The	losing	side	argued	on	the	 basis	 of	 significant	 dissimilarities	 between	 fish	 and	whales:	 fish	oxygenate	 using	 gills,	 reproduce	 by	 laying	 eggs	 and	 have	 true	 fins,	whereas	 whales	 oxygenate	 using	 lungs,	 reproduce	 by	 suckling	 live-born	young,	 and	 their	 fin-like	 appendages	are	differently	 structured	from	the	fins	of,	say,	a	shark.	There	was	no	dispute	about	these	facts,	
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only	about	their	relevance.	Both	parties	agreed	that	whales	are	lung-using,	 air-breathing	 mammals	 and	 that	 they	 are	 sea-creatures.	(Sainsbury	2014,	3)	
If	we	assume	that	the	meaning	of	a	word	in	a	community	is	determined	by	how	it	is	 used	 in	 that	 community,	 there	 seem	 to	 be	 two	 distinct	meanings	 associated	with	the	term	‘fish’.4	The	lawsuit	in	question	appears	to	take	place	at	a	point	in	history	where	the	meaning	 is	gradually	changing.	The	merchants	and	seafarers	(as	well	as	most	people	up	until	that	point	in	history)	were	using	the	word	‘fish’	to	pick	out	whales	as	well	as	other	aquatic	animals,	and	the	anatomists	(as	well	as	 most	 people	 after	 this	 point	 in	 time)	 used	 the	 word	 so	 as	 to	 not	 include	whales.	 Even	 so,	 the	 different	 agents	 clearly	 seem	 to	 be	 having	 a	 substantial	disagreement	when	one	of	 the	parties	were	asserting	“whales	are	 fish”	and	the	other	 party	 denied	 this.	 If	 their	 words	 had	 different	 meanings,	 how	 could	 we	account	for	such	disagreement?	This	is	Sainsbury’s	puzzle:	
we	 may	 presume	 that	 the	 ancients	 used	 ‘fish’	 with	 a	 meaning	 on	which	 ‘Whales	 are	 fish’	 was	 true.	 The	 meaning	 of	 their	 word	 ‘fish’	would	align	with	their	use:	they	used	it	to	include	whales,	and	that	fits	its	 meaning.	 Then	 there	 is	 only	 a	 verbal	 difference	 between	 the	disputants	 in	Maurice	 vs.	 Judd.	 ‘Whales	 are	 fish’,	 understood	 in	 the	ancient	way,	 is	 true,	 but,	 understood	 in	 the	modern	way,	 it	 is	 false.	This	is	inconsistent	with	the	fact	that	the	debate	was	substantive,	and	not	merely	verbal.	(Ibid.,	4)	
The	way	Sainsbury	cashes	out	 the	notion	of	a	substantive	disagreement	 is	 that	such	disagreement	 requires	 agreement	 in	meaning	 (2014,	 4).	 There	must	 be	 a	proposition	that	one	part	affirms	and	the	other	denies.	This	is	what	creates	the	puzzle.		
																																																								4	As	mentioned	in	a	previous	footnote,	the	possibility	of	topic	continuity	despite	semantic	drift	is	controversial.	 Assuming	 that	 there	 is	 continuity	 of	 topic	 in	 the	 case	 ’fish’,	 Ball	 (forthcoming)	would	 deny	 that	 this	 case	 involves	 a	 difference	 in	 meaning	 of	 the	 relevant	 term.	 I	 follow	Sainsbury	 (2014)	 and	 Sawyer	 (2018)	 in	 taking	 cases	 like	 the	 one	 above	 to	 involve	 a	 semantic	change.	 Importantly,	 my	 criticism	 of	 Ball’s	 view	 (section	 4	 below)	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 such	details.	
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However,	Sawyer	(2018)	argues	that	there	need	not	be	sameness	in	meaning	in	order	 to	 account	 for	 such	disagreement.	 Rather,	what	 accounts	 for	 this	 sort	 of	disagreement	 is	 continuity	 of	 topic	 (I	 return	 to	 Sawyer’s	 proposed	 solution	 to	Sainsbury’s	puzzle	in	more	detail	in	section	3.1.	below).	If	this	is	correct,	we	need	the	 notion	 of	 topic	 continuity	 to	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 substantial	disagreement	 despite	 semantic	 drift.	 Thus	 understood,	 accounting	 for	substantial	disagreement	is	one	of	the	central	explanatory	tasks	for	the	notion	of	topic	continuity.	
Based	 on	 the	 considerations	 in	 this	 section,	 I	 understand	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 to	be	such	 that	 if	 there	 is	 continuity	of	 inquiry	and	possibility	of	substantial	 disagreement,	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 obtains.	 Put	differently,	I	will	call	whatever	relation	accounts	for	the	possibility	of	continuity	of	 inquiry	 and	 substantial	 disagreement	 in	 cases	 such	 as	 the	 ones	 looked	 at	above,	the	continuity-of-topic	relation.	A	natural	question	to	ask,	then,	is	in	virtue	of	 what	 does	 this	 relation	 obtain?	 In	 the	 next	 section	 I	 will	 put	 forth	 two	suggestions	as	to	how	continuance	of	topic	obtains	found	in	the	literature.	Both	suggestions	are	examples	of	what	I	call	The	Identity	Approach	to	Continuance	of	
Topics.	
	
3.	The	Identity	Approach		
In	 this	 section	 I	 focus	 on	 two	 general	 strategies	 for	 accounting	 for	 the	continuance-of-topic	 relation	 found	 in	 the	 literature.	 These	 strategies	 explain	continuance	 of	 topic	 in	 terms	 of	 identity	 of	 some	 feature.	 The	 first	 strategy	 I	consider	 is	 to	 account	 for	 stability	 of	 topics	 in	 terms	 of	 sameness	 of	 concepts.	The	general	approach	is	to	say	that	continuance	of	topics	is	more	coarse-grained	than	the	intension	and	extension	of	a	term.	The	second	strategy	is	to	ultimately	deny	 that	 there	 can	 be	 stability	 of	 topics	 despite	 a	 change	 in	 meaning.	Proponents	of	 this	view	do	however	hold	 that	 there	 is	stability	of	 topics	 in	 the	kind	 of	 cases	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 of	 the	 paper.	 Taking	 this	 as	 a	starting	 point,	 they	 deny	 that	 the	 cases	 involve	 a	 change	 in	 meaning.	 Both	 of	
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these	general	strategies	are	examples	of	The	Identity	Approach	to	continuance	of	topics.	I’ll	look	at	each	strategy	in	turn.	
	
3.1.	Identity	of	Concepts		
The	first	strategy	is	advocated	by	Sawyer	(2018),	who	argues	that	the	stability	of	topic	 through	 a	 linguistic	 change	 is	 to	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 stability	 of	concepts.	 Such	 concepts	 are	 understood	 as	 mental	 particulars	 that	 are	individuated	in	terms	of	their	topics.	That	is,	concepts	are	individuated	in	terms	of	 relations	 to	 objective	 properties	 or	 objects	 that	 are	 independent	 of	 our	conception	of	such	properties	or	objects:		
It	 is	 the	 concept	 expressed	 by	 a	 term	 that	 determines	 its	 subject	matter.	 This	 is,	 in	 effect,	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 subject	matter	 itself	 enters	 into	 the	 individuation	conditions	of	 the	 relevant	concept.	(Sawyer	2018,	137)	
As	a	result,	a	term	can	express	the	same	concept	at	different	times	despite	being	associated	with	different	conceptions.	
Sawyer	thus	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	the	explanatory	role	of	concepts	and	 linguistic	meaning.	On	 this	 framework,	 the	 linguistic	meaning	 of	 a	 term	 is	determined	by	use:		
I	suggest	that	the	linguistic	meaning	of	a	term	at	a	time	be	understood	as	the	characterization	of	the	relevant	subject	matter	that	members	of	the	 linguistic	 community	would	 settle	 on	 at	 that	 time	were	 they	 to	reach	reflective	equilibrium	in	the	context	of	a	dialectic.	(Ibid.,	130)	
So	understood,	a	term	may	change	its	meaning	while	still	being	used	to	express	the	 same	 concept.	 On	 this	 view,	 then,	 sameness	 of	 concept	 (and	 thereby	continuance	of	topic)	is	more	coarse-grained	than	sameness	of	meaning.		
STAYING	ON	TOPIC	 	 		
	174	
One	 thing	 to	 note	 is	 that	 Sawyer	 makes	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 cases	 of	linguistic	change	that	involve	a	change	in	topic	and	those	that	do	not:		
From	a	philosophical	perspective,	meaning	shift	 falls	 into	 two	broad	categories:	cases	that	are	accompanied	by	a	corresponding	change	in	subject	matter;	and	cases	that	are	not	(Ibid.,	127—128).	
I	take	this	to	be	a	widespread	view	–	after	all,	either	there	is	a	change	or	there	is	not	a	change.	I	will,	however,	challenge	this	assumption	in	section	3	of	this	paper.	
Sawyer	 uses	 her	 framework	 to	 account	 for	 Sainsbury’s	 puzzle	 concerning	 the	semantic	difference	between	an	utterance	of	“whales	are	fish”	in	the	15th	century	and	now	 (addressed	 in	 the	previous	 section).	 In	doing	 this,	 she	 focuses	on	 the	semantic	change	in	‘whale’	rather	than	‘fish’,	but	I	take	it	that	this	doesn’t	make	an	essential	difference	to	this	line	of	response.5	People	in	the	15th	century	would	settle	 on	 a	 characterization	 of	 whales	 according	 to	 which	 the	 animals	 were	described	 as	 fish.	 Today,	 however,	 our	 linguistic	 community	 would	 not	characterize	 whales	 as	 fish.	 Since,	 on	 Sawyer’s	 framework,	 meaning	 is	determined	by	the	agreed	upon	characterization	of	the	relevant	subject	matter	in	a	community,	the	meaning	of	the	term	‘whale’	has	changed.	This	explains	why,	in	the	15th	century	the	sentence	“whales	are	 fish”	was	generally	regarded	as	 true,	whereas	today	we	would	regard	the	sentence	as	false.	
Despite	 this,	 Sawyer	 says,	 there	 is	 stability	 of	 topic,	 since	 there	 has	 been	 a	stability	of	concepts	associated	with	the	term	‘whale’.	Throughout	the	linguistic	change	of	‘whale’,	the	individuals	in	the	linguistic	communities	stood	in	relation	to	the	same	kind	of	animal.	As	a	result,	there	has	been	stability	of	topic	despite	the	 semantic	 drift.	 This	 is	why,	 despite	 the	difference	 in	meaning	between	 the	anatomists’	 and	 the	 fishermen’s	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘whale’,	 they	 could	 be	 said	 to	have	a	substantial	disagreement.	Sawyer	thus	ascribes	the	same	explanatory	role	to	continuance	of	topic	as	I	did	in	section	(2.2).		
																																																								5	If	someone	were	to	object	to	Sawyer’s	response	to	Sainsbury’s	puzzle	on	the	grounds	that	the	case	of	’whale’	is	not	analogous	to	the	case	of	’fish’,	that’s	fine.	However,	this	is	not	the	objection	I	want	to	raise	in	this	paper.	
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To	 sum	 up,	 Sawyer	 takes	 continuance	 of	 topic	 to	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	sameness	 in	 concepts.	 A	 similar	 line	 of	 thought	 is	 found	 in	 Richard	(forthcoming).	 He	 agrees	 that	 there	 might	 be	 continuance	 of	 topics	 despite	semantic	drift	and	that	such	stability	is	explained	in	terms	of	concepts.	His	view	differs	 from	 that	 of	 Sawyer	 in	what	 he	 takes	 the	 nature	 of	 concepts	 to	 be.	 On	Richard’s	 view,	 concepts	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘stretched	 out’	 objects	 that	persist	 over	 time.	 The	 continuance	 of	 topics	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 words	expressing	concept	time	slices	that	belong	to	the	same	stretched	out	concept.	On	this	model,	two	concept	time	slices	will	concern	the	same	topic	if	they	belong	to	the	same	stretched	out	concept.6	
Although	 the	 two	 views	 differ	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 views	 on	 the	 nature	 of	concepts,	 the	 general	 strategy	 is	 the	 same:	 Continuance	 of	 topics	 is	 to	 be	explained	 in	 terms	of	sameness	of	concepts	–	be	 it	concept	 tokens	being	of	 the	same	type	or	concept	time	slices	belonging	to	the	same	stretched	out	concept.	A	consequence	 of	 both	 views	 is	 that	 the	 continuance	 of	 topic	 relation	 must	 be	transitive,	since	sameness	(i.e.	identity)	is	a	transitive	relation.		
	
3.2.	Identity	of	Meaning	
Whereas	the	views	considered	 in	 the	 former	paragraphs	hold	that	sameness	of	topic	 is	more	 coarse-grained	 than	 sameness	 of	meaning,	 the	 view	 I’ll	 consider	next	 denies	 this.	 However,	 it	 does	 so	 in	 a	 novel	 and	 relevant	 way.	 Instead	 of	saying	that	revising	our	representational	devices	leads	to	a	change	in	topic	due	to	 a	 change	 in	 meaning,	 Ball	 (forthcoming)	 argues	 that	 such	 revisions	 do	 not	result	in	a	change	of	meaning,	and	as	a	result	the	topic	remains	the	same.		
The	 key	 claim	 is	 that,	 despite	 appearances	 to	 the	 contrary,	 cases	 such	 as	 ‘fish’	and	‘whale’	do	not	involve	a	change	in	meaning.	Instead,	the	meaning	of	a	word	is	fixed	 by	 our	 final	 (accepted)	 stipulation	 about	 that	 word’s	 meaning.	 Ball	 says	that	“on	the	subject	continuity	model	that	I	advocate,	there	is	no	new	meaning;	a																																																									6 	C.f.	 Cappelen’s	 (2018,	 144—146)	 construal	 of	 Richard’s	 (forthcoming)	 Species	 Model	 of	
Concepts.	
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successful	 stipulation	 fixes	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 word	 as	 it	 was	 used	 all	 along”	(Ball	forthcoming,	19).	So	for	instance,	if	we	assume	that	there	will	be	no	further	revisions	made	to	the	word	‘fish’,	the	meaning	of	the	word	was	always	so	that	it	excluded	 whales.	 When	 the	 merchants	 and	 fishermen	 argued	 in	 court	 that	whales	 are	 fish,	 they	 were	 using	 the	 word	 with	 the	 same	meaning	 as	 we	 are	today,	although	they	were	not	aware	of	the	full	meaning	of	the	word.	The	same	goes	 for	 the	 ancient	 language	 community	 in	 which	 no	 one	 ever	 doubted	 that	whales	are	fish.	People	in	such	communities	were	simply	wrong,	and	when	they	uttered	(5):	
5.	Whales	are	fish	
they	were	saying	something	false.		
Note	that	proponents	of	this	view	would	not	be	happy	with	the	way	I’ve	set	out	the	 discussion	 thus	 far.	 In	 presenting	 the	 debate,	 I’ve	 been	 assuming	 the	possibility	of	 semantic	drift	 in	 certain	 cases	of	 topic-continuity.	On	Ball’s	 view,	there	would	 not	 really	 be	 semantic	 drift	 in	 such	 cases.	 If	 there	 is	 sameness	 of	topic,	 the	meaning	 of	 a	word	 is	 the	 same.	 Although	 I	 have	 been	 assuming	 the	possibility	 of	 continuance	 of	 topics	 despite	 semantic	 drift,	 I	 need	 not	 insist	 on	this.	What	I	would	have	to	insist	on	is	stability	of	topics	in	cases	such	as	the	ones	considered	 above	where	 there	appears	 to	 be	 a	 change	 in	meaning.	 Ball	would	agree	that	there	is	continuance	of	topics	in	such	cases.	What	he	would	dispute	is	that	such	cases	involve	semantic	drift.	Instead	he	would	say	that	the	meaning	has	stayed	 constant,	 but	 that	 this	meaning	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 last	 agreed	 upon	stipulations.	 Importantly,	 the	 argument	 in	 the	 next	 part	 of	 the	 paper	 holds	regardless	of	whether	or	not	one	accepts	the	possibility	of	semantic	drift	in	cases	of	topic	continuity.		
A	 key	 claim	 of	 Ball’s	 subject	 continuity	 model	 is	 that	 revisionary	 endeavours	often	maintain	a	stability	of	topic.	In	fact,	I	take	this	to	be	one	of	the	motivating	observations	 for	 the	 view.	 Ball	 considers	 the	 alternative	 view,	 the	 view	 that	revisionary	analysis	necessarily	 involves	a	change	in	subject	matter.	This	 is	the	
subject-change	view	of	revisionary	analysis.	He	argues	against	this	view	partly	on	
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the	basis	of	what	he	calls	The	Argument	Argument.	Consider	two	individuals	who	disagree	on	whether	or	not	same-sex	couples	should	be	allowed	 to	marry.	The	person	who	thinks	same-sex	couples	should	not	be	allowed	to	marry	 thinks	so	on	the	grounds	that	they	also	believe	that	the	purpose	of	marriage	is	to	produce	children.	In	a	debate	between	the	two	individuals,	this	latter	person	utters	(6):	
6.	The	purpose	of	marriage	is	to	produce	children	
Now	Balls	says	that	in	general,	
As	a	matter	of	methodology,	we	should	 look	 for	an	 interpretation	of	these	arguments	and	our	responses	to	them	that	makes	sense	of	what	we	are	doing.	(Ball	forthcoming,	6)	
This	 suggests,	 he	 says,	 the	 following	 requirement	 on	 our	 interpretation	 of	 a	debate	about	a	revisionary	analysis:	
It	must	 give	 parties	 to	 the	 debate	 reasonably	 good	 epistemic	 status	with	 respect	 to	 the	 things	 they	 say.	 In	many	 typical	 cases,	 this	will	mean	that	the	parties	to	the	debate	are	saying	things	that	they	know,	or	at	least	justifiably	believe,	to	be	true.	[…]		
It	must	make	assertions	relevant	 to	 the	debate.	When	a	party	 to	 the	debate	makes	an	assertion,	that	assertion	should	serve	some	purpose:	for	example,	by	giving	evidence	 for	her	position	or	evidence	against	her	opponent’s	position.	(Ibid.)		
If	 we	 assume	 that	 debates	 concerning	 how	 to	 revise	 a	 concept	 or	 term	necessarily	 involve	 a	 change	 of	 subject	matter,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	behaviour	of	the	person	uttering	(6).	 If	she	uses	the	term	in	her	own	preferred	way,	let’s	call	this	marriage1,	she	is	saying	something	trivial	and	not	relevant	to	the	discussion	since	that	use	of	the	term	‘marriage’	would	by	definition	exclude	same-sex	couples.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 if	 this	were	the	case,	her	opponent	could	very	well	 accept	 her	 utterance,	 knowing	 that	 the	 statement	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	with	her	own	position.	At	the	same	time,	if	the	speaker	intended	to	use	the	word	
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the	way	her	opponent	prefers	to	use	it,	call	this	marriage2,	she	should	consider	(6)	 as	 an	 obvious	 falsehood,	 but	 she	 doesn’t.	 Ball	 concludes	 that	 the	 subject-change	view	cannot	make	sense	of	the	person’s	utterance	of	(6).	As	a	result,		
the	 subject-change	 view	 simply	 fails	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 way	 we	argue	 for	 and	 against	 revisionary	 analyses;	 and	 even	 in	 those	 cases	where	the	subject-change	view	has	a	partial	story	to	tell,	it	often	fails	to	explain	the	whole	phenomenon.	(Ball	forthcoming,	10)	
Ball’s	argument	does	at	least	partly	depend	on	the	claim	that	stability	of	topics	is	needed	to	make	sense	of	these	kinds	of	debates.	
Ball’s	 subject	 continuity	 model	 accommodates	 the	 view	 that	 revisionary	endeavours	often	maintain	a	 stability	of	 topic.	 It	does	 so,	 however,	 by	denying	that	such	endeavours	may	involve	a	change	in	meaning	of	words	in	cases	where	the	topic	remains	stable.	In	this	sense,	Ball	advocates	a	clear	distinction	between	cases	where	we	have	a	change	in	topics	and	cases	where	the	topic	remains	the	same.	In	the	next	section	I	will	argue	that	this	is	a	mistake.	I	will	show	that	topic	continuity	 is	 more	 complex;	 there	 are	 cases	 of	 topic	 change	 that	 happen	 so	gradually	that	no	point	in	history	marks	a	discontinuity	with	immediate	previous	uses	of	 the	word.	 I	 argue	 that	both	of	 the	general	approaches	 looked	at	 in	 this	section	of	the	paper	fail	to	account	for	these	observations.	
	
4.	The	Continuance-of-Topic	Relation	is	Non-Transitive		
The	 aim	 of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 establish	 that	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 is	non-transitive.	 I	 will	 do	 this	 through	 a	 case	 study,	 namely	 the	 evolutionary	change	of	the	term	‘meat’.	In	the	17th	century	‘meat’	meant	anything	edible.	That	is,	 ‘meat’	 used	 to	pick	out	 food	 in	 general.	 Today,	 however,	 the	 term	picks	out	animal	 flesh	 only.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 case	 of	 ‘meat’	 involves	 a	 change	 in	 topic.	Sawyer	 mentions	 this	 case	 as	 an	 example	 of	 topic	 change	 that	 is	 relatively	straightforward,	since	the	case	involves	a	change	in	meaning	as	well	as	in	topic:		
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The	extensions	of	terms	such	as	‘meat’	[…]	change	over	time	because	different	entities	satisfy	their	descriptive	meanings	at	different	times.	Meaning	 shift	 of	 this	 first	 kind	 is	 also	 accompanied	 by	 a	 change	 in	subject	matter.	What	makes	meaning	shift	of	this	first	kind	relatively	straightforward	is	the	fact	that	the	intuitive	change	in	subject	matter	of	 the	 relevant	 terms	 is	 marked,	 in	 each	 case,	 by	 the	 change	 in	extension	that	results	from	the	change	in	linguistic	meaning.	(Sawyer	2018,	133)		
However,	 as	 we’ll	 see	 below,	 if	 the	 case	 of	 ‘meat’	 is	 portrayed	 according	 to	Sainsbury	 &	 Tye’s	 (2012,	 46)	 stipulations,	 the	 case	 becomes	 anything	 but	straightforward.	In	fact,	I	will	argue	that	the	case	of	‘meat’	is	the	best	illustration	of	the	complexity	of	the	continuance-of-topic	relation.	
	
4.1.	The	case	of	‘Meat’	
Let’s	start	by	acknowledging	the	fact	that	there	has	been	a	change	in	meaning	of	the	 term	 ‘meat’	 from	 the	 17th	 century	 until	 today.7	Sainsbury	 &	 Tye	 focus	 on	linguistic	meaning	 in	general	rather	than	topics,	but,	as	Sawyer	points	out,	 it	 is	clear	that	there	is	a	discontinuity	of	topic	as	well.	Now,	throughout	the	years	the	meaning	of	‘meat’	gradually	drifted	until	one	day	the	word	was	used	to	pick	out	animal	 flesh	 only.	 Importantly,	 at	 no	 point	 did	 anyone	 make	 a	 decision	 to	abandon	 the	 old	 use;	 everyone	 deferred	 to	 other	 uses	 in	 their	 language	community	when	using	the	word.	Even	so,	a	semantic	drift	happened	along	the	way.	But	at	no	point	was	the	drift	significant	enough	for	anyone	to	pick	up	on	it	as	it	was	happening.		
We	may	construe	the	evolution	of	the	meaning	change	as	a	timeline	starting	at	t1	when	 the	 word	 picked	 out	 food	 in	 general,	 and	 then	 there	 were	 a	 number	 of																																																									7	Again,	 Ball	 (forthcoming)	 would	 deny	 this	 claim.	 He	might	 say	 that	 the	 term	 ’meat’	 had	 the	same	meaning	all	along,	or	that	there	are	different	terms	with	distinct	meanings	involved	in	this	story.	I	base	the	presentation	of	the	story	of	’meat’	on	Sainsbury	&	Tye’s	(2012)	construal	of	the	case,	 according	 to	which	 there	was	 a	 change	 in	meaning.	 Importantly,	 the	 argument	 to	 follow	does	not	depend	on	details	about	the	meaning	of	the	term.	
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microscopic	 steps,	 t2,	 t3,	 t4	…..	 tn,	along	 the	way	 until	 today,	which	we	may	 call	
t2018.	Now,	although	there	has	been	a	change	in	topics	from	t1	until	t2018,	there	was	no	discontinuity	of	topic	at	any	of	the	small	steps	tn—tn+1	along	the	way.					
To	see	why	this	is	the	case,	consider	the	following	scenario:	Someone	in	the	17th	century	wants	 to	explore	 the	harms	and	benefits	of	 eating	 food,	 as	opposed	 to	not	eating	anything	at	all.	This	person	would	ask	the	question:	
5.	What	are	the	health	harms	and	benefits	of	eating	meat?		
Further,	let’s	say	that	someone	today	wants	to	investigate	the	health	harms	and	benefits	of	eating	meat,	i.e.	animal	flesh.	This	person	would	also	ask	question	(5).	Even	 though	 it	 is	 stipulated	 that	 the	 two	 individuals	 are	using	 the	 same	 terms	when	formulating	their	questions,	there	seems	to	be	an	obvious	discontinuity	of	inquiry	between	their	two	projects.	If	this	is	the	case,	there	cannot	be	sameness	of	 topic	 between	 ‘meat’	 in	 the	 17th	 century	 and	 now,	 since	 sameness	 of	 topic	would	guarantee	continuity	of	inquiry	in	this	case.		
Further,	we	could	imagine	that	at	any	given	time	in	the	history	of	the	evolution	of	‘meat’	 there	was	 an	 individual	 asking	 (5).	 Since	 the	 semantic	 drift	 happens	 so	gradually	 without	 any	 point	 in	 history	 marking	 a	 discontinuity	 with	 the	immediate	previous	use,	 it	 is	 the	case	 that	at	any	 time	 it	 is	 true	 that	 there	was	continuity	of	inquiry	when	someone	asked	question	(5)	at	tn	and	when	someone	asked	 the	 same	 question	 at	 tn+1.	 Hence,	 since	 there	 is	 continuity	 of	 inquiry,	 it	must	be	the	case	that	there	is	continuity	of	topic	at	any	time	tn	and	tn+1.		
Now,	consider	another	case:	Someone	in	the	17th	century	asserts	(6):		
6.	Vegetarians	do	not	eat	meat		
This	 utterance	 would	 be	 false,	 since	 vegetarians	 do	 eat	 food,	 and	 the	 person	making	 the	 statement	 seems	 to	 be	 confused	 about	what	 a	 vegetarian	 is.	Many	years	later,	in	2018,	someone	asserts	(6)	again.	Due	to	the	change	of	reference	of	‘meat’	 this	 utterance	 is	 true.	 Knowing	 this,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 people	 being	happy	 with	 someone	 today	 disquotationally	 reporting	 on	 the	 17th-century	
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speech	act.	That	is,	if	we	were	to	say	that	someone	in	the	17th	century	said	that	vegetarians	do	not	eat	meat,	this	would	be	highly	misleading	and,	arguably,	false.	This	 indicates,	 again,	 that	 there	 must	 be	 a	 difference	 in	 topic	 between	 the	utterance	of	(6)	in	the	17th	century	and	an	utterance	of	the	very	same	sentence	today.	 Even	 so,	 it	 seems	 perfectly	 fine	 to	 say	 that	 at	 any	 time,	 tn,	 during	 the	semantic	 evolution	 of	 the	 term	 ‘meat’	 it	 is	 fine	 to	 disquotationally	 report	 an	utterance	of	(6)	at	tn-1.	
Furthermore,	 in	 the	 case	 above,	 the	 person	 sincerely	 uttering	 (6)	 in	 the	 17th	century	 does	 not	 have	 a	 substantial	 disagreement	 with	 the	 person	 sincerely	negating	the	same	sentence	in	2018.	To	make	this	clear,	imagine	a	further	case	in	which	our	17th-century	individual	is	no	longer	confused	about	what	a	vegetarian	is	and	utters,	“Vegetarians	do	eat	meat”.	This	is	true,	since	vegetarians	eat	food.	Contrast	this	with	someone	today	saying,	“Vegetarians	do	not	eat	meat”.	This	is	also	true,	due	to	the	semantic	drift.	Importantly,	this	seems	like	a	case	in	which	we	 would	 not	 be	 happy	 to	 say	 that	 the	 two	 individuals	 disagree	 about	 what	vegetarians	eat.	To	make	it	even	more	vivid,	add	a	time	machine	to	the	story:	The	person	 from	 the	 17th	 century	 travels	 to	 our	 time	 where	 she	 meets	 our	contemporary	speaker.	Naturally,	 they	soon	enter	 into	a	chat	about	 the	dietary	requirements	of	vegetarians.	At	first	it	might	appear	to	them	and	people	around	that	 they	are	having	a	disagreement,	but	 this	 is	only	superficially	so	and	 it	will	quickly	be	discovered	that	the	interlocutors	are	merely	talking	past	each	other.	No	one	would	 say	 that	 they	actually	disagree	about	what	vegetarians	do	or	do	not	 eat.	 Hence,	 there	 is	 no	 continuity	 of	 topic	 in	 the	 beginning	 and	 end	 of	 the	chain	of	deference.	Still,	just	like	before,	it	seems	perfectly	coherent	to	stipulate	that	 at	 any	 time,	 tn,	 a	 sincere	 utterance	 of	 “vegetarians	 do	 eat	 meat”	 would	constitute	a	disagreement	with	someone	sincerely	uttering	 “vegetarians	do	not	eat	meat”	at	tn+1.	This,	again,	shows	that	there	is	continuity	of	topics	at	any	time	
tn	and	tn+1.	
What	makes	the	case	of	‘meat’	interesting	is	that	at	no	point	during	the	history	of	the	term	does	it	make	sense	to	say	that	there	was	discontinuity	of	topic	along	the	way.	From	one	day	to	the	next	there	was	always	continuity	of	topic	in	utterances	involving	the	word	 ‘meat’.	However,	as	we	have	seen,	at	some	point	during	the	
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semantic	drift	there	came	a	time	in	which	there	was	no	longer	continuity	of	topic	with	 the	 original	 case,	 where	 the	 term	 ‘meat’	 was	 first	 introduced.	 The	continuance-of-topic	 relation,	 then,	 must	 be	 non-transitive:	 It	 is	 possible	 that	two	utterances,	a	and	b,	deploy	continuity	of	topic	and	that	utterance	b	and	c	also	deploy	such	continuity,	and	at	the	same	time	that	utterance	a	and	c	do	not	deploy	continuity	of	topic.	
If	the	argument	in	this	section	is	correct,	any	view	that	accounts	for	continuance	of	topic	in	terms	of	identity	relations	fails,	since	identity	is	transitive.	Let’s	look	at	each	of	the	frameworks	looked	at	in	section	2	to	see,	in	some	more	detail,	why	this	is	the	case.	
	
4.2.	The	Identity	Approach:	Concepts	
Let’s	 return	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 concept	 view:	 Proponents	 of	 this	 account	would	have	to	say	that	‘meat’	as	used	in	the	17th	century	expresses	a	different	concept	than	 ‘meat’	 used	 today,	 since	 the	 terms	 concern	 different	 topics.	 However,	 in	order	 to	make	 sense	of	 the	 fact	 that	 every	 step	along	 the	way	preserves	 topic,	they	would	have	to	say	that	it	is	the	same	concept	expressed	at	every	time	tn	and	
tn+1.	These	two	claims	are	inconsistent	and	so	the	concept	identity	view	lacks	the	resources	to	account	for	the	non-transitivity	of	topics	in	cases	such	as	‘meat’.	
Proponents	of	Sawyer’s	view	might	want	to	object	that	I	have	not	given	a	correct	characterization	of	the	‘meat’	case.	On	the	view	we’re	considering,	concepts	are	individuated	in	terms	of	relations	to	individuals	and	objective	properties	in	the	external	world.	Take,	for	instance,	the	case	of	‘whale’:		 the	term	‘whale’	expresses	the	concept	whale	in	the	actual	world	both	at	 t1	and	at	 t2	in	virtue	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 linguistic	 community	at	 t1	and	the	linguistic	community	at	t2	both	stand	in	the	requisite	relation	to	whales.	(Sawyer	2018,	135)	
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One	 might	 want	 to	 argue	 against	 the	 non-transitivity	 of	 topic	 continuity	 by	saying	that	in	the	case	of	 ‘meat’,	there	are	actually	distinct	concepts	involved	at	every	 minor	 step	 tn	and	 tn+1	since	 there	 is	 a	 slight	 difference	 in	 the	 group	 of	entities	 one	 is	 related	 to.	 This	would,	 however,	 be	 problematic.	 If	 sameness	 of	concepts	 is	 to	 account	 for	 continuance	 of	 topics	 and	 continuance	 of	 topic	 is	needed	to	account	 for	continuance	of	 inquiry	and	substantial	disagreement,	we	fail	 to	 explain	 how	 someone	 at	 tn	and	 tn+1	could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 a	 substantial	disagreement	or	how	there	could	be	continuity	of	topic	between	these	points	in	time	in	the	case	of	‘meat’.	As	we	have	seen,	Sawyer	explicitly	uses	her	account	of	topic	 continuity	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 substantial	 disagreement.	 In	 order	 to	account	 for	the	potential	of	having	substantial	disagreements	between	any	two	microscopic	 steps	along	 the	evolutionary	history	of	 the	 term	 ‘meat’,	 she	would	therefore	have	to	say	that	it	is	the	same	concept.	I	thus	take	it	that	the	sameness	of	 concept	 view	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 continuance	 of	 topics	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	continuance-of-topic	relation	being	non-transitive.	
	
4.3.	The	Identity	Approach:	The	Subject	Continuity	Model	
Ball’s	 subject	 continuity	 model	 faces	 similar	 worries.	 In	 order	 to	 explain	 how	there	could	be	a	continuity	of	topic	of	‘meat’	at	every	step	tn	and	tn+1	proponents	of	 the	 subject	 continuity	model	would	 have	 to	 say	 that	 the	 tokens	 of	 the	 term	have	 the	 same	meaning.	Remember	 that,	 on	 this	 view,	meaning	 is	 fixed	by	 the	final	agreed	upon	stipulations.	Since,	by	assumption,	tokens	of	‘meat’	at	t2018	and	tokens	 of	 the	 same	 term	at	 t2018-1	deploy	 topic	 continuity,	 this	means	 that	 they	will	 have	 the	 same	meaning.	We	 could	 repeat	 this	 for	 every	minor	 step	all	 the	way	 back	 to	 t1	in	 the	 17th	 century.	However,	 this	would	 have	 the	 consequence	that	 the	word	 ‘meat’	 had	 the	 same	meaning	 at	 t1	as	 in	 t2018,	 since	 sameness	 of	meaning	 is	 transitive.	 However,	 if	 this	 is	 correct,	 there	 must	 be	 continuity	 of	topic	between	utterances	involving	‘meat’	then	and	now.	This,	as	we	have	seen,	is	clearly	 not	 the	 case,	 since	 there	 could	 not	 be	 substantial	 disagreement	 or	continuity	of	inquiry	involving	the	term	‘meat’	then	and	now.	Hence,	the	subject	continuity	model	 lacks	 the	resources	 to	explain	how	there	can	be	continuity	of	
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topics	at	every	step	through	the	evolutionary	chain	but	discontinuity	of	topics	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	chain.			
Given	Ball’s	commitment	to	the	idea	that	continuity	of	topics	is	needed	to	explain	individuals’	 argumentative	 strategies	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 he	 could	 deny	 this.	Let’s	say	someone,	at	 t1	asserts,	 “vegetarians	eat	meat”	 in	a	 letter.	Let’s	call	 the	writer	 of	 the	 letter	 S1	 and	 the	 receiver	 S2.	 By	 the	 time	 the	 letter	 reaches	 S2,	we’re	at	t2.	At	this	point,	S2	writes	back	saying	“as	a	matter	of	fact,	vegetarians	do	
not	eat	meat”.	In	order	to	make	sense	of	this	argumentative	strategy,	we	should	grant	that	S2	is	talking	about	the	same	topic	as	S1	when	using	the	term	‘meat’.	S2	does	not	disagree	with	S1’s	use	of	 ‘meat’.	She	merely	thinks	vegetarians	do	not	eat	food.	Analogous	cases	could	be	repeated	between	every	minor	step	along	the	way	from	t1	until	t2018.	By	Ball’s	own	Argument	Argument	it	seems	to	follow	that	we	must	say	that	the	interlocutors	are	talking	about	the	same	subject	in	order	to	make	sense	of	their	argumentative	strategies.	
Now,	 imagine	 if	 our	 current-day	 time-traveller	were	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 discussion	with	S1.	Assuming	that	she	is	aware	of	the	difference	between	how	people	used	the	term	‘meat’	at	 t1	and	today,	she	would	simply	grant	S1’s	statement,	and	not	respond	by	saying	“vegetarians	do	not	eat	meat”.	The	reason	 is	 that	she	knows	that	 such	 an	 assertion	would	 not	 be	 relevant	 to	 the	 conversation.	 Instead,	 she	should	accept	S1’s	utterance,	“Vegetarians	eat	meat”,	as	not	conflicting	with	her	own	 belief	 as	 well	 as	 her	 potential	 linguistic	 response.	 Note	 that	 I	 am	 not	assuming	 anything	 about	 the	 actual	 meaning	 of	 the	 word	 ‘meat’	 in	 this	 case.	Rather,	I’m	hypothesising	about	the	interlocutor’s	argumentative	strategies.	If,	as	Ball	 argues,	 sameness	 or	 difference	 in	 subject	 matter	 is	 to	 account	 for	 such	argumentative	strategies,	it	seems	to	follow	that	we	must	say	that	S1	and	S2018	(i.e.	our	current-day	individual)	are	not	talking	about	the	same	subject	matter	in	the	case	of	‘meat’	in	order	to	explain	why	they	do	not	argue	in	the	way	we	would	expect	had	their	utterances	concerned	the	same	subject	matter.		
As	a	result	of	this,	 it	seems	that	 in	order	to	make	sense	of	these	argumentative	strategies	we	must	say	that	there	is	continuance	of	topic	at	every	minor	step	in	the	evolutionary	history	of	‘meat’,	but	not	continuance	of	topic	at	the	beginning	
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and	end	of	the	chain.	Hence,	Ball’s	Subject	Continuity	Model	fails	to	account	for	the	non-transitivity	of	the	continuance-of-topic	relation.	In	the	next	sub-section	I	will	 consider	 one	 more	 possible	 objection	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	Identity	Approach.	
	
4.4.	The	Sorites	Objection	
The	argument	presented	against	the	Identity	View	may	be	stated	thus:	
P1:	 If	 the	 Identity	View	 is	 correct,	 then	 it	 is	 the	 case	 that	 continuance-of-topic	relation	is	transitive	P2:	It	is	not	the	case	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	transitive	C:	The	Identity	View	is	not	correct.	
The	 argument	 is	 valid.	 P1	 is	 uncontroversial.	 Proponents	 of	 the	 Identity	 View	would	then	have	to	deny	P2.	I	have	given	good	reasons	to	think	that	P2	is	true.	The	Identity	Theorist	would	have	to	deny	that	the	sort	of	case	I’ve	presented	(i.e.	the	case	of	‘meat’)	is	possible.	It’s	important	to	note	that	I’ve	presented	the	case	of	 ‘meat’	 in	 a	 theory-neutral	 way.	 That	 is,	 in	 presenting	 the	 case	 I	 have	 not	assumed	anything	uncontroversial	about	 the	continuance-of-topic	relation.	 It	 is	uncontroversial	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	necessary	for	continuity	of	 inquiry	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 substantial	 disagreement.	 The	 case	 of	 ‘meat’	illustrates	that	we	may	have	continuity	of	inquiry	and	substantial	disagreement	at	 any	 minor	 step	 through	 history,	 but	 that	 there	 nonetheless	 could	 be	discontinuity	 of	 inquiry	 and	 no	 substantial	 disagreement	 at	 the	 beginning	 and	end	 of	 the	 evolutionary	 chain.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 this,	 I	 have	 concluded	 that	 the	continuity-of-topic	relation	is	non-transitive.	
The	 objection	 to	 my	 argument	 that	 I	 wish	 to	 consider	 in	 this	 section	 is	 one	according	 to	 which	 the	 case	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 Sorites	 case.	 If	 this	 is	correct,	the	Identity	Theorist	could	argue	that	the	case	of	‘meat’	does	not	pose	a	problem	for	their	view,	since	in	general,	hardly	anyone	thinks	that	the	response	to	 standard	 Sorites	 cases	 is	 to	 deny	 that	 the	 relation	 in	 question	 is	 transitive.	
STAYING	ON	TOPIC	 	 		
	186	
There	 are	 various	 competing	 accounts	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 vagueness	 involved	 in	Sorites	cases,	and	the	Identity	Theorist	may	simply	adopt	whatever	seems	to	be	the	best	account	on	 the	market.	To	 take	an	example,	 the	 Identity	Theorist	may	follow	 Williamson	 (1994)	 and	 argue	 that	 our	 ignorance	 about	 thresholds	 in	borderline	cases	does	not	mean	 that	 there	cannot	be	such	 thresholds.	 If	 this	 is	the	case,	they	may	claim	that	even	though	it	seems	to	the	individuals	involved	as	though	there	is	continuity	of	inquiry	and	substantial	disagreement	at	any	point	tn	and	tn+1,	there	must	be	some	point	in	history	where	this	is	not	the	case.	That	is,	there	must	be	a	point	at	which	people	are	simply	mistaken	about	whether	or	not	they	have	a	substantial	disagreement	or	whether	there	is	continuity	of	inquiry.		
This	 response	 comes	 with	 a	 considerable	 theoretical	 cost	 for	 the	 Identity	Theorist.	 Let’s	 assume	 that	 the	 cut-off	 point	 in	 question	 happened	 at	 a	 given	time,	tn.	The	Identity	Theorist	would	then	have	to	say	that	there	was	continuity	of	inquiry	and	possibility	of	substantial	disagreement	between	tn-1	and	tn,	but	not	between	 tn	and	 tn+1.	 She	will	have	 to	 insist	 that	 this	 is	 the	case	despite	 the	 fact	that	the	way	in	which	the	case	is	set	up,	the	amount	of	change	between	any	two	points	will	be	symmetric.	She	would	 then	have	 to	explain	why	 it	 is	 that	people	had	 the	 behavioural	 patterns	 appropriate	 to	 there	 being	 continuity	 of	 topic	despite	the	lack	thereof.	For	instance,	on	Ball’s	view,	we	would	have	to	account	for	people’s	argumentative	strategies	in	terms	of	something	else	than	continuity	of	topics.	If	someone	at	tn	(right	before	the	cut-off	point)	uttered	“vegetarians	eat	meat”	 and	 someone	 at	 tn+1	 (right	 after	 the	 cut-off	 point)	 took	 themselves	 to	disagree	 and	 as	 a	 response	 uttered	 “vegetarians	 do	 not	 eat	 meat”,	 we	 cannot	explain	 this	 argumentative	 strategy	 in	 terms	of	 continuity	 of	 topic.	 This	would	conflict	with	Ball’s	claim	that	continuity	of	topic	is	needed	in	order	to	account	for	agents’	 rational	 argumentative	 strategies.	 This	 seems	 like	 a	 serious	 cost	 for	 a	theory	 that	 is	 committed	 to	 explaining	 individuals’	 argumentative	 strategies	 in	terms	of	continuity	of	topics.	Further,	the	Identity	Theorist	would	not	only	have	to	explain	why	the	people	in	the	story	thought	that	they	were	having	substantial	disagreements	 between	 tn	and	 tn+1	but	 also	why	 it	 seems	 so	 sensible	 to	 us,	 the	spectators,	 to	ascribe	 substantial	disagreement	 to	 such	 individuals	without	 the	appeal	to	continuity	of	topics.		
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Due	to	the	theoretical	cost,	I	take	this	route	to	be	explanatorily	unattractive.	But	what	are	the	alternatives?	In	the	next	paragraph	I	will	consider	another	possible	–	and	potentially	more	promising	–	account	of	the	continuance-of-topic	relation,	namely	 Cappelen’s	 (2018)	 Contestation	 Theory.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 non-transitivity	of	topic	continuity	puts	some	important	restrictions	on	this	view.			
	
5.	The	Contestation	Theory	of	The	Limits	of	Revision	
Cappelen	agrees	that	continuance	of	topic	does	not	track	sameness	of	semantic	properties.	 He	 takes	 continuance	 of	 topic	 to	 be	 more	 coarse-grained	 than	sameness	of	extension	and	intension:		
Two	 sentences	 with	 different	 semantic	 contents	 (where	 semantic	content	 is	 understood	 as,	 at	 least,	 having	 the	 same	 extension	 and	intension)	can	be	used	to	say	the	same	thing,	or	to	talk	or	be	about	the	same	topic	(Cappelen	2018,	108).		
He	also	agrees	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	complex.	In	fact,	the	key	claim	of	his	Contestation	Theory	is	 that	we	cannot	give	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	 for	 continuance	 of	 topics.	 Instead,	 such	 continuity	 (or	 the	 lack	thereof)	is	to	be	established	on	a	case-to-case	basis.	
Prima	facie	this	seems	to	fit	well	with	the	observations	made	in	the	previous	part	of	 the	paper:	The	continuance-of-topic	relation	 is	 too	complex	for	us	to	make	a	clear	 distinction	 between	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 topic	 has	 been	 stable	 and	 cases	where	the	topic	has	changed.	Giving	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	in	terms	of	identity	of	some	sort	–	be	it	identity	of	concepts	or	identity	of	meaning	–	fails	to	 accommodate	 the	 intricate	 nature	 of	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation.	 The	non-transitivity	of	 topics	does,	 however,	present	 a	need	 to	qualify	 some	of	 the	claims	of	the	Contestation	Theory.	
Although	 Cappelen	 maintains	 that	 one	 cannot	 give	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	conditions	for	stability	of	topics,	he	relates	the	notion	of	topics	to	the	notion	of	
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samesaying:	“if	A	and	B	said	the	same,	then	they	are	talking	about	the	same	thing	and	 their	 topic	 is	 the	 same”	 (Cappelen	 2018,	 113).	 This	 claim	 figures	 into	 his	response	 to	 the	 Strawsonian	 challenge,	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.1.	 The	 response	“appeals	 to	 data	 about	 when	 we	 correctly	 describe	 people	 as	 having	 said	 the	
same	thing”	(Ibid.,	107).	The	argument	runs	as	follows: 
The	 first	step	 in	 this	argument	points	out	 that	A	and	B	can	samesay	each	other	using	a	 sentence	 ‘Fa’,	 even	 though	 the	extension	of	 ‘F’	 in	A’s	 speech	 differs	 from	 the	 extension	 of	 ‘F’	 in	 B’s	 speech.	 […]	 The	second	 step	 in	 the	 argument	 says	 that	 if	 samesaying	 is	 possible	despite	 differences	 in	 extension,	 then	 so	 is	 ‘talking	 about	 the	 same	topic’.	 Sameness	 of	 topic	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 samesaying	 (Ibid.,	107-108).	
The	 general	 idea,	 I	 take	 it,	 is	 that	 whenever	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 say	 that	 two	people	are	samesayers	they	are	talking	about	the	same	topic.	This	gives	us	some	guidelines	 as	 to	what	 to	 check	 for	when	we	want	 to	 assess	 (on	 a	 case-to-case	basis)	whether	or	not	two	utterances	concern	the	same	topic.	If,	 for	instance,	 it	seems	appropriate	to	say	that	the	scientist	and	the	layperson	are	saying	the	same	when	using	a	particular	term,	they	are	indeed	talking	about	the	same	topic,	and	so	we	have	a	response	to	the	Strawsonian	challenge.	This	view,	when	combined	with	the	observation	that	the	continuance-of-topic	relation	is	non-transitive,	has	some	interesting	consequences	for	the	notion	of	samesaying.		
We	may	distinguish	between	two	broad	views	on	the	nature	of	samesaying.	On	the	 one	 hand,	 we	 have	 views	 according	 to	 which	 samesaying	 is	 a	 matter	 of	similarity	 of	 contents.	 On	 the	 other,	 we	 have	 views	 according	 to	 which	samesaying	 requires	 identity	 of	 (at	 least	 some	 aspects	 of)	 content.	 The	 latter	view	 is	 defended	 by	 Cappelen	 and	 Lepore	 in	 their	 (2007).	 Here	 they	 argue	against	the	view	that	the	samesaying	locution	does	not	require	content	identity	across	 contexts.	 Cappelen	 and	 Lepore’s	 main	 argument	 against	 the	 view	 that	samesaying	is	a	matter	of	similarity	runs	as	follows:	
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Similarity	is	not	transitive.	Transitivity	is,	however,	built	into	the	'said	that'	locution.	Consider	first	(T1):		
(T1)	If	A	said	what	B	said,	and	B	said	what	C	said,	then	A	said	what	C	said.	
If,	 however,	 A	 said	 something	 similar	 to	 what	 B	 said,	 and	 B	 said	something	similar	to	what	C	said,	it	simply	doesn't	follow	that	A	said	something	 similar	 to	 what	 C	 said.	 (T1),	 according	 to	 the	 similarity	theory,	 could	 be	 false.	 Since	 T1	 can't	 be	 false,	 the	 similarity	 theory	fails.	 ‘A	 said	 that	 p’	 simply	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 same	 as	 ‘A	 said	something	similar	to	p’.	[…]	as	far	as	we	can	tell,	this	is	about	as	close	to	 a	 conclusive	 objection	 to	 the	 view	 that	 ‘A	 said	 that	 p’	means	 the	same	 as	 ‘A	 said	 something	 similar	 to	 p’	 that	 any	will	 ever	 come	 up	with.	So,	we	could	 just	end	 the	critical	discussion	here.	 (Cappelen	&	Lepore	2007,	124)	
However,	samesaying	can	only	truly	go	 ‘hand	in	hand’	with	the	continuance-of-topic	 relation	 as	 long	 as	 the	 former	 is	 also	 a	 non-transitive	 relation.	Consequently,	the	view	of	samesaying	advocated	by	Cappelen	and	Lepore	(2007)	is	not	available	to	proponents	of	Cappelen’s	Contestation	Theory.	If	we	were	to	combine	 the	 claim	 that	 samesaying	and	 continuance	of	 topics	 go	hand	 in	hand	with	 the	view	that	samesaying	requires	 identity	of	content	 this	would	result	 in	another	 version	 of	 the	 Identity	 View	 of	 topic	 continuity.	 I’ve	 shown	 that	 the	Identity	View	of	topic	continuity	fails,	and	as	a	result	the	Contestation	Theory	is	a	plausible	account	of	topic	stability	only	as	long	as	it	is	combined	with	a	similarity	account	 of	 samesaying.	 By	 adopting	 a	 similarity	 view	 of	 samesaying,	 the	contestation	theory	avoids	the	problems	posed	for	the	Identity	View.		
The	 similarity	 account	 of	 samesaying	 renders	 the	 samesaying	 relation	 non-transitive,	and	so	it	fits	well	with	how	we	would	ascribe	samesaying	in	the	case	of	‘meat’:	At	every	minor	step	along	the	way	of	the	historical	evolution	of	‘meat’	we	would	be	happy	to	ascribe	samesaying	to	an	utterance	of	“meat	is	edible”	at	tn	
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and	 an	 utterance	 of	 the	 same	 sentence	 at	 tn+1.	 Still,	 we	 would	 not	 ascribe	samesaying	to	an	utterance	of	the	sentence	in	the	17th	century	and	today.		
	
6.	Conclusion	
I	have	argued	 that	 the	continuance-of-topic	 relation	 is	non-transitive.	By	doing	this,	I	have	revealed	a	structural	problem	with	the	Identity	Account	of	stability	of	topics:	 Topic	 stability	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	 terms	 of	 transitive	 relations,	such	as	identity.		
Further,	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 paper	 show	 why	 it	 is	 wrong	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	distinction	between	cases	in	which	topic	is	preserved	and	cases	in	which	topic	is	not	preserved.	In	cases	such	as	‘meat’	the	topic	has	changed	since	the	term	was	first	 introduced.	Even	so	 there	 is	a	 chain	of	 topic-continuity	between	all	minor	evolutionary	steps	all	the	way	back	to	the	first	use	of	the	term.	
The	 upshot	 of	 these	 findings	 is	 that	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 is	 a	 lot	more	 complex	 than	 traditionally	 assumed.	More	 investigation	 into	 exactly	how	complex	 the	 relation	 is	 is	 needed.	 It’s	 possible	 that	 the	 factors	 that	 determine	whether	 or	 not	 the	 relation	 obtains	 are	 so	 complex	 that	 we	 cannot	 give	necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 the	 continuance-of-topic	 relation	 to	obtain.	Although	 there	 is	 something	unsatisfactory	with	 this	 sort	of	account,	 at	least	 it	 is	 preferable	 to	 the	 Identity	 View	 of	 topic	 stability	 in	 that	 it	 does	 not	conflict	with	the	non-transitive	nature	of	the	continuance-of-topic	relation.	
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